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The aim of this dissertation is to undertake a study of the trinitarian ecclesiology of the 
North American evangelical theologian Stanley J. Grenz (d.2005), along with his imago Dei 
theology, revisioned social trinitarianism, narrative theology, incorporation of theosis, and 
theology of triune participation. This dissertation also utilizes the hermeneutical 
philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, in conjunction with Grenz’s trinitarian ecclesiology, to 
propose a missional and hermeneutical ecclesiology. Chapter one begins with an overview 
of Grenz’s theology and a discussion of the current state of Grenz scholarship. It then 
introduces Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the self and theory of narrative identity. The chapter 
concludes with an overview of chapters two, three, and four.  
 
Chapter two traces the manner in which Grenz’s social trinitarianism and imago Dei 
theology yield a social imago. The first section overviews Grenz’s The Social God and the 
Relational Self, the social imago, the ecclesial self, his notion of ecclesial eschatological 
prolepsis, and his theology of triune participation. The second section responds to key 
criticisms of social trinitarianism, discusses Grenz and Ricoeur on the relational self, and 
outlines the manner in which Grenz’s theology of theosis and triune participation “in 
Christ” and through the Spirit yields an ecclesially oriented communal theo-anthropology. 
The final section takes up Grenz’s social imago and triune participation in relation to 
female/male mutuality in ecclesial participation and community. 
 
Chapter three discusses Grenz’s narrative theology and the development of a narrative 
imago. The first section overviews Grenz’s The Named God and the Question of Being and 
his development of the narrative of the divine name as the saga of the triune God, his 
further use of theosis, and the narrative imago arising within storied participation “in 
Christ” through the Spirit. The second section examines the continuity of Named God with 
Social God and argues that Grenz presents a revisioned social trinitarianism. The second 
section also considers Grenz and Ricoeur on the narrative self and proposes that Grenz’s 
ecclesial theo-anthropology now becomes a cruciform Christo-anthropology. The third 
section takes up the narrative imago and female/male mutuality and cruciformity as it 
arises from the ecclesial relation of storied and communal theotic triune participation. 
 
Chapter four treats the development of a Grenzian ecclesial imago and proposes a 
missional and hermeneutical ecclesiology. The first section presents Grenz’s ecclesiology 
as it is oriented towards mission and the connection of theosis, triune participation, and 
ecclesia. This section then proposes a missional grammar for the church as God’s ecclesial 
hermeneutics of community. The second section discusses potential charges of 
ecclesiological foundationalism, considers Grenz and Ricoeur on the summoned self, and 
extends Grenz’s theo-anthropology and Christo-anthropology into a missio-anthropology. 
The third section considers the mutuality and cruciformity of ecclesial “male and female” 
relation “in Christ” and through the Spirit, manifest in ecclesial friendship and hospitality, 
as the coming-to-representation and hermeneutics of community of the triune God. The 
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A Personal Journey 
Stanley Grenz (1950–2005) was a pre-eminent, provocative, and prolific North 
American evangelical theologian at the time of his untimely death in March 2005. My first 
encounter with Grenz’s theology was in 1996 as an undergraduate religion major at 
Wayland Baptist University (WBU) in Plainview, Texas. At this point in time, though, I did 
not engage his thought or theological vision deeply. This would change in dramatic 
fashion in the early 2000s. After spending two years at Southwestern Baptist Theological 
Seminary (1998–2000) in Ft. Worth, my family and I returned to Plainview for me to 
complete my first theological Masters degree at WBU. This proved to be a critical season in 
my theological development in which, through the influence of my major theology 
professor at WBU, Fred Meeks, I rediscovered Grenz, in particular his Theology for the 
Community of God and Primer on Postmodernism, and shortly thereafter his The Social God 
and the Relational Self.1 
My own life situation contributed significantly to my investment in Grenz’s 
theology. Upon returning to Plainview, my wife and I were grieving our first miscarriage, 
and would ultimately lose three babies total to miscarriage (1998, 2001, 2004) and suffer a 
failed adoption (2003). The theological propositionalism I was raised in proved to be ill-
equipped to handle the grief I was experiencing. During this time, I found Grenz’s writings 
marked by a definite pastoral quality as they acted as a balm in the midst of my grief. 
Grenz wrote as a theologian with the heart of a pastor, a quality extending from the 
ecclesial nature of his theology. Grenz’s theology resonated not only academically, but also 
became spiritually and practically formative. For Grenz, theology is not only concerned 
with establishing proper and correct belief, but exists as a servant to the church as it 
pursues its mission and mutual life “in Christ” and through the Spirit within in its 
particular context. Not only this, but in Grenz’s estimation, any kind of Christian theology 
must be properly trinitarian. Thus I was captured by a trio of themes: ecclesial 
participation in the divine triune life, the need for theology to be thoroughly trinitarian in 
                                                             
1 TCG; SGRS; and Stanley J. Grenz, A Primer on Postmodernism (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1996). 
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shape, and a distinctly trinitarian spirituality. It is a testimony to his character and spirit 
that those sympathetic to and critical of Grenz will say he was their friend. This gives me 
hope that he would have called me a friend as well. Grenz’s posture exhibited a 
generousness of which we are in dire need in these times of troubling tribalism. I regret 
that I was never able to meet him in person. Grenz has been not only my foremost 
theological influence but a mentor from afar.  
In addition to the need for theology to be thoroughly and properly trinitarian, 
Grenz also proved a turning point for me in conceiving of theology as necessarily practical, 
ecclesial, constructive, and related to ethics at every turn. As well, in the midst of 
reconsidering the inherited naïve foundationalism uncritically accepted from my 
Southern Baptist roots, I discovered great promise in Grenz’s proposal for doing theology 
in a postfoundationalist mode and his use of narrative theology.2 I was aided further in my 
theological development with the discovery of Paul Ricoeur during my Master of Divinity 
studies at Logsdon Seminary in Abilene, Texas in 2007. My major theology professor at 
Logsdon, Dan Stiver, is a Ricoeur scholar and through him I was introduced to Ricoeur. 
The first Ricoeur book I ever read was The Symbolism of Evil3 while doing research for a 
course on theodicy. I found deep resonance here due to my previous (and even 
continuing) experience with grief. As I studied more of Ricoeur,4 I found as well that his 
hermeneutical philosophy and philosophical anthropology, with its emphasis on narrative 
and the social nature of the self, proved a natural complement to the ethos of Grenz’s 
theology. I became convinced these Ricoeurian themes offered great promise in 
conjunction with Grenz’s own emphasis on narrative, communal theological 
anthropology, and the ecclesial self.  
                                                             
2 See for example Grenz’s articulation in BF. 
3 Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson Buchanann (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1969). 
4  At this stage I was reading Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992); Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, trans./ed. John B. 
Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, 
and Imagination, trans. David Pellauer, ed. Mark I. Wallace (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1995); and Dan 
R. Stiver, Theology After Ricoeur: New Directions in Hermeneutical Theology (Louisville, KY: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 2001).   
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During this same time my wife and I were experiencing upheaval in our ecclesial 
situation as well. Despite growing up in a conservative Southern Baptist context, our view 
on “women in ministry” changed. Not only did we come to accept the place of women in 
all positions of ecclesial service alongside men and the legitimacy of women’s ordination, 
but my wife entered seminary and we were ordained together in a dual ceremony. In the 
wake, however, we not only felt the sharp disapproval that came from our former 
Southern Baptist ecclesial home, but the continued struggle of women called to ministry 
to find pastorates and places of service, even in Texas Baptist churches.5 As a result, I 
discerned a need to rethink not merely ordination, but the inherited theological structures 
which prevent the full participation of “male and female” in the church together as bearers 
of the imago Dei, with and alongside each other. I detail all this to hopefully provide the 
reader with an indication of my impetus in writing this particular dissertation, which takes 
up a study of the shape of Grenz’s trinitarian ecclesiology in conversation with the thought 
of Ricoeur. 
 
Thesis Statement and Objectives 
Grenz was an ecclesial theologian through and through. However, the bulk of 
Grenz secondary material has been focused on Grenz’s theological method. While strides 
have been made in recent years at more sensible evaluations of his method and 
reorienting the study of Grenz toward his trinitarian focus, no one has produced a full-
length monograph on his ecclesiology.6 This dissertation exists then, to discern the shape 
of Grenz’s burgeoning trinitarian ecclesiology and the attendant implications for “male 
and female” as the imago Dei and a constructive missional theology for ecclesial witness in 
the contemporary context. This study will be structured by the overarching matrix of 
Trinity, narrative, and mission and will be carried out through an exploration of Grenz’s 
                                                             
5 On the state of women ministers in North American Baptist life, see the series of studies from 
2005 to 2015 at www.bwim.info/state-of-women-in-baptist-life/ [Accessed: 28 February 2017]. As well, the 
Review and Expositor 110.1 (Winter 2013) issue was on the “current status of Baptist women in ministry.” See 
in particular Eileen R. Campbell-Reed, “Baptists in Tension: The Status of Women’s Leadership and Ministry, 
2012,” 49–64 and Tracy Hartman, “Already but Not Yet: The Status of Women Baptist Pastors,” 65–76. 
6 See the discussion on secondary Grenz scholarship in chapter one of this dissertation. 
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revisioned and strengthened social trinitarianism,7 narrative theology, and theological 
anthropology in conversation with Ricoeur’s hermeneutical philosophy. All this is in 
pursuit of a constructive proposal for church, gender, and mission that stands in creative 
fidelity with Grenz which I am calling a “hermeneutical ecclesiology.” 
Toward the successful accomplishment of this purpose, this dissertation has these 
five stated objectives:  
1.   This dissertation aims to demonstrate the coherence and interdependence of 
Grenz’s ecclesiology, revisioned social trinitarianism, narrative theology, and 
imago Dei theological anthropology, along with their connection to Grenz’s notion 
of theosis and theology of triune participation. 
 
2.   This dissertation, in keeping with Grenz’s own contextual theological method, 
aims to appropriate and resource in a critical manner Grenz’s engagement with 
postmodernism, ecclesiology, and wider theology as a contemporary missional 
theology.8 
 
3.   This dissertation aims to present and study Grenz’s “mutualist”9 views on gender 
relations as they are developed through his discussion of “male and female” in 
relation to the imago Dei, and the implications for church and mission. A major 
task of my proposal will be an explication and extension of Grenz’s relational and 
narrative imago Dei theology, particularly with respect to gender.10 The subject of 
                                                             
7 Note however the view in Jason S. Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz (London: 
Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2013), in particular 87–120, that RTG and NGQB indicate a move “beyond” the social 
Trinity. This dissertation argues contrary to Sexton on this point. 
8 See this done already in some measure in John R. Franke, “Faith Seeking Understanding in a 
Postmodern Context: Stanley Grenz and Nonfoundational Theology,” Princeton Theological Review 12.1. 
(Spring 2006), 17–22; Franke, The Character of Theology: An Introduction to Its Nature, Task, and Purpose – A 
Postconservative Evangelical Approach (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2005); and Franke’s afterword to 
RTC, 361–9. 
9 In the terms of the evangelical gender debate, Grenz would be more widely known as an 
“egalitarian.” (Stanley J. Grenz and Denise Muir Kjesbo, Women in the Church: A Biblical Theology of Women 
in Ministry (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 1995), 17–18) However, the descriptors “mutualist” or “complementarity 
without hierarchy” are similar and also resonate with his approach. See Scot McKnight, The Blue Parakeet: 
Rethinking How You Read the Bible (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2008), 158–61, 233–4 for his preference of 
“mutuality” rather than “egalitarian.” See also the subtitle to Robert W. Pierce and Rebecca Merrill Groothuis, 
eds., Discovering Biblical Equality: Complementarity Without Hierarchy, Second edition (Downers Grove, IN: 
IVP Academic, 2005) of which Grenz contributed the essay, “Biblical Priesthood and Women in Ministry,” 
272–86. 
10 Grenz states: “This [social/communal] understanding of the divine image constitutes a strong 
foundation for affirming the participation of men and women in all areas of church life. . . . Because men and 
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gender relations was contentious in Grenz’s evangelical context when he was 
writing and remains contentious.11 As well, the subject of “gender” could occupy a 
number of dissertations from a variety of vantage points on its own. However, 
while the approach taken needs some circumscription, a dissertation on Grenz’s 
ecclesiology cannot rightly avoid Grenz’s rendering of the relation of male and 
female, interwoven as this is with his revisioned social trinitarianism, imago Dei 
theology, and sexual ethics.12 For this reason, this dissertation seeks to approach 
the subject of gender as it arises as an implicated subject under the wider scope of 
ecclesiology in Grenz’s theology,13 indicated in the title of this study where gender 
is situated between church and mission.14 
 
4.   This dissertation aims to develop a hermeneutical ecclesiology in trinitarian, 
narrative, and missional perspectives that stands in creative fidelity with Grenz. 
The choice of the hermeneutical metaphor in relation to ecclesiology takes partial 
inspiration from a programmatic statement of Stanley Hauerwas concerning his 
political ecclesiology: “The church does not have a social ethic; the church is a 
social ethic.”15 Extending the logic of his maxim in relation to a missional 
ecclesiology, Hauerwas also states, “[T]he church does not have a mission, but 
                                                             
women have unique contributions to make, the church must value the contributions of both sexes to the 
fulfillment of its task.” (Women in Ministry, 172, emphasis mine) See also SE, 253–4. 
11 For evidence the evangelical gender debate is currently live, see Bruce A. Ware and John Starke, 
eds., One God in Three Persons: Unity of Essence, Distinction of Persons, Implications for Life (Wheaton, IL: 
Crossway, 2015) as a recent collection of essays which argue for a male-female hierarchy. See also Michael F. 
Bird and Robert Shillaker, “Subordination in the Trinity and Gender Roles: A Response to Recent 
Discussion,” in The New Evangelical Subordinationism? Perspectives on the Equality of God the Father and God 
the Son, eds. Dennis W. Jowers and H. Wayne House (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2012), 288–310 and 
Emily Louise Zimbrick-Rogers, “‘A Question Mark Over My Head’: Experiences of Women ETS Members at 
the 2014 ETS Annual Meeting,” A Question Mark Over My Head: The Experience of Women in the Evangelical 
Academy (Christians for Biblical Equality, Special Edition, 2015), 4–13. 
12 The subject of gender relations comprised a longstanding interest for Grenz. He published SE 
originally in 1990. Eleven years later he published SGRS, which treats many of the same themes in relation to 
the social Trinity, imago Dei, and ecclesial self. See chapter seven in SGRS (267–303) for a particularly 
concentrated discussion. 
13 See this approach in Stanley J. Grenz, “Anticipating God's New Community: Theological 
Foundations for Women in Ministry,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 38.4 (December 1995), 
595–611; Grenz, Women in the Church; and Grenz, “Theological Approaches for Male-Female Relationships,” 
in Christian Perspectives on Gender, Sexuality, and Community, ed. Maxine Hancock (Vancouver, BC: Regent 
College Publishing, 2003), 83–101. 
14 In keeping with the delimitation of this study, while recognizing the importance of current 
debates surrounding same-sex marriage, sexual identity/orientation, various revisionist accounts of sexuality 
and gender theory in critical discourse, and theological discussions regarding intersex conditions, these 
matters will be bracketed to the side in order to maintain the focus on female/male mutuality. 
15 Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 99. 
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rather is mission.”16 I propose that, in drawing linguistically from the field of 
hermeneutical theology, it can also be said that “the church does not simply have a 
hermeneutic; the church is God’s hermeneutic.” In brief, by this I mean the church 
is God’s way of being made known in the world, or what has elsewhere been called 
the “hermeneutics of peoplehood,”17 particularly as the “in Christ” and through the 
Spirit constituted ecclesial relation of “male and female” comprise alongside, with, 
and in relation to each other the imago Dei in ecclesial friendship, hospitality, and 
witness as an ecclesial hermeneutics of community. 
 
5.   This dissertation aims to utilize the hermeneutical philosophy of Paul Ricoeur as a 
companion to Grenz in support of this project.18 Ricoeur’s influence can be seen in 
the naming of my ecclesiological proposal as “hermeneutical.” I draw this 
description with inspiration from Ricoeur as a hermeneutical philosopher and the 
desire to utilize the promise of his hermeneutics for theology in general and 
ecclesiology in particular. Ricoeur’s influence is also seen in relation to the 
discussion of the imago Dei and a Grenzian theological anthropology, in critical 
interaction with Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the self, which he discusses as the 
narrative self and which is simultaneously an irreducibly relational self.19 The use 
of Ricoeur’s philosophical hermeneutics holds great promise as well as its own 
attendant peril. Ricoeur was a voluminous author and a seemingly indefinite 
number of theses from a variety of disciplines could be written on him. Due to the 
extensiveness of his writing, the number of subjects he touched upon 
(phenomenology, linguistics, psychoanalysis, structuralism, continental 
philosophy, analytic philosophy, biblical exegesis, hermeneutics, narrative 
identity, the self, ethics), and the substantiality of his philosophy generating 
application to multiple fields,20 this study could easily become about Ricoeur and 
                                                             
16 Stanley Hauerwas, “Beyond the Boundaries: The Church Is Mission,” in Walk Humbly with the 
Lord: Church and Mission Engaging Plurality, eds. Viggo Mortensen and Andreas Østerlund Nielsen (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 55. Emphasis original. See also David E. Fitch, The End of Evangelicalism? 
Discerning a New Faithfulness for Mission: Towards an Evangelical Political Theology (Eugene, OR: Cascade 
Books, 2011), 140–1. 
17 John H. Yoder, “The Hermeneutics of Peoplehood: A Protestant Perspective of Practical Moral 
Reasoning,” Journal of Religious Ethics 10.1 (Spring 1982), 40–67. 
18 In light of Ted Peters’ observation that Grenz’s desire was to “build a bridge between 
evangelicalism and Continental hermeneutical theology,” the use of Ricoeur in this manner seems very 
“Grenzian” and resonant with his own method. See Peters, “Stanley J. Grenz, In Memoriam,” Dialog 44.2 
(Summer 2005), 131. 
19 See Stiver, Theology After Ricoeur, 160–187 on Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the self in Oneself as 
Another. 
20 See for instance Kenneth A. Reynhout, Interdisciplinary Interpretation: Paul Ricoeur and the 
Hermeneutics of Theology and Science (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013); Greg S. Johnson and Dan R. 
Stiver, eds., Paul Ricoeur and the Task of Political Philosophy (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013); Scott 
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not Grenz if effort is not made to ensure Ricoeur is properly circumscribed. For 
this reason, I have been intentionally selective about the number of Ricoeurian 
themes resourced in this study. 
One last word in this introduction is warranted on the constructive aspect of this 
dissertation. I see my work as an extension of Grenz’s project, not in an effort to speak for 
Grenz or contend that how I explicate things would be exactly how Grenz himself would 
have done so. Rather, my aim is to further theological reflection that takes its cues from a 
Grenzian theological orientation and is fitting to an overall Grenzian theological method. 
Because Grenz’s early passing left his corpus unfinished, it is left to others who come after 
him to carry through on the intuitions of his work. In line with others who have completed 
their projects ahead of mine, I am honored, in creative fidelity to Grenz, to take my turn in 
carrying his project forward. 
                                                             
Davidson, ed., Ricoeur Across the Disciplines (London: Continuum, 2010); Dariusz Skórczewski, Andrezej 
Wierciński, and Edward Fiała, eds., The Task of Interpretation: Hermeneutics, Psychoanalysis, and Literary 
Studies (Lubin, PL: Wydawnitctwo KUL, 2009); and Annemie Halsema, and Fernanda Henriques, eds., 




FROM GRENZ TO RICOEUR:  
THEOLOGICAL GRAMMAR, HERMENEUTICAL RHYTHM, AND THE CHURCH 
 
The Current State of Grenz Scholarship 
 This first chapter gives an initial summary of Grenz and Ricoeur to set the stage for 
the remainder of the study. The first section discusses the wider scope of Grenz studies, 
traces briefly Grenz’s identity as a trinitarian, Baptist, and evangelical theologian, and ends 
with a consideration of Grenz’s trinitarian and narrative theological grammars. The 
second section provides an introduction to Ricoeur and a discussion of the peril, promise, 
and plot of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics for the theological task. The third section briefly charts 
the course for the remainder of the study. 
 
The Wider Scope of Grenz Studies 
Beginning in the early 1980s Stanley J. Grenz enjoyed a very prodigious theological 
writing career up until his death in 2005, with his last book being published posthumously. 
This section takes up a survey of primary and secondary sources related to Grenz studies. 
Though the subjects of his writings tend to overlap considerably, there are nevertheless 
several categories into which they can be organized. 
 
A Thematic Overview of Grenz’s Corpus 
Wolfhart Pannenberg – Grenz finished his PhD at the University of Munich in 1978 
with Pannenberg as his Doktorvater.1 Beginning in the 1980s Grenz produced a string of 
articles well into the 1990s on Pannenberg’s theology.2 In 1987–1988 Grenz did a year of 
                                                             
1 Following Pannenberg’s instructions to study something from his own tradition, Grenz wrote his 
dissertation on eighteenth century Baptist Isaac Backus. (Stanley J. Grenz, Isaac Backus, Puritan and Baptist: 
His Place in History, His Thought and Their Implications for Modern Baptist Theology, NABPR Dissertation 
Series 4, (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1983) 
2 See Stanley J. Grenz, “Wolfhart Pannenberg's Quest for Ultimate Truth,” Christian Century 105.26 
(September 1988), 795–8; Grenz, “Pannenberg on Marxism: Insights and Generalizations,” Christian Century 
104.27 (September 1987), 824–6; Grenz, “The Appraisal of Pannenberg: A Survey of the Literature,” in The 
Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg: Twelve American Critiques, eds. Carl E. Braaten and Philip Clayton 
(Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Publishing House, 1988), 19–52; Grenz, “Commitment and Dialogue: 
Pannenberg on Christianity and the Religions,” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 26.1 (Winter 1989), 196–210; 
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post-doctoral study with Pannenberg, the result of which was his major monograph on 
Pannenberg, Reason for Hope.3 Grenz would ultimately take a number of Pannenbergian 
themes such as postfoundationalism, the eschatological priority of the future, and the 
social Trinity and critically appropriate them into his own proposals.4 
Ecclesia and ethics – The written corpus of Grenz also evidences sustained 
attention on ethical concerns with a particular focus; namely, that of equipping the church 
in its context for proper witness to the gospel. This can be effectively called ecclesial 
ethics, which are not ethics in simply broad generalized terms, but ethics in and for the 
church.5 In addition to smaller treatments, Grenz also produced a major one volume 
treatment of ethics titled The Moral Quest, which gave a standard overview of the history 
of ethics as well as tracing his proposal for trinitarian love as the basis for a comprehensive 
Christian ethic.6 
Spirituality and piety – Grenz’s German Baptist Pietist heritage also makes itself 
known in Grenz’s writings through a number of articles and monographs that deal 
considerably with spirituality and piety, particularly as it is found in the life of the church 
                                                             
Grenz, “Pannenberg and Evangelical Theology: Sympathy and Caution,” Christian Scholar's Review 20.3 
(February 1991), 272–85; Grenz, “Sacramental Spirituality, Ecumenism, and Mission to the World: 
Foundational Motifs of Pannenberg's Ecclesiology,” Mid-Stream 30.1 (January 1991), 20–34; Grenz, “Wolfhart 
Pannenberg: Reason, Hope, and Transcendence,” The Asbury Theological Journal 46.2 (Fall 1991), 73–90; 
Grenz, “The Irrelevancy of Theology: Pannenberg and the Quest for Truth,” Calvin Theological Journal 27.2 
(November 1992), 307–11; Grenz, “‘Scientific’ Theology/‘Theological’ Science: Pannenberg and the Dialogue 
between Theology and Science,” Zygon 34.1 (March 1999), 159–66; Grenz, “Why Do Theologians Need to be 
Scientists?" Zygon 35.2 (June 2000), 331–56; Grenz, “Pannenberg, Wolfhart,” in The Oxford Companion to 
Christian Thought, eds. Adrian Hastings, Alistair Mason, and Hugh Pyper (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 509–10. 
3 Stanley J. Grenz, Reason for Hope: The Systematic Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 1990); Revised edition (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005).   
4 See also the section “The Influence of Pannenberg” in this chapter. 
5 See for example Stanley J. Grenz and Wendell J. Hoffman, AIDS: Ministry in the Midst of an 
Epidemic (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1990); Grenz, Women in the Church; Grenz, Welcoming but Not 
Affirming: An Evangelical Response to Homosexuality (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1998); 
Grenz and Roy D. Bell, Betrayal of Trust: Confronting and Preventing Clergy Sexual Misconduct, Second 
edition (Grand Rapid, MI: Baker Books, 2001); Grenz, “Christian Integrity in a Postmodern World,” in New 
Dimensions in Evangelical Thought, ed. David S. Dockery (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 1998), 394–410; and Grenz, 
“The Purpose of Sex: Toward a Theological Understanding of Human Sexuality,” in Readings in Christian 
Ethics, Volume 2: Issues and Applications, eds. David K. Clark and Robert V. Rakestraw (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker Books, 1996), 166–72.   
6 See MQ, 276–302 and Stanley J. Grenz, “Towards a Comprehensive Christian Ethic of Love,” in 
Christian Character, Virtue & Bioethics: Proceedings of the 1996 Clinical Bioethics Conference, ed. Edwin C. Hui 
(Vancouver, BC: Regent College, 1996), 179–98. 
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as the people of the triune God, evincing more of Grenz’s Baptist roots with its focus on 
the local body of Christian believers. These writings are rooted in Grenz’s Baptist inspired 
pietism even when written for a more general North American evangelical audience.7 
Postmodernism and community – One of the most enduring themes in Grenz’s 
writings from the early 1990s onward is that of community, which again reflects his basic 
Baptist ecclesial orientation. Around the same time, Grenz was a new professor at Carey 
Theological College and Regent College in Vancouver, BC. In his exposure to the new 
cultural environment of Vancouver, Grenz took an interest in postmodernism, about 
which he began to write extensively. Grenz already evinces a strong interdisciplinary 
quality in his ethical writings and this only continues in relation to his interest in 
postmodernism. Not only does Grenz bring postmodernism into contact with community 
as a theological theme,8 but these two themes together begin to permeate all his writings 
from his publishing of A Primer on Postmodernism in 1996 and thereafter. 
Theological method and epistemology – Stemming from his engagement with 
postmodernism, Grenz developed strong critiques of the modern, foundationalist 
epistemology and theological method represented within the evangelical milieu in which 
he was writing.9 Grenz published a slender book called Revisioning Evangelical Theology in 
1993, which set forth what was to become one of the central aims of his theological 
career.10 This was followed in 1994 with his one volume systematic, Theology for the 
                                                             
7 See for example Stanley J. Grenz, “Maintaining the Balanced Life: The Baptist Vision of 
Spirituality,” Perspectives in Religious Studies 18.1 (Spring 1991), 59–68; Grenz, “Belonging to God: The Quest 
for a Communal Spirituality in the Postmodern World,” The Asbury Theological Journal 54.2 (Fall 1999), 41–
52; Grenz, “Concerns of a Pietist with a PhD,” Wesleyan Theological Journal 37.2 (Fall 2002), 58–76; Grenz, 
“Christian Spirituality and the Quest for Identity: Toward a Spiritual-Theological Understanding of Life in 
Christ,” Baptist History and Heritage 37.2 (Spring 2002), 87–105; and Grenz and Jay T. Smith, Created for 
Community: Connecting Christian Belief with Christian Living, Third edition (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Academic, 2014).   
8 See this in Stanley J. Grenz, “The Community of God: A Vision of the Church in the Postmodern 
Age,” Crux 28.2 (June 1992), 19–26; Grenz, “Community as a Theological Motif for Evangelical Theology,” In 
die Skriflig 28 (September 1994), 395–411; Grenz, “Star Trek and the Next Generation: Postmodernism and the 
Future of Evangelical Theology,” in The Challenge of Postmodernism: An Evangelical Engagement, Second 
edition, ed. David S. Dockery (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2001), 75–89; Grenz, “Social God,” 70–92; 
BF; and SGRS.   
9 See Grenz’s disputations with classical foundationalist Wayne Grudem in BF, 14, 37, 50–1 and RTC, 
85, 159, 165–7, 212–3, 224. 
10 RET.   
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Community of God, which evidences Grenz’s interest in narrative and provides intimations 
of his subsequent postfoundationalism.11 In the development of his own constructive 
postfoundationalist method, Grenz focused on integrating his two primary triads: the focal 
motifs of Trinity, community, and eschatology, and the trialogue of theological sources of 
Scripture, tradition, and culture. The resultant volume was the 2001 Beyond 
Foundationalism, co-authored with John R. Franke. As well, Grenz developed substantial 
use of narrative theology in his engagement with postmodernism and the revisioning of 
evangelical theological method, an emphasis which factors heavily in his corpus from the 
mid 1990s onward.12 
Theological anthropology – The interdisciplinary nature of Grenz’s approach to 
theology is showcased in his theological anthropology, in which the imago Dei is resourced 
widely in conversation with his other categories. During the course of his theological 
development of the imago Dei, Grenz produced a strong relational ontology in 
conversation with his social trinitarianism, in which the nature of personhood consists of 
mutuality and interdependence. Grenz’s imago Dei theology, showing Pannenberg’s 
influence, is also fundamentally eschatological in nature. It evinces as well a thick 
Christological character that intertwines with Grenz’s use of narrative, as those “in Christ” 
are caught up into the story of Christ as the true imago Dei. Grenz’s thorough development 
                                                             
11 See TCG, 6–8. Interestingly, Wayne Grudem’s one volume, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to 
Biblical Doctrine (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994) was published the same year as TCG. Grudem represents 
the kind of foundationalist method Grenz found grievous. 
12 See for example RET, 71–7, 125–7, 136–9, 153–6; Stanley J. Grenz “Beyond Foundationalism: Is a 
Nonfoundationalist Evangelical Theology Possible?” Christian Scholar's Review 30.1 (Fall 2000), 57–82; Grenz, 
“Conversing in Christian Style: Toward a Baptist Theological Method for the Postmodern Context,” Baptist 
History and Heritage 35.1 (Winter 2000), 82–103; Grenz, “Articulating the Christian Belief-Mosaic: Theological 
Method after the Demise of Foundationalism,” in Evangelical Futures: A Conversation on Theological Method, 
ed. John G. Stackhouse Jr. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2000), 107–36; Grenz, “The Universality of the 
‘Jesus-Story’ and the ‘Incredulity Toward Metanarratives’,” in No Other Gods Before Me? Evangelicals and the 
Challenge of World Religions, ed. John G. Stackhouse Jr. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2001), 85–111; 
Grenz and John R. Franke, “Theological Heritage as Hermeneutical Trajectory: Toward a Nonfoundationalist 
Understanding of the Role of Tradition in Theology," in Ancient & Postmodern Christianity: Paleo-Orthodoxy 
in the 21st Century – Essays In Honor of Thomas C. Oden, eds. Kenneth Tanner and Christopher A. Hall 
(Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 2002), 215–39; Grenz, “Nurturing the Soul, Informing the Mind: The Genesis of the 
Evangelical Scripture Principle,” in Evangelicals and Scripture: Tradition, Authority, and Hermeneutics, eds. 
Vincent E. Bacote, Laura C. Miguelez, and Dennis L. Okholm (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2004), 21–
41; and Grenz, “Jesus as the Imago Dei: Image-of-God Christology and the Non-Linear Linearity of Theology,” 
Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 47.4 (December 2004), 617–28.   
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of the imago Dei as a theological resource factors heavily in this study, as can be seen in 
the chapter headings.13 
Trinitarian theology – Grenz was dissatisfied with what he viewed as the lack of 
substantial trinitarian engagement in his North American Baptist and evangelical 
context.14 After his year of study with Pannenberg, Grenz began to work on ways to 
develop the social Trinity concept more fully. At the heart of his methodological proposal 
was the conviction that the Trinity ought to lie at the structural center of the whole 
theological enterprise, permeating all parts of it in the process.15 Grenz makes use of the 
language of “divine community” as a trinitarian descriptor as early as 1985 in The Baptist 
Congregation16 and it appears in regards to the social Trinity in his 1990 Sexual Ethics.17 
Subsequently, the language of “social Trinity” and the triune God as a perichoretic 
“community of love” was present from his 1994 Theology for the Community of God 
onward.18 In this volume Grenz unveiled the burgeoning trinitarian theological method 
that would so shape the rest of his career. In this book Grenz did not begin with Scripture 
or the doctrine of revelation as was normal in evangelical systematics, choosing instead to 
foreground what he took to be theology proper – the Trinity.19 
                                                             
13 For how these themes come together in Grenz’s resourcing of the imago Dei, see Stanley J. Grenz, 
“The Imago Dei and the Dissipation of the Self,” Dialog 38.3 (Summer 1999), 182–7; Grenz, “Anticipating God's 
New Community,” 595–611; Grenz, “Theological Approaches for Male-Female Relationships,” 83–101; Grenz, 
“The Social Imago: The Image of God and the Postmodern (Loss of) Self,” in Papers of the Henry Luce III 
Fellows in Theology, Volume 6, ed. Christopher I. Wilkins (Pittsburgh, PA: Association of Theological Schools 
in the United States and Canada, 2003), 49–78; Grenz, “The Social God and the Relational Self: Toward a 
Trinitarian Theology of the Imago Dei,” in Trinitarian Soundings in Systematic Theology, ed. Paul Louis 
Metzger (London: T&T Clark, 2005), 87–100; SGRS; and NGQB, 360–73. 
14 See BF, 171; Stanley J. Grenz, “The Doctrine of the Trinity: Luxuriant Meadow or Theological 
Terminus?,” Crux 39.4 (December 2003), 15–18; and RTC, 220–1.   
15 See BF, 169–202 and RTC, 220–2. 
16 Stanley J. Grenz, The Baptist Congregation: A Guide to Baptist Belief and Practice (Valley Forge, PA: 
Judson Press, 1985), 18. 
17 SE, 48, 59, 65, 71, 84. 
18 See MQ, 206, 238–39, 261–2, 277–8, 285; TCG, 72, 76, 78, 80, 101, 112, 142, 179, 187, 243, 245, 305, 350, 
483, 489; RTC, 220–1; BF, 201; and SGRS for examples. See also Grenz’s February 2005 lecture, “Humanity: 
Personal Identity and the Quest for Home,” Session two of “Getting Back to Basics: Truth, Humanity, Church, 
and Scripture,” Critical Concerns Course, Emergent Conference, San Diego, CA (1 February 2005), 5–6, file 
‘Session2.human.ccc.wpd’ at the JRA. Here the phrase “God as the social Trinity – the divine community 
characterized by love” is used approvingly along with his imago Dei theology to describe Grenz’s own 
theological position. 
19 TCG, 24–5. 
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As indicated above, this trinitarian emphasis was evident in his theological 
methodology in Beyond Foundationalism as well as The Social God and the Relational Self, 
which showcases his development of the social Trinity in relation to his theological 
anthropology. The trinitarian focus continues on, finding its place in The Named God and 
the Question of Being, which was his contribution of a trinitarian theo-ontology. As well, 
his Renewing the Center should not be overlooked. This book generated some of the most 
strident critiques Grenz received, particularly in relation to the centrality Grenz gave to 
convertive piety within evangelical identity.20 What critics missed however was the 
thoroughgoing trinitarianism of Grenz’s theology. The confluence of Grenz’s resourcing of 
the imago Dei, his Baptist pietism, and his forays into theosis indicate that one of Grenz’s 
major contributions is a revisioned social trinitarianism, which entails nothing less than 
convertive piety also revisioned as participation in the triune God (or trinitarian 
participation).21 Grenz was a pioneer in North American evangelical theology and 
represents one of the most thoroughly trinitarian proposals in recent years.22  
Ecclesiology and gender – Flowing from the previous discussions is Grenz’s focus 
on ecclesiology and gender. Grenz wrote widely on gender and sexuality, beginning with 
his Sexual Ethics book in 1990 onward. The portion of Grenz’s writing here that pertains 
most specifically to this study concerns those parts of Grenz’s corpus that examine women 
in ministry (a perennially contentious topic in Baptist and evangelical life in Grenz’s 
milieu), gender roles in church and home, and Grenz’s resourcing of a relational and 
communal conception of the imago Dei in regards to gender relations, sexuality, and 
community.23 All this factors heavily in Grenz’s development of his trinitarian theo-
                                                             
20 See for example the polemical review of D. A. Carson, “Domesticating the Gospel: A Review of 
Stanley J. Grenz’s Renewing the Center,” Southern Baptist Journal of Theology 6.4 (Winter 2002), 82–97. 
21 See Jay T. Smith, “A Generous Theology: Reinterpreting Convertive Piety as Trinitarian 
Participation in the Work of Stanley J. Grenz" (PhD Diss., Trinity College, University of Bristol, 2013). See also 
Stanley J. Grenz, “Celebrating Eternity: Christian Worship as a Foretaste of Participation in the Triune God,” 
in Semper Reformandum: Studies in Honour of Clark H. Pinnock, eds. Stanley E. Porter and Anthony R. Cross 
(Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2003), 378–91; SGRS, 323–5; and NGQB, 364–5 on Grenz’s treatment of theosis. 
22 See Jason S. Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 182–8 and Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, 
The Trinity: Global Perspectives (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007), 216 for support of this 
assessment. 
23 See for example Stanley J. Grenz, “Theological Foundations for Male-Female Relationships,” Crux 
35.3 (September 1999), 2–14; Grenz, “Anticipating God's New Community”; Grenz, “Post-Feminism and a New 
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anthropology in his Social God volume and indicates an intimate link between his 
theological anthropology and ecclesiology. Taking my cues from Grenz at this point, it is 
under the larger focus of ecclesial personhood that I will treat the theme of gender in 
relation to Grenz’s larger theological grammar. 
As noted above, Grenz’s theology has shown an ecclesial quality and concern from 
the beginning. Grenz’s second full length manuscript, after the publishing of his 
dissertation, was the slender treatment of ecclesiology in The Baptist Congregation, which 
demonstrated his initial but still as yet undeveloped interest in community as a 
theological theme.24 A significant interest for Grenz thereafter was the ecclesial 
community of God, and in a very real sense, all that Grenz wrote was for the church and its 
witness in the world. Grenz never produced another dedicated volume to ecclesiology, 
which was presumably to come as a later volume in his “Matrix” series.25 But throughout 
his engagement with postmodernism, community, and his revisioning of evangelical 
theological method, Grenz showed development in his ecclesiology from the pertinent 
section in his one volume systematic to his later essay on ecclesiology26 in The Cambridge 
Companion to Postmodern Theology in 2003 and in his development of the “ecclesial self”27 
in Social God in 2001.  
 
Grenz’s Evangelical Critics 
Though his corpus was cut short, Grenz has received significant engagement as a 
contemporary and recent theologian. Several notable unpublished doctoral dissertations 
                                                             
Gender Covenant: A Response to Elizabeth Fox-Genovese,” in Women and the Future of the Family, eds. 
James W. Skillen and Michelle N. Voll (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2000), 46–56; Grenz, “Theological 
Approaches for Male-Female Relationships”; Grenz, “Biblical Priesthood and Women in Ministry,” in 
Discovering Biblical Equality, 272–86; Grenz, Women in the Church; SE, and SGRS. 
24 Stanley J. Grenz, The Baptist Congregation: A Guide to Baptist Belief and Practice (Valley Forge, PA: 
Judson Press, 1985); Reprint edition (Vancouver, BC: Regent College Publishing, 1998). 
25 This series, called the “Matrix of Christian Theology,” of which SGRS and NGQB were the only two 
volumes, was intended to be a six volume set when completed. See SGRS, xi and Sexton, The Trinitarian 
Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 88, 143, 182. 
26 TCG, 461–570 and Stanley J. Grenz, “Ecclesiology,” in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern 
Theology, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 252–268. See also chapter 
four, footnote 3. 
27 See in particular SGRS, 312–334. 
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have been produced in which Grenz’s work features prominently.28 Some of these are 
quite critical treatments of Grenz’s theology that were very typical of a significant portion 
of the North American evangelical reception of Grenz’s critique of foundationalism and 
writings on gender. An example of this kind of response to Grenz’s views on gender can be 
seen in Peter Schemm’s “North American Evangelical Feminism and the Triune God,” 
which features a substantial critique of Grenz and its own subordinationist proposal in 
contrast.29 An example of an early considerably skeptical treatment of Grenz’s theological 
method is “Revising Evangelical Theological Method in the Postmodern Context: Stanley J. 
Grenz and Kevin Vanhoozer as Test Cases” by Chauncey Everett Berry. In this study, while 
his presentation is more favorable toward Vanhoozer’s approach, Berry ultimately still 
finds both Grenz and Vanhoozer problematic and mounts an attempt at “clearing the 
theological fog regarding postconservative evangelicalism.”30 However, the most 
prominent critique of Grenz’s theological method and engagement with postmodernism is 
probably the collection of essays titled Reclaiming the Center. Filled with considerable 
harsh polemic, this book was a strident response to Grenz’s Renewing the Center and 
postconservative theology. With the publication of this book, Grenz received the dubious 
                                                             
28 See Jay T. Robertson, “Evangelicalism’s Appropriation of Nonfoundational Epistemology as 
Reflected in the Theology of Stanley J. Grenz” (PhD Diss., Mid-America Baptist Theological Seminary, 2002); 
Evan C. Lenow, “Community in Ethics: A Comparative Analysis of the Work of Thomas Aquinas and Stanley 
J. Grenz” (PhD Diss., University of Liverpool, 2007); James D. Hoke, “Examining the Concept of Truth in 
Stanley Grenz’s Theology: Assessing its Influence on Emerging Evangelicals” (PhD Diss., Trinity Theological 
Seminary, 2008); Darrell Richard Jackson, “The Discourse of ‘Belonging’ and Baptist Church Membership in 
Contemporary Britain: Historical, Theological and Demotic Elements of a Post-Foundational Theological 
Proposal” (PhD Diss., University of Birmingham, 2009); Daniel K. Magnuson, “Postconservative Evangelical 
Theology in a Postmodern Context: Three Proposals” (PhD Diss., Luther Seminary, 2010); Julia P. Langdal, 
“The Fellowship of the Self and Community: Applying Object Relations Theory and Trinitarian Theology in a 
Clinical Case Study” (DPsy Diss., Fuller Theological Seminary, 2011); Laurie A. Mellinger, “Teaching Theology 
as a Christian Spiritual Practice: The Example of Stanley J. Grenz” (PhD Diss., Catholic University of America, 
2010); and Matthew Scott Wireman, “The Self-Attestation of Scripture as the Proper Ground for Systematic 
Theology” (PhD Diss., The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2012). 
29 Peter R. Schemm, “North American Evangelical Feminism and the Triune God: A Denial of 
Trinitarian Relational Order in the Works of Selected Theologians and an Alternative Proposal” (PhD Diss., 
Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2001).   
30 Chauncey Everett Berry, “Revising Evangelical Theological Method in the Postmodern Context: 
Stanley J. Grenz and Kevin J. Vanhoozer as Test Cases” (PhD Diss., The Southern Baptist Theological 
Seminary, 2003). The quote comes from the major section heading on 234. 
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honor of having an ensemble cast of fourteen traditionalist North American evangelical 
scholars join forces to rebut his theology.31 
 
Monographs on Grenz’s Method 
The two most recent volumes on Grenz’s theological method, though, are of higher 
quality and offer more balanced and appreciative appraisals. Steven Knowles’ Beyond 
Evangelicalism examines Grenz’s theological method more thoroughly within the post-
liberal matrix influenced by George Lindbeck, with reference to Grenz’s epistemological 
trialogue of sources. Though claiming that Grenz’s postfoundationalism moves Grenz 
“beyond evangelicalism” such that he has become “post-evangelical,” Knowles 
nevertheless produces an appreciative treatment of Grenz and concludes Grenz has 
contributions he can make to traditional evangelicalism in a postmodern context.32 
However, a key weakness of his study is that he is so intent on treating Grenz through the 
lens of the postmodern critique, and its attendant effects on Grenz’s epistemological 
method, that he misses key theological themes. Perhaps most significantly, Knowles 
considers Grenz’s most recent works minimally, and so fails to grasp adequately the 
thoroughly trinitarian nature of Grenz’s project. One effect of this oversight is that he is 
ultimately unable to discern Grenz’s intent to develop a trinitarian theo-epistemology.33 
Brian Harris’ The Theological Method of Stanley J. Grenz seeks to treat Grenz as a 
theologian more thoroughly. Harris offers immediate positives in his study both as a 
Baptist theologian himself and through his strong awareness and deep grasp of Grenz’s 
evangelical context. Harris evaluates Grenz as to whether or not he has accomplished a 
legitimately postfoundational theological method that effectively revisions evangelical 
theology. Harris remains a sympathetic critic of Grenz, but nevertheless concludes 
                                                             
31 Millard J. Erickson, Paul Kjoss Helseth, and Justin Taylor, eds., Reclaiming the Center: Confronting 
Evangelical Accommodation in Postmodern Times, (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2004). See the generous 
reply to Carson’s polemic (cited in footnote 20 above) in Stanley J. Grenz, “Toward an Undomesticated 
Gospel: A Response to D. A. Carson,” Perspectives in Religious Studies 30.4 (Winter 2003), 455–61.   
32 Steven Knowles, Beyond Evangelicalism: The Theological Methodology of Stanley J. Grenz, 
(Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2010).   
33 See Smith, “A Generous Theology,” 6, 111 for support. See also Jason S. Sexton, “Review of Beyond 
Evangelicalism: The Theological Methodology of Stanley J. Grenz,” Evangelical Quarterly 83.1 (2011), 84–8 for a 
particularly trenchant review of Knowles. 
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(contrary to Knowles) that Grenz retains a “soft” or “chastened” foundationalism.34 
However, there are two main issues with Harris’ treatment. A curious feature is that Harris 
attempts to analyze the application of Grenz’s theological method most fully laid out in 
his 2001 Beyond Foundationalism by judging it against a book published before 2001 – 
Grenz’s 1998 Welcoming but not Affirming – rather than examining publications produced 
closer to or after Beyond Foundationalism. An analysis and critique of Grenz’s theological 
method as applied to his ethics is wholly legitimate and warranted by Grenz’s own 
approach to theology. The result of Harris’ approach, though, is that his study lacks 
substantial consideration of Grenz’s most mature theology.35 Another weakness is that, 
similar to Knowles, the question remains whether Harris’ study shows sufficient grasp of 
Grenz’s trinitarian theological grammar and desire to develop a fully trinitarian theo-
epistemology in his revisioning of evangelical theology.36 Both Harris and Knowles, it 
seems, underestimate the centrality of the Trinity in Grenz’s theology. 
 
Recent Trinitarian Reorientations 
Into this situation Jason Sexton offers his volume, The Trinitarian Theology of 
Stanley J. Grenz, which is the first full length monograph to take up the thoroughgoing 
trinitarian nature of Grenz’s theology.37 Sexton’s book has several strengths, among them 
being tremendously comprehensive research, a clearly demonstrated and adequate 
understanding of Pannenberg’s influence on Grenz, and establishing Grenz as a pioneer in 
contemporary North American evangelical trinitarian theology. Despite these strengths 
                                                             
34 See Brian S. Harris, The Theological Method of Stanley J. Grenz: Constructing Theology from 
Scripture, Tradition, and Culture (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2011); Harris, “Stanley Grenz’s 
Theological Method: Revisioning Evangelical Theology or Business as Usual,” in Gospel, Truth, and 
Interpretation: Evangelical Identity in Aotearoa New Zealand, eds. Tim Meadowcroft and Myk Habets 
(Auckland, NZ: Archer Press, 2011), 241–65; and Harris, “Why Method Matters: Insights from the Theological 
Method of Stanley J. Grenz,” Crucible 2.1 (November 2009), 1–14. 
35 The most obvious other choice from a theological ethics perspective would have been SGRS (like 
BF, published in 2001), or perhaps a more in depth and sustained comparison of the earlier Welcoming but 
Not Affirming with the later SGRS. Such an approach would seem to find support in the praise of SGRS 
offered in Anthony C. Thiselton, The Hermeneutics of Doctrine (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007), 131. 
36 Smith, “A Generous Theology,” 111. 
37 Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz. See also my review of Sexton’s monograph, 
Russell L. Almon, “Review of The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz by Jason S. Sexton,” Review and 
Expositor 111.2 (May 2015), 344–5.   
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however, his work does show some weaknesses. These being, the neglect of the theme of 
convertive piety in Grenz’s theology in relation to his trinitarianism, the lack of 
understanding of Grenz as a properly narrative theologian by treating him as a 
“systematic” “soft-foundationalist” without due attention to Grenz’s own self-definition 
over against other classically foundationalist systematic proposals in his context,38 and the 
curious contention that Grenz in his later career was moving “beyond” and away from the 
social Trinity.39 Despite these weaknesses, Sexton’s book has great value as the first to give 
Grenz’s trinitarian theology the explicit attention it deserves.  
The most recent study though, is perhaps the most significant and insightful into 
Grenz’s theology thus far. Jay Smith, who was Grenz’s teaching assistant for several years 
and at the time of his death, has produced his 2013 PhD dissertation on Grenz’s 
reinterpretation of convertive piety as trinitarian participation called “A Generous 
Theology.”40 Smith’s study is helpful in elucidating how Grenz positioned himself in 
relation to his evangelical critics, his evangelical context at large, and how he wanted to 
revision evangelical theology. Smith’s work gives substantial analysis of Grenz’s use of 
postmodernism, his critique of foundationalism, the influence of Pannenberg, and two 
substantial chapters on Grenz’s thoroughgoing trinitarianism. Additionally though, Smith 
is also the first to elucidate the centrality of convertive piety, not only as a thread through 
the whole of Grenz’s theology in general, but its specific reinterpretation and integration 
into Grenz’s social trinitarianism as “trinitarian participation” as well.41 As such, Smith’s 
study comprises a vital trinitarian reorientation to the current state of Grenz studies. 
                                                             
38 For example, Grenz’s defining of his own approach and theological method in BF, 14, 37, 50–51, 
253 and RTC, 212–13 in specific contrast to the classically foundationalist systematics of Wayne Grudem, 
whose one volume textbook, Systematic Theology, still retains great popularity in the States.   
39 This contention is curious given Grenz’s February 2005 lecture, “Humanity: Personal Identity and 
the Quest for Home,” which Sexton himself cites. (The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 103) Here, the 
phrase “God as the social Trinity – the divine community characterized by love” (“Humanity,” 5–6) is used 
approvingly by Grenz. Sexton suggests this use of “social Trinity” is an “exception” to Grenz’s purported move 
beyond the social Trinity, observing that elsewhere in his lecture notes Grenz refers to the Trinity as “the 
divine community of love.” However, Sexton’s claim neglects the fact that phrases such as “divine 
community” and “divine community of love” are themselves references to a Grenzian social trinitarianism. 
40 Jay T. Smith, “A Generous Theology: Reinterpreting Convertive Piety as Trinitarian Participation 
in the Work of Stanley J. Grenz.”   
41 See Smith, “A Generous Theology” and Jay T. Smith, “A Trinitarian Epistemology: Stanley J. Grenz 
and the Trajectory of Convertive Piety,” Pacific Journal of Baptist Research 6.1 (April 2010), 44–64.   
 19 
Though Grenz’s corpus remained unfinished, his extant works offer theological 
wisdom for the church’s witness in a number of areas: theological method, epistemology, 
engagement with postmodernism, spirituality and the Christian life, gender and sexuality 
in the church and home, and the centrality of the Trinity to the whole theological edifice. 
It can be seen that early critiques of Grenz maintained an excessive focus on what was 
considered to be his controversial views on gender roles, his engagement with 
postmodernism, and especially his revisioning of foundationalist evangelical theological 
method. The valuable studies by Knowles and Harris on Grenz’s methodology are both 
more appreciative and balanced in their assessments, yet both also continue the neglect of 
the role of the Trinity in Grenz’s theology. This state of affairs has received a crucial 
reorientation with the introduction of Sexton’s recent treatment of Grenz’s trinitarian 
theology, the first volume to do so, though with the aforementioned weaknesses. Jay Smith 
has offered an even more acute corrective to the burgeoning field of Grenz studies, which 
traces not only Grenz’s relationship to his evangelical critics and social trinitarianism, but 
the threading of convertive piety all throughout Grenz’s theology, and in particular the 
relationship of his pietism and trinitarian participation. Though the ecclesial focus of 
Grenz’s theology has been noted by others, the above analysis indicates the need for a new 
appraisal of Grenz’s views on gender relations as well as a more substantial and dedicated 
treatment of his ecclesiology.42 It is to these ends that I engage this study of Grenz in 
conversation with Paul Ricoeur. 
 
Grenz: Trinitarian, Baptist . . . Evangelical? 
It is prudent at this point, before going on to a consideration of Grenz’s theological 
grammar, to draw brief attention to some of the essential features of Grenz’s theological 
                                                             
42 Aside from recognitions that Grenz did theology for the sake of the church, the only dedicated 
treatment to Grenz’s ecclesiology I can find is Jason S. Sexton, “Stanley Grenz’s Ecclesiology: Telic and 
Trinitarian,” Pacific Journal of Baptist Research 6.1 (April 2010), 20–43. The need for a fresh examination of 
Grenz’s ecclesiology is also demonstrated by Reclaiming the Center. In its main sections, this collection of 
essays takes up “Truth, Foundationalism, and Language” (part 2), “Theological Method” (part 3), and 
“Evangelical Historiography” (part 4). In chapter nine of RTC, “Evangelical Theology and the Ecclesiological 
Center,” Grenz critiques the “para-church” nature of evangelicalism and laments the lack of a substantial 
evangelical ecclesiology. The sparse mention of Grenz’s ecclesiology in Reclaiming the Center is interesting, 
or perhaps telling, in contrast. 
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identity that are significant in relation to this study; namely, Grenz as a trinitarian, Baptist, 
and evangelical theologian. These features will be discussed through a consideration of the 
influence of Pannenberg for Grenz, the importance of Grenz’s pietism, and the question of 
Grenz’s status as an evangelical. 
 
The Influence of Pannenberg 
The influence Pannenberg had on Grenz cannot be overestimated. Grenz went on 
to adapt creatively and revision several Pannenbergian themes. There are three in 
particular with which we are concerned to introduce here that will be traced more fully 
throughout this study in relation to Grenz’s ecclesiology: postfoundationalism, 
Pannenberg’s priority of the future, and the social Trinity.43 Firstly, Pannenberg through 
much of his career, due to his search for universal and verifiable truth, was considered an 
epistemological foundationalist.44 However, F. LeRon Shults has vigorously challenged this 
assessment, arguing instead that Panneberg’s emphasis on coherence qualifies him as a 
postfoundationalist.45 At the heart of Pannenberg’s epistemological method is the notion 
of the coherence theory of truth, that all theological truth must cohere and that it must do 
so in the triune God. Grenz at this point critically adapts Pannenberg’s notion of 
coherence into his own postfoundationalist epistemology and theological method.46 
Secondly, Grenz regarded Pannenberg as one of the key “theologians of hope” and 
critically engaged Pannenberg’s eschatology and the notion of the ontological priority of 
the future.47 From this engagement Grenz develops his own notions of eschatological 
realism, prolepsis, and eschatology as the orienting motif in his theology.48 As well, Grenz 
combines the idea of eschatological prolepsis and community in relation to the church, 
such that the church is not simply “community” but becomes more fully the proleptic, 
                                                             
43 On Pannenberg’s influence, see the chapter length treatments in Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology 
of Stanley J. Grenz, chapters two and three, and Smith, “A Generous Theology,” chapters three and four. 
44 This is the observation of Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 34. 
45 F. LeRon Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology: Wolfhart Pannenberg and the New 
Theological Rationality (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999). 
46 BF, 43–6, 50 and RTC, 203–7, 213, 218. 
47 Stanley J. Grenz and Roger E. Olson, Twentieth-Century Theology: God and the World in a 
Transitional Age (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 1992), 170–2. 
48 RTC, 28, 254–6. 
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eschatological community of God, anticipating the final consummation of God’s program 
for creation.49 Thirdly, what may be the most important Pannenbergian influence involves 
Grenz’s critical adaption of Pannenberg’s trinitarian theology, which Grenz saw as setting 
the stage for those who followed. Grenz himself states that Pannenberg’s “elevation of the 
social Trinity to the center of theology provides the foundation for a move to community, 
but he leaves to others the challenge of developing the idea itself.”50 Grenz it seems took 
this challenge upon himself, as this is what he set about doing, creatively adapting the 
doctrine of the social Trinity and applying it to his theology of the imago Dei, relationality, 
community, and ultimately for our purposes, the church.51 
 
The Importance of Pietism 
If Pannenberg’s influence in catapulting Grenz to his pursuit of a thoroughgoing, 
fully trinitarian theology is where we see a particular resonance between the two 
theologians, it is on the subject of pietism where we see a curious contrast. Pannenberg 
was highly critical of pietism and denounced it as harmful to theology and of the same 
vein as a Schleiermachian subjectivism or even conservative experiential religion.52 Grenz 
in turn saw Pannenberg as favoring rationality and reason over religious piety in the 
church’s public theology.53 However, it is the critical convergence of Grenz’s heritage of 
Baptist pietism, represented by the experiential category of convertive piety, and the 
                                                             
49 See RTC, 255, 291, 324, 332 and SGRS, 19, 217, 235, 281, 324, 331, 336. See also Smith, “A Generous 
Theology,” 135, 169, 175, 227 and Sexton, “Stanley Grenz’s Ecclesiology: Telic and Trinitarian.” 
50 Grenz, “The Irrelevancy of Theology, 311. 
51 See especially SGRS. 
52 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 3 vols., trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (London: T&T 
Clark International, 2004), 1:42–8. See Grenz’s take on Pannenberg’s attitude toward pietism in Stanley J. 
Grenz and Edward L. Miller, Fortress Introduction to Contemporary Theologies (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress 
Press, 1998), 127–30. Grenz’s evangelical critics were also fond of finding the shadow of Friedrich 
Schleiermacher in Grenz’s pietism. Smith calls this the “Schleiermachean Shibboleth,” which is used along 
with “postmodern” to mean “less than evangelical” and to establish a false equivalency between Grenz and 
Schleiermacher/liberalism. See Smith, “A Generous Theology,” 68–70, 94. See also Glen G. Scorgie and Phil C. 
Zylla, “A Tale of Two Pietist Theologians: Friedrich Schleiermacher and Stanley Grenz,” in Revisioning, 
Renewing, Rediscovering the Triune Center: Essays in Honor of Stanley J. Grenz, eds. Derek J. Tidball, Brian S. 
Harris, and Jason S. Sexton (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2014), 283–302 for a comparison of the similarities 
and differences between Grenz and Schleiermacher and a defense of Grenz. For Grenz’s own critique of 
Schleiermacher, see Grenz, Twentieth-Century Theology, 39–51; RET, 70, 138, 140, 149; and BF, 10, 33–4, 35, 37, 
70, 107, 150, 171, 185–6, 188. Cf. Nancey Murphy, Beyond Liberalism and Fundamentalism: How Postmodern 
Philosophy Set the Theological Agenda (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1996), 22–8. 
53 Grenz, Twentieth-Century Theology, 197–8. 
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trinitarianism he encountered and adapted from Pannenberg that creatively worked to 
influence Grenz’s theology through to the end.  
The importance of Grenz’s pietism in relation to his trinitarian theology has not 
always been fully recognized in secondary Grenz scholarship. Indeed, in the most recent 
monographs on Grenz, a discernable progression is evident where only recently has the 
link between his pietism and trinitarian focus been brought out in full force. The 
treatments of Harris and Knowles both give minimal attention to Grenz’s publications 
after Beyond Foundationalism and while both show an awareness of the importance of 
Pannenberg for Grenz, they nevertheless appear not to grasp the full impact of 
Pannenberg on the role of the Trinity in Grenz’s theology. As a result, neither give the 
Trinity the place it deserves in Grenz’s theology and while both make mention of Grenz’s 
pietism, neither are able to make the connection to his trinitarian theology.54  
Into this situation, Sexton produced a much needed trinitarian reorientation to 
Grenz’s theology that stands as a great service to Grenz scholarship. Sexton additionally 
provides an acknowledgement, through the words of Jonathan R. Wilson (who shares 
Grenz’s Baptist heritage), of the role Grenz’s pietism played in strengthening his work.55 
Wilson states:  
Throughout Grenz’s work his heritage in Pietism (as embodied in the North 
American Baptist tradition) shapes and strengthens his work. This may be seen in 
his articulation of a theological method that makes room for experience, in the 
centrality of “the community of God” for his exposition of doctrine, in the primacy 
of love in his theo-ontology, and in the very full account of the Spirit in his 
doctrine of the Trinity.56 
However, despite numerous mentions of “participation” in Sexton’s treatment of Grenz’s 
trinitarian theology, he ultimately treats Grenz’s pietism only briefly in a section 
                                                             
54 See Smith, “A Generous Theology,” 136, 185, 189. The minimal treatment of Grenz’s corpus after BF 
(SGRS, RTG, and NGQB) by Harris and Knowles is the legitimate result of the focused nature of their studies. 
Even so, it should be observed Grenz made the centrality of his trinitarian focus evident even before these 
later works in TCG, BF, and RTC (as well as many journal articles). But see also the more recent positive 
review of Sexton’s case for the centrality of the Trinity for Grenz in Brian S. Harris, “Review of The Trinitarian 
Theology of Stanley J. Grenz by Jason S. Sexton,” Journal of Reformed Theology 9.4 (2015), 401–3. 
55 Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 33. 
56 Jonathan R. Wilson, “Stanley J. Grenz: Generous Faith and Faithful Engagement,” Modern 
Theology 23.1 (January 2007), 119. Cf. Roger E. Olson and Christian T. Collins Winn, Reclaiming Pietism: 
Retrieving an Evangelical Tradition (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2015), 114, 161, 171–6. 
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comparing it to Pannenberg’s spirituality.57 Because of this, Sexton is unable to bring 
together the confluence of Grenz’s emphasis on convertive piety and the Trinity. It is at 
this point that Jay Smith has offered in his study a more fully realized reorientation of 
Grenz scholarship that recognizes not only the importance of Pannenberg and convertive 
piety for Grenz, but also the creative convergence of Grenz’s pietism with his social 
trinitarianism, producing a revisioning and reinterpretation of convertive piety as itself 
“trinitarian participation.”58 
 
Which Evangelical? Whose Evangelicalism? 
Grenz admitted that he was a “pietist with a PhD”59 and furthermore he believed 
that pietism constituted a legitimate aspect of evangelical identity, even if it does not 
exhaust it. It is at this point that we see a corollary consequence to Sexton’s (lack of) 
treatment of Grenz’s pietism. One of the auxiliary aims of Sexton’s study seems to be that 
of convincing those who aren’t sure about Grenz’s theology that Grenz is a trustworthy 
evangelical.60 However, given that it is precisely on the point of Grenz’s pietism that some 
of the sharpest and most strident critiques have been made, to fail to bring Grenz’s notion 
of convertive piety into contact with his trinitarianism threatens to elide one of the most 
distinctive ways that Grenz proposed to revision evangelical theology. This is why Smith’s 
study is so important to Grenz scholarship. 
                                                             
57 For the references to “participation,” see Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 16, 
32, 62–4, 99, 105, 108–10, 113–6, 131, 135, 151–2, 155 and for the treatment of Grenz’s pietism, see 32–4. Sexton 
also mentions Grenz’s use of theosis sparsely on 17, 73–4, and 107. My suggestion is that in light of the role of 
“participation” in Grenz, Smith’s thesis of “trinitarian participation” in Grenz, and Grenz’s own overtures in 
this direction, that theosis deserves a more substantial treatment in relation to Grenz’s theology which I 
develop in this study as theotic “triune participation.” For a brief account of Grenz’s use of theosis (along 
with Clark Pinnock, Paul Fiddes, and Douglas Harink), see Mark S. Medley, “Participation in God: The 
Appropriation of Theosis by Contemporary Baptist Theologians,” in Theosis: Deification in Christian Theology, 
Volume 2, ed. Vladmir Kharlamov (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2011), 205–46. 
58 See Smith, “A Generous Theology,” 230–6 and Smith, “A Trinitarian Epistemology,” 57–64. I 
suggest Smith’s thesis at this point offers some relief to Harris’ concern that Grenz lacks sufficient emphasis 
on “conversion.” See Harris, The Theological Method of Stanley J. Grenz, 220–1. It should also be noted that 
Grenz does not merely accept his pietistic heritage uncritically, but seeks to revision it in contact with his 
trinitarian theology. 
59 Grenz, “Concerns of a Pietist with a PhD.” 
60 Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 5–10, 177–88. It should be noted that Sexton 
admits the contested nature of evangelical identity. (8–9) 
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Beginning in Revisioning Evangelical Theology, Grenz pulls his idea of convertive 
piety from evangelical historian Donald Dayton.61 While it is common for pietism to be 
denigrated as simply a product of modern individualism, Grenz saw something important 
in the pietist heritage for both evangelical identity and spirituality.62 Grenz followed this 
earlier treatment up some years later with an even more full exposition of convertive piety 
in evangelical historical identity in Renewing the Center,63 tracing evangelical history as a 
hybrid movement birthed and formed out of the productive confluence of Puritanism and 
Pietism in the eighteenth century.64 While his former work did not garner as much 
pushback, the latter volume generated vigorous and vociferous criticism. In addition to 
criticisms stemming from his reliance on Dayton, Grenz was also critiqued for his seeming 
adherence to the Rogers and McKim thesis,65 in which he was purported to place the 
lamentable dogmatism of North American evangelical fundamentalism on the back of the 
“Old Princeton” school epitomized by B. B. Warfield, Charles Hodge, and A. A. Hodge.66  
While Grenz is more nuanced than critiques of his historiography suggest, it is 
noteworthy that the strident criticisms he received play out as one might expect if his 
                                                             
61 RET, 14, 23. See also Donald W. Dayton, “The Limits of Evangelicalism: The Pentecostal Tradition,” 
in The Variety of American Evangelicalism, eds. Donald W. Dayton and Robert K. Johnston (Downers Grove, 
IL: IVP, 1991), 48. 
62 RET, chapters one and two. 
63 RTC, chapters one and two. 
64 See RTC, 52–9 on this as well as on convertive and experimental piety. See also Smith, “A 
Generous Theology,” 18–36 on Baptist conversionist spirituality and convertive piety. 
65 See RTC, 65, 69, 77, 80, 84, 85. Grenz cites in this regard, Jack B. Rogers and Donald K. McKim, The 
Authority and Interpretation of the Bible: An Historical Approach (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979), 77, 
200–23, 296–7, 304, 328–30, 333–4, 337–9, 347–8 and Jack B. Rogers, Scripture in the Westminster Confession 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1967), 425–6. 
66 See Paul Kjoss Helseth, “Are Postconservative Evangelicals Fundamentalists? Postconservative 
Evangelicalism, Old Princeton, and the Rise of Neo-Fundamentalism,” in Reclaiming the Center, 223–50. 
Smith counters with more nuance that Grenz’s assertion is “that the evolving, modern understanding of 
inerrancy came to its present form at Princeton, and that, coupled with Darby’s dispensationalism and the 
threat of a growing theological liberalism, combined to form early twentieth century fundamentalism. The 
Princeton theologians’ piety was not at issue for Grenz, nor was their codification, necessarily, of inerrancy 
per se; what was at issue for Grenz was the juxtaposition of modern inductive scientific method, Scottish 
common sense philosophy, and a desire to staunch the flow of growth of liberal Christianity. Out of this 
causal matrix came a vigorous, though logically suspect, understanding of the Bible’s authority and more 
importantly, a shift in evangelical priorities. No longer were evangelicals necessarily identified by their 
spirituality (convertive piety); after the formation of the National Association of Evangelicals in 1942, 
evangelicals were known by their affirmation of the inerrancy of Scripture and doctrinal orthodoxy.” See 
Smith, “A Generous Theology,” 52–3. 
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proposals are accurate.67 The reactions against Grenz’s revisioning and proposed renewing 
of evangelicalism demonstrate themselves the legacy of evangelicalism as a hybrid 
movement. Arguably the closest thing to a recognized taxonomy for evangelical identity is 
Bebbington’s quadrilateral:68 biblicism, crucicentrism, conversionism, and activism.69 
There is however, no central evangelical magisterium to give a definitive discernment of 
how this taxonomy is to be interpreted. Thus when Grenz’s evangelical credentials and 
identity are questioned, it becomes necessary to ask: “Which evangelical? Whose 
evangelicalism?”70 The critiques of Grenz’s evangelical critics do not place Grenz outside 
the evangelical camp,71 but rather only one expression of it and in the process give 
testimony to the fractured nature of contemporary evangelicalism.72 This is the very 
                                                             
67 See the criticisms of Helseth, “Are Postconservative Evangelicals Fundamentalists?,” 223–50; 
William G. Travis, “Pietism and the History of American Evangelicalism,” 251–80; and Chad Owen Brand, 
“Defining Evangelicalism, ” 281–304 in Reclaiming the Center. These comprise chapters nine, ten, and eleven 
respectively of “Part 4,” disputing Grenz’s evangelical historiography. See also Smith, “A Generous Theology,” 
45–57 for Smith’s delineation of evangelical history and identity and an able defense of Grenz’s evangelical 
historiography. 
68 See W. R. Ward, "Evangelical Identity in the Eighteenth Century," in Christianity Reborn: The 
Global Expansion of Evangelicalism in the Twentieth Century, ed. Donald M. Lewis (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2004), 11 who speaks of “the famous Bebbington Quadrilateral.” 
69 See David Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History from the 1730s to the 1980s 
(London: Routledge, 1989). Bebbington says, “There are the four qualities that have been the special marks of 
Evangelical religion: conversionism, the belief that lives need to be changed; activism, the expression of the 
gospel in effort; biblicism, a particular regard for the Bible; and what may be called crucicentrism, a stress on 
the sacrifice of Christ on the cross. Together they form a quadrilateral of priorities that is the basis of 
Evangelicalism.” (2–3) 
70 See Robert E. Webber, The Younger Evangelicals: Facing the Challenges of the New World (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2002) who distinguishes between “traditional evangelicals,” “pragmatic 
evangelicals,” and “younger evangelicals.” Webber places Grenz as one of the younger evangelicals, but the 
importance here is not the age of these particular evangelicals per se, but their approach to evangelical 
identity. Webber describes their development as such in chapters four through seven respectively: “History: 
From Ahistorical to Tradition,” “Theology: From Proposition to Narrative,” “Apologetics: From Rationalism to 
Embodiment,” and “Ecclesiology: From Invisible to Visible.” 
71 This is supported by Harris’ detailing of the pluriform nature of evangelicalism and his 
observation that while Grenz’s revisioning will likely not find favor among “traditionalists,” it likely will be 
effective for three groups: “younger evangelicals,” “postconservative evangelicals,” and “Pentecostal 
evangelicals.” See Harris, The Theological Method of Stanley J. Grenz, 25–52 for his study of evangelicalism and 
105, 128–9, 144, 160 for his comments regarding the effectiveness of Grenz’s revisioning among different 
groupings of evangelicals. See also Grenz’s own article, “Die Begrenzte Gemeinschaft (‘The Boundaried 
People’) and the Character of Evangelical Theology,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 45.2 (June 
2002), 301–16 which seeks to re-imagine evangelical identity through a “centered set” rather than a “bounded 
set” approach. 
72 For instance, Smith states in response to criticisms of Grenz’s historiography, “In that Grenz’s 
understanding of the historical trajectory of evangelicalism has drawn both praise and criticism, it reflects 
the fractured nature of evangelical historiography as a whole. Where on one side, Ernest Sandeen, Jack 
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division that Grenz hoped his revisioning of evangelical theology, one that placed 
theological rigor and experiential piety in close contact, could heal. 
 
Grenz’s Grammar – Motifs and Sources 
In Beyond Foundationalism, after two chapters setting the stage for shaping 
theology in a postmodern context in “Part One,” Grenz articulates a method for theology 
that he describes as moving “beyond foundationalism.” “Part Two” details his “trialogue”73 
of sources for theology: Scripture, tradition, and culture. “Part Three” outlines his triad of 
focal motifs for theology: the Trinity, community, and eschatology.74 Taken together, these 
can be seen as forming Grenz’s theological grammar, made up of what I am construing as 
his “narrative” sources and “trinitarian” motifs. This section will take up the question of 
Grenz’s postfoundationalism75 and then briefly introduce the sources and motifs. 
 
                                                             
Rogers, Donald McKim, Mark Noll, W. R. Ward and David Bebbington seek to cast an evangelical trajectory 
that has a larger role for Pietism and downplay the development of the concept of inerrancy until the late 
nineteenth century; the other side, consisting of John Woodbridge, Paul Kjoss Helseth and Iain Murray seek 
to develop an evangelical trajectory that is much narrower, with the concept of inerrancy conceived both as 
the genesis of evangelicalism and the epistemological concept at the heart of evangelicalism.” See Smith, “A 
Generous Theology,” 46–7. 
73 SGRS, x. 
74 Both triads receive more condensed treatment in RTC, chapter six, 192–225. 
75 Sexton notes what he perceives as “Grenz’s attempt to establish distance from the term 
“postfoundationalist” (The Trinitarian Theology of Stanely J. Grenz, 35) in Grenz’s “Articulating the Christian 
Belief-Mosaic.” Sexton, though, offers no defense of this, nor does he mention Grenz’s other uses of 
“nonfoundationalism,” and fails to take note of Grenz’s seeming positive use of “(post)foundational” (119) and 
“(post)foundationalist” (120) in the same article. A review of the relevant Grenzian source material (BF, RTC, 
“Beyond Foundationalism,” “Articulating the Belief Mosaic,” and “Theological Heritage as Hermeneutical 
Trajectory”) reveals ambiguity concerning whether Grenz’s theology should be called “nonfoundationalist” 
or “postfoundationalist.” He sometimes uses “nonfoundationalist,” while at other times he uses both together 
in close proximity, at times seemingly interchangeably, as well as using “postfoundationalist” approvingly in 
section headings. (RTC, 208) This produced a protest from Archie J. Spencer who complained of Grenz’s 
ambiguity in this regard. (“Culture, Community, and Commitments,” Scottish Journal of Theology 57.3 
(August 2004), 338–360) Grenz responded by acknowledging the “ambiguity of nomenclature” but did not 
seek to alleviate this ambiguity. (“The Virtue of Ambiguity: A Response to Archie Spencer,” Scottish Journal of 
Theology 57.3 (August 2004), 361–5) My judgement is that in Grenz’s view either term can legitimately be 
used of his theology. His main concern seemed to be that theological method and epistemology move 
“beyond foundationalism.” However, in line with most studies (critical and friendly) on Grenz, in sensitivity 
to concerns voiced in Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology, 31–7 of an unhelpful relativism 
attached to nonfoundationalism, taking cues from Smith, “A Generous Theology,” 90, 106–126, and 223–6, 
and in line with Grenz’s own section headings in chapter six of RTC and Grenz’s articulation of an 
“eschatological realism,” (BF, 272 and RTC, 254–6) I will refer to Grenz as a “postfoundationalist” for the 
purposes of this study. 
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Grenz and the Question of (Post)Foundationalism 
Another area of dispute is the question of foundationalism. Grenz quotes Nicholas 
Wolterstorff: “On all fronts foundationalism is in bad shape. It seems to me there is 
nothing left to do but give it up for mortally ill and learn to live in its absence.”76 The 
proposal for a postfoundationalist evangelical theology has been controversial to say the 
least. Can evangelicalism move beyond its foundationalist inheritance? The criticisms in 
response to Grenz’s postmodern turn and critique of classical foundationalism77 indicate 
that for many, a postfoundationalist evangelical theology is a category error.78 F. LeRon 
Shults, though, offers an instructive summary of Pannenberg’s theological method 
wherein he describes an ideal postfoundationalist theological method. Four couplets of 
this summary offer a succinct description of postfoundationalism which “accurately, 
though not precisely, approximate Grenz’s epistemological position.”79 They are as follows:  
(PF1): interpreted experience engenders and nourishes all beliefs, and a network of 
beliefs informs the interpretation of experience. 
(PF2): the objective unity of truth is a necessary condition for the intelligible 
search for knowledge, and the subjective multiplicity of knowledge indicates the 
fallibility of truth claims. 
(PF3): rational judgment is an activity of socially situated individuals, and the 
cultural community indeterminately mediates the criteria of rationality.  
(PF4): explanation aims for universal, transcontextual understanding, and 
understanding derives from particular contextualized explanations.80 
                                                             
76 Wolterstorff, Reason within the Bounds of Religion (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1976), 52. But see 
also the call for more careful nuance in the critiques of foundationalism in Thiselton, The Hermeneutics of 
Doctrine, 128–31. 
77 BF, 38. Grenz states, “Foundationalist epistemological proposals routinely draw from the 
metaphor of a building to conceive how human knowledge arises. Like a physical edifice, knowledge must be 
built on a sure foundation,” and then counters on the basis of the demise of foundationalism and the nature 
of the theological task, “theology can no longer model itself after the foundationalist metaphor of 
constructing an edifice.” (“Articulating the Belief Mosaic,” 110, 123) 
78 For example, see Douglas Groothuis, “Truth Defined and Defended,” 59–80; J. P. Moreland and 
Garrett DeWeese, “The Premature Report of Foundationalism’s Demise,” 81–108; and R. Scott Smith, 
“Language, Theological Knowledge, and the Postmodern Paradigm,” 109–33 in Reclaiming the Center. It may 
also be D. A. Carson’s own modernist and foundationalist doctrine of Scriptural inerrancy that prompted 
him to protest Grenz’s rejection of propositionalism, to invoke the “Schleiermachian Shibboleth,” and 
conclude: “With the best will in the world, I cannot see how Grenz’s approach to Scripture can be called 
‘evangelical’ in any useful sense.” (The Gagging of God: Christianity Confronts Pluralism (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Zondervan, 1996), 481) 
79 Smith, “A Generous Theology,” 109. 
80 Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology, 43. Important to remember is Grenz’s intention 
to develop a specifically trinitarian theo-epistemology. See Smith, “A Trinitarian Epistemology.” 
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Some recent treatments, though, contend Grenz did not successfully develop a 
postfoundationalist method, but instead remained a soft or chastened foundationalist.81 
This dissertation takes a contrasting view to these and holds Grenz to have been successful 
in forming a postfoundationalist theology. All in all, with his full corpus in view, I suggest 
the perspective that Grenz remained a soft or chastened foundationalist potentially fails to 
understand adequately Grenz’s theological method in one or more of the following four 
areas: 1) his refusal to entertain modernist and foundationalist conditions for the 
legitimization of theological claims,82 2) the way he described his method metaphorically 
(for instance, as a mosaic or web83), 3) the narrative and communitarian shape of his 
theology, and 4) flowing from these, the grammar with which he infused his theology. 
 
The Trinitarian Motifs84 
 According to Grenz, “All truly Christian local theologies are trinitarian in content, 
communitarian in focus, and eschatological in orientation.”85 With this summary of his 
motifs at the end of chapter five of Beyond Foundationalism, Grenz set the stage for the 
further explication of the Trinity as theology’s structural motif in chapter six, community 
as the integrative motif of theology in chapter seven, and eschatology as the orienting 
motif of theology in chapter eight. The second motif reflects Grenz’s long-standing 
concern for “community” as a theological category, and is visibly present as Grenz’s 
integrative motif as early as Revisioning Evangelical Theology.86 While the Trinity and 
eschatology were not present fully as motifs in Revisioning Evangelical Theology, they were 
nevertheless present in nascent form. Grenz speaks of the Trinity as the “community of 
                                                             
81 Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 35; Brian S. Harris, “Can Evangelical Theology 
Move Beyond Foundationalism: Some Insights from the Theological Method of Stanley J. Grenz,” Crucible 1.1 
(May 2008), 1–17; and Harris, The Theological Method of Stanley J. Grenz, 156–79. However, see also the 
contrasting views in Smith, “A Generous Theology,” 90, 106–126, and 223–6 and Knowles, Beyond 
Evangelicalism, 5, 83–4, 118. 
82 For example, see Grenz’s move away from the correspondence theory of truth in RTC, 177, 192–
225 and his later critique of onto-theology and development of a theo-ontology in NGQB. 
83 See Grenz, “Articulating the Christian Belief-Mosaic.” See also chapter three, footnote 13. 
84 See Harris, The Theological Method of Stanley J. Grenz, 182–214, 258–66; Knowles, Beyond 
Evangelicalism, 128–53; Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 15–17; and Smith, “A Generous 
Theology,” 186–95 for their discussions of Grenz’s motifs. 
85 BF, 166. 
86 RET, 137–62. 
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love” and connects this to the church as well as a “community of love.” Additionally, Grenz 
declares that while divine self-disclosure ultimately lies in the eschatological future, it is 
also a present reality and that the church is an eschatological community.87 The Trinity 
motif, again, was not explicitly stated in Theology for the Community of God but was 
nevertheless on display within its trinitarian structuring. Community was, again, present 
visibly as the integrative motif, or more specifically as he stated in his introduction, the 
eschatological community of the triune God.88 The trio of Trinity, community, and 
eschatology ultimately received their fullest explication in Beyond Foundationalism89 and 
went on to find their fullest application in Grenz’s corpus within his Social God and Named 
God volumes. Grenz states, “theology is ‘church dogmatics,’ and the ‘dogmatics’ of the 
Christian church must by its very nature be trinitarian.”90 As will be discussed further in 
chapter two, not only the Trinity motif, but the community and eschatological motifs as 
well are trinitarian in nature. For this reason, this triad of Grenz’s theological grammar will 
be treated as trinitarian motifs. 
 
The Narrative Sources91 
 Chapters three, four, and five respectively of Beyond Foundationalism explicated 
Grenz’s sources for theology: Scripture as the “norming norm” of theology, tradition as the 
hermeneutical trajectory of theology, and culture as the embedding context of theology.92 
                                                             
87 RET, 58, 76, 126, 129, 132, 150, 158–9, 171, 181–8. See the “community of love” references in 181–8, 
“eschatological community” in 158–9, 182–4, and “eschatological orientation” on 182. 
88 TCG, 23–4. Note also Grenz’s study of the “kingdom of God” as an integrative motif in twentieth 
century theology. See RET, 139–47 and TCG, 20–4. Grenz finds the “kingdom” theme too generic and needful 
of more specific content, which he finds in the integrative motif of community. As well, showing 
Pannenberg’s influence, he keeps the eschatological dimension of the “kingdom” theme, which comes to 
fruition in Grenz’s eschatological motif and his use of eschatological prolepsis. Cf. Wolfhart Pannenberg, 
Anthropology in Theological Perspective, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1985), 531–2. See 
also Russell D. Moore, “Leftward to Scofield: The Eclipse of the Kingdom in Post-Conservative Evangelical 
Theology,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 47.3 (September 2004), 429–30. 
89 See also Grenz’s more condensed treatment in RTC, 219–25 
90 BF, 188. 
91 See Knowles, Beyond Evangelicalism, 110–27 and Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. 
Grenz, 11–15 for discussions of Grenz’s sources. See also Harris, The Theological Method of Stanley J. Grenz, 
105–19, 149–70, 250–7 and his view that “tradition” and “culture” are more properly “resources” or “formative 
factors” due to the ordered nature of Grenz’s trialogue. (167, 174) See as well chapter three, footnote 13. 
92 See also the treatment in RTC, 214–19. Note as well the discussion of the sources in Stanley J. 
Grenz, “How Do We Know What to Believe? Revelation and Authority,” in Essential of Christian Theology, ed. 
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Grenz first detailed these sources in a chapter length treatment in Revisioning Evangelical 
Theology which was followed up by a recap of the sources in the introduction to Theology 
for the Community of God.93 Additionally, Grenz placed his section on Scripture under the 
auspices of pneumatology in his systematic theology, thus being consistent with his fully 
trinitarian approach.94 Though he received some criticism, here an initial glimpse can be 
seen in how the written Word and Spirit are joined together for Grenz, indicating that it is 
the Spirit speaking through the Scriptures in a fully trinitarian sense that makes the 
Scriptures the “norming norm” and norming narrative of theology.95  
As well, Grenz was aware through his contact with the postmodern critique and 
his own postmodern turn that everyone interprets from particular contexts. For Grenz, the 
theological heritage of the church plays a key role in providing this interpretive theological 
context. However, Grenz does not reify church tradition, declaring it an “open” rather than 
a “closed” confessional tradition, allowing for further development along the 
hermeneutical trajectory set by the theological heritage of the church.96 This openness is 
vital as the church’s tradition should never become a simple substitute for the norming 
narrative of Scripture and theological construction necessarily takes place in ever new 
contexts and cultures. It is in these various cultural milieus that the Spirit speaks to the 
church, that the gospel is proclaimed, and that provide thought forms the church can 
utilize in the theological task.97 As will be discussed in chapter three, Grenz’s approach to 
his sources was deeply shaped by the influence of narrative theology. For this reason, this 
triad of Grenz’s theological grammar will be treated as narrative sources.98 
                                                             
William C. Placher (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003), 20–33. In SGRS, x Grenz states 
regarding his trialogue, that theological construction “arises out of the perichoretic dance of a particular, 
ordered set of sources of insight.” 
93 RET, 87–108 and TCG, 16–20. 
94 TCG, 379–404. 
95 RTC, 215 and BF, 64–6. 
96 BF, 124–5. 
97 RTC, 217–9 and BF, 158–66. See also Stanley J. Grenz, “What Does Hollywood Have to Do with 
Wheaton? The Place of (Pop) Culture in Theological Reflection,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 
43.2 (June 2000), 303–14. 
98 Grenz’s trialogue is similar to the Anglican triad of “Scripture, tradition, and reason” and the 
Wesleyan quadrilateral of “Scripture, tradition, reason, and experience.” Grenz expresses appreciation for 
the quadrilateral (TCG, 15) but has concerns regarding foundationalist applications of the quadrilateral 
where experience acts as the governing source for all the other sources. For Grenz, experience was not a 
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Ricoeur’s Rhythm – Detour and Return 
Before charting the course for the rest of the study, we now undertake an initial 
consideration of Ricoeurian hermeneutics, which will set the stage for subsequent 
engagements with Ricoeur. This section takes place in three parts: part one comprises a 
first moment that considers the perceived peril of Ricoeurian hermeneutics, part two 
comprises a second moment that uncovers the potential promise of Ricoeurian 
hermeneutics, and part three comprises a third moment that explores the productive plot 
of Ricoeurian hermeneutics. 
 
Prefiguration: The Perceived Peril of Ricoeurian Hermeneutics 
 This first moment begins by noting that the notion of hermeneutics itself has 
tended to be seen as a problem in need of a solution. This observation provides the 
context for a consideration of charges of subjectivism leveled at Ricoeur by some scholars. 
After that, the manner in which Ricoeur sought to circumscribe his own philosophical 
project is discussed. 
 
Hermeneutics as a Problem to Overcome 
James K. A. Smith begins his book The Fall of Interpretation99 with this quote from 
Dennis Schmidt’s The Ubiquity of the Finite: “However one wants to characterize it – 
whether as finitude, limit, mortality, opinion, partiality, mutability, or immanence – the 
first topic of philosophy has generally been taken to be something to overcome.”100 Smith 
                                                             
source per se, but was in some measure the focus of the theological task. “Theology, then, is in some sense 
the critical reflection on Christian experience, for it seeks to account for and describe the encounter with 
God in accordance with specifically Christian categories.” (16) In Grenz’s revisioning, the category of 
experience can be seen in his use of convertive piety, triune participation, and narrative, and ultimately 
flows through both triads of his theological grammar. What then of the traditional “reason” source? Grenz 
criticized the decline of the Trinity under modern rationalism, as well as Hegel’s treatment of the Trinity as 
available to human reason apart from Christian revelation. (BF, 183–6) But reason does not simply drop out 
after Grenz’s critique of foundationalism, but gets revisioned and remains implicit in a postfoundationalist 
and narrative posture, taking on an eschatological character that Grenz referred to as “eschatological 
realism.” (239–73) 
99 James K. A. Smith, The Fall of Interpretation: Philosophical Foundations for a Creational 
Hermeneutic, Second edition (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2012), 13. 
100 Dennis J. Schmidt, The Ubiquity of the Finite: Hegel, Heidegger and the Entitlements of Philosophy 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), 1. 
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further notes that the hermeneutical condition has long been treated itself as a product of 
the Fall. Smith states,  
[H]ermeneutics has traditionally been linked with the curse and banishment from 
the Garden. Interpretation, in short, is a result of the Fall, is itself a fall – from the 
intelligible to the sensible, from immediacy to mediation, from reading to 
hermeneutics. As the medieval poet Dante tells the story, the nature of the Fall 
itself was a transgression of the sign (il trapassar del segno), a lawless semiotic act 
that initiated the tragic history of interpretation and corrupted the previous 
immediacy Adam enjoyed in Eden. Hermeneutics is something to be overcome by 
redemption, whereby the curse of interpretation will be removed in a 
hermeneutical paradise where interpretation is absent . . . when paradise is 
regained it is hermeneutics itself that will be banished.”101 
Such is often the disposition found when considering the history of hermeneutics, 
seen particularly in the legacy of Friedrich Schleiermacher. Ever since Schleiermacher “de-
regionalized,” and thus universalized, hermeneutics, it has been common to speak in 
terms of “the problem of hermeneutics.”102 And on what many would see as the other side 
from Schleiermacher, from a conservative evangelical perspective, Graeme Goldsworthy 
displays a distinct lack of trust for philosophical hermeneutics. Goldsworthy briefly (and 
perhaps inadequately) weighs figures such as Hans-Georg Gadamer and Ricoeur and 
concludes that philosophical hermeneutics has “eclipsed the gospel” and placed what he 
calls “evangelical hermeneutics” under “constant attack.”103 Is this the fate of the 
                                                             
101 Smith, The Fall of Interpretation, 13–15. See also Kevin Hart, The Trespass of the Sign: 
Deconstruction, Theology, and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 3–39. 
102 B. H. McClean, Biblical Interpretation and Philosophical Hermeneutics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 37. Ricoeur himself takes up a study of the problem of hermeneutics in Paul Ricoeur, 
“The Task of Hermeneutics,” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 43–62 and Ricoeur, “The Problem of 
Hermeneutics,” in Hermeneutics: Writings and Lectures 2, trans. David Pellauer, eds. Daniel Frey and Nicola 
Strickler (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 1–44. Although, as we shall see, Ricoeur does not simply see fit to 
problematize hermeneutics in terms of peril, but sees productive promise within the hermeneutical 
condition as well. 
103 Graeme Goldsworthy, Gospel-Centered Hermeneutics: Biblical-Theological Foundations 
(Nottingham: APOLLOS, 2006), 130–8. There is some question whether Goldsworthy’s treatment of 
philosophical hermeneutics is adequate however, as he badly misrepresents a key figure like Hans-Georg 
Gadamer. For instance, he states, “Gadamer regards the distance between the reader and the text as 
something that inhibits understanding.” (136) He doesn’t seem to realize, though, that Gadamer contradicts 
this in Truth and Method saying, “Time is no longer primarily a gulf to be bridged because it separates; it is 
actually the supportive ground of the course of events in which the present is rooted. Hence temporal 
distance is not something that must be overcome. . . . the important thing is to recognize temporal distance as a 
positive and productive condition enabling understanding. It is not a yawning abyss but is filled with the 
continuity of custom and tradition, in the light of which everything handed down presents itself to us.” 
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hermeneutical condition, to be considered as a problem, as itself a product of the Fall, or 
as something that must be overcome? Or is it possible to perform a reversal at this point 
and problematize the posture that treats the hermeneutical condition as a problem? 
When considering the peril that hermeneutics may pose to theology, it is best to 
admit there is legitimate reason for caution. Martin Heidegger perhaps serves as a prime 
example of what many theologians fear. On the one hand, Heidegger contends that 
theology need not be “led on the leash of philosophy” and that “what is revealed in faith 
can never be founded by autonomously functioning reason.” However, on the other hand, 
he seems to negate this sentiment when he declares the articulation of this same faith 
requires “the appropriate conceptual interpretation” which is “ontologically determined 
by a content that is pre-Christian and that can thus be grasped purely rationally,” and then 
further asserting the task of phenomenology is to “correct theology.”104 
 
The Great Debate: Chicago vs Yale 
It is ostensibly this sort of philosophical hegemony that factored into the Chicago-
Yale debate, in which post-liberal Yale theologians such as Hans Frei stridently criticized 
Ricoeur as he came to be associated with contributing to a subjectivist theological 
method. Frei and his post-liberal colleagues tended to lay three charges at the feet of 
Ricoeur: 1) that he is an example of “experiential-expressivism,” 2) such that he occludes 
the “literal sense” of the Scriptural narratives, 3) by subjecting them to a hermeneutical 
hegemony wherein they are subsumed into his account of general hermeneutics and 
meaning. 105 However, Ricoeur scholar Boyd Blundell observes that what stands out as odd 
                                                             
(Truth and Method, Second edition, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (London: Continuum, 
1989), 297, emphasis mine)  
104 Martin Heidegger, “Phenomenology and Theology,” in Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 50–3. See also Merold Westphal, “The Kantian Tradition: 
The Danger of Philosophical Hegemony,” in Theology and Philosophy: Faith and Reason, eds. Oliver Crisp et 
al. (London: T&T Clark International, 2012), 116. 
105 See Hans W. Frei, “Theology and the Interpretation of Narrative: Some Hermeneutical 
Considerations,” 94–116; Frei, “The ‘Literal Reading’ of Biblical Narrative in the Christian Tradition: Does It 
Stretch or Will It Break?,” 117–52; and Frei, “Conflicts in Interpretation: Resolution, Armistice, or Co-
existence?,” 153–166 in Theology and Narrative: Selected Essays, eds. George Hunsinger and William C. 
Placher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) for examples. See also George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of 
Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (London: SPCK, 1984), 136 for his attribution to Ricoeur of 
“experiential-expressivism”; William C. Placher, “Paul Ricoeur and Postliberal Theology: A Conflict of 
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is Ricoeur’s own lack of participation in this debate.106 It seems that the post-liberal 
reaction against Ricoeur’s philosophical hermeneutics may well have been a case of 
mistaken identity and projection. 
Instead, the criticisms of the post-liberals, which it must be said do have some 
merit, are better applied to the correlationist and revisionist theology of David Tracy, 
Ricoeur’s colleague at the University of Chicago.107 While we can perhaps agree with 
Tracy’s assertion that theology can benefit from engagement with philosophical 
hermeneutics, the manner in which Tracy carried this out is problematic. Tracy’s 
theological method distinguished between what he calls fundamental theology, whose 
proper public is the academy, and systematic theology, whose proper public is the church. 
The problem is that since Tracy’s fundamental theology holds the power in his model, and 
that since it is here that he engages with philosophical hermeneutics, when the claims of 
theology and philosophy conflict he is forced to side with philosophy. Ironically, instead of 
fulfilling his aim of theology appropriating philosophical insights, a perhaps unintentional 
hermeneutical hegemony ensures.108 Thus, Frei’s fears do seem to be valid. What is not 
clear though, is whether these fears should be projected back onto Ricoeur.  
 
Ricoeur’s “Double Life” 
It may then be a strange irony when Tracy remarks that Ricoeur’s influence has 
always been intended as a “strictly philosophical contribution to theological self-
                                                             
Interpretations?” Modern Theology 4.1 (1987), 35–52 and Placher, “Introduction,” in Theology and Narrative: 
Selected Essays, 3–25 for agreement with Frei; and Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy of 
Paul Ricoeur: A Study in Hermeneutics and Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 141, 159, 
181, 236, 251 for his subjectivist charge against Ricoeur. See also the contrary assessments in Stiver, Theology 
After Ricoeur, x, 243–4 and Boyd Blundell, Paul Ricoeur between Theology and Philosophy: Detour and Return 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2010), 4, 43–7. 
106 Blundell, Paul Ricoeur between Theology and Philosophy, 40. 
107 Stiver, Theology After Ricoeur, 46, 86, 218 and Blundell, Paul Ricoeur between Theology and 
Philosophy, 40–53. 
108 See Blundell, Paul Ricoeur between Theology and Philosophy, 16–21, 28–31, 40–2. In fairness to 
Tracy, he shifts from a more modernist stance in Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology (New 
York, NY: Seabury Press, 1979) and The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of 
Pluralism (New York, NY: Crossroad, 1981) to a more postmodern one in Plurality and Ambiguity: 
Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope (San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row, 1987). See also his later defense of himself 
against the post-liberals for evidence of his own gradual hermeneutical turn that muted his previous 
modernist sensibilities in David Tracy, “Lindbeck’s New Program for Theology: A Reflection,” The Thomist 49 
(1985), 460–72. Cf. Stiver, Theology After Ricoeur, 86, 218. 
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understanding,” and that, “Unlike some of his admirers, Ricoeur himself never allows 
philosophy or theology to be confused or conflated.”109 This statement by Tracy accords 
well with Ricoeur’s own admitted practice, which is illustrated nicely in the editing of the 
published version of his Gifford Lectures, Oneself as Another. In order to keep the promise 
he made to himself “not to mix the philosophical and the theological”110 he omitted the two 
studies from the Giffords dedicated specifically to “natural theology.”111 We are confronted 
here with what may be the peril of inconsistency in what appears to be Ricoeur’s “double 
life,” which seems to sit in considerable tension with the grain of his dialogical and 
dialectical approach.112 In fact, in reference to Oneself as Another, Merold Westphal issues a 
lament concerning “the discrepancy between the book written and the book we might 
claim to have a right to expect.”113 And Henry Venema wonders, “shouldn’t Ricoeur 
articulate how the particularity of his own religious tradition stimulates the production of 
an imaginative vision that affects what appears to him as philosophically necessary?”114  
What are we to make of this? If Ricoeur himself did not see fit to mix theology and 
philosophy, what use is he to the overarching theological task? 
We should keep in mind that Ricoeur himself confesses to “living a kind of double 
allegiance” and even refers to his separation of philosophy and theology as “controlled 
schizophrenia.”115 In a 2003 interview, he had these revealing words: “I might even concede 
here a point . . . that my thought is not so removed from certain religious and biblical 
issues as my standard policy of ‘conceptual ascetisicm’ might have been prepared to admit 
in the past . . . I no longer consider such conceptual asceticism tenable.”116  My suggestion is 
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that Ricoeur’s own later qualifications along these lines, being more consonant with the 
dialectical posture evinced throughout his career, provide relief to the tension caused by 
his “conceptual asceticism” and open up a substantial storehouse of promise to be found 
in Ricoeurian hermeneutics for theology.117 
 
Configuration: The Potential Promise of Ricoeurian Hermeneutics 
 This second moment seeks to identify three areas of promise which flow from 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutical philosophy. There is first a consideration of the manner in which 
Ricoeur proposes a self-dispossession in his philosophy. Next the benefit of Ricoeur’s 
philosophical humility for theological ex-centricity is discussed. After that, the importance 
of Ricoeur’s philosophical rhythm of “detour and return” is presented along with his 
hermeneutical and narrative arcs. 
 
Ricoeur and Self-dispossession 
One such area of promise is the posture of self-dispossession evidenced in 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics which is influenced in part by what Ricoeur calls his “post-
Hegalian Kantianism.”118 To be sure, the mentioning of Kant and Hegel together will cause 
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considerable consternation for some theologians who worry about the freedom of 
theology from the strictures of modernity. But it is important to note the dialectic Ricoeur 
establishes which situates him at equal distance between the Kantian and Hegelian 
traditions. In brief, Westphal notes that with Kant, Ricoeur calls us to abandon Hegel’s 
claim to certain and complete knowledge. Against Hegel, the hermeneutical circle never 
comes to completion in final, absolute knowledge. But with Hegel, Ricoeur calls us to 
abandon Kant’s notion of the ahistorically universal and necessary a priori, in exchange for 
the recognition that our presuppositions, and that we ourselves as fragile cogitos, are 
embedded in historically located traditions.119 
Here we see evidence that Ricoeur would be mystified by the post-liberals who 
wished to lump him in with those revisionist theologians who subordinate Scripture or 
theology to their own philosophical conceptions.120 According to Ricoeur, “a critique of the 
illusions of the subject must be included in the very act of ‘self-understanding in the face 
of the text.’”121 Blundell points out here that the Ricoeurian “hermeneutic of suspicion,” 
rather than being used to discredit Scripture, is instead turned toward the readers of 
Scripture and their prejudgments, in order to enable the “world of the text” to maintain its 
own integrity.122 It turns out that “a mastering subject is not only bad theology, it’s bad 
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hermeneutics.” Within such a Ricoeurian posture of self-dispossession, the “hermeneutic 
awareness of the fragility of a faith that is transmitted through history via a network of 
symbols restores a humility appropriate to recipients of a freely given gift.”123 
 
Ricoeur and Theological Ex-centricity 
This notion of humility comes through not only in the dispossession of the “self” in 
Ricoeur, but in the sense of mutuality Ricoeur establishes between philosophy and 
theology. In his essay, “Philosophical Hermeneutics and Theological Hermeneutics,” 
Ricoeur states,  
In one sense theological hermeneutics appears as a particular case of 
philosophical hermeneutics, to the extent that it contains the major categories of 
the latter: discourse, writing, explanation, interpretation, distanciation, 
appropriation, etc. The relation, then, would be one between a general and a 
regional hermeneutics. But in another sense theological hermeneutics displays 
specific traits which question the claim to universality of such a philosophical 
hermeneutics as that of H. G. Gadamer. The relation between the two hermeneutics 
thus seems to be inverted, philosophical hermeneutics becoming the organon [or 
instrument] of theological hermeneutics.”124 
Later in the same article, Ricoeur repeats these sentiments and then speaks of the 
relation between philosophical and theological hermeneutics as one “which can be 
expressed in terms of a mutual inclusion,” and describes theology as having its own “ex-
centric” character.125 What is clear is that, far from Heidegger’s totalizing phenomenology, 
or Frei’s fears of hermeneutical hegemony, Ricoeur establishes a relation between 
philosophy and theology in which each exists in a posture of self-dispossession towards 
the other. Ricoeur is careful that both should retain their own proper integrity and that 
neither should master the other.126 Ricoeur does not accept any kind of imperialism from 
either philosophy or theology. 
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“Detour and Return” 
Further promise can be found in Ricoeur’s hermeneutical and narrative arcs 
developed in the 1970s and 1980s. In describing the central motif of his philosophy, 
Ricoeur has stated, “Detour/return is the rhythm of my philosophical respiration.”127 
Flowing from this “detour and return” rhythm the hermeneutical and narrative arcs have 
come to stand as the backbone to the body of Ricoeur’s thought. In brief, the 
hermeneutical, or critical, arc128 is comprised of three moments: a first naïveté or naïve 
understanding, a second moment of critical testing and explanation, and a third return 
moment variously described as a postcritical naïveté, appropriation, or application. Later, 
in his three volume series, Time and Narrative, Ricoeur further developed another arc 
known as the narrative arc. Like the hermeneutical arc, the narrative, or mimetic, arc is 
comprised of three moments in the process of “mimesis” or “figuration”: prefiguration, 
configuration, and refiguration.129  
It would be tempting to overlay the later narrative arc on top of the hermeneutical 
arc, establishing a one-to-one correspondence between them. But such a conflation would 
be a mistake in the end. Admittedly, the rhythm of “detour and return” is interwoven 
through both, such that they: begin on the “main road” of an initial moment of a first 
naïveté (hermeneutical arc) or prefiguration (narrative arc), detour through a second 
moment of critical testing and distanciation (hermeneutical arc) or configuration 
(narrative arc), resulting in a third return moment of a second naïveté (hermeneutical arc) 
or refiguration (narrative arc).130 However, despite this similar methodological feature 
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shared between them, a key difference is that the hermeneutical arc has as its main 
feature receptivity, a mode of understanding and appropriating texts that have already 
been created. The narrative arc though, has as its main feature productivity, a mode of 
producing texts that will be received by others, or in terms of Ricoeur’s theory of narrative 
identity: emplotment, phronesis, and practical wisdom. As Ricoeur himself alludes, both of 
these arcs might also be called spirals,131 since one may return many times over to a text (as 
in the hermeneutical arc) and the task of emplotment bound up with phronesis remains 
an ongoing process (as in the narrative arc).132 
 
Refiguration: The Productive Plot of Ricoeurian Hermeneutics 
 Extending from the promise of Ricoeur’s philosophy, this last moment takes up the 
manner in which Ricoeurian hermeneutics can be productive for theology. This moment 
begins with a consideration of Ricoeur in relation to ontological hermeneutics and his 
own development of a critical hermeneutics. This leads into a consideration of Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics of the self. And finally, this third moment culminates with a brief 
articulation of Ricoeur’s theory of narrative identity. 
 
Ricoeur and Ontological Hermeneutics 
In Ricoeur’s perspective one may say that “its hermeneutics all the way down” in 
that he is generally regarded as having an ontological hermeneutics. Ricoeur drew on 
figures such as Heidegger and Gadamer in the development of this hermeneutical 
perspective. While Schleiermacher was responsible for the “de-regionalization,” or 
universalizing of hermeneutics in regards to written texts, Heidegger is chiefly responsible 
for inaugurating the turn to a fully ontological hermeneutics. Building upon the 
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phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, Heidegger moved from the pure description of 
essences to the interpretation of Dasein (“Being-there”) against the backdrop of human 
existence, the horizon against which Being appears. In his discussion of the structure of 
human existence (Dasein) he stressed the importance of “understanding,” borrowing from 
Wilhelm Dilthey, implying that humans exist essentially in a hermeneutical structure.133 
Thus human existence subsists in a fundamental hermeneutical condition in which 
“Dasein finds itself ‘being-there,’ always inheriting a past, that is, ‘thrown’ into existence, 
and having to move towards the future.”134 Stiver concludes, “What Heidegger did, was to 
take the model of interpreting a text – which involves the hermeneutical circle, and 
inherent dimension of judgement, and inexact methods – as the basic model for 
understanding and experiencing.”135 
Gadamer took Heidegger’s hermeneutical insight and extended it, critiquing the 
Enlightenment “prejudice against prejudice,” recognizing human entanglement in history 
through a “historically shaped consciousness,” and urging that preunderstandings (or 
traditioning) are not inherently obstacles but actually prepare one to know anything at all, 
and ultimately give way to the “clash” and subsequent “fusion” of horizons.136 Gadamer’s 
aphorism, “Being that can be understood is language,”137 implies that all understanding is 
linguistic and hermeneutical. Ricoeur picks up Gadamer’s ontological hermeneutics and 
extends it further. Ricoeur was not satisfied with what he viewed as Gadamer’s false splits 
between understanding and explanation and belonging and alienation. Ricoeur also took 
issue with Gadamer’s split between truth and method, remarking at one point that for 
Gadamer it was actually a matter of “truth or method.”138 Ricoeur develops a “critical 
supplementation”139 to Gadamer through his application of the paradigmatic model of the 
text to human persons and the development of his hermeneutical and narrative arcs. Thus 
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Ricoeur’s ontological hermeneutics becomes a critical hermeneutics140 and he lays the 
gauntlet of the hermeneutical challenge at our feet. This is evident in Oneself as Another, 
which functions well as a summing up of Ricoeur’s philosophical hermeneutics,141 and 
displays his hermeneutics of the self and theory of narrative identity, introduced below. 
 
Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics of the Self 
Attention to the hermeneutics of the self and what can be called the 
hermeneutical self brings one close into the center of Ricoeur’s philosophy. While 
Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology appears in some sense as a “turn to the subject,” 
upon close examination his hermeneutics of the self represents a turn away from the 
subject as well.142 That is, he represents a turn away from the mastering modern subject or 
cogito, instead positing a distinctly postmodern wounded cogito that cannot be neatly 
separated from the body, the world, language, or other persons.143 Stiver notes four themes 
in Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the self: the embodied self, the interpersonal self, the social 
self, and the narrative self.144 Firstly, Ricoeur, in agreement with Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
saw that it is through our bodies that persons engage with the world and rejects the idea of 
the cogito as an autonomous agent. In these ways Ricoeur emphasized the dispossession of 
the self and it is the embodied and embedded nature of human existence that gives rise to 
and supports the entire hermeneutical project. No longer is the self a fully transparent 
text, but selfhood is an ongoing task.145 We not only interpret others, but we ourselves need 
interpretation as well. Embodiment means the freedom of our being-in-the-world, but 
also, it is our being-in-the-world that makes us fragile, fallible, and liable to fall.146  
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Secondly, particularly in Oneself as Another, Ricoeur posits an interpersonal self. 
The ethical practices of one’s narrative identity are unthinkable (and unliveable!) apart 
from others.147 There is no conception in Ricoeur of the self apart from a turn to the 
“other.”148 For instance, Ricoeur draws on the idea of making a promise, the very act of 
which presupposes other persons. Ricoeur also invokes the idea of solicitude for the other, 
which involves relations of friendship marked by esteem and mutual recognition, 
participation in projects inconceivable without others, and the experience of shared 
suffering.149 Thirdly, also in Oneself as Another, Ricoeur posits the social self. Just as human 
persons are born into families, they also inherit the horizons and traditions of the 
communities in which they were formed and shaped, communities that have endured 
over time. Thus there is also a sense of receiving one’s identity through social institutions. 
This raises the promise of fruitful collaboration as well as the suspicious peril of 
domination, violence, and misuse of power.150 Where there are many human beings, there 
are issues related to institutions, and following from that, issues of justice. At the heart of 
the good life is the practical wisdom needed to live together well.151 In this way Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutical challenge contains within it a phronetic, ethical challenge.152 
 
Ricoeur and Narrative Identity 
Fourthly, Ricoeur posits the narrative self.153 Both the receptivity of the 
hermeneutical arc and the productivity of the narrative arc discussed previously are 
interwoven and at play with each another in Oneself as Another. It is through these arcs 
that Ricoeur develops his theory of narrative identity, which extends from the observation 
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that one’s existence in time and the world is not only embodied, interpersonal, and 
relational (or social), but is also narratival – a story. Ricoeur poses a distinction between 
the Latin terms for identity: idem and ipse.154 Idem identity means “sameness,” and is 
marked by empirical perseverance or what might be called the bare facts of one’s 
existence. Ipse identity is what Ricoeur terms as “selfhood,” and this form of identity is 
“characterized by self-constancy, reflexively implying others in its very constitution. The 
two types of identity are held together by narrative and overlap on the key aspect of 
character.”155 In volume 3 of Time and Narrative, Ricoeur states: “The difference between 
idem and ipse is nothing more than the difference between a substantial and formal 
identity and a narrative identity.”156 Further, at the heart of the narrative configuration of 
the self is the idea that the self’s dynamic identity is not threatened by the other, but in a 
very real sense narrative identity is constituted and validated by the other. We not only 
emplot ourselves through life, but we do so through an ongoing hermeneutical/narrative 
process of deconstruction and reconstruction within inextricable and irreducible relation 
to others.157 Thus Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the self is simultaneously a hermeneutics of 
language, a hermeneutics of embodiment and emplotment, and a hermeneutics of 
relationality and sociality, which issue forth into a hermeneutics of narrative identity.158 
 
The Church between Grenz and Ricoeur: Toward a Hermeneutical Ecclesiology 
 We can now chart the course for the rest of this study of Grenz’s ecclesiology in 
conversation with Ricoeur. This first chapter began on the “main road” of Grenzian studies 
with a consideration of the wider scope of Grenz scholarship, an introduction to 
Pannenberg’s formative influence on Grenz, Grenz’s Baptist pietism, his wider evangelical 
context, and a brief introduction to Grenz as a postfoundationalist theologian and the 
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Grenzian grammar comprised of the triad of trinitarian motifs and trialogue of narrative 
sources. This chapter then presented an introductory discussion of Paul Ricoeur through 
the perceived peril, potential promise, and productive plot of Ricoeurian hermeneutics. 
We now return to the main subject of this study, Grenz’s trinitarian ecclesiology, and 
briefly map the way forward. 
 Methodologically, the triadic theological matrixes of the Grenzian grammar are 
embedded into the fabric of the dissertation throughout. The trinitarian motifs (Trinity, 
community, eschatology) are connected thematically with chapter two, which takes up 
Grenz’s use of social trinitarianism in relation to ecclesiology. Grenz’s trialogue of 
theological sources, what I am referring to as the narrative sources (Scripture, tradition, 
and culture), have primary thematic connection with chapter three, which gives 
consideration to Grenz’s narrative theology in relation to ecclesiology.159 Finally, as a part 
of the constructive proposal of this dissertation, chapter four proposes my own third 
missional matrix, informed by its own corresponding grammar of church, 
gospel/atonement, and kingdom.  
In conjunction with the Grenzian grammar, Ricoeur makes a significant 
methodological contribution in the embedding of the hermeneutical and narrative arcs 
into the structure of the study. Thus each chapter contains three sections corresponding to 
the “detour and return” rhythm discussed previously. The first section of each chapter 
begins on the “main road” of a summarization of Grenz’s theology. The second section of 
each chapter then “detours” through a moment of critical analysis. The third section of 
each chapter indicates a “return” moment, seeking implications and appropriation. Not 
only is the “detour and return” present within the individual chapters, but chapters two 
(Trinity), three (narrative), and four (mission) evince their own “detour and return” 
rhythm. 160 Chapter two takes up Grenz’s social trinitarianism, which detours through his 
                                                             
159 Note that while the triadic theological matrixes are thematically connected to chapters two and 
three respectively, due to the interconnected nature of Grenz’s grammar, the other set remains present even 
when not considered explicitly. 
160 There is a similarity between Ricoeur’s hermeneutical and narrative arcs and Grenz’s triadic 
theological matrixes in that both exhibit a fundamental interwovenness. Thus Stiver reminds us that 
Ricoeur’s “three stages are sharply distinguished more in analysis than reality.” (Theology After Ricoeur, 57) 
However, Ricoeur’s concern to avoid “cryptotheology” (Oneself as Another, 24) mean that his arcs come from 
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narrative theology in chapter three, which then culminates in a missional moment in 
chapter four. The hope and wager is that this will ensure this study exhibits the receptivity 
and productivity of Ricoeur’s hermeneutical and narrative arcs in reference to Grenz’s 
theological grammar and ecclesiology. In this way I propose this study can serve as 
ecclesiological Grenzian grammar lessons. 
The remainder of this study is outlined as follows, governed by the overarching 
matrix of Trinity, narrative, and mission.161 Each chapter invokes the same sort of 
“From…to…” structure Grenz used in the chapter headings found within Social God and 
Named God. Chapter two is titled “From Social God to Social Imago: The Trinitarian Shape 
of the Hermeneutical Community,” and proceeds in conversation with the trinitarian 
grammatical matrix of Trinity, community, and eschatology. This chapter thus begins 
where Grenz begins, with the Trinity as the structural motif of the entire theological 
edifice. Chapter two will also take as its thematic center Grenz’s Social God volume in the 
elucidation of Grenz’s imago Dei theology, the “social imago,” trinitarian theo-
anthropology, non-hierarchical gender relations (“male and female” as the imago Dei), his 
theology of triune participation (particularly Grenz’s use of theosis in a proleptic, 
eschatological frame), and the ecclesial self along with Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the 
relational self. 
Chapter three is titled, “From Named God to Narrative Imago: The Narrative Shape 
of the Hermeneutical Community,” and proceeds with the grammatical matrix of the 
narrative sources (Scripture, tradition, and culture). This chapter thus features a second 
important aspect of Grenz’s theological grammar, his use of narrative theology. This 
chapter will take as its thematic center Grenz’s Named God volume, which forms an 
important critical supplementation to Grenz’s social doctrine of the Trinity in relation to 
Grenz’s narrative of the saga of the divine name. Again, in conversation with Ricoeur’s 
                                                             
his philosophical imagination. Grenz, though, is free to credit his triadic matrixes to a trinitarian 
imagination as they comprise their own “perichoretic dance.” (SGRS, x) While due caution is needed 
regarding the “perichoretic” metaphor, I intend my matrix of Trinity, narrative, and mission to utilize 
Ricoeur’s philosophical imagination as well as flow from a trinitarian theological imagination. 
161 See also my treatment of Grenz’s trinitarian ecclesiology in conversation with Ricoeur in a more 
condensed form in Russell L. Almon, “The Postmodern Self in Theological Perspective: A Communal, 
Narrative, and Ecclesial Approach,” Ecclesiology 13.2 (May 2017), 179–96. 
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theory of narrative identity and hermeneutics of the self, Grenz’s imago Dei theology, the 
“narrative imago,” Christo-anthropology, non-hierarchical gender relations (“male and 
female” as the imago Dei “in Christ” and through the Spirit as they participate in the Jesus 
narrative), and storied participation (proleptic, eschatological sharing in the narrative of 
Christ) fill out in more fullness Grenz’s ecclesiological offerings. 
Chapter four is titled, “From Missional God to Ecclesial Imago: The Missional 
Shape of the Hermeneutical Community,” and proceeds in conversation with the 
missional matrix of church, gospel/atonement, and kingdom. Trinity, narrative, and 
mission here enjoy an interwoven relationship. The aim is to develop a productive 
proposal for a “hermeneutical ecclesiology” in which “male and female” live into their 
status as the imago Dei alongside each other in non-hierarchical relation and together in 
mission. In conversation with Ricoeurian narrative identity and his notion of the 
“summoned self,” Grenz’s imago Dei theology will be developed in terms of the ecclesial 
imago (a proleptic, perichoretic, and participatory reality embodied in the church as a 
hermeneutical community with the vocational calling to be the foretaste of the imago 
Dei). The ecclesial imago will then be connected to a missio-anthropology, non-
hierarchical gender relations (“male and female” alongside each other in the missio Dei), 
and missional participation (theosis as proleptic triune participation and narrative 
participation and therefore ecclesial participation in the missio Dei). The full inclusion of 
“male and female,” “in Christ” and through the Spirit, in missional mutuality, ecclesial 
friendship, and ecclesial hospitality is an integral aspect of gospel witness and the triune 
God’s ecclesial hermeneutics of community. The conclusion will present a summary and 




FROM SOCIAL GOD TO SOCIAL IMAGO:  
THE TRINITARIAN SHAPE OF THE HERMENEUTICAL COMMUNITY 
 
 This second chapter discusses Grenz’s social doctrine of the Trinity and its 
interfacing with the imago Dei as a theological, ecclesiological, and eschatological 
concept.1 Thus it seeks to go “from social God to social imago.” This chapter begins with 
Grenz’s development of his social trinitarianism as the “main road.” However, with 
awareness of recent criticisms of social trinitarian thought, the second section offers a 
critical moment aimed at assessing Grenz’s social trinitarianism. While the social 
trinitarian critiques are found to be significant and serious, Grenz’s communual theo-
anthopology is proposed as offering a strong response. Flowing from this discussion, the 
third section makes some initial constructive proposals concerning the intersection of the 
social imago, gender, and ecclesial triune participation. 
 
The Social God and the Imago Dei 
Christian theology is an ongoing, second-order, contextual discipline that engages 
in critical and constructive reflection on the faith, life, and practices of the 
Christian community. Its task is the articulation of the biblically normed, 
historically informed, and culturally relevant models of the Christian belief-mosaic 
for the purpose of assisting the community of Christ’s followers in their vocation to 
live as the people of God in the particular social-historical context in which they 
are situated.2 
[T]heology is “church dogmatics,” and the “dogmatics” of the Christian church 
must by its very nature be trinitarian. . . . Given the social nature of God, a theology 
that is truly trinitarian will find coherence, or its integrative motif, in the concept 
of community, which is reflective of the nature of God and God's intention for 
creation. Thus, the trinitarian content of theology points to the concept of 
community as providing the integrative motif for theology and eventually to 
eschatology as its orienting motif.3 
 This first section presents Grenz’s social trinitarian theology and theological 
anthropology, particularly as it is presented in Social God. First, there is a consideration of 
                                                             
1 SGRS, xi. 
2 BF, 16. 
3 BF, 188, 202. 
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Grenz’s take on the trinitarian theological task and theological language. Second, a primer 
on Grenz’s social trinitarianism is given leading into a summary of chapter one in Social 
God. Third, a brief study of the postmodern self overviews chapters two and three, 
finishing out “Part 1 – The Context: Trinitarian Theology and the Self.” Fourth, a summary 
of Grenz’s exegesis of the imago Dei in chapters four, five, and six (“Part Two – The Texts: 
The Imago Dei in Trinitarian Perspective”) is presented. Fifth, Grenz’s suggestions in 
chapters seven and eight (“Part Three – The Application: The Social Imago and the 
Postmodern (Loss of) Self”) regarding the social imago and ecclesial self are discussed. 
 
The Nature of the Task of Trinitarian Theology and Theological Language 
 Before introducing Grenz’s social doctrine of the Trinity, it is appropriate to 
consider his treatment of the nature of the theological task and the question of theological 
language in the context of trinitarian considerations. The immediately preceding quotes 
are programmatic statements from Grenz regarding the task of theology. These form a 
connection in Grenz’s thought with the final chapter of Rediscovering the Triune God 
regarding the nature of theology. In Rediscovering the Triune God Grenz discusses eleven 
theologians who have made lasting contributions to the twentieth century trinitarian 
renaissance.4 The golden thread presented by this century of trinitarian theological 
renewal according to Grenz is the question of how theology can envision “the relationship 
between God-in-eternity and God-in-salvation in a manner that both takes seriously the 
importance of the latter to the former and avoids collapsing the former into the latter or 
compromises the freedom of the eternal God.”5 
Grenz answers with what Jason Sexton dubs the Grenz Grundaxiom:6 that “any 
truly helpful explication of the doctrine of the Trinity must give epistemological priority to 
                                                             
4 These eleven theologians appear in RTG: chapter two, “Restoring the Triune Center” discusses 
Karl Barth and Karl Rahner; chapter three, “The Trinity as the Fullness of History” discusses Jürgen 
Moltmann, Wolfhart Pannenberg, and Robert W. Jenson; chapter four, “The Triumph of Relationality” 
discusses Leonardo Boff, John Zizioulas, and Catherine Mowry LaCugna; and chapter five, “The Return of the 
Immanent Trinity” discusses Elizabeth Johnson, Hans Urs Balthasar, and Thomas F. Torrance. Grenz also 
notes RTG constitutes a book length expansion of the discussion of the twentieth century trinitarian 
renaissance found in chapter one of SGRS. (RTG, x)  
5 RTG, 222. 
6 Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 81, 100. 
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the presence of the trinitarian persons in the divine economy but reserve ontological 
primacy for the dynamic of their relationality within the triune life.”7 This raises the 
question regarding what kind of trinitarian ontology is up to the task. Demonstrating his 
continuity from Beyond Foundationalism to Rediscovering the Triune God, Grenz 
determines that such a trinitarian ontology must be both communal and eschatological. 
And the task of developing such an ontology is described in true Grenzian form as 
provisional and ongoing.8 The provisional nature of theology is a longstanding feature of 
Grenz’s. In his words: “Christian theology is pilgrim theology.”9 As well, the task of theology 
has a “proleptic character” due to its anticipatory and eschatological nature, resulting in 
doctrinal formulae that “always have a provisionality to them.”10 For Grenz, the story of the 
triune God continues on through participation in the ecclesial community and its 
practices, one of which is theological discernment under the presence of the Holy Spirit.11  
In addition to the progressive and ongoing nature of ecclesial contemplation of 
the trinitarian belief mosaic, Grenz also shows himself to be committed to the indirect 
nature of theological language and God-talk. The importance of the indirect nature of 
theological language for Grenz is underscored in the introduction to Social God.12 There 
Grenz notes that not only has the twentieth century trinitarian renaissance brought 
renewed interest in the doctrine of the Trinity, but the “revival of interest in one particular 
model of the Trinity, the social analogy which has its roots in the patristic era.”13 The social 
model’s tendency to posit God as subsisting in three centers of action has met with both 
                                                             
7 RTG, 222. See also the resonance of this statement with Grenz’s own summation of the trintiarian 
theological methodology of T. F. Torrance in RTG, when he states, “Although [Torrance’s] methodological 
understanding invests the economic Trinity with a kind of epistemological priority, it clearly views the 
immanent Trinity as possessing ontological primacy.” (212) 
8 RTG, 221–2. 
9 BF, 17. Grenz states, “the theological task will never be completed this side of the eschaton” and 
therefore, “the task of theology is ongoing and best characterized by the metaphor of pilgrimage.” (17) 
Similarly, in RET Grenz describes theology as always “in transitu” and the theologian as a “pilgrim thinker 
working on behalf of a pilgrim people.” (83) Grenz describes the task of theology in TCG as always “in via – 
on the way. And the theologian is a pilgrim thinker ministering on behalf of a pilgrim people.” (12–13) In 
SGRS Grenz identifies the theological enterprise as an “ongoing conversation among the various topic of 
systematic theology, viewed as a coherent mosaic model of Christian belief.” (9) 
10 RTC, 351. 
11 RTG, 222–3. 
12 SGRS, 3–9. 
13 SGRS, 4. Emphasis original. 
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wide acclaim and trenchant critique, but its revival combined with its criticism has 
generated a rethinking of the idea of “person” seen in the relational turn in both theology 
and philosophy.14 However, the relational turn has also acutely accentuated the question 
of the validity of use of the word “person” for both humans and the trinitarian members. 
Specifically at issue is drawing too close to the error of tritheism when social trinitarians 
give the impression they speak univocally rather than analogically, thus highlighting the 
question of theological language.15 Grenz has already invoked analogy in the theological 
task at large, describing theological systems themselves as “analogue models.”16 And he is 
known for his own social analogy of the Trinity17 which receives even further development 
in Social God. 
However, Grenz now moves his discussion to the linguistic turn in philosophy and 
theology, focusing on theological language as metaphorical.18 He begins by citing George 
Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s treatment of metaphors as central to our experience of the 
world at large.19 He then draws on Sallie McFague20 with four basic points. First, 
metaphorical language functions with an “is”-and-“is not” character and so cannot be 
                                                             
14 Grenz (SGRS, 5, 6) quotes Ted Peters, “The idea of person-in-relationship seems to be nearly 
universally assumed,” (God as Trinity: Relationality and Temporality in Divine Life (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1991), 37) and John L. Gresham Jr., “This provides the strange sight, in the 
pluralistic world of contemporary theology, of Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox, liberation, feminist, 
evangelical and process theologians agreeing on a particular model of God!” (“The Social Model of the Trinity 
and Its Critics,” Scottish Journal of Theology 46.3 (1993), 327) 
15 SGRS, 6. 
16 RET, 64, 78–9, 82–3 and Stanley J. Grenz and Roger E. Olson, Who Needs Theology? An Invitation to 
the Study of God (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 1996), 79. Grenz (SGRS, 6–7) directs the reader to James B. 
Torrance, “The Doctrine of the Trinity in Our Contemporary Situation,” in The Forgotten Trinity, ed. Alasdair 
I. C. Heron (London: BCC/CCBI, 1989) 4–5 for a positive take on analogy and W. Norris Clarke, Explorations 
in Metaphysics: Being, God, Person (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 123–49 on 
criticisms of the Thomistic concept of analogy. Cf. Stiver, The Philosophy of Religious Language, 23–9. 
17 See the discussions in Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 67–86 and Smith, “A 
Generous Theology,” 185–218 for their (mostly complementary) descriptions of Grenz’s development of the 
social Trinity. 
18 For a rich philosophical take on metaphor, see Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: The Creation of 
Meaning in Language, trans. Robert Czerny et al. (London: Routledge, 2003). Stiver, The Philosophy of 
Religious Language, 228 notes the original French title for The Rule of Metaphor, La Métaphore vive, can be 
rendered as “living metaphor.”  
19 SGRS, 6. See also George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press, 1980). 
20 SGRS, 7–9. Here Grenz cites Sallie McFague, Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear 
Age (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1987), 33–5 and McFague, Metaphorical Theology: Models of God in 
Religious Language (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1982), 12–13, 23–8. 
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taken literally in every respect.21 Second, theology can no longer function under the 
medieval analogia entis (or analogy of being) due to the post-Reformational demise of the 
sacramental conception of the universe that supported it.22 Third, the goal of theology is to 
offer a “synoptic vision” of ourselves and the world organized according to a “root 
metaphor,” which for Grenz involves the coherent articulation of the specifically 
trinitarian Christian belief mosaic. Fourth, Grenz declares the acknowledgement of 
metaphorical God-talk further facilitates the understanding of the theological task as an 
ongoing conversation in which the Christian conception of God emerges from a dialectal 
movement of thought involving theology proper and anthropology. In this ongoing 
conversation anthropological language is used in reference to God, but only with a 
metaphorical function.23 Grenz concludes:  
Nevertheless, anthropological conceptions and articulations are themselves 
dependent on a transcendent ground that stands in judgement over both 
anthropological theology and our theological anthropology. Hence, this aspect of 
the theological conversation may be viewed as a double – or reciprocal – 
movement from the divine to the human and from the human to the divine.24 
                                                             
21 Stiver notes in The Philosophy of Religious Language, 112–33 that scholars are widely disagreed 
concerning the relationship between analogy and metaphor. Stiver mentions McFague as one who generally 
disparages analogy in relation to metaphor whereas David Burrell likens analogy to recent understandings of 
metaphor and David Tracy seems to use analogy, metaphor, and symbol interchangeably. Stiver concludes, 
“At this juncture in the discussion, we can probably not overcome the disparity of definition. It is arguable 
that metaphor, analogy, and symbol can be seen as very similar, and it is arguable that they are very 
different.” (127) 
22 McFague’s contention regarding the demise of the medieval sacramental universe finds some 
support in Brad S. Gregory, The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2012). James R. Peters, The Logic of the Heart: Augustine, Pascal, and the 
Rationality of Faith (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2009), 16 suggests it was the late medieval 
nominalists who, having forged a “divide between the truths of reason and the truths of faith” form the 
genesis of the separation of the sacred and secular, which was then reinforced by early modern philosophers. 
However, McFague’s contention stands in need of nuance in that the sacramental has never been wholly 
displaced by the secular. Rather, after the medieval period, Western modernity became contested space 
situated between the forces of both secularization and sacralization. In his discussion of Charles Taylor, 
James K. A. Smith observes that the secular age continues to be “haunted” by the sacramental past (How 
(Not) to Be Secular: Reading Charles Taylor (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2014), 79–91). Taylor himself states, 
“the hegemony of the mainstream master narrative of secularization will be more and more challenged. This 
I think is now happening.” (A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2007), 534–5) 
23 SGRS, 8–9. Additionally, note that while Grenz accepts the classical theological language of 
“generation” and “procession” in regards to the Father, Son, and Spirit, he also declares these terms are 
“metaphors” which “attempt to put into human words the ineffable essence of God.” (TCG, 66–8) 
24 SGRS, 9. Thus, while Grenz’s theology has a distinct “from above” and “from below” quality, this 
quotation is an illustration of the pervasive feature of divine transcendence in Grenz’s theology (also evident 
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 Subsequently, Grenz suggests the near consensus that “person” is a relational 
concept indicates the next major task in trinitarian theology perhaps rests in the area of 
theological anthropology.25 This connects well with Grenz’s characteristic emphasis on 
community as he notes that “‘person’ has more to do with relationality than with 
substantiality and that the term stands closer to the idea of communion or community 
than to the conception of the individual in isolation or abstracted from communal 
embeddedness.”26 Grenz surveys the social personalism that has dislodged modern 
individualistic notions of what it means to be a person in Martin Buber, Michael Polyani, 
and John MacMurray and offers brief sketches of Alistair  McFadyen27 and Katherine 
Keller28 on relational personhood.29 However, in Grenz’s estimation, even though 
McFadyen and Keller engage theological insights, neither of them offer “a thoroughgoing 
theological reconceptualizing of the self or human personhood.”30 Grenz wants to go 
further and develop a specifically trinitarian theological anthropology of the self and 
imago Dei.31 We will see how Grenz develops this aim, and how it impacts church, gender, 
and mission as this chapter unfolds. At this point, I offer a brief statement of Grenz’s 
trinitarian theology before turning to the postmodern condition of the self. 
 
A Primer on Grenzian Social Trinitarian Theology 
 In Theology for the Community of God, Grenz offers a summary of the content of 
trinitarian doctrine in four statements.32 First, the triune God is one. The God Christians 
                                                             
in TCG) in which it is the “from above” that makes the “from below” possible at all. One should also note the 
intimation of the Grenz Grundaxiom (also evident in TCG) even before Grenz’s more explicit articulation in 
RTG. 
25 Grenz cites David S. Cunningham, These Three Are One: The Practice of Trinitarian Theology 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1998), ix and Torrance, “The Doctrine of the Trinity in Our 
Contemporary Situation,” 15 for support. 
26 SGRS, 4. Grenz also states the self is “not ultimately merely a ‘what,’ an essence, but a ‘who,’” 
whose identity is established as “person-in-relationships.” (SGRS, 12) 
27 Alistair I. McFadyen, The Call to Personhood: A Christian Theory of the Individual in Social 
Relationships (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 7, 9, 59, 100–1. 
28 Keller, From a Broken Web: Separation, Sexism, and Self (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1986), 166–7, 
228. 
29 SGRS, 9–14.  
30 SGRS, 14. Emphasis original. 
31 SGRS, 10, 14–20. 
32 This paragraph follows TCG, 66–9. 
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know is the one God confessed by the biblical faith community who is of one divine 
essence. Christians are not polytheists or tritheists but (trinitarian) monotheists.33 Second, 
the triune God is three. The Christian God is not an undifferentiated, solitary oneness and 
the tri-personal distinctions are internal, and not simply external to the divine reality. 
Because the threeness of the divine persons is an ontological reality it is also functional 
and economic. The three both comprise the one God in eternity and are jointly at work in 
the divine program in the world. Third, the triune God is a diversity. The differentiation of 
Father, Son, and Spirit as an ontological threeness form an eternal reality internal to God’s 
nature and essence. Further, these differentiations – whereby the Father generates the Son 
and the Spirit proceeds from the Father (and the Son) – constitute an ontological as well 
as economic diversity as each trinitarian person completes a specific work in the divine 
economy.34 Fourth, the triune God is a unity. The Christian God entails diversity within 
unity as well as unity in diversity – a diversity that is also ontological and economic. 
Despite their varying work, the operations of the trinitarian persons are never divided. All 
are involved in every area and aspect of the divine program for creation. The divine 
persons present an ontological, eternal unity in diversity and so together comprise the 
divine essence through their perichoretic (or mutually indwelling and interpenetrating) 
relations.35 
 Grenz next suggests that the mutual relations of the Father, Son, and Spirit help us 
to understand the insight in 1 John 4:8, 16 that “God is love.” Declaring the unity of God to 
be the love and reciprocal self-dedication of the trinitarian persons to each other, Grenz 
says: “Indeed, God is love – the divine essence is the love that binds together the Trinity.”36 
                                                             
33 See Christoph Schwöbel, “Radical Montheism and the Trinity,” Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische 
Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 43.1 (2001), 74 for his development of a trinitarian monotheism “in which 
the economic relations of God to world” are “grounded in God’s everlasting relationality” (which has 
resonance with Grenz) and his insistence that “only a radically monotheistic theology can be a proper 
trinitarian theology, and only a proper trinitarian theology can be a radically monotheistic theology.” 
34 Grenz depicts the Father as ground of the world and divine program for creation, the Son as 
revealer and redeemer; and the Spirit as the active personal divine power in creation and completer of the 
divine program. (TCG, 67) In CFC Grenz lists these in bullet points: “the Father is Originator,” “the Son is 
Revealer,” and “the Spirit is Completer.” (20) 
35 TCG,68.  See also SGRS, 10, 14, 16, 19, 43–4, 49, 50, 292, 310, 316–7, 332, 335–6. 
36 TCG, 69. Note also the connection Grenz establishes between the divine essence of love and 
perichoresis where he speaks of “God as love” and perichoresis very similarly. Kurt Anders Richardson, 
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In this manner, “God is love” becomes Grenz’s most basic assertion regarding the social 
Trinity. In Theology for the Community of God Grenz develops his trinitarian theology with 
a basically Augustinian posture.37 However, Grenz also critiqued what he saw as an 
Augustinian individualism (that looks to the inner soul as an image of the Trinity) with the 
help of Richard of St. Victor (who is said to hold a more fully personal Trinity and more 
substantial idea of persons-in-relation)38 and cites Colin Gunton approvingly concerning 
Richard’s promise for a “theological understanding of humans as the imago Dei.”39 Grenz’s 
trinitarian theological interpretation of 1 John 4:7–21 provides an indication that “God is 
love” could well serve as a fifth statement concerning the essential content of a Grenzian 
doctrine of God as the divine community of love, or social Trinity. Thus Grenz 
summarizes: “The statement ‘God is love’ refers primarily to the eternal, relational, 
intratrinitarian fellowship among Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, who together are the one 
God. In this way, God is love within the divine reality, and in this sense, through all 
eternity God is the social Trinity, the community of love.”40 
 We now move from this articulation of Grenz’s social trinitarianism which 
immediately precedes and informs Social God to his chapter one discussion of the 
twentieth century trinitarian renewal.41 In this chapter – titled: “From the One Subject to 
                                                             
“Uncreated and Created Relations,” in Revisioning, Renewing, Rediscovering the Triune Center, 92 draws a 
similar connection saying, “‘God is love’ is the perichoretic relations, as Augustine so well perceives.” 
37 See TCG, 69–72, RET, 186–7, and SGRS, 315–16, 327 for his dependence on Augustine in conceiving 
the Spirit as the bond of love, communion, or mutual love between the Father and the Son. See Augustine, 
The Trinity, The Works of Saint Augustine, I/5, trans. Edmund Hill, ed. John E. Rotelle (New York, NY: New 
City Press, 1991), 5.11; 6.5.7; 6.10; 15.17.27–9, 31; 15.17.26; and 15.19.37 for the sections Grenz cites. Cf. Sexton, The 
Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 63–4, 77–86, 99–111. See also chapter three, footnote 180. 
38 BF, 181–2. 
39 BF, 182. See Colin Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 89–
91. Gunton states that Richard provides “an approach to the doctrine of the Trinity that contains possibilities 
for the development of a relational view of the person." (91) Grenz provides a similar critique with the help 
of Richard in SGRS, 31. Cf. Thiselton, The Hermeneutics of Doctrine, 237–8. 
40 BF, 195. In MQ the “social Trinity” is “the eternal community of Father, Son, and Spirit.” (238) 
Grenz also states, “God is love within himself: The Father loves the Son; the Son reciprocates that love; and 
this love between the Father and the Son is the Holy Spirit. In short, through all eternity God is the social 
Trinity, the community of love.” (TCG, 72) This statement of Grenz’s social trinitarianism evinces the 
Augustinian posture present in both SGRS and NGQB (along with influence from key Eastern figures). On 
this same page Grenz refers to triune love as the “inner dynamic of God” and as “the fundamental divine 
attribute.” See chapter eight of SGRS (in particular 313–22) for a similar treatment. 
41 Not only does Grenz expand chapter one of SGRS into RTG, but the chapter on the Trinity in BF, 
169–202 presents similar research in an earlier form (see especially 183–192) and intimates much of the 
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the Three Persons” – Grenz surveys the landscape of contemporary trinitarian theology in 
search for resources to facilitate his theological anthropological aims of developing a 
trinitarian theology of the imago Dei. He moves from Hegel setting the stage for trinitarian 
renewal; to Karl Barth’s revelational trinitarianism reasserting the centrality of the Trinity; 
to Karl Rahner’s assertion that the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity and vice 
versa (Rahner’s Rule), setting the terms for subsequent theological discussion; to Jürgen 
Moltmann’s trinitarian eschatological panentheism.42 However, while recognizing the 
contributions of these figures, it is the reciprocal relational trinitarianism of Pannenberg,43 
John Zizioulas’ notion of “being as communion,”44 and Catherine LaCugna’s identification 
of “personhood as communion”45 which hold the most promise for Grenz’s aims.46  
 Grenz notes that “the development of a trinitarian theology rooted in a connection 
between God and history to which Barth gave impetus and which Moltmann fosters, finds 
its most systematic expression in Pannenberg's work.”47 Pannenberg sought to give priority 
to the three divine persons over that of the divine unity as in much of classical theology. In 
pursuit of this goal he focused on God’s self-revelation in Christ. For Pannenberg this 
involves the full trinitarian revelation of Father, Son, and Spirit as they relate to each other 
                                                             
content of SGRS. Thus, a strong continuity of thought exists from TCG to BF to SGRS in Grenz’s development 
of a social and relational trinitarianism.   
42 SGRS, 23–46.  
43 SGRS, 46–50 See also Grenz, Reason for Hope, 57–102 and RTG, 88–106. 
44 SGRS, 50–3. See also RTG, 131–47. 
45 SGRS, 53–7. See also RTG, 147–162. 
46 SGRS, 46–57. Regarding Zizioulas and LaCugna, Grenz says: “Insofar as this emergent 
trinitarianism elevates the perichoretic life of the three persons as comprising the one God, the renewal of 
trinitarian theology entails a more profound understanding of God as inherently relational and dynamic.” 
(16) See also Jay Smith’s two-chapter discussion “Prolepsis and Perichoresis, Part I” (129–184) and “Prolepsis 
and Perichoresis: Part II” (185–218) in “A Generous Theology.” Smith indicates Grenz was likely substantively 
exposed to the notion of perichoretic relationality through Pannenberg. Smith notes perichoresis first 
appeared in Cappadocian Christology and was later applied to the Trinity by John of Damascus. Smith 
observes Zizioulas and LaCugna use the term frequently and he covers their impact on Grenz in a 
subsection, “Perichoresis: Grenz and the Social Trinitarians” (207–217). For a treatment that urges caution in 
applying perichoresis to created relations, see Charles Twombly, Perichoresis and Personhood: God, Christ, 
and Salvation in John of Damascus (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2015). For a careful but more positive 
assessment of applying perichoresis in this manner, see Richardson, “Uncreated and Created Perichoretic 
Relations,” 79–94. 
47 SGRS, 46. For discussions of Pannenberg’s trinitarian theology, see Roger E. Olson, “Trinity and 
Eschatology: The Historical Being of God in Jürgen Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg,” Scottish Journal of 
Theology 36.2 (May 1983), 213–27 and Olson, “Wolfhart Pannenberg’s Doctrine of Trinity,” Scottish Journal of 
Theology 43.2 (May 1990), 175–206. 
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in the outworking of salvation-history and by which they show themselves to be mutually 
dependent on each other through their reciprocal relational self-differentiation in their 
mutual self-giving. Furthermore, Pannenberg’s Principle declares that God’s being, his very 
deity, is linked with his rulership over the world.48 The Son not only receives all things 
from the Father in the Spirit, but the Father’s kingdom and deity are as well ontologically 
dependent on the Son in the Spirit, meaning that the Son and the Father are also 
reciprocally dependent on the Spirit for their respective triune personhood.49 For 
Pannenberg, the Father, Son, and Spirit each receive their being or divinity as a “person-in-
relationship” with the other two. In this way, Grenz notes that Pannenberg located the 
divine unity of the triune God in the mutual relations of the three divine persons as they 
are revealed in salvation-history, and established that the category of relation is not 
merely external but constitutive of the divine essence.50 
 Grenz presents Zizioulas and LaCugna as important voices, one Eastern and the 
other Western, who have fostered the Eastern trinitarian insights of the Cappadocian 
Fathers51 in the contemporary theological discussion. Zizioulas’ main insight extends from 
what he has called the “Cappadocian Contribution”52 and has been so influential as to give 
the title of his book, Being as Communion,53 the status of a methodological axiom Grenz 
dubbed the “Zizioulas Dictum.”54 In moving communion to the center of trinitarian 
                                                             
48 “Pannenberg’s Principle” was so named in Olson, “Wolfhart Pannenberg’s Doctrine of the 
Trinity,” 199. 
49 Grenz echoes this in TCG, 68. 
50 See Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 1:259–336 (volume one, chapter five) for his discussion of 
the “The Trinitarian God” and 1:337–448 (volume one, chapter six) on “The Unity and Attributes of the Divine 
Essence.” Grenz also notes that while he does not reject perichoresis per se, “Pannenberg notes (contra 
Moltmann's use of the term) that it was never intended to account for the unity of the divine essence (the 
use to which Moltmann puts it) but presupposes that unity on the basis of the origin of the Son and the 
Spirit in the Father.” (SGRS, 49) For a more positive take on Moltmann’s use of perichoresis, see Kurt Anders 
Richardson, “Moltmann’s Communitarian Trinity,” in Jürgen Moltmann and Evangelical Theology: A Critical 
Engagement, ed. Sung Wook Chung (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2012), 17–39. 
51 In SGRS, 51 Grenz cites Gunton, “We have seen that the achievement of the Cappadocians . . . was 
to create a new conception of the being of God, in which God’s being was seen to consist in personal 
communion.” (The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 53) 
52 See John D. Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness: Further Studies in Personhood and the Church, 
ed. Paul McPartlan (London: T&T Clark, 2006), 155–177. 
53 John D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (Crestwood, NY: St. 
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985).  
54 RTG, 134–5, 141–3, 148, 219. 
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theology as a fully ontological category, Zizioulas credits the Cappadocians with 
introducing a far reaching insight. In a Greek and Roman context in which relation was 
something additional to one’s nature (or hypostasis), these Greek Fathers identified for the 
first time the Greek term hypostasis, which until this point was synonymous with ousia, 
with the term prosopon. By making this connection, Zizioulas declares they effectively 
transformed “person” into the constitutive aspect of being, making being itself relational. 
The result in Zizioulas’ words is, “to be and to be in relation become identical.”55 Zizioulas 
pairs the notion of hypostasis (personhood as relation) with that of ekstasis, that is, a 
movement of self-giving towards self-transcendence in a movement of communion with 
the other, to develop a fully formed view of personhood.56 Grenz notes the connection of 
ekstasis to love, in which “love is the expression of communion, for in love persons exist in 
ekstatic relationship.” Thus Grenz finds Zizioulas concluding from the Johannine 
declaration “God is love,” that “love does not emerge out of the divine substance, but 
constitutes that substance; love is what ‘makes God what he is, the one God.’”57 Within the 
dynamic interplay of hypostasis and ekstasis, personhood is comprised of the co-inherence 
of communion and otherness in which “the being of the divine persons is constituted by 
the communion or relationality they enjoy.”58 Zizioulas has elevated love and communion 
to ontological status, such that there can be no true being or personhood without 
constitutive, self-giving, ekstatic communion.59 
                                                             
55 Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 88. Emphasis original. SGRS, 52; RTG, 136; NGQB, 299–303. 
56 SGRS, 52 and RTG 141–2. Cf. Aristotle Papanikolaou, Being with God: Trinity, Apophaticism, and 
Divine-Human Communion (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 2006), 86–8, 142–6. 
57 Quotes from RTG, 141 where Grenz cites Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 46. See also SGRS, 52–3. 
58 SGRS, 52. Kurt Anders Richardson comments in Grenzian fashion: “In God's eternally 
interpenetrating, mutually containing ‘persons’ we are given to know the richness of being in eternal 
relations of the one God. The normativity of the term ‘perichoresis’ is such because it appropriately conveys 
the knowledge of God, not only as God's eternal sociality or having a capacity for relationship, but because 
God, who is love, is ontologically the basis for relationality itself.” (“Uncreated and Created Perichoretic 
Relations,” 83) 
59 See Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 15–26, 27–49, 83–9; Zizioulas, "Human Capacity and Human 
Incapacity: A Theological Exploration of Personhood," Scottish Journal of Theology 28.5 (October 1975), 401–
48; Zizioulas, "The Doctrine of the Holy Trinity: The Significance of the Cappadocian Contribution," in 
Trinitarian Theology Today: Essays on Divine Being and Act, ed. Christoph Schwöbel (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1995), 44–60; and Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness, 88–9. While borrowing widely from Zizioulas 
concerning personhood and communion, Grenz ultimately demurs from Zizioulas’ central notion of the 
“Father-caused communion of the three persons” and the divine monarchy. (RTG, 142–7) See also Sexton, 
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 Moving to LaCugna, Grenz notes: “Zizioulas' dictum – namely, that the divine 
being is constituted by the communion of the three trinitarian persons – lies at the heart 
of LaCugna's work.”60 She combines Zizioulas’ dictum with aspects of Barth’s revelational 
insights, Rahner’s Rule, trinitarian history in Moltmann and Pannenberg, and her own 
methodological principle of the inseparability of theology proper and soteriology. In 
formulating her principle, LaCugna held that God in se or ad intra comprises a mystery 
since all that can be known of God is based on the economy of salvation, meaning all 
theology is therefore defined by its relation to salvation-history.61 This principle then, the 
“LaCugna Corollary,”62 holds that God-in-salvation (reworked as oikonomia) and God-in-
eternity (reworked as theologia) are inseparable and intertwined.63 However, trinitarian 
doctrine for LaCugna is not ultimately about the mysterious inner divine life but about 
“God-for-us.” Therefore, this maxim serves to recover the Trinity as a teaching about “God’s 
life with us and our life with each other.”64 Important for Grenz here is what lies behind this 
oikonomic trinitarianism; namely, the ontology of personhood as communion LaCugna 
adapted from Zizioulas. Grenz observes, along with Mark Medley, that LaCugna found 
person and not substance to be the “cause, origin, and end” of God and all that exists. 
Thus, the ultimate source of everything that exists is not a “by-itself” or “in-itself,” but a 
“toward another.”65 So when LaCugna issues her declaration that “Trinitarian life is also our 
                                                             
The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 94 and Alan J. Torrance, Persons in Community: An Essay on 
Human Description and Human Participation (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 289–94 which Grenz cites. 
60 SGRS, 53. See also Catherine M. LaCunga, God for Us: The Trinity and the Christian Life (New York, 
NY: HaperOne, 1991), 1–8, 13, 21–44, 70, 196, 209–228, 250, 290–3, 300–5, 390–1, 400 and LaCugna, “God in 
Communion with Us: The Trinity,” in Freeing Theology: The Essentials of Theology in Feminist Perspective, ed. 
Catherine M. LaCugna (New York, NY: HarperOne, 1993), 83–114. 
61 SGRS, 53–4. 
62 Peters, God as Trinity, 124. 
63 RTG, 152–5. However, note Grenz’s ultimate objection to LaCugna’s proposal to dismiss talk of the 
“economic” and “immanent” Trinity in favor of theologia (God in se) and oikonomia (soteriology). He judges 
this effectively subsumes theologia under oikonomia, collapsing the immanent Trinity into the economic 
Trinity – seemingly making our experience in salvation (oikonomia) the end and perhaps even substance for 
the doctrine of the Trinity (theologia), rather than simply the epistemological starting point for the 
knowledge of God (a la the Grenz Grundaxion). (SGRS, 53–7 and RTG, 158–162, 220) Cf. Sexton, The 
Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 94–5 and Kärkkäinen, The Trinity: Global Perspectives, 178–93. 
64 SGRS, 55 citing LaCugna, God for Us, 228. Emphasis original. RTG, 157. 
65 RTG, 157–8 and Mark S. Medley, Imago Trinitatis: Toward a Relational Understanding of Becoming 
Human (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002), 27, 40. Grenz characterizes Medley’s study as a 
more postmodern articulation of LaCugna’s God for Us. 
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life,”66 personhood (human or divine) comes to mean “to be for and from another.”67 Grenz 
notes that while she, unlike Zizioulas, problematically moves from human personhood to 
the divine persons, the result is still “an ontology that elevates person-in-communion” 
which is “reminiscent of Zizioulas’ language of ekstasis and hypostasis.”68 With what Grenz 
heralds as the “triumph of the divine persons”69 and the “triumph of relationality,”70 the 
stage is set for Grenz’s recasting of a trinitarian theology of the imago Dei. Grenz declares, 
[T]he rebirth of trinitarian theology has opened the door for the doctrine of God, 
understood now as the delineation of the relationality of the trinitarian persons, to 
take its rightful role within anthropology, which role it had abdicated to the 
human sciences. In short, the retrieval of the doctrine of the Trinity has paved the 
way for a fully theological anthropology.”71 
 
The Postmodern Condition of the Self 
The task of theology is bound up with the conversational nature of Grenz’s 
trialogue of sources72 that represents a critical, constructive reflection on the “faith, life, 
and practices of the Christian community” as well as the prevailing thought forms of the 
social-historical culture and context in which the church is embedded.73 The purpose for 
this is the setting forth of a coherent articulation of the Christian belief mosaic “indicative 
of the [postmodern] context in which the contemporary church is called to live and 
minister today.”74 After setting the trinitarian theological stage, Grenz now seeks an 
understanding of the narrative represented by the turn to the (individual) subject. Here 
we trace some of the prominent ideas within Grenz’s study of the rise (chapter two) and 
the demise (chapter three) of the self from modernity to postmodernity. 
                                                             
66 LaCugna, God for Us, 228. Emphasis original. 
67 SGRS, 55. 
68 SGRS, 55–7 (55). Note that LaCugna’s method of moving from human personhood to divine 
personhood ultimately runs counter to Grenz’s theo-anthropology and trinitarian theo-ontology. 
69 SGRS, 57. 
70 RTG, chapter four. 
71 SGRS, 16 (see also 57). This will ultimately take the form of a theo-anthropology in which divine, 
triune being is constitutive of human being ecclesially “in Christ” and “through the Spirit.” 
72 See RTC, 214–25; SG, ix–x. 
73 BF, 17–18. 
74 SGRS, ix–x. From his desire for an articulation of the Christian belief mosaic in the postmodern 
context, Grenz gleans the series title “The Matrix of Christian Theology” of which SGRS and NGQB were the 
only two instalments. Grenz also refers to these volumes as “a delineation of the matrix of postmodern 
Christian theology.” (x)  
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Chapter two is titled “From Interiority to Psychotherapy: An Archeology of the 
Self.”75 Grenz notes the term “self” is part of the standard grammar of contemporary 
culture. More particularly, the self is a modern construct with a distinctive focus on 
interiority.76 However, the self does not appear out of vacuum, but has itself a story. Grenz 
begins this story with Augustine’s turn inward and Boethius’ introduction of the 
individual. While motivated by the Greek dictum “know thyself,” Augustine also 
proceeded with the assumption of “faith seeking understanding” and conviction that 
turning inward leads to knowledge of God.77 Augustine’s appeal to the cogito paves the 
way for what Charles Taylor calls “the stance of radical reflexivity or adopting the first-
person standpoint.”78 Grenz summarizes, “Augustine viewed the inward call as none other 
than God's own voice inviting him to cling to the divine unity and thereby to find the unity 
of his own life restored in God. In short, he was convinced that the inward journey marks 
the pathway to God.”79 Boethuis’ contribution comes from his attempt to defend against 
Nestorianism and Eutychianism. Both of these seemingly opposite Christological positions 
mistakenly linked “person” and “nature” too closely for Boethuis. To combat these errors, 
he distinguished between nature and person in which a person (hypostasis) represents the 
individual substance of a rational nature.80 “By connecting person with unique identity – 
that is, with being an individual – Boethuis paved the way for the expressivist concept of 
the self that eventually came to full flower in the Romantic movement.”81 
Before the Romantics however, came the Enlightenment conception of the self as 
an abiding, stable, rational reality that is essentially constitutive of the individual – the 
“world-mastering self”82 and the “self-mastering self.” The world-mastering self finds its 
genesis in René Descartes, who in his quest for ultimate certitude for rational knowledge, 
                                                             
75 SGRS, 58–97. See also Grenz’s summary of this chapter in “Social God,” 71–4. 
76 SGRS, 58–60. Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 111–3. 
77 SGRS, 60–4. 
78 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 130–31. 
79 Grenz, “Social God,” 72. Grenz also states: “Gunton goes so far as to claim that the development of 
the individualistic concept of person which emerged out of Augustine’s approach ‘has had . . . disastrous 
effects on modern Western thought.’” (Quoting Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 95) 
80 SGRS, 65–7. 
81 SGRS, 67. 
82 SGRS, 67–77. 
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invoked his famous cogito, ergo sum.83 Descartes’ notion of the rational subject was further 
refined by John Locke’s “disengaged self” in which the self is comprised of one’s inner 
consciousness constructed by the passive mind, as well as Immanuel Kant’s “universal self” 
in which the search for ultimate rationality elevates the autonomous individual to 
transcendental proportions thus inaugurating “the advent of radical individualism.”84 In 
Grenz’s telling, the Enlightenment world-mastering self is the inner, active, rational agent 
in world-mastery established through instrumental reason, which takes charge of its world 
so as to be self-constitutive and self-determining. This is paralleled in the Puritans, Pietists, 
and subsequent revivalists by the advent of the self-mastering religious self.85 Grenz 
contends that in these post-Reformation theological movements the Enlightenment 
instrumental stance toward the world also realized a spiritual purpose; namely, the 
assurance of true conversion, elect status, and salvation.86 In pursuit of this assurance, the 
task of self-mastery became a religious vocation.87 
 In the wake of the world-mastering and self-mastering self comes the “self-
sufficient”88 and “self-constructing” self as modern psychology takes up its role as the 
instrumental science of the psyche. Grenz begins this portion of the narrative with the first 
American psychologist, William James,89 who rejected substantialist ideas such as the soul 
or ego, instead favoring a functionalist psychology of the mind as a “stream of 
consciousness.” James postulated a distinction between the “me” (the objective, empirical 
self) and the “I” (the passing, subjective self, conscious of itself) such that the “I” becomes a 
                                                             
83 SGRS, 77–86. While acknowledging Augustine and Descartes (unintentionally) had a hand in the 
trajectory that leads to the modern self, both assumed a theistic context in which the turn inward was 
nevertheless oriented toward “faith seeking understanding” and knowledge of God. On Descartes’ relation to 
Augustine, see Stephen Menn, Descartes and Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). See 
also Michael Allen Gillespie, The Theological Origins of Modernity (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 
2008), 170–206 concerning “Descartes’ Path to Truth.” 
84 SGRS, 76. See also Grenz, “Social God,” 71–2. 
85 SGRS, 78–82. See RTC, 55–60 and 298–303 for Grenz’s sketch of these themes in relation to 
convertive piety, experimental piety, and ecclesiology. 
86 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 231. 
87 SGRS, 82–6. Grenz, “Social God,” 73. The religious aspect had never faded fully from view, though 
in the contested space of Western culture the influence of “secular” paradigms on even religious selfhood is 
evident here. 
88 SGRS, 86–97. 
89 Michael Wetheimer, A Brief History of Psychology (New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 
1970), 45. 
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transient, fleeting sense of self-consciousness. The self then is self-creating as the 
successive “I’s” give shape to the stream of consciousness. Grenz notes that while Jamesian 
functionalism threatened to eclipse the self, his emphasis on individuality instead brought 
about its reemergence and set the stage for what can be called “self-psychology.”90 
Following James came Gordon Allport, Erik Erikson, and Erich Fromm,91 each of whom 
contributed to what Robert Bellah calls “the therapeutic self.”92 Maybe the most well 
known in this trajectory is Abraham Maslow, who declared the human ideal to be “self-
actualization,”93 at the heart of which is his famous “hierarchy of needs.”94 Any sort of 
thwarting of the actualization of the inner self is to be deemed pathological.95 The rise of 
psychology as the queen of the sciences marks the move from self-mastery as a religious 
vocation aided by divine grace, to one of secularized self-mastery aided by psychological 
therapy. The result is the ascendency of the therapeutic self and “the triumph of the 
therapeutic”96 in which the highest value is freedom to actualize or mold oneself.97 
The modern notion of the self emerged from the 1,500-year journey from 
Augustine to Maslow. The result was a self-sufficient, self-constructing, and centered (as 
well as self-centering) self, thought to constitute a stable identity in a chaotic world. Grenz 
notes, however, that this kingdom of the (individual) self would be short lived as the 
“centered self of the modern era appears to be one of the casualties of the post-modern 
dethroning of all ruling monarchs.”98 Grenz narrates the sabotaging of the self in chapter 
three, “From Autobiography to Preference: The Undermining of the Self.”99 Grenz notes an 
alternative trajectory developed which fixed attention on a particular rather than 
universal self, a self-focused self which emerges not through self-mastery but self-
                                                             
90 SGRS, 88–92. 
91 SGRS, 93–5. 
92 Robert N. Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (New 
York, NY: Harper and Row, 1986), 127. 
93 Abraham H. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, Second edition (New York, NY: D. Van 
Nostrand, 1968), vi–vii and 189–90. 
94 Abraham H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1954), 80–92. 
95 SGRS, 93–6.  
96 SGRS, 96–7. See also Philip Rieff, The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith After Freud (New 
York, NY: Harper and Row, 1966), 5. 
97 Grenz, “Social God,” 74. 
98 SGRS, 97. 
99 SGRS, 98–137. See also Grenz’s summary of this chapter in “Social God,” 74–77. 
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expression. The process of self-completion through self-expression, self-exploration, and 
inner self-awareness yields what can be called “the autobiographical self” created by 
Michel de Montaigne.100 Similarly, Jean-Jacques Rousseau began writing autobiography to 
uncover the particular nature that made him a unique self, which at the same time he 
regarded as the intrinsically good soul of humanity. Moving further toward the goal of self-
expression though were the Romantic expressivists, who stood as the heirs to Montaigne 
and Rousseau.101 In Grenz’s words, “The Romantic vision was driven by the belief that 
ultimate reality, viewed as the cosmic self, is intricately connected with the individual self 
and that the world is in some profound sense the creation of the self.”102 
Though highly centered, the Romantic self-expressive and self-reliant self, built on 
the pre-reflective plane of “feeling,” lacked stability.103 Having rejected Enlightenment 
reason as constitutive of the human essence, the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century German idealists looked to the willful self as the world-constructing self. The 
result was a crisis of the self as Arthur Schopenhauer concluded the universal will was 
irrational and impersonal and Friedrich Nietzsche declared that human culture was 
underwritten by the will to power. The Vienna modernists amplified this crisis, illustrated 
in the way Freudian psychoanalysis undercut the idea of a permanent, unitary self marked 
by continuity and cohesion. The modernists still sought an inner depth, but the casting 
aside of the centered self and the disintegration of the willful self yielded a frustrated free-
floating self.104 The tools for further demolition were provided by Ferdinand de Saussure’s 
structural linguistics and structuralist anthropologists such as Claude Levi-Strauss,105 who 
“dissolved the self into the structures of the social realm without and the brain within.”106  
Structuralism though was merely the death gurgle of modernism. Grenz credits 
the completion of the postmodern turn to Michel Foucault’s injunction to leave behind 
                                                             
100 SGRS, 100–4. Taylor, Sources of the Self, 181. 
101 SGRS, 104–9. 
102 Grenz, “Social God,” 75. 
103 SGRS, 109–17. In fact, the stable modern self seems to have never been anything more than a 
chimera, and in some ways we have a revisiting of Augustine’s fragmentation of the self. 
104 SGRS, 117–28. 
105 SGRS, 128–30. 
106 Grenz, “Social God,” 76. 
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any pretense of neutrality and the contention that subjectivity comes from the 
internalization of a myriad of social determinants that govern how people live, think, and 
speak, thus extending Nietzsche’s “death of God” metaphor to the death of the self.107 The 
postmodern ethos is thus characterized by the demise, dissolution, deconstruction, and 
perhaps even the destruction of the (modern) self. Nevertheless, the postmodern 
condition is not left in a state of pure self-lessness. A narrative “self” yet remains who 
receives its “plot” from the social location, cultural context, and community of reference in 
which it is embedded. There remains as well the socially constructed “self” which exists in 
a nexus108 and “web of interlocution”109 that looks to possibly ephemeral relationality for 
the creation of identity. This situation presents peril, at least potentially, in that the 
postmodern moment nets a highly unstable and “chaotic self” prone to psychic 
fragmentation.110 However, in Grenz’s perspective, the postmodern condition of the self 
presents opportunity and promise as it also opens the door to the suitable occasion for the 
development of a fully theological anthropology.111 
 
Revisioning the Imago Dei112 
Grenz now works toward the development of his imago Dei theology with a 
consideration in Social God of the divine image in relation to the church’s theological 
                                                             
107 SGRS, 130–3. Grenz, “Social God,” 76. See also David Couzens Hoy, "Foucault: Modern or 
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112 See Grenz’s prior and similar treatments of the imago Dei in SE, 44–52; MQ, 146–7, 238, 277, 261, 
268, 275, 294–5, 298–9; Grenz, “The Imago Dei and the Dissipation of the Self,” 182–7; RTC, 104, 221, 290, 330–
1; and BF, 180–2, 192–3, 197–202, 228, 238. TCG, 168–80 prefigures his treatment here and presents the imago 
Dei as a special standing, a special fellowship, an eschatological reality, and a special community. 
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deposit (chapter four),113 Christology (chapter five),114 and eschatology (chapter six).115 This 
section presents an overview of the major themes in these chapters.116 Having traced the 
inward centering of the self in the trajectory from Augustine to Maslow, and its 
decentering from Montaigne to Foucault, Grenz now seek to revision the imago Dei in 
light of the “postmodern anthropological problematic”117 in order to foster “the 
reconstruction of the self in the wake of its dissipation.”118 Chapter four, “From Structure to 
Destiny: The Imago Dei in Christian Theology,” surveys the theological tradition, which has 
historically looked to the divine image as the locus for human identity. Though exegetes 
have disagreed about the particulars, one common feature encountered as the theological 
tradition came into contact with Western philosophical trends is the regarding of the 
divine image in a highly individualized fashion. Thus the divine image has come to be 
understood as either a structure of rational human nature or the individual’s relational 
standing before God.119  
Grenz locates the genesis of the structural imago in the Aristotelian view of the 
human as a “rational animal,” so influential that the church fathers took for granted the 
divine image was a rational capacity involving the exercise of reason and the will.120 Grenz 
develops this in a study of Irenaeus, regarded as the origin of the patristic distinction 
between the “image” and “likeness” of God from Genesis 1:26, wherein while the “likeness” 
was lost, the “image” (inclusive of human reason and will) remains after the fall. However, 
Grenz also notes Irenaeus’ multifaceted and eschatologically orientated view of the image 
as similitudo Dei focused on Christ himself as the true imago.121 Grenz then briefly traces 
Clement of Alexandria, Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa, and Cyril of Alexandria who differed 
in details but were widely influenced by Irenaeus, also casting the imago Dei as a rational 
                                                             
113 SGRS, 141–82. 
114 SGRS, 183–222. 
115 SGRS, 223–264. 
116 See Grenz’s own summarization in “Social God,” 77–85. 
117 SGRS, 142. 
118 Grenz, “Social God,” 78. 
119 SGRS, 142. 
120 SGRS, 143–4. 
121 SGRS, 144–8. 
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capacity.122 The structural imago, though, found its solidification in Augustine (who 
posited a unitary view of the rational soul as the image of God oriented toward love of, 
knowledge of, and communion with the triune God),123 and flowered in medieval theology 
under Aquinas (who more fully individualized and intellectualized the divine image).124 
The structural view, however, came under attack from the Protestant Reformers. 
This yielded a relational understanding which shifted the focus from noun to verb, and in 
which humans “image” God as an act versus possessing the image as a structure. Luther 
and Calvin both disparaged the distinction between image and likeness as well as held 
that the divine image was lost through sin. Luther held that restoration was found in 
relationship to God through the Word and Spirit. Calvin constructed a dynamic view of 
the divine image as the mirror of the divine, dependent on one’s relation to God, and 
restored through divine grace.125 Despite the introduction of relational themes in the 
Reformation, the structural view still remained dominant in modern theology, with the 
relational view offering only a minority report (and remaining highly individualized).126 
Grenz though suggests a third view, that of the divine image as goal and destiny, or an 
eschatological, telic imago,127 stating, “The concept of the imago Dei as destiny, which 
views humans as a history or a narrative, provides the hermeneutical perspective for 
constructive theological engagement with the contemporary context.”128 
Chapter five, “From Humankind to the True Human: The Imago Dei and Biblical 
Christo-Anthropology,” is the middle chapter in the middle portion of the book, acting as a 
Christological fulcrum for Social God. Thus, Grenz does not move to develop his 
suggestion of an eschatological imago immediately. Instead, while noting Claus 
Westermann’s observation that the “most striking statement” of the first Genesis creation 
                                                             
122 SGRS, 149–52. Though the patristics tended to also share Irenaeus’ Christological imago Dei focus, 
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that in his later writings this was overshadowed by the view of the divine image as a rational structure of the 
soul. 
124 SGRS, 157–61. 
125 SGRS, 161–70. 
126 SGRS, 170–7. 
127 SGRS, 177–82. 
128 Grenz, “Social God,” 78. 
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narrative “is that God created human beings in his image,”129 Grenz nevertheless chooses 
what for him is the requisite path that extends beyond creation and leads through a 
biblical, New Testament Christology. Therefore, Grenz presents a survey of biblical texts 
that trace salvation-history from creation, through Christ, and then on to the 
eschatological horizon of the new creation.130 Through this survey, we discover that though 
effaced, the creational divine image is filled with and points toward Christological as well 
as proleptic eschatological hope. 
Grenz begins with an exegetical survey of Genesis 1:26–27. Contrary to patristic 
and medieval voices, Grenz notes the contemporary exegetical consensus that selem 
(image) and demut (likeness) are synonymous, parallel terms. The Hebrew imago Dei is 
likely borrowed from the royal, kingship ideology of Israel’s Near Eastern neighbors.131 
Grenz surveys possibilities for the content of the concept; namely, the imago Dei as 
similarity, counterpart, dominion, and representation.132 Grenz cautions against a one-
dimensional view, but still regards representation as the likely heart of the concept, 
wherein an image was thought to represent or even mediate the presence of a physically 
absent god or king.133 By extension, the divine image herein indicates that humankind in 
some way represents and “mediates within creation the immanence of the transcendent 
Creator.”134 Moreover, as a counter-myth, the imago Dei undermined the exclusive 
individuality of the royal image. Instead, the divine image references humankind 
(evidenced by the corporate term adam in Genesis 1:26–27) and “humans-in-relationship” 
(suggested by creation as “male and female”). “Rather than embodying a ‘democratization’ 
of the royal ideology, therefore, the first creation narrative effects a universalizing of the 
divine image.”135 
                                                             
129 Claus Westermann, Genesis: An Introduction, trans. John J. Scullion (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress 
Press, 1992), 111. 
130 Grenz, “Social God,” 79. 
131 SGRS, 184–92. 
132 SGRS, 192–9. 
133 SGRS, 200–3. Grenz cites, Phyllis A. Bird, “‘Male and Female He Created Them’: Genesis 1:27b in 
the Context of the Priestly Account of Creation,” Harvard Theological Review 74 (1981), 137–8, 141, 157, 159 in 
his discussion. 
134 Grenz, “Social God,” 79. 
135 Grenz, “Social God,” 80. SGRS, 201. 
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The full meaning of the divine image though moves “from a creatio-centric to a 
christocentric anthropology.”136 Drawing on the pervading New Testament “glory-
christology,”137 Grenz looks to 2 Corinthians 4:4–6 in which Christ as the image of God 
radiates the glory of God. Herein, Grenz identifies a narrative focus displayed within an 
allusion to humankind as the divine image in Genesis, understood only in light of Christ, 
the second Adam. The narrative focus gets stronger in Colossians 1:15–20 where Christ, as 
eikon theou, is the “firstborn of all creation” (v. 15) and “firstborn from the dead” (v. 18) 
oriented toward reconciling all creation (v. 20). Thus only within the narrative of Jesus as 
the true imago can salvation history and humankind created in the divine image be 
properly understood. As well, Hebrews 1:1–4 declares the final superiority of Christ. 
Specifically, Hebrews 1:3 fashions Jesus as the reflection of God’s glory and imprint of God’s 
being thereby fusing glory and image language. Moreover, Christ himself is the impress 
according to whom those stamped with the divine image are conformed.138 Within New 
Testament narrative Christology, it is through his embodied work in salvation history “that 
Jesus Christ fully reveals God, and thereby is the imago Dei in fulfillment of Genesis 1:26–
27, as he redeems humankind.”139 
According to the Christocentric perspective of the New Testament, the Genesis 
narrative points to the revelation of the nature and glory of God in Jesus Christ as the 
image of God. In addition to this reality, Jesus is the head of a new humanity destined to 
be conformed to his image. Thus chapter six is titled, “From Eschatological Hope to 
Ongoing Task: The Imago Dei and the New Humanity.” Grenz continues his exegetical 
survey, now in relation to the image of God and the eschatological hope. First, Grenz’s 
exegesis finds that Romans 8:29 contains an eschatological orientation found in the 
certainty of being “in Christ” and imprinted with “the image of the Son” for the purpose of 
achieving the divinely given goal from the beginning – that Christ will become the 
preeminent head of the new (ecclesial) humanity conformed to and participating in the 
                                                             
136 Grenz, “Social God,” 80. 
137 SGRS, 203–12. 
138 SGRS, 212–22. Grenz also highlights these three scriptures in “Social God,” 80–1. 
139 This quote appears in SGRS, 222 and Grenz, “Social God,” 82. 
 70 
imago Christi.140 Next, 1 Corinthians 15:49 as Romans 8:29’s “essential commentary”141 
connects the imago Christi with the resurrected new humanity via an Adam-Christ 
typology and a correlate last-Adam Christology. Thus Grenz explains that the first-Adam 
was not God’s final intention for humankind created imago Dei. Rather the divine destiny 
finds completion in the advent of the new humanity who shares in the resurrection of the 
last-Adam, thus bearing the image of Christ as the true image of God.142 
The image of God thus conceived, however, is not only a future goal within the 
glorified new humanity, but in a proleptic fashion comprises a present reality as the new 
humanity already shares in the imago Dei through being “in Christ,” which Grenz sees as 
explicit in 2 Corinthians 3:18. Moreover, Grenz notes the participation which is marked by 
the present sharing is also a process of progressive transformation. Further, this takes 
place not through an individualistic process but within the constituting of a new 
community of those who share in the Spirit, thus realizing the original design of creation 
in God’s image as persons-in-community.143 Finally, those sharing in the divine image as a 
process in the present also carry the imago Dei as an ethical imperative or task in the 
present. Colossians 3:9–11 presents being “in Adam” and “in Christ” as two distinct 
narrative realities and ways of living, with “in Christ” representing the communal life 
appropriate to the new humanity. Similarly, Ephesians 4:17–24 forms an echo of this 
passage as those redeemed “in Christ” through the Spirit are exhorted to put on the “new 
human,”144 revealing a corporate focus in which the new ecclesial community comprises a 
“life patterned after God’s”145 life of righteousness and holiness.146 
 
                                                             
140 SGRS, 224–33. 
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The Social Imago, Community, and Eschatological Prolepsis 
The preceding overview summarized Grenz’s narrative of the journey from the 
postmodern context marked by the loss of the centered self, through the history of the 
individualized imago in theological anthropology as a rational structural possession and 
relational capacity, to a survey of biblical texts from the Old Testament creation of 
humanity as the imago Dei to the goal of the New Testament interpretation of this idea in 
the new humanity of the new creation. A Christocentric, eschatologically oriented 
presentation of humankind destined to be the imago Dei emerged, achieving its telos in 
the new humanity headed by Christ as the true imago. Grenz now moves toward a 
reconstruction of the “self-in-community” by means of a trinitarian ontology of the 
“person-in-relationship” though a consideration of embodied human sexuality in chapter 
seven147 and the ecclesial self in chapter eight.148 
Chapter seven, “From the Eternal City to Primordial Garden: The Imago Dei and 
Human Sexuality,”149 takes a hermeneutical journey from new creation back to the Genesis 
creation narratives.150 Genesis 1:26–27 announces two anthropological themes – “the 
creation of humankind in the divine image and the creation of humans as sexually 
differentiated and hence relational creatures.”151 Grenz connects these with a reading of 
the two creation narratives together and in light of the biblical narrative as a whole. The 
second creation story, Genesis 2:18–25, reaches its high point with Adam’s declaration of 
“bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh” (v. 23) as the creation of the woman rescues him 
from his solitude. The sexual character of Adam’s isolation is revealed in that only as he 
looks upon his female counterpart, ishshah, is he referred to as ish (“man” or “male”) and 
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not simply as adam (v. 18) or “earth creature.”152 Thus individual existence subsists in a 
sense of fundamental incompleteness or rather, to state it positively, an innate longing for 
relational completeness.153 Extending this further, Grenz states, “Sexuality is the sense of 
incompleteness together with the quest for wholeness that provides the impulse – the 
drive toward bonding.”154 In Genesis this dynamic finds its primal expression in the 
community of male and female in marriage, but only as the genesis toward broader 
human community. Read canonically, the goal of embodied sexuality and the bonding 
impulse is the eschatological new humanity in relationship to God and all creation (the 
eternal city), of which the proleptic, penultimate foretaste is the ecclesial community.155 
Drawing on this insight, Grenz now declares that the relational self is sexual in 
that it consists of the “person-in-bonded-community.”156 Yet the question remains of how 
embodied human sexuality (creation as “male and female”) and the relational self relate to 
a trinitarian conception of the imago Dei. Grenz turns to the divine self address, “Let us 
make humankind in our image,” in Genesis 1:26.157 Grenz notes authorial intent is not 
proto-trinitarian, nor did the New Testament writers themselves draw a trinitarian 
inference. Nevertheless, following patristic through Reformational theological impulses, 
Grenz observes that the “vantage point of the post-Cappadocian hermeneutical trajectory 
facilitates Christians in seeing the triune God at work in the creation of humankind as 
male and female.”158 Grenz specifies that God remains beyond sexual distinctions, even as 
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the triune community acts as the transcendent ground of human community and imago 
Dei relationality.159 Thus the door opens to the suggestion that the interplay between 
creation in the divine (triune) image and the relationality endemic to human sexual 
differentiation reflects something about the triune Creator; namely, divine relationality.160 
Grenz now turns his attention toward Barth and expresses his appreciation of 
Barth’s I-Thou relationality and perception that the “sameness and difference” of male and 
female is present in a prior way in the triune God. He likewise credits Barth with ushering 
in the wide influence of the analogia relationis161 in contemporary theology. However, 
Grenz also avers from Barth, charging that Barth ultimately exchanges human sexuality as 
a mere symbol for the I-Thou, such that sexuality is eventually left behind. Grenz 
emphasizes that while marriage and genital sexual expression are limited to this age, 
embodied sexuality and the bonding dynamic are operative beyond eschatological 
culmination in constituting the new communal humanity of the new creation. Grenz also 
finds that Barth moves too quickly from male-female relationality to the divine 
prototype.162 Grenz contends that reading the creation narratives in light of the telos of the 
imago Dei indicates an intermediate step is needed which leads through “the church as the 
prolepsis of the new humanity, and the relational self as ultimately the ecclesial self.”163 
Grenz’s suggestions thus far yield the insight that the divine image does not reside 
in the individual per se, but rather in the relationality of persons-in-bonded-community. 
Chapter eight, “From the Many to the One: The Reconstruction of the Self-In-
Community,”164 sets forth “an ecclesial ontology of persons-in-community for the sake of 
the construction of the relational self as the ecclesial self” in which the ecclesial self is “the 
eschatological outworking of the divine love.”165 To facilitate his aim, Grenz begins with an 
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overview of the return of the concept of the social self. The philosophical genesis for the 
social self was William James’ distinction between the “me” and the “I”. However, Grenz 
finds that James’ proposal was marked by a lingering individualism. More promising in 
Grenz’s view is the social psychologist George Herbert Mead, who proposed that 
individual experience comes indirectly by means of one’s social group in which the “me” 
emerges from a dialog between the “I” and the social context. Thus, rather than a given 
prior to sociality, Mead pushed in the direction of viewing the self as an ongoing process, 
with a past and future that together forms a narrative.166 
Grenz now moves to a consideration of the ecclesial self, beginning with a 
discussion of the triune relationality standard for his social trinitarianism, in which 
perichoretic love expresses the dynamic of the divine life.167 God is love168 in that the divine 
essence is the agape that characterizes the divine life169 and in which “the triune God 
comprehends lover, beloved, and the shared love.”170 And perichoresis, stemming from the 
patristic appropriation of the idea as a Christological concept, speaks of the trinitarian 
relations as they “mutually inhere in one another, draw life from one another, ‘are’ what 
they are by relation to one another.”171 Thus the personhood of the divine three is 
relationally constituted as person-in-relationship to the other two, thus preserving the 
“otherness-in-relation”172 manifest in the unity of the one God and the particularity of the 
divine persons.173 The human goal to reflect the divine communal dynamic as the imago 
Dei forms the link connecting triune love and the ecclesial self.174 
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Grenz invokes Panayiotis Nellas’ insight that humans are “characterized 
fundamentally by the mystery of love” which impels them toward “communion.”175 From 
here Grenz draws on the Eastern theological tradition of deification (or theosis) as 
participation in the triune divine life.176 This participation occurs specifically extra se in 
Christo as the Spirit incorporates those “in Christ” into the Jesus story, which acts as the 
communal, identity producing narrative and “emplotment”177 of the ecclesial 
community.178 By means of (ecclesial) being “in Christ” through the “Person-love” and 
“Person-Gift” of the Spirit,179 members of the ecclesial community are brought into 
creaturely participation in the eternal relationship of the Father and Son, and thus triune 
participation in “the very perichoretic dynamic that characterizes the eternal divine life.”180 
Thus ecclesial existence is marked by trinitarian love as the mutual life of redeemed 
persons-in-community, “in Christ” and through the Spirit, is brought into being through 
participation in the “eternal reciprocal glorification” of the triune life.181 
Grenz’s refiguring of the imago Dei therefore yields a social imago in which 
personhood emerges not from an inward turn of the individual but is bound up with 
relationality.182 As the personhood of the triune members is constituted in their reciprocal 
relations, so the divine intent is that imago Dei relationality also be marked by an ontology 
of persons-in-community and ecclesial relation grounded in the divine life disclosed in 
Jesus Christ through the Spirit. Such a communal ontology yields an understanding of 
identity which leads to the ecclesial self marked by participation in the triune life.183 
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Though “ultimately eschatological, the deification that constitutes the self-in-community 
is proleptically present in the here and now” as a foretaste of the new humanity.184 As the 
Spirit constitutes the “self” of those “in Christ” (the ecclesial self) and thereby shapes the 
ecclesial community in the pattern of triune love, this Spirit generated inclusion in the 
perichoretic life marks a human “coming-to-representation” of triune relationality. This in 
turn constitutes the church ontologically to be the prolepsis of the divine image185 and sign 
of God’s way of being in creation as well as the dynamic of divine love. “In short, the 
indwelling Spirit leads and empowers the church to fulfill its divinely mandated calling to 
be a sacrament of trinitarian communion, a temporal, visible sign of the eternal, dynamic 
life of the triune God.”186 
 
Critical Detour: The Relational Self, Theo-Anthropology, and the Imago Dei 
Having now completed the “main road” of a summary of Grenz’s social trinitarian 
theology and the elucidation of his imago Dei theology leading to the social imago and 
ecclesial self, we can see the threefold grammar of Trinity, community, and eschatology at 
work all throughout Grenz’s theological anthropology and ecclesiology in Social God. We 
are working towards a consideration of Grenz’s social imago in relation to gender in the 
third section of this chapter. However, before doing that, we now embark on a critical 
detour in three parts. The first part details a series of recent critiques of the social Trinity. 
The second considers Ricoeur’s notion of the relational self as a critical supplementation 
to Grenz’s delination of the postmodern self. The third presents Grenz’s communal theo-
anthropology, both as an answer to aforementioned social trinitarian critiques and to 
chart the path into our discussion of the social imago and gender.  
 
Is God (Still) Social? 
The twentieth century trinitarian resurgence and its subsequent aftermath can in 
many respects be called the rise and demise of the social Trinity. Nuances vary, but the 
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story generally holds that at some point, usually in the medieval period, trinitarian dogma 
was suppressed in Western Christianity.187 Aquinas is often offered as a paradigmatic figure 
who, following in the trajectory left by Augustine, first speaks of De Deo uno, the one God, 
and only thereafter elucidates De Deo trino, the three-personed God. Subsequently, the 
Enlightenment saw the Trinity not simply obscured but as an outright embarrassment. 
The decline was so great that Ted Peters lamented that “trinitarian thinking has proved to 
be one of the best-kept secrets in theology during the last half of the twentieth century.”188 
However, Barth arrived on the scene and his determined Christocentric approach brought 
the Trinity back as a top priority. And while talk of God as a “divine society” appears 
earlier189 than Jürgen Moltmann’s190 popularizing of a social approach, after Barth he and 
others set about developing what became known as social trinitarianism. The paucity of 
trinitarian engagement soon shifted, such that David Cunningham quipped in 1998: “the 
phenomenon look[s] not so much like a renaissance as a bandwagon.”191 As noted at the 
beginning of this chapter, Grenz would offer his Social God volume (2001) three years after 
this statement by Cunningham and go on to produce his own full length treatment of the 
trinitarian resurgence in Rediscovering the Triune God (2004). Twentieth century social 
trinitarianism has its critics however.192 Stephen Holmes, for instance, writes: “I argue that 
the explosion of theological work claiming to recapture the doctrine of the Trinity that we 
have witnessed in recent decades in fact misunderstands and distorts the traditional 
                                                             
187 See for example Daniel J. Treier and David Lauber, “Introduction,” in Trinitarian Theology for the 
Church, eds. Daniel J. Treier and David Lauber (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2009), 7–9 for their 
recounting of “the standard narrative.” 
188 Peters, God as Trinity, 7. 
189 For a representative example, see J. R. Illingworth, The Doctrine of the Trinity (London: 
Macmillan, 1907), 142–3. See also Claude Welch, In This Name: The Doctrine of the Trinity in Contemporary 
Theology (New York, NY: Scribner’s Sons, 1952), 133–51 for a study of the revival of the social analogy before 
1952. 
190 See Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God (Minneapolis, MN: 
Fortress Press, 1993), 198–9. 
191 Cunningham, These Three Are One, 19. 
192 For an earlier more sympathetic critique than more recent ones, see Gresham, “The Social Model 
of the Trinity and Its Critics,” 325–43. See also the overview provided by Christoph Schwöbel, “The 
Renaissance of Trinitarian Theology: Reasons, Problems, and Tasks,” in Trinitarian Theology Today: Essays on 
Divine Being and Act, ed. Christoph Schwöbel (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 1–30 and Schwöbel, “Where Do 
We Stand in Trinitarian Theology? Resources, Revisions, and Reappraisals,” in Recent Developments in 
Trinitarian Theology: An International Symposium, eds. Christophe Chalamet and Marc Vial (Minneapolis, 
MN: Fortress Press, 2014), 9–71 for his follow-up report. 
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doctrine so badly that it is unrecognizable.”193 To put it mildly, at least in academic circles, 
the social Trinity has been in sharp retreat. Interestingly, the recent critiques of the social 
Trinity have focused on scholars such as Moltmann194 and Miroslav Volf,195 and tend to 
bypass Grenz altogether. Nevertheless, these critiques also provide important criticisms of 
social trinitarian approaches at large. Thus the need exists to lay them out to determine 
the manner in which they may implicate Grenz as well.  
From the summary of Grenz’s social trinitarian theology and discussion of Social 
God already presented, we can identify three Grenzian concerns: trinitarian and ecclesial 
personhood, perichoretic relationality, and practical consequence. However, in the recent 
critiques, issues related to social trinitarian developments of personhood and the use of 
perichoresis lead to charges of anthropological projection instead of practical advantage. 
Consternation over divine personhood stem largely from concerns related to divine 
simplicity where there is a perceived danger of “person” being reduced to individual. The 
danger lurking is the dreaded lapse into tritheism, which Grenz himself notes as a 
perpetual critique against social trinitarians.196 The particular concern is probably voiced 
no better than Karl Barth, who states: “The meaning of the doctrine [of the Trinity] is not, 
then, that there are three personalities in God. This would be the most extreme expression 
of tritheism, against which we must be on our guard. . . . We are speaking not of three 
divine ‘I’s,’ but thrice of the one divine I.197 Barth was aware the concept of person had a 
complex history and the concern he voices here is a legitimate one. As we’ve seen in 
                                                             
193 Stephen R. Holmes, The Quest for the Trinity: The Doctrine of God in Scripture, History, and 
Modernity (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2012), xv. 
194 See for example Karen Kilby, “Perichoresis and Projection: Problems with Social Doctrines of the 
Trinity,” New Blackfriars 81.957 (2000), 432–45. Cf. Randall Otto, “The Use and Abuse of Perichoresis in 
Recent Theology,” Scottish Journal of Theology 54.3 (August 2001), 366–84. 
195 See for example Kathryn Tanner, “Trinity,” in The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology, eds. 
Peter Scott and William T. Cavanaugh (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 319–332; Tanner, “Social 
Trinitarianism and its Critics,” in Rethinking Trinitarian Theology: Disputed Questions and Contemporary 
Issues in Trinitarian Theology, eds. Robert J. Wozniak and Giulio Maspero (London: T&T Clark International, 
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Zondervan, 2014), 75–93. 
196 SGRS, 6. 
197 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics I / 1, eds. G. W. Bromily and T. F. Torrance (Edinbugh: T&T Clark, 
1956), 358. 
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Grenz’s study of the self in Social God, that the idea of person in modernity became 
attached to self-hood and self-consciousness such that “person” came to mean individual, 
it thus becomes easy to see why some are squeamish at this point.198 
Karen Kilby cuts even deeper regarding the social trinitarian use of perichoretic 
relationality and is relentless in her charge of projection and circularity. Kilby claims 
regarding the use of perichoresis that from an examination of “social theories of the Trinity 
one can form the impression that much of the detail is derived from either the individual 
author’s or the larger society’s latest ideals of how human beings should live in 
community.”199 Thus, in her view, social trinitarian approaches merely project human 
wishes onto God, only to turn around and use that as the blueprint for human community. 
Beyond even this, Kilby avers that social trinitarians “have to be projectionist.”200 What she 
means by this is that those who use perichoresis in relation to both divine and human 
community, by necessity, must first fill the content of perichoresis with human notions of 
love and community only then to present this concept as a resource from Christian 
theology on relationality and community.201 What ensues then is theological sleight of 
hand or a social trinitarian “rabbit-from-a-hat-trick.”202 However, Kilby’s concerns are not 
only limited to the projection which occurs when theologians purportedly seek wisdom 
                                                             
198 Barth of course, famously used “mode of being” over “person” in reference to the trinitarian 
members. This caused another set of problems in relation to charges of modalism. Gijsbert van den Brink 
makes a suggestion that strongly mirrors Grenz’s approach: “It would have been much more in line with the 
overall tenor of Barth’s theology not to let the concept of person be defined by extra-Christian (or mixed) 
sources, but rather to start from its specific Christian connotations as emerging in the doctrine of Trinity, in 
order then to draw out its ontological implications and use it to evaluate critically any current alternative 
understandings of the person. In fact, this is exactly what proponents of social trinitarianism usually do: 
rather than uncritically adopting standard modern accounts of personhood, they criticize these from the 
insight, derived from trinitarian doctrine, that to be a person does not mean to be an autonomous self-
centered individual in the Cartesian sense but to find one’s very identity in mutual relations with others.” 
(“Social Trinitarianism: A Discussion of Some Recent Theological Criticisms,” International Journal of 
Systematic Theology 16.3 (July 2014), 347) See also Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 10–13, 86–103 
and Torrance, Persons in Communion, 229ff. 
199 Kilby, “Perichoresis and Projection,” 441. 
200 Kilby, “Perichoresis and Projection,” 441. Emphasis original. 
201 Kilby states: “First, a concept, perichoresis, is used to name what is not understood, to name 
whatever it is that makes the three Persons one. Secondly, the concept is filled out rather suggestively with 
notions borrowed from our own experiences of relationships and relatedness. And then, finally, it is 
presented as an exciting resource Christian theology has to offer the wider world in its reflections upon 
relationships and relatedness.” (“Perichoresis and Projection,” 442) 
202 This is the description of Kilby’s claim in van den Brink, “Social Trinitarianism,” 338. 
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concerning human or ecclesial community by looking to divine relationality. She also 
voices misgivings about looking for “insight” into the inner triune life of which the social 
doctrine of the Trinity is meant to be the “picture of the divine.”203 She in essence is 
claiming that social trinitarian proposals get themselves into trouble by trying to say too 
much. As an alternative to social and “political” approaches to the Trinity, she advocates 
for an apophatic approach.204 In this view, trinitarian doctrine is not considered a first 
order teaching, but is rather a second order grammatical proposition, rule, or set of rules 
about how to read Scripture, approach Christian spirituality and prayer, and speak the 
vocabulary of Christianity properly.205 
Mark Husbands is also concerned with the regulative function of trinitarian 
doctrine and protests that social trinitarian proposals subvert the necessary ontological 
distinction between God and creation.206 In his essay “The Trinity is Not Our Social 
Program,” he takes particular aim at Catherine LaCugna and Miroslav Volf. Husbands 
claims that when LaCugna states, “Trinitarian life is also our life . . . To conceive trinitarian 
life as something belonging only to God, or belonging to God apart from the creature, is to 
                                                             
203 Kilby, “Perichoresis and Projection,” 443. 
204 See this in Karen Kilby, “Trinity, Tradition, and Politics,” in Recent Developments in Trinitarian 
Theology, 73–86. See also Kilby’s earlier essay, “Is an Apophatic Trinitarianism Possible?,” International 
Journal of Systematic Theology 12.1 (January 2010), 65–77. Herein, Kilby warns against the presence of idolatry 
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states, “to accept the doctrine of the Trinity is to hold a range of beliefs about the immanent Trinity, about 
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immanent Trinity.” (66, emphasis original) 
205 Kilby, “Perichoresis and Projection,” 443. But see also van den Brink’s reply, “[T]his argument can 
be applied to any Christian theological doctrine, as has famously been done by George Lindbeck . . . But then 
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not) of social trinitarianism with it, since so many other doctrinal affirmations are equally at stake.” (“Social 
Trinitarianism,” 344) 
206 Mark Husbands, “The Trinity is Not Our Social Program: Volf, Gregory of Nyssa, and Barth,” in 
Trinitarian Theology for the Church, 120–41. His title is a protest of Miroslav Volf, “‘The Trinity is Our Social 
Program’: The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Shape of Social Engagement,” Modern Theology 14.3 (July 1998), 
403–423 which also appeared as “‘The Trinity is Our Social Programme’: The Doctrine of the Trinity and 
Social Engagement,” in The Doctrine of God and Theological Ethics, eds. Alan J. Torrance and Michael Banner 
(London: T&T Clark, 2006), 105–24. 
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miss the point entirely,”207 the distinction between God and humanity has been undone 
and collapsed because the triune God has been too “closely tied to the social existence and 
well-being of the community.”208 Husbands acknowledges the extent that Volf goes 
through to delimit his proposal concerning human imaging of the Trinity. Nevertheless, 
the very mention of perichoretic personhood proves to be an improper theological 
strategy for Husbands. No matter how nuanced the proposal Volf submits, he remains 
guilty in Husbands’ estimation of both an ecclesial idealism extending from an over-
realized eschatology and of undercutting the God/humanity distinction by “offering us an 
account of ecclesial or social existence in which trinitarian life in now offered as a model 
for creaturely imitation or echo.”209  
Kathryn Tanner intensifies the critique of approaches of social trinitarian 
modeling with her claim that the inherent projection and circularity mean no significant 
theological or anthropological contribution is gained. For this reason, Tanner asserts that 
social trinitarian doctrine is not merely bad theological speculation, but it fails to do any 
real work at all.210 Holmes further claims that social trinitarian offerings flounder in this 
way because the doctrine of the Trinity is being put to an improper use. He reminds us 
that the free church egalitarian ecclesiology Volf derives from trinitarian claims is widely 
different from the hierarchical Eastern Orthodox proposal of Zizioulas, also based on 
trinitarian dogma. Holmes therefore states, “the claim that a social doctrine of the Trinity 
is generative for ecclesiology and ethics is in danger of being cast into doubt if such wildly 
                                                             
207 LaCugna, God for Us, 228. In response to this and similar statements by LaCugna, Paul Molnar 
offers a terse critique that mirrors Kilby’s concern of projection: “Unwilling and unable to distinguish 
between God in se [in himself] from God acting ad extra [in relation to the world], this thinking invites 
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Immanent Trinity: In Dialogue with Karl Barth and Contemporary Theology (London: T&T Clark, 2002), 128) 
See also Grenz’s critique of LaCugna in footnote 63 of this chapter. 
208 Husbands, 121. 
209 See Husbands, 122–6. Interestingly, regarding the charge of ecclesial idealism, Husbands fails to 
note Volf’s statements that the church’s “creaturely and historical nature” means that “[t]he church reflects 
in a broken fashion the eschatological consummation of the entire people of God with the triune God in 
God’s new creation.” (After Our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the Trinity (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
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210 Kathryn Tanner, Christ the Key (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 230 and Tanner, 
“Trinity,” 324–8. 
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divergent implications can be drawn from the same doctrine.”211 In Holmes’ judgment, this 
is largely the result of improper instrumental uses of the Trinity to answer questions more 
adequately addressed with Christology.212 Very much in line with this, Tanner suggests as 
an alternative to “modeling the Trinity,” a turn towards participation.213 She states, 
“humans do not attain the heights of trinitarian relations by reproducing them, but by 
being [Christologically] incorporated into them as the very creatures they are.”214 The 
critiques raised by critics of social trinitarianism are substantial and it is important to give 
an account of what resources Grenz may have for a response. Such will occupy the last 
part of this section. Before moving to that though, we make a brief Ricoeurian detour. 
 
Grenz, Ricoeur, and the Relational Self 
 We begin this portion of our detour at the end of Grenz’s deconstruction of the 
postmodern self in the first section of this chapter. This is Grenz’s jumping off point for his 
own theological construction of the relational imago Dei and ecclesial self. In many 
respects we may judge that Grenz was perhaps too successful in his deconstruction of the 
self. While the modern stable and unencumbered self may have been nothing more than 
an illusion, the postmodern self is no better off it seems.215 What perhaps seems different is 
                                                             
211 Stephen R. Holmes, “Three Versus One? Some Problems of Social Trinitarianism,” Journal of 
Reformed Theology 3.1 (2009), 82–4 (82). Van den Brink responds, “If pointing to two theologians who 
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piece of Christian doctrine (or of any other doctrine for that matter) will stand. So Holmes’ strategy simply 
proves too much.” (“Social Trinitarianism,” 338) 
212 Holmes, “Three Versus One?”, 88. See also Stephen R. Holmes, “Classical Trinity: Evangelical 
Perspective,” in Two Views on The Doctrine of the Trinity, ed. Jason S. Sexton (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 
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213 See Kathryn Tanner, “Trinity, Christology, and Community,” in Christology and Ethics, eds. F. 
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life.” (123) And also, “Present participation in the trinitarian communio through faith in Jesus Christ 
anticipates in history the eschatological communion of the church with the triune God.” (129) 
214 Tanner, “Trinity,” 329. 
215 See Linda Woodhead, “Theology and the Fragmentation of the Self,” International Journal of 
Systematic Theology 1.1 (March 1999), 53–72 for a description of the fragmented modern self as the “bestowed 
self,” “rational self,” “boundless self,” and “effective self.” Knowles, Beyond Evangelicalism, 23–31 also gives a 
good overview of the decentered postmodern self. Commenting on the fragmentary nature of the 
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that postmoderns have taken to heart Foucault’s advice to cease pretending the self is 
anything other than fragmented. Grenz, however, remains hopeful that the self in 
postmodernity doesn’t have to succumb completely to demise. Grenz mentions 
specifically a narrative self and even cites Ricoeur on this score in the last chapter of Social 
God.216 This will serve as a bridge between Grenz and Ricoeur in chapter three. In this 
section though, we instead pick up on Grenz’s suggestion of a postmodern self that looks 
to possibly ephermeral relationality for the creation of identity. The question at this point 
is: does Grenz have sufficient warrant for his optimism? It is here that a Ricoeurian pause, 
extending the prior discussion of the relational and social self,217 can confirm the 
hopefulness of Grenz which leads to his subsequent revisioning of the imago Dei. 
 As a reminder, Ricoeur agrees with the emphasis of the postmodern 
deconstruction of the self that the self is not an autonomous agent which is somehow fully 
transparent to itself. In this Ricoeur underscores his emphasis on the dispossession of the 
self. As well, in a Ricoeurian frame, selfhood becomes a task and even a goal, rather than a 
given.218 Furthermore, the idea of a completed subject prior to and apart from social bonds 
is an illusion. Thus the identity of the self is always already in some sense traditioned and 
entangled with others, with the “other” (whether the human or Divine Other!).219 While we 
can never start from the beginning, there is also a sense that we don’t have to. The upshot 
here is that while much, but not all, of postmodern thought tends toward the dissolution 
of the self, Ricoeur stands as a mediating figure between modernity and radical 
postmodern deconstruction.220 As Dan Stiver states, “Postmodern thought in general 
                                                             
postmodern self, Anthony Thiselton states the postmodern self “faces life with suspicion rather than trust.” 
(Interpreting God and Postmodern Self (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 11–12) Woodhead counters Thiselton’s 
view on postmodern fragmentation, contending some varieties of the postmodern self can actually offer 
stable identities. (“Theology and the Fragmentation of the Self,” 68–70) 
216 SGRS, 329. 
217 See the discussion in chapter one. Ricoeur’s fullest development of the social self appears in 
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Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005). 
218 Stiver, Theology After Ricoeur, 161–78. 
219 See for example Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 3, 176–81, 352–5. 
220 On Ricoeur’s resistance to more radical notions of the dissolution of the self, Johann Michel 
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rejects a disconnected and atomistic view of the self but sometimes goes so far as to lose 
the self in its sociality. Ricoeur offers a view of the self who is inherently intersubjective 
but who nonetheless maintains responsibility.”221 David Ford likewise intones that in 
Ricoeur’s thought, the self “is neither autonomous and centered (as in some modern 
conceptions) nor fragmented and dispersed (as in some postmodernism), but has its being 
‘as another.’”222 What Ricoeur does in Oneself for Another (for example) is to doggedly call 
our attention, front and center, to a social embeddedness which does not dissolve us, but 
rather constitutes us in essential and irreducible relation in the face of the other (again, 
whether the human or Divine Other).223 Here is a version of the self after modernity with a 
surplus that gestures toward the deeply relational and communal nature of Grenz’s 
ecclesial self. 
Ricoeur engaged in a deep discussion with Emmanuel Lévinas in developing his 
idea that we ought to understand “oneself as another.”224 He agrees that personal (or 
relationally constituted) identity is shaped by the encounter with the other, but he avers 
that it should be so starkly rooted in obligation.225 In Ricoeur’s judgment, Lévinas did not 
give adequate attention to the ability of the self to respond to the other with a “capacity of 
discernment and recognition.”226 Ricoeur’s worry seems to be that Lévinas’ foregrounding 
of passivity before the accusation of the other hinders the necessary reciprocity involved 
in a relationship like friendship. In an especially moving quote Ricoeur connects the 
emphasis on companionship in friendship with the idea of solicitude (or relational 
solidarity with an other), particularly the solicitude involved in mutual suffering: 
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221 Stiver, Theology After Ricoeur, 179. 
222 David Ford, “Holy Spirit and Christian Spirituality,” in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern 
Theology, 284. See also Ford, Self and Salvation: Being Transformed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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For from the suffering other there comes a giving that is no longer drawn from the 
power of acting and existing but precisely from weakness itself. This is perhaps the 
supreme test of solicitude, when unequal power finds compensation in an 
authentic reciprocity in exchange, which, in the hour of agony, finds refuge in the 
shared whisper of voice or the feeble embrace of clasped hands.227 
What Ricoeur presents is a relational self that is also an ethical self, which has even 
attracted the attention of feminist scholars such as Pamela Sue Anderson. Feminist 
scholars often voice concerns that modern views of the self are not adequately open to 
otherness, while postmodern views can thin the self so much there remains little left as 
the basis for an empowered self.228 Anderson herself is representative when she queries 
whether it would make sense for feminists to seek the power to act only to turn around 
and relinquish the agency necessary to act.229 Even so, in regards to Ricoeur’s philosophy of 
the capable self with the power to act, she discerns that Ricoeur presents great promise.230  
In what has been called Ricoeur’s “little ethics,”231 the relational, social self 
ultimately becomes an ethical self with the goal of “aiming at the ‘good life’ with and for 
others, in just institutions.”232 Even so, while giving a rich philosophical description of the 
structure and goal of a good life over the course of three studies in Oneself as Another, Boyd 
Blundell remarks that Ricoeur offers a thin account of the content of this life. Blundell 
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questions how we might judge such a life and proffers that the most we might be able to 
claim is a “well done,” in the same way one might have done well in a career without any 
indication if the career itself was a good one.233 Nevertheless, Blundell extolls this as a good 
thing for the theologian. He states, “The thinness of Ricoeur’s account of the good life is a 
strength rather than a weakness, a humble admission that the ‘good life’ cannot be defined 
with greater specificity without going further than philosophy can go.”234 This is in line 
with Ricoeur’s approach in the introduction to Oneself as Another where he states he 
intends a philosophy that is open to biblical faith, but that avoids being 
“cryptotheological.”235 And Ricoeur states in his closing words, “With this aporia of the 
Other, philosophical discourse comes to an end.”236 By saying this he is making good on his 
earlier contention that “hermeneutics has neither the first nor the last word.”237 It is this 
very unwillingness of Ricoeur to go further than he ought as a philosopher that makes his 
philosophical hermeneutics productive for theology.238 Nevertheless, while Ricoeur can go 
no further, Grenz has no such limitation. This portion of our Ricoeurian detour comes to a 
close having indeed given credence to Grenz’s hopefulness for the postmodern self, that 
while decentered, it need not give way to destruction. We now return to Grenz with a 
consideration how his communal imago Dei theo-anthropology and proposal of the 
ecclesial self may be subsequently developed and can answer the charges of the social 
trinitarian critics. 
 
Grenzian Theo-Anthropology and (Ecclesial) Community 
 We have seen that Grenz sought to resource a social doctrine of the Trinity and 
relational notion of perichoretic personhood in his revisioning of a communal version of 
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the imago Dei in the form of the social imago and ecclesial self. However, as was outlined 
earlier, social doctrines of the Trinity have come under sharp attack. Concerns are present 
regarding fears over the reduction of person to individual and the presence of circularity 
and anthropological projection that threatens to reduce God to a “predicate of human 
experience”239 and blur the distinction between Creator and the created. What answers 
might Grenz have to misgivings regarding personhood, perichoresis, and projection in 
social trinitarian proposals? 
We get some initial help from Khaled Anatolios in reference to John Zizioulas’ 
“personalist” theology of “being as communion.” Anatolios concedes that “person” in its 
ancient usage is not simply identical to contemporary usages, but he disagrees that we 
should presume a simple blanket disjunction. He says rather a middle way is needed 
between the assumption of continuity between patristic and modern notions of “person” 
and “communion,” and total discontinuity. He proposes a move to the “dialectics of 
analogical predication” in which “difference does not negate likeness, and likeness does 
not cancel out difference.”240 Such an analogous approach, Anatolios contends, is even 
recommended to us by Scripture in the words of Jesus: “that they may be one, as we are 
one.” (John 17:11 NRSV)241 
Grenz is aware of the problems of speaking too univocally about God,242 and 
employs such a method of analogy, an analogy of relation or communion, in the 
development of his social trinitarian vision which drew on the rethinking of the idea of the 
“person,” the perichoretic unity and distinction of the divine persons, and Zizioulas’ 
ontology of personhood applied to the church. Grenz states: 
                                                             
239 Spencer, “Culture, Community, and Commitments,” 352. Spencer also worries a social approach 
will reduce God to a “predicate of human social experience” (340, 349) and a “predicate of our language and 
experience” (350).  
240 Khaled Anatolios, “Personhood, Communion, and the Trinity in Some Patristic Texts,” in The 
Holy Trinity in the Life of the Church, ed. Khaled Anatolios (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2014), 147–51 
(150). Anatolios’ comments are a partial counter to Michel Barnes terse contention, “If the word [person] 
disappeared entirely from English and other modern languages our reading of the patristic trinitarian 
writings would be greatly improved.” (“Review of Gregory of Nyssa and the Concept of Divine Persons by 
Lucian Turcescu,” Modern Theology 23.4 (October 2007), 642) We should also not overlook the similarity of 
Anatolios’ description of analogy with Grenz’s description of analogy/metaphor earlier in this chapter. 
241 Anatolios, “Personhood, Communion, and the Trinity in Some Patristic Texts,” 151. 
242 SGRS, 6. 
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The ingenious use of perichoresis to describe the manner in which the trinitarian 
persons are constituted by the mutuality of relationships within the life of the 
triune God opened the way for the development of a dynamic ontology of persons-
in-relationship or persons-in-communion. This ontology characterizes the 
essential nature of personhood as consisting of mutuality and interdependence. 
According to this understanding, “communion does not threaten personal 
particularity,” as John Zizioulas notes, “it is constitutive of it.”243 
This, of course, builds to what Grenz calls the “ecclesial self,” which denies that personal 
identity is formed primarily from an “inward turn” but instead is constituted by 
relationality and communion. The ecclesial self is “constructed extra se in Christo by the 
Holy Spirit,” finding “identity through participation in the divine dynamic of love.”244 
Grenz’s exposition of the ecclesial self may indeed seem to some like 
anthropological projection. Gerald Bray voices his concern about Grenz’s supposed 
improper use of the imago Dei and states that Grenz’s Social God volume is about social 
anthropology and not at all about the Trinity.245 Anthony Thiselton takes a starkly different 
view, saying that Grenz works in a “different direction” than “fashionable projections” and 
concludes that for Grenz, “a carefully defined ‘social’ approach to the Trinity lays out the 
ground for a relational understanding of human selfhood.”246 Despite Bray’s contention, 
Grenz indeed devotes the first chapter of his Social God volume to the Trinity. What 
follows then is not simply an anthropology but rather a thoroughly trinitarian theo-
anthropology.247 For Grenz, while theology in its epistemological dimension moves both 
                                                             
243 SGRS, 317. 
244 SGRS, 332. 
245 Gerald Bray, “Review of The Social God and the Relational Self by Stanley J. Grenz,” Evangelical 
Quarterly 76.3 (2004), 280–1. 
246 Anthony C. Thiselton, “Review of The Social God and the Relational Self by Stanley J. Grenz,” 
Theology 106.830 (March 2003), 134–6. 
247 There is resonance here in Grenz’s approach with how T. F. Torrance works out his notion of 
“onto-relations” in relation to divine and human personhood (see The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being 
Three Persons, Revised edition (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2016), 102–4, 126–9, 133, 157, 160–8, 171–4, 
193–4, 197). Building from the theological idea of the divine perichoresis, Torrance applies “onto-relations” to 
personhood (see in particular 103, 157, 160, 163 and 219–21 on the analogy of relation) such that they are 
“being-constituting relations” which operate with an “understanding of the three divine persons in the one 
God in which the ontic relations between them belong to what they essentially are in themselves in their 
distinctive hypostaseis.” (Myk Habets, “Getting Beyond the Filioque with Third Article Theology,” in 
Ecumenical Perspectives on the Filioque for the 21st Century, ed. Myk Habets (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 
2014), 224) Regarding divine and human personhood, Torrance evinces resonance with Grenz when he 
states, “We must think of God, rather as ‘personalising Person,’ and of ourselves as ‘personalised persons,’ 
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‘from above’ and ‘from below’ in a sort of dialectical manner, in the ontological dimension 
it gives primacy to the nature of the eternal God who is triune.248  
As well, in chapters two and three of Social God, Grenz takes measures to deftly 
and skillfully critique and deconstruct not only the modern Cartesian self, but the 
postmodern loss of self, and the ascendency of what might be called a most-modern 
therapeutic self in order to clear the necessary ground for his own theological explication 
of the ecclesial self. Thus, there is for Grenz then, no equivocation regarding personhood 
or reducing “person” to contemporary notions of the individual. This is in fact what Grenz 
specifically denies when he invokes the notion of relationally constituted persons-in-
communion.249 He does not decide what persons are ahead of time from either 
philosophical or cultural sources and apply it back onto the trinitarian persons. Thus, in 
making the Trinity his structural motif and community his integrative motif, rather than 
projecting anthropology backwards into the divine life, Grenz works in the other direction 
in his imago Dei theology, viewing the triune God as the transcendent basis for all of 
creation, and grounding human and ecclesial personhood in a determinedly trinitarian 
communion ontology.250 
                                                             
people who are personal primarily through onto-relations to him as the creative Source of our personal 
being, and secondarily through onto-relations to one another within the subject-subject structures of our 
creaturely being as they have come from him,” (Christian Doctrine of God, 160, emphasis original) and “This 
onto-relational concept of ‘person,’ generated through the doctrines of Christ and the Holy Trinity, is one 
that is also applicable to inter-human relations, but in a created way reflecting the uncreated way in which in 
which it applies to the trinitarian relations in God.” (Christian Doctrine of God, 103, emphasis mine) See also 
RTC, 208–10. 
248 This is methodologically consistent with the Grenz Grundaxiom. See footnote 63 in this chapter 
for Grenz’s critique of where LaCugna goes wrong in her theological method in this regard. 
249 See the unfortunate attribution of Husbands to Grenz that the triune persons are “individual 
realities.” (“The Trinity is Not Our Social Program,” 134) Grenz denies this on the very page cited by 
Husbands. While speaking of the “concrete particularity of Father, Son, and Spirit,” Grenz then states, “In this 
rendering the three are not to be viewed simply as individuals but rather as persons whose reality can only 
be understood in terms of their relations to each other. By virtue of these relations they together constitute 
the being or ousia of God.” (BF, 179, emphasis mine) For an account of the Father, Son, and Spirit as 
“speaking persons,” “willing and acting agents,” and “persons in communion,” see Anatolios, “Personhood, 
Communion, and the Trinity in Some Patristic Texts,” 151–64. Cf. Thomas H. McCall, Which Trinity? Whose 
Monotheism? Philosophical and Systematic Theologians on the Metaphysics of Trinitarian Theology (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 236–41. 
250 Grenz develops this approach in response to theologians who, for reasons regarding divine 
mystery or to avoid unwarranted speculation, treat the Trinity as a “theological terminus.” This would 
include Paul Helm (his colleague at Regent College in Vancouver, BC) who argues for a “cautious 
trinitarianism” that is “reluctant to employ trinitarianism for non-soteriological purposes – for example . . . as 
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 We also saw that a central concern of the critiques leveled by Kathryn Tanner was 
the emphasis on modeling the Trinity, to which she proposes a turn to participation. 
Tanner’s concern here is shared by Paul Fiddes, who also suggests his own turn toward 
participation in God. In the process he has critiqued advocates of the social view of the 
triune persons as “persons-in-relation” for only proposing an imitation versus a full 
participation in the triune God.251 Fiddes expresses concern this approach only allows for 
“modeling” and drawing “parallels” with the Trinity.252 His proposal is that we speak of the 
trinitarian persons as “persons-as-relations” and aims to complement imitation of God 
with participation in God. Fiddes contends that identifying the divine persons as relations 
provides a way to hold being (ontology) and knowing (epistemology) together. The being 
of the divine persons as relations can only be known through an epistemology of 
participation; “each only makes sense in the context of the other,” says Fiddes.253  
Grenz’s early advocacy of a social view of the Trinity may sound like he is ripe for 
such a criticism. He not only describes the triune God in The Moral Quest as the “eternal 
community of Father, Son, and Spirit,” but explicitly promotes a mirroring of the 
communal relations of the divine persons in relationship to others. Grenz states: 
The Christian vision speaks of humankind, in turn, as “created in God’s image.”  
The divine design is that we mirror within creation what God is like in God’s own 
eternal reality.  The Christian vision of God as the social Trinity and our creation to 
                                                             
a paradigm of human community.” (“Cautious Trinitarianism,” Crux 39.4 (December 2003), 19–23) Grenz 
states counter to this, “Is the Christian confession that God is triune the end of our inquiry into the being of 
God? Or does the doctrine of the Trinity provide a fruitful starting-point for theological and ethical 
reflection? I would argue the latter. The doctrine of the Trinity both provides a central motif that gives shape 
or structure to theology and forms the transcendent grounding for the ordering of human relationships.” 
(“The Doctrine of the Trinity: Luxuriant Meadow or Theological Terminus,” 17) 
251 Some of the scholars he has critiqued for focusing too narrowly on imitation are Miroslav Volf, 
Jürgen Moltmann, Catherine LaCunga, and David Cunningham. See Paul S. Fiddes, Participating in God: A 
Pastoral Doctrine of the Trinity (Lousiville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2000), 28–56. 
252 See Cunningham, These Three Are One, 166–90 for the section that Fiddes cites in his critique. 
Fiddes says Cunningham “lays stress on the nature of the divine persons as subsistent relations . . . yet he 
deals with ‘participation’ almost entirely as a parallel between the participation that occurs within God’s 
own communion and that within human society; he does not dwell on human participation in God.” 
(Participating in God, 39, emphasis in original) However, Cunningham does say that by participation he 
means taking part, “not in something, but in someone – an other” and that he is speaking of “not merely of 
working alongside others in a common activity, but of dwelling in, and being indwelt by, one another.” 
(These Three Are One, 166) 
253 Fiddes, Participating in God, 29, 38. See also Paul S. Fiddes, “Relational Trinity: Radical 
Perspective,” in Two View on the Doctrine of the Trinity, 159–85. 
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be the imago Dei provides the transcendent basis for the human ethical ideal as 
life-in-community.254 
Even so, Grenz is not only concerned about mirroring, but speaks plainly of participation 
in the divine triune life as well, saying: “The Father [has] sent the Son in order to realize 
God’s eternal design to draw humankind . . . to participate in his own life.”255 He further 
notes that participation in the divine life is not a matter of mere “external imitation” 
which only involves “ethical improvement”256 and that it calls for more than simply a 
shared experience or narrative. In Grenz’s words, “The fellowship we share with each other 
is not merely that of a common experience or a common narrative . . . [but] is nothing less 
than our common participation in the divine communion between the Father and the Son 
mediated by the Holy Spirit.”257 Here we already see in Theology for the Community of God 
an emphasis on triune participation which will ultimately be woven into a threefold cord 
of the imago Dei, relational personhood, and ecclesia. 
Grenz’s own turn towards triune participation becomes as well an emphasis on 
theosis as early as his Social God volume.258 It can be seen that Grenz even matches 
Tanner’s emphasis on the Christological mediation of triune participation in his 
construction of the social imago and ultimately the ecclesial self.259 True to the orienting 
third motif of his theological grammar, he insists that the ecclesial relation and existence 
marked by triune love is, in fact, the eschatological participation in the divine life (i.e., 
theosis) of redeemed persons-in-community effected “in Christ” and through the Spirit.260 
                                                             
254 Grenz, MQ, 238. Grenz further states, “At the heart of the concept of the divine image is God’s 
ultimate intention that humankind show forth God’s own character.” (TCG, 187)  
255 TCG, 484. See also SGRS, 323–8 and NGQB, 360–73 for Grenz’s link between the imago Dei and 
our being “in Christ” as participation in God which will is discussed in chapter three. 
256 SGRS, 324 and NGQB, 365. 
257 TCG, 484–5. The context for this statement is his understanding of the church as the ecclesial 
image of God.  
258 SGRS, 322–8. 
259 Grenz’s frequent refrain is some variation of “‘in Christ’ and through the Spirit,” a theme at the 
heart of Grenz’s notion of triune participation/theosis. (Medley, “Participation in God,” 212) Notice also 
chapter five of SGRS promotes a “biblical Christo-anthropology” that posits Jesus as the “true human” and 
true imago. Thus Grenz’s trinitarian and communal theo-anthropology comes intertwined with a Christo-
anthropology which is given more depth in chapter three of this dissertation. 
260 Thus Grenz’s view of the imago Dei points beyond the creational horizon, seeing its primary 
location in Jesus as the true imago and its ultimate fulfillment in human ecclesial community participating 
in the triune Divine Community and oriented toward the eschatological horizon. David Kelsey, though, has 
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Furthermore, this very same theotic triune participation that constitutes the ecclesial self-
in-community is proleptically present in the here and now, which in turn constitutes the 
ecclesial community “in Christ” and through the Spirit as the prolepsis of the divine image 
and a sacrament of divine communion.261 
 
The Social Imago, Gender, and Triune Participation 
 We now come to the first of three dedicated sections which seek to work towards 
an account of the interrelation in Grenz’s thought between the imago Dei, gender, and 
triune participation. The goal through these sections is to establish something of a 
cumulative case approach. Thus the remarks in this section will seek to establish insights 
and threads that will be extended more fully in the later sections. This section progresses 
through three moments. There is first a consideration of the relation of the social imago 
and female/male mutuality in Grenz. Second, a detour introduces insights from Sarah 
Coakley and Miroslav Volf on gender and the Trinity. Finally, this section concludes with a 
consideration of female/male mutuality in relation to triune and ecclesial participation in 
an effort to point the way towards a constructive account of a hermeneutical ecclesiology. 
 
The Social Imago and Female/Male Mutuality in Grenz 
 For Grenz, the triune God is the “Divine Community” who, while standing as the 
source of human relationality and communion, is nevertheless beyond all sexual 
                                                             
questioned Grenz’s eschatological orientation of the imago Dei, saying: “must not human beings be said to be 
actually human beings and truly in the image of God only at the end of the story of their eschatological 
consummation? Is the entirety of human history, then, not in fact a history of actual human beings, in actual 
human communities, actually in the image of God? If so, why treat them as having the dignity, and deserving 
the respect, of the ends in themselves, and not merely as means to our own ends?” (Eccentric Existence: A 
Theological Anthropology, Volume two (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009), 904) While a 
thorough treatment is not possible in this space, a twofold response is warranted. First, we must see Grenz’s 
rendering of the imago Dei as located within his specifically theo-anthropology. It can be asked, then, if 
Kelsey’s concerns would misunderstand Grenz and implicitly place the imago Dei under the demands of a 
foundationalist, onto-theological political theory, potentially netting an anthropological theology rather 
than a theological anthropology, thus fulfilling the worries of the social trinitarian critics? Second, we should 
note while Grenz’s treatment of the imago Dei looks beyond creation toward its eschatological orientation, 
Grenz does not simply bypass creation either. Grenz’s treatment of the imago Dei is necessarily pluriform. In 
addition to his proposal in SGRS, Grenz develops a complementary understanding of the imago Dei as a 
“special standing” in the present, a “special fellowship” with God, an “eschatological reality” and “divine 
destiny,” and a “special community” in TCG, 168–80.  
261 SGRS, 335–6. 
 93 
distinction. As well, Grenz holds that the embodied creation of “male and female” in the 
image of the triune God means that the relational self is also sexual, signifying the sense of 
individual human incompleteness, the drive and desire toward bonding, and consisting of 
“persons-in-bonded-community.”262 The interplay between creation in the divine (triune) 
image and human sexual differentiation point toward the divine relationality of the triune 
Creator. Thus the triune God who is beyond all sexual distinction is still yet the ground 
and constitution of the relationality and communion endemic to human sexuality and the 
imago Dei relationality expressed in the social imago.263 Grenz as well holds that the 
sexually differentiated nature of humanity will persist into the eschatological age. Though 
the marriage of “male and female” is a high calling and ought to be taken seriously, it is still 
only one expression of the imago Dei.264 Marriage and genital sexual expression are 
penultimate and limited to this age, yet the reality of embodied sexual differentiation and 
the bonding dynamic persist into the new age and point toward the eschatological new 
humanity of the new creation.265 Furthermore, a trinitarian reading of the Genesis creation 
                                                             
262 SGRS, 272, 283. See as well SE, chapter one – Male and Female: The Nature of Human Sexuality, 
15–30 and chapter two – Male and Female: Humankind as a Sexual Creation, 31–54. Note also Grenz’s 
emphasis that the dynamic of sexuality is far more than having or gratifying erotic desires and/or genital 
sexual expression. (“Is God Sexual?,” 192) See also the discussion in Thiselton, The Hermeneutics of Doctrine, 
239–40, 250–1. 
263 See Grenz, “Is God Sexual?,” 208–9. For an exegetical perspective which denies human sexual 
differentiation has anything to do with the imago Dei, see Phyllis Bird, “Male and Female He Created Them,” 
147–55. However, Phyllis Trible states in contrast, “Clearly, ‘male and female’ correspond structurally to ‘the 
image of God,’ and this formal parallelism indicates a semantic correspondence.” (God and the Rhetoric of 
Sexuality (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1978), 17) See SGRS, 273 for Grenz’s agreement with Trible. See 
also Grenz’s statement that, contrary to the substantialist concept, the imago Dei is “not the possession of the 
individual qua individual but rather is a relational or community concept.” (“Response to Terry Muck, ‘After 
Selfhood: Constructing the Religious Self’,” Insights 113.1 (Fall 1997), 31–2) In line with this, a Grenzian 
perspective rules out any rendering of the divine image in terms of a tripartite structure located in individual 
human persons. Joel B. Green, Salvation (St. Louis, MO: Chalice Press, 2003), 19–20 appeals to an 
understanding of imago Dei relationality very much like Grenz’s and states, “It would be easy to imagine that 
the community of the Godhead is replicated in a tripartite understanding of the human person – body, soul, 
and spirit. This would be a mistake in category.” (19) A Grenzian perspective rules out a tripartite 
understanding both because of its individualism and the univocity of its internal grammar that causes the 
divine image to be interpreted improperly according to numerical sameness. 
264 Thus, in SE, Part 2 discusses marriage and Part 3 discusses singleness. 
265 Gregory of Nyssa is often cited in favor of an androgynous eschatological state which is sexless 
and/or genderless. But Cortez, Christological Anthropology in Historical Perspective, 31–55 argues that while 
Gregory holds “biological sexuality” will fade away, having been transcended in Christ, eschatological gender 
difference may still yet persist. (49–55) Cortez cites Sarah Coakley, Powers and Submissions: Spirituality, 
Philosophy, and Gender (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 163 to say for Gregory “it is possible that 
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narratives266 according to the goal and destiny of the imago Dei points forward toward the 
realization of the ecclesial imago, the ecclesial self, ecclesial relation, and thus the church 
as the prolepsis of the new humanity. 
Before going further, it is necessary to field a recent critique from Megan DeFranza 
regarding Grenz’s understanding of sexuality.267 DeFranza’s concerns extend from what 
she considers to be Grenz’s conflation of sex, gender, and sexuality.268 The result for 
DeFranza is that Grenz reads his whole anthropology through an ill-conceived “lens of the 
sexual” and notion of “sexual incompleteness,” yielding a “sexual imago” which Grenz 
cannot get past and that stunts his whole project.269 Perhaps most concerning is the 
determination that, according to DeFranza’s telling at least, because the lens of the sexual 
                                                             
eschatological humanity is ‘de-genitalized’ but not de-gendered.” (52) Grenz differs somewhat, stating: 
“marriage and genital sexual expression are linked to this penultimate age.” (SGRS, 301, emphasis mine) 
Cortez mentions Kari Elisabeth Børresen, “God’s Image, Man’s Image? Patristic Interpretation of Gen. 1.27 
and 1 Cor. 11.7,” in Image of God and Gender Models in Judaeo-Christian Tradition, ed. Kari Elisabeth Børresen 
(Oslo: Solum Forlag, 1991), 199–205, who accepts Augustine’s eschatological inclusion of biological sexuality 
while resisting his gender hierarchicalism, which seems generally descriptive of Grenz’s approach. 
266 Grenz (SGRS, 284) cites Irenaeus as “probably the first” to offer a trinitarian reading of Genesis 
1.26. 
267 See Megan K. DeFranza, Sex Difference in Christian Theology: Male, Female, and Intersex in the 
Image of God (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2015), 147, 149, 154–7, 162–4, 166–8, 172, 175–7, 181, 184, 187–9, 195–
9, 215–21, 224–6, 230, 234–7, 239–42, 244–5, 280, 285 for her discussions and critiques of Grenz. 
268 DeFranza, Sex Difference in Christian Theology, 197–8, 216. However, we might ask if DeFranza 
merely assumes the separation of sex and gender, as well as her critique of binaries, from contemporary 
critical discourse without adequately interrogating such discourse for theological purposes. See Sex 
Difference in Christian Theology, 166 where she castigates Grenz for disregarding the “normal definitions” of 
sex/sexuality as an indication of this. However, there are concerns about such an approach. I agree with Beth 
Felker Jones that a sex/gender distinction can be potentially helpful for rooting out malformed social 
constructions of gender, particularly as they impact women. However, Jones continues: “What is less helpful 
about the distinction between sex and gender, nature and nurture, is that – in practice – the two are often 
impossible to split apart. The two categories slip into one another, and sometimes that slippage tempts us to 
give up on maleness and femaleness altogether,” and “To be ‘saved’ by destroying women cannot be good for 
women. This is the fundamental reason that I don’t buy arguments that would do away with so-called ‘binary 
sexuality’ – the understanding that humans exist in two sexes, male and female. Scripture teaches that we 
were created male and female and that God loves us as such. A sinful world may hate and despise 
female bodies, but God loves them and plans to redeem them.” (Faithful: A Theology of Sex (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Zondervan, 2015), 31–2) As well, Elaine Storkey warns the “gender baggage” from the social sciences (as 
well as some interpretations of Scripture) needs to be “unpacked and examined before the concept can be 
accorded new [theological] citizenship.” (“Evangelical Theology and Gender,” in The Cambridge Companion 
to Evangelical Theology, eds. Timothy Larsen and Daniel J. Treier (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 161) See also Sarah Coakley’s dissatisfaction with the critique of gender binaries in critical discourse 
(while still being attentive to the concerns of such discourse) and her proposal for a “theological approach to 
gender” in which the gendered “twoness is ambushed by [divine] threeness.” (God, Sexuality, and the Self: An 
Essay ‘On the Trinity’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 53–8 (53, 58)) 
269 DeFranza, Sex Difference in Christian Theology, 186–9. 
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looms so large in Grenz’s project, in the end he is not even shy about describing God as 
“sexual.”270 In response, we should first underscore that what DeFranza interprets from 
Grenz as a totalizing “sexual incompleteness” is actually in Grenz’s own terms sexuality 
“understood as the sense of incompleteness and the corresponding drive for wholeness . . . 
[which] forms the dynamic that not only seeks human relationships but also motivates the 
quest for God.”271 What is in view here is not that sexuality as a whole should be identified 
in simple fashion with human incompleteness totally on its own. DeFranza at this point 
magnifies one side of the sexual dynamic to the diminishment of the other and thus only 
gives half of Grenz’s definition. “Incompleteness” for Grenz is not itself the sum-total of 
sexuality. Grenz’s view is more dynamic than that. For him embodied human sexuality 
encompasses the whole relational dynamic of the recognition (or sense, or realization) of 
incompleteness together with the corresponding desire for social bonding and community 
which ultimately points toward the ecclesial and eschatological horizons.272  
In addition, while DeFranza reads Grenz as collapsing sex, gender, and sexuality 
into each other, she fails here to be a patient reader of Grenz that allows him to define his 
own terms.273 As a result, while Grenz is clear to note that the dynamic surplus of sexuality 
far exceeds sexual intercourse or genital sexual expression,274 DeFranza still imports her 
own more restrictive definitions into her analysis. This causes her to seemingly reduce 
Grenz’s vision of sexuality in some instances to “sexual need,” “sexual desire,” and even the 
“sex drive.”275 In the end, she (mis)construes Grenz’s multi-layered vision of sexuality in 
                                                             
270 DeFranza, Sex Difference in Christian Theology, 197. 
271 SGRS, 280. Emphasis mine. 
272 SGRS, 283. Cf. Grenz, “Social God,” 87 and Grenz, “Is God Sexual?, 191–2. 
273 See this judgement as well in Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 160–1. See also 
DeFranza’s claim that Grenz has “imbibed too much of the Freudian spirit of the age.” (Sex Difference in 
Christian Theology, 189) Sexton responds that DeFranza “seems too driven by her own argument to fairly 
read [Grenz’s] work without convolution, doing more robust eisegesis on Grenz’s corpus than exegesis, 
creating a more Freudian Grenz than his writings actually allow, meanwhile ignoring his theological 
descriptions and definitions of terms.” (164) 
274 See Grenz, “Is God Sexual?,” 192 and SGRS, 277. 
275 See this in Megan K. DeFranza, “Sexuality and the Image of God: Dangers in Evangelical and 
Roman Catholic Theologies of the Body,” Africanus Journal 3.1 (April 2011), 19; DeFranza, “Review of Singled 
Out: Why Celibacy Must Be Reinvented in Today’s Church by Christine A. Colón and Bonnie E. Field,” Africanus 
Journal 2.2 (November 2010), 59; and Defranza, Sex Difference in Christian Theology, 189, 198. We also note 
DeFranza’s attempt to articulate a theology of intersexuality is needful and highly commendable in its aim. 
Nevertheless, in addition to this reductionism, there are some methodological problems with her project. 
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ways that not only gloss over his own distinctions but attributes to Grenz that which he 
specifically denies.276 Such is the case when DeFranza places Grenz in the position of 
having described God as sexual. She cites Grenz’s essay, “Is God Sexual?,” in support, but 
her conclusion here is both overstated and overreached. Grenz’s position here is more 
nuanced. As Jason Sexton points out, Grenz’s concerns here surround concepts of God as 
radically non-sexual in such a way as to disconnect human sexuality from what it means to 
be created in the divine image.277 This, for Grenz, would serve to undercut imago Dei 
relationality. But Grenz states his position carefully: “[A]lthough God is neither strictly 
male nor female . . . God somehow encompasses what to us are the sexual distinctions of 
male and female.”278 However, if any doubt remains, Grenz specifies even more clearly in 
Social God that the church has acted wisely in rejecting “the idea of a God who is literally 
sexual. God is neither male nor female, nor a duality of male and female.”279 Grenz is clear 
that sexual embodiment is a human distinctive and not a feature of the transcendent, 
triune God. Even so, the God who is beyond all sexual distinction remains the 
transcendent ground of human imago Dei relationality, a reality that Grenz specifies as 
pointing beyond itself to the ecclesial community and eschatological horizon.280 
                                                             
The first part of DeFranza’s study comprises her own culture source, setting the context of the thought forms 
of current science and critical discourse, and the second gives her own theological proposal. While this may, 
at first, appear similar to Grenz’s own engagement with culture in SGRS, there is a large difference. Whereas 
Grenz has substantial methodological resources to safeguard his project from cultural projectionism, 
DeFranza’s study does not seem so well equipped in this regard. DeFranza may simply assume the binary 
critique and separation of sex and gender from contemporary critical discourse such that her theological 
project is rendered susceptible to over-determination by her culture source, and thus vulnerable to charges 
of cultural foundationalism, projectionism, and onto-theology. This is further reflected in that, while she 
aims to “restore the social Trinity to the social imago” (Sex Difference in Christian Theology, 230–8), she fails 
to engage any of the prominent critiques of social trinitarianism previously discussed in this chapter from 
Kilby, Tanner, Holmes, etc. 
276 In addition to his clear distinguishing between biological sexuality and his deeper, more 
expansive definition (SGRS, 267–303), see also his careful use of phrases such as “sexual differentiation” 
(SGRS, 269–76) and “genital sexual expression” (SGRS, 300–2) which add further nuance to his discussion. 
277 Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 160. 
278 Grenz, “Is God Sexual?,” 208. Emphasis mine. Grenz also states: “[T]he foundational connection 
between the triune God and human sexuality does not occur because God is either male or female or because 
God is both male and female.” (“Is God Sexual?,” 211–12, emphasis mine) 
279 SGRS, 293. 
280 DeFranza does note Grenz’s emphasis on the ecclesial self, the eschatological horizon, and his 
Christological focus in Sex Difference in Christian Theology, 240, 280. Perhaps ironically, she states: “The 
social imago as the ecclesial/eschatological community is the proper image of the social Trinity.” (237) 
DeFranza seems to suggest she is correcting Grenz at this point, but I would contend this is the very thing 
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 Moving forward from these considerations, we now observe that Grenz as well 
holds determinedly onto the mutuality of “male and female” in all spheres of life.281 For 
example, he quotes Bonhoeffer on the mutual dependence inherent in the creation of 
humans as “male and female.”282 Bonhoeffer states: 
The creature is free in that one creature exists in relation to another creature. And 
God created them man and woman. The human being is not alone. Human beings 
exist in duality, and it is in this dependence on the other that their creatureliness 
consists. The creatureliness of human beings is no more a quality or something at 
hand or an existing entity than human freedom is. It can be defined in simply no 
other way than in terms of the existence of human beings over-against-one-
another, with-one-another, and in-dependence-upon-one-another.283 
Grenz holds that the God who is the unity-in-diversity of the Father, Son, and Spirit is 
“fundamentally relational” and therefore it is no surprise that at “the pinnacle of creation, 
a unity-in-diversity – humankind as male and female – emerges.”284 Extending from this, 
and true to the thrust of his trinitarian imago Dei theology, Grenz locates the grammar of 
godly human relationships and female/male mutuality in the triune relations.285 Not only 
                                                             
Grenz was explicitly doing in his theological project. Unfortunately, DeFranza’s own reductive rendering of 
what she terms Grenz’s “sexual imago” obscures from her view the full development and significance of 
these Grenzian features. 
281 See Grenz, Women in the Church, 151–7; Grenz, “Anticipating God’s New Community,” 595–611; 
and Grenz, “Theological Approaches to Male-Female Relationships,” 83–101. See also SGRS, 273–6 for his 
exegesis of the women as an ezer kenegdo from a “mutualist” perspective. 
282 See SGRS, 295. See also Lisa Dahill’s description of Adam’s dependence on the bodily otherness 
of Eve as the “person-forming limit to his original loneliness and dominance.” (“Con-Formation with Jesus 
Christ: Bonhoeffer, Social Location, and Embodiment,” in Being Human, Becoming Human: Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer and Social Thought, eds. Jens Zimmermann and Brian Gregor (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 
2010), 180, 183) Dahill is commenting on Bonhoeffer’s idea of Eve as “limit” to Adam in Creation and Fall: A 
Theological Exposition of Genesis 1–3, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, Volume 3, trans. Douglas Stephen Bax, ed. 
John W. de Gruchy (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1997), 98–9. 
283 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 64. Emphasis original. This statement occurs in the context of 
Bonhoeffer’s development of the analogia relationis (or analogy of relation) in Creation and Fall, 60–7. The 
quote provided here represents a more recent translation versus the older version Grenz utilized in SGRS, 
295. 
284 Grenz, “Theological Approaches for Male-Female Relationships,” 85. 
285 We should register, however, the shared and similar skepticism of Bird and Shillaker, 
“Subordination in the Trinity and Gender Roles,”305–6 and Kevin Giles regarding any correlation of the 
Trinity and the man/woman relationship. Giles states: “The Trinity is a threefold relationship; the 
man/woman relationship is twofold. If God’s threefoldness were stressed, and it was agreed the Trinity was 
prescriptive of human relations, then threesomes would be the ideal! Furthermore, the Father/Son 
relationship is a picture of a male/male relationship. Most of us would not want to build on this observation! 
Finally, if the divine Father/Son relationship prescribes human relationships, we would think it first applied 
to the human father/son relationship or the parent/child relationship.” (“CBE and the Doctrine of the 
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is the economic manifestation of Jesus’ obedience to the Father an exemplar for all human 
beings (female and male and not just women), calling us to mutual submission to one 
another, but this mutuality is evidenced in the immanent divine relations as well.286 
Grenz mentions that some theologians look to the eternal movement of 
generation in which the Father begets the Son to construct an asymmetrical model of the 
Trinity of authority and subordination, where authority flows from the Father to the Son 
and then to the Spirit, as the basis for a linear and one-sided conception of male authority 
and female subordination and submission.287 However, Grenz avers strongly: 
Such a conclusion fails to see that the dynamic Origen referred to as “the eternal 
generation of the Son” moves in two directions. As the church father Athanasius 
realized, not only does this dynamic generate the Son, it also constitutes the 
Father. In that the Son is none other than the eternal Son of the eternal Father, the 
Son is not the Son without the Father. But in the same way, the Father – being the 
eternal Father of the eternal Son – is not the Father without the Son.288 
Along with this, Grenz presses forward to assert a dynamic of mutual dependence within 
the Trinity.289 Perhaps surprisingly, he offers a stipulation that “the Son is subordinate to 
                                                             
Trinity,” Priscilla Papers 25.4 (Autumn 2011), 21 and see similar worries in Kevin Giles, “The Trinity 
Argument,” in Raising Women Leaders: Perspectives on Liberating Women in Pentecostal and Charismatic 
Contexts, eds. Shane Clifton and Jacqueline Grey (Sydney, AU: Australasian Pentecostal Studies, 2009), 141) 
While we should be aware of the limits of analogy, such interpretations as these applied to Grenz would 
effectively (mis)read his analogy of relation according to a grammar of numerical sameness and univocity 
that would misrepresent his approach. 
286 Grenz, “Theological Foundations for Male-Female Relationships,” 616–9.  
287 Grenz, Women in the Church, 154; Grenz, “Anticipating God’s New Community,” 597–8; and 
Grenz, “Theological Approaches for Male-Female Relationships,” 87–8. For a recent overview of the full 
range of positions regarding the evangelical “subordination” debate, see Dennis W. Jowers and H. Wayne 
House, eds., The New Evangelical Subordinationism? Perspectives on the Equality of God the Father and God the 
Son. For a strong critique of “eternal functional subordination,” see McCall, Which Trinity? Whose 
Monotheism?, 175–88. 
288 Grenz, “Theological Approaches for Male-Female Relationships,” 87. Grenz states similarly in 
reference to Irenaeus, “As Irenaeus pointed out in the second century, without the Son the Father is not the 
Father of the Son.” (Women in the Church, 154) See also Thomas G. Weinandy, “The Filioque: Beyond 
Athanasius and Thomas Aquinas: An Ecumenical Proposal,” in Ecumenical Perspectives on the Filioque for the 
21st Century, 185–97 concerning the reciprocal “personing” of the Father, Son, and Spirit in their triune 
relations and the manner in which the divine persons as subsistent relations are also mutually dependent on 
the action of the Spirit. Weinandy states: “As subsistent relations fully in act they define and are 
simultaneously being defined by their mutual and reciprocal fully in act relations.” (196) See as well NGQB, 
283–90, 339–41 on the reciprocally constituting triune “personal relations.” 
289 In the context of his discussion of triune mutuality Grenz evinces what is later called his 
Grundaxiom of the ontological primacy of the immanent Trinity and the epistemic priority of the economic 
Trinity, stating: “What is true within the eternal divine dynamic (. . . the ‘immanent Trinity’) is in turn visible 
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the Father within the eternal Trinity.” However, in a very similar way as above, he 
continues by saying that the Father, having entrusted the Son with his reign, is mutually 
dependent on the Son for his deity.290 Here Grenz displays the influence of the “reciprocal 
relational trinitarianism” of Pannenberg which moves him to conclude, “the subordination 
of the Son to the Father must be balanced by the subordination of the Father to the Son.”291 
Grenz thus refuses any sort of unilateral gender essentialism which works with an inner 
logic that assigns to men the roles of authority, leadership, and protection and to women 
the roles of subordination and submission.292 Instead, Grenz beckons us to the high calling 
of mutuality “in Christ” and through the Spirit which best reflects the eternal dynamic 
within the triune God.293 
 
Sarah Coakley and Miroslav Volf on Gender and the Trinity 
 Is the line that Grenz draws here from the mutuality of the triune relations to the 
mutuality of “male and female” in human creation too straight? At first glance, the recent 
volume God, Sexuality, and Self by Sarah Coakley may serve as a verification that Grenz 
indeed confirms the suspicions of the social trinitarian critics. While I cannot hope to do 
justice to Coakley’s whole work in this space, there is what initially seems an apparent 
                                                             
within salvation history (. . . the ‘economic Trinity’).” (“Theological Approaches to Male-Female 
Relationships,” 87)  
290 Grenz, Women in the Church, 153–4. 
291 Grenz, “Anticipating God’s New Community,” 598. 
292 While recognizing creational female/male sexual differentiation (“Anticipating God’s New 
Community, 599), Grenz refuses to reify gender role constructs, saying: “I acknowledge the basic difference 
between males and females. But what is more difficult to determine is what that difference entails and how 
such a difference ought to find expression in the roles that men and women fulfill in their various 
relationships, including within marriage.” (“Post-feminism and a New Gender Covenant,” 52) This statement 
runs counter to a recent assertion from Megan du Toit. Though urging care regarding the distinction 
between sex and gender, she then seems to conflate these in regards to Grenz, and thus mistakes Grenz’s 
insistence on fundamental female/male sexual differentiation for a gendered essentialism. (“Gender: 
Counter-Cultural Practice? Cultural Construct? New Creation?,” in The Gender Conversation: Evangelical 
Perspectives in Gender, Scripture, and the Christian Life, eds. Edwina Murphy and David Starling (Eugene, OR: 
Wipf and Stock, 2016), 161, 165) 
293 See Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 159–64, 169–71. For other defenses of full 
female/male mutuality, see Philip B. Payne, Man and Woman, One in Christ: An Exegetical and Theological 
Study of Paul’s Letters (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2009) and I. Howard Marshall, “Mutual Love and 
Submission in Marriage: Colossians 3.18–19 and Ephesians 5.21–33,” 186–204; Gordon D. Fee, “The Priority of 
Spirit Gifting for Church Ministry,” 241–54; and Rebecca Merrill Groothuis, “‘Equal in Being, Unequal in Role’: 
Exploring the Logic of Women’s Subordination,” 301–33 in Discovering Biblical Equality. 
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dissonance with Grenz’s trinitarian project. Coakley undertakes her own sort of “théologie 
totale” in a trinitarian mode,294 but it should be noted that she gives voice to a similar kind 
of distrust of social trinitarian claims as those voiced by Kilby, Tanner, and Holmes. She in 
particular has feminist theologians in mind who posit the Trinity as the “imitable 
prototype for ecclesial and social relations.” And while she is concerned to overturn the 
same sort of hierarchies, she states insistently, “When humans come, in contrast, into 
authentic relation with God as Trinity through the Spirit, their values and orders of 
‘hierarchy’ change; they are not imitating God thereby, but rather being radically 
transformed by ecstatic participation in the Spirit.”295 
 Coakley states any attempt to answer the contemporary question of the trinitarian 
God must go the route of the inherent entanglements of human sexuality and spirituality. 
Thus she takes up basically an extended discussion of a trinitarian theology of desire in 
which the Spirit becomes the fulcrum of her project. In the course of her discussion 
Coakley locates contemplative and ascetic practices as the context in which “silence in the 
Spirit” fosters the potential response to the Word and where reason is stretched beyond its 
secularity in the contemporary world.296 Regarding gender, though she seeks to overturn 
hierarchies, she nevertheless rejects any sense of dualism and insists that sexuality and 
gender matter and that gender is a “potential vehicle of embodied salvation” that even 
“has an eschatological hope.”297 For Coakley, “desire is an ontological category belonging 
primarily to God, and only secondarily to humans.” And she further specifies, “In God, 
                                                             
294 See Coakley’s explanations in God, Sexuality, and the Self, 27, 33–65, 66–9. But see also Wesley 
Hill’s dissent with “Coakley’s rejection of Johannine trinitarianism in favor of an allegedly incompatible 
Pauline theology.” (“Faith’s Desire: Review of God, Sexuality, and the Self by Sarah Coakley,” First Things 244 
(Jun–Jul 2014), 57) 
295 Quotes from Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 270, 321–2. Emphasis original. She also states, 
“God qua God cannot be cut down to size to fit a false feminist fear of divine transcendence.” (322) 
296 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 1–2, 25. 
297 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 54. Though Coakley distances herself from some accounts of 
gender fluidity, even suggesting gender is “ineradicable,” see the cautions of Beth Felker Jones concerning 
Coakley’s “imagined transformation” of gender if such “isn’t tethered to the goodness of creation and 
goodness of real men and women here and now” and Jones’ desire for a “sustained account of continuity 
between creation and consummation.” (“The Spirit Helps Us in Our Weakness: A Review of God, Sexuality, 
and the Self,” The Other Journal: An Intersection of Theology and Culture (9 June 2014) 
http://theotherjournal.com/2014/06/09/the-spirit-helps-us-in-our-weakness-a-review-of-god-sexuality-and-
the-self/ [Accessed: 28 February 2017]) Cf. Beth Felker Jones, Marks of His Wounds: Gender Politics and Bodily 
Resurrection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 87–114. 
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‘desire’ of course signifies no lack” but rather contains “the plenitude of longing love that 
God has for God’s own creation and for its full and ecstatic participation in the divine, 
trinitarian life.”298 Thus Coakley seeks a Spirit leading, prayer-based, and incorporative 
approach to the Trinity. Suggestively, the link Grenz maintains between human sexuality 
and the drive for bonding on the one hand, and Coakley’s connection between human 
sexuality and desire (divine and human) on the other, are both oriented toward (triune) 
participation in the divine life. Ultimately, this works to overcome the initial apparent 
dissonance and signifies a major resonance between their respective projects.299 
 Given the wariness of approaches that model the Trinity as projectionist by social 
trinitarian critics, it is perhaps surprising to find that one of the theologians most sharply 
criticized for trinitarian imitation, Miroslav Volf, shares the same critique in regards to 
female/male relations and gender.300 For instance, in Exclusion and Embrace Volf issues a 
charge of projection against both Barth and Luce Irigaray.301 Regarding Barth, he recounts 
Barth’s insistence that we do not know what it means for God to be Father from human 
fathers. Rather we know what it means to be a human father from God as Father. Thus we 
should refuse the “analogy from below” and proceed with an “analogy from above.” Yet 
Barth draws from the Father’s begetting of the Son the idea that human males image God 
as Father by leading and being superordinate, leaving women with the subordinate role. 
Volf contends that Barth follows his analogy from above, but only after “project[ing] a 
patriarchal construction of masculinity onto God and tacitly declar[ing] it was there from 
                                                             
298 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 10. See SGRS, 313–20 for Grenz’s nuanced discussion of the 
four loves (agape, philia, storge, and even eros) in relation to God. 
299 This resonance is present even despite the ultimate divergence between Coakley’s acceptance of 
same-sex marriage and Grenz’s dissent. See Stanley J. Grenz, “Homosexuality and the Christian Sex Ethic,” in 
Christian Perspectives on Gender, Sexuality, and Community, 127–50 and Sarah Coakley, The New Asceticism: 
Sexuality, Gender and the Quest for God (London: Bloomsbury Continuum, 2015), 38, 52–3, 129–43 for their 
differing positions. See also Wesley Hill’s charge, “One doesn’t get the sense [Coakley] is aware or cares to 
discuss, the ways her project could wind up reinforcing – and deepening – traditional Christian accounts of 
sex, gender, and divine naming.” (“Faith’s Desire,” 57) 
300 See Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and 
Reconciliation (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1996), 167–90 and Volf, “The Trinity and Gender Identity,” in 
Gospel and Gender: A Trinitarian Engagement with being Male and Female in Christ, ed. Douglas A. Campbell 
(London: T&T Clark, 2003), 155–78. See also Myk Habets, “Prologue – Gender: Divine or Human?,” in 
Reconsidering Gender: Evangelical Perspectives, eds. Myk Habets and Beulah Wood (Eugene, OR: Wipf and 
Stock, 2011), 5–19 which provides a sympathetic discussion of Volf’s treatment in Exclusion and Embrace.  
301 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 171–4. For Grenz’s critique of Barth, see SGRS, 299–303. 
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the beginning.”302 Irigaray, however, fully affirms the need for a projected God, since on her 
reckoning, the Father, Son, and Spirit offer no feminine horizon. The woman is suppressed 
by “masculine transcendence.” Irigaray then is unapologetic about creating a feminine 
Trinity constructed according to her feminist conceptions of gender. 
 The problem from Volf’s point of view is that since God is beyond sexual difference 
(as Grenz also affirmed), the approach of both Barth and Irigaray effectively serve as the 
“ontologization of gender,”303 an approach that as well cuts against Grenz’s development of 
a theo-anthropology. So is there any hope of developing a constructive trinitarian theology 
of gender relations? While Volf declines any sort of essential biblical “manhood” or 
“womanhood,” he thinks there is a way to proceed on two fronts. First, he states that 
“gender identity is rooted in the sexed body and negotiated in the social exchange 
between men and women within a given cultural context,”304 and second, he proposes a 
focus on trinitarian relational personhood.  
In his proposal, Volf affirms (along with Grenz) that embodied sexuality is an 
inalienable feature of human existence. There are, in line with Genesis 1 and 2, no generic 
human beings.305 What does this mean for Galatians 3:28 according to Volf? He is 
ultimately not convinced by claims for an eschatological androgynous ideal. Paul does not 
wish to cancel out distinctiveness (sexual or otherwise), but bring all into harmony with 
Christ. Neither does Paul rend “spirit” and “body” apart in a dualistic fashion that would 
undermine “gender dimorphism.”306 Volf states: 
What has been erased in Christ is not the sexed [male or female] body, but some  
important culturally coded norms attached to sexed bodies. The oneness in Christ 
is a community of people with sexed bodies and distinct gender identities, not 
some abstract unity of pure spirits or de-gendered ‘persons.’”307  
                                                             
302 Volf, “The Trinity and Gender Identity,” 159. 
303 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 173. See Grenz’s agreement with Volf on the “ontologization of 
gender” in SGRS, 293–4. While they align on this point, the two nevertheless part ways when Volf holds that 
human sexual differentiation is not exegetically linked to the divine image in Genesis 1:27. (Exclusion and 
Embrace, 173–4) See SGRS, 272 where Grenz notes this nuanced divergence between him and Volf. 
304 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 181. 
305 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 183. 
306 Volf, “The Trinity and Gender Identity,” 172. 
307 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 184. He further states: “[J]ust as the Hebrew Scripture knows of no 
primal androgyne, no sexually undifferentiated humanity from which ‘male and female’ have emerged, so 
also Paul’s claim that there is “no longer ‘male and female’” entails no eschatological denial of gender 
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Drawing on 1 Corinthians 11:2–16, Volf suggests that man and woman are “not without” the 
other and find identity in mutual relation. Regarding trinitarian personhood, Volf observes 
that the triune persons are reciprocally and internally constituted by the perichoretic 
indwelling of the other divine persons. This means the distinctive personhood of each is 
literally unthinkable without the others. In an analogous manner, male and female are 
also relationally constituted and neither can be thought without the other. Therefore, “to 
be a woman means to be a human being of the female sex who is ‘not without man’; to be 
a man means to be a human being of the male sex who is ‘not without woman’.”308 
 
Female/Male Mutuality and Triune (Ecclesial) Participation 
 The project of Volf to construct a theology of female/male relation from 
“trinitarian identities”309 holds much resonance with Grenz; who, following what has been 
called his Grundaxiom, seeks to give primacy to the Divine Community of Father, Son, and 
Spirit as the ontological ground of human relationality and community (in what has been 
described in this chapter as a theo-anthropology). Similarly, in the words of Myk Habets, 
what Volf’s approach yields for us “is a thoroughly trinitarian account of personhood, 
applied to humans as male and female.”310 From this, rather than and contrary to the idea 
                                                             
dimorphism.” (184) See also Jones, Marks of His Wounds, 93 who notes that, while proposed as way to fight 
misogyny, “the tradition of gender dissolution” has often not yielded an actual “dissolution into androgyny, 
though this would entail its own problems, but as a resolution of all humanity into normative maleness.” For 
agreement that Galatians 3:28 does not imply the abolition of sexual differentiation, see N. T. Wright, “The 
Biblical Case for Ordaining Women,” in Surprised by Scripture: Engaging Contemporary Issues (New York, NY: 
HarperOne, 2014), 64–8 and Judith Gundry-Volf, “Beyond Difference? Paul’s Vision of a New Humanity in 
Galatians 3:28,” in Gospel and Gender, 8–36. 
308 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 187. Volf proposes this Pauline “not without” “suggests precisely 
such a complex and dynamic understanding of gender identity that corresponds to the nature of identity . . . 
in the doctrine of the Trinity.” (“The Trinity and Gender Identity,” 174–5) Grenz makes a shorter but similar 
argument regarding 1 Corinthians 11:2–16 linked to the mutual empowerment of women and men together 
and alongside each other in “Theological Approaches to Male-Female Relationships,” 88, 94–9. 
309 Volf, “The Trinity and Gender Identity,” 164–9. 
310 Habets, “Gender: Divine or Human?,” 15–19 (8). Emphasis original. Grenz states in accordance, 
“While Genesis 2 indicates that God created humans for community, Genesis 1 suggests that the human 
social reality finds its source in the divine [triune] social dynamic. The bridge between creature and Creator 
lies in the creation of humankind to be the bearer of the imago Dei as male and female.” (“Is God Sexual?,” 
209) We should note additionally the emphasis on personhood, rather than reading gender back into God or 
rendering the imago Dei in some sort of numerical sameness with the Trinity. Thus when Paul Helm dissents 
from Grenz’s trinitarian imago Dei theology by saying, “one might have expected that mankind should have 
been established not as a single person, or even as a couple, man and wife, but as a triple, a triad, or a troika. 
If God is a triune community of persons, and if this is what gives God his identity, above all things, then 
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of a “neither-one-nor-the-other” which neuters by erasing female/male distinction, or a 
“both-the-one-and-the-other” which neuters by synthesizing female/male difference, Volf 
posits the idea of a “not-without-the-other” which “affirms gender differences while at the 
same time positing one gender is always internal to the other. The irreducible duality is 
preserved and made part of a complex identity in which each, in its own way, always 
already contain the other.”311 Much like Grenz, Volf rests his theology of gender relations 
on a trinitarian ontology of persons-in-communion which resists any notion of 
hierarchy,312 and in which the relation of male and female manifests the grammar of the 
relations of the triune persons. This is in accord with Grenz’s relational imago Dei 
theology, constructed from his overarching theological grammar composed of the motifs 
of Trinity, community, and eschatology, and from which emerges not simply community 
in general terms but “male and female” as a community of mutuality. 
 The community of “male and female” in the imago Dei is not where Grenz leaves 
off however. I noted previously how Grenz’s connection between human sexuality and the 
drive for bonding which finds its transcendent ground in the triune God who is love, and 
Coakley’s trinitarian theology of desire which forges a link between human sexuality and 
desire (whether divine and human), gesture toward a resonance in which both projects 
are oriented toward (triune) participation in the divine life. Pressing this further, in 
Grenz’s telling, this participation has a particular, and indeed, ecclesial shape and 
character. While this emphasis comes out strongly in Grenz’s conception of ecclesial 
theosis and triune participation in the later pages of Social God,313 we also catch a glimpse 
of it in an earlier essay where Grenz states,  
Although the Old Testament elevates marriage as the primal bond uniting man 
and woman, in the New Testament we discover an even more theologically 
important relationship. Drawing from the words of Jesus himself, the New 
Testament writers present as the primary relationship into which humans can 
enter the covenant with God in Christ which in turn leads to membership in the 
                                                             
humankind, made in the image of God, ought to be triune,” (“Cautious Trinitarianism, 23) he ironically 
(mis)reads Grenz’s social analogy in a univocal manner and thus misrepresents Grenz’s position. 
311 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 187. 
312 Miroslav Volf, “Being as God Is: Trinity and Generosity,” in God’s Life in Trinity, eds. Miroslav Volf 
and Michael Welker (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2006), 10–12 and Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 180. 
313 SGRS, 325–6. 
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covenant community, the fellowship of Christ’s disciples. Consequently, within 
this relationship we become most completely the imago Dei.314 
Because of this, the creational female/male community as well as marriage take on 
penultimate status as they point beyond themselves to the ecclesial and eschatological 
horizon.315 Therefore, in Social God, Grenz makes the move from the relational self and 
social imago to the ecclesial self.316 Thus the path Grenz charts leads to ecclesial 
personhood brought about by theotic triune participation. For this reason, triune 
participation is necessarily an ecclesial participation, one in which the ecclesial 
community of “male and female” is incorporated “in Christ” and through the Spirit into the 
perichoretic life of the triune God. Therefore, triune mutuality forms the heart of ecclesial 
community. Having been drawn into the divine life, the ecclesial relation and community 
of “male and female” – constituted “in Christ” and through the Spirit as the prolepsis of the 
divine image and a sacrament of divine communion – should also, within its ecclesial 
existence, manifest the mutuality which characterizes the triune relations. We are not yet 
ready to articulate a thickly conceived hermeneutical ecclesiology, but we have gleaned 
two important aspects toward that direction; namely, the trinitarian shape of the ecclesial 
community and the corresponding grammar of mutuality. Both are vital to the ecclesial 
existence by which the triune God is made known in the world. 
 
                                                             
314 Grenz, “Theological Approaches to Male-Female Relationships,” 93–4. See as well Grenz, 
“Anticipating the New Community,” 601–2. 
315 Thus we might also say the community expressed in both marriage and in singleness are 
mutually implicated ways of living out our mutual ecclesial life “in Christ” and through the Spirit. Grenz 
states: “God's loving character becomes visible as we love one another, whether as partners who share the 
exclusive love relationship of marriage or as participants in the more inclusive non-marital bonds that bring 
persons – both male and female – together within the context of Christ's fellowship. Within this fellowship, 
our task is to help others, in the words of Jean Vanier, to ‘grow toward wholeness and to discover their place, 
and eventually exercise their gifts, in a network of friendship.’ This requires, he adds, ‘the integration of one's 
sexuality in a vision of fellowship and [ecclesial] friendship.’” (“Theological Approaches to Male-Female 
Relationships,” 94 quoting Jean Vanier, Man and Woman He Made Them (London: Darton, Longman and 
Todd, 1984), 97–8) 




FROM NAMED GOD TO NARRATIVE IMAGO: 
THE NARRATIVE SHAPE OF THE HERMENEUTICAL COMMUNITY 
 
This third chapter treats the development of the dynamic of triune narrative 
identity which arises from the eternal trinitarian divine self-naming in Grenz’s Named God 
volume, and its implications for the imago Dei. Thus while the previous chapter moved 
“from social God to social imago,” this chapter goes “from named God to narrative imago.” 
In this manner, the examination of Grenz’s social trinitarianism in chapter two now meets 
an important critical narrative moment, which then leads into the ecclesial return 
moment in chapter four. This chapter opens with a descriptive summary of Named God as 
its “main road.” This is followed by a critical moment which assesses the continuity and/or 
discontinuity of Named God with Grenz’s prior social trinitarian theology and then 
presents the refinement of Grenz’s theo-anthropology into a Christo-anthropology. This 
chapter then concludes with some constructive proposals concerning the intersection of 
the narrative imago, gender, and storied triune participation. 
 
The Named God and the Imago Dei 
[T]he Spirit places humans "in Christ" and thereby bestows on them personal 
identity extra se in Christo insofar as the Spirit incorporates them into the Jesus 
story. . . . The sense of self for those who are "in Christ," therefore, emerges from a 
particular "emplotment," to cite Ricoeur's term. Being "in Christ" entails 
participating in the narrative of Jesus, with its focus on the cross and the 
resurrection. It involves retelling one's own narrative, and hence making sense out 
of one's life, by means of the plot of the Jesus narrative.1 
[T]he saga of the I AM is ultimately the narrative of "the Father and the Son and 
the Holy Spirit." The saga of the divine name, in other words, is the saga of the 
relationships among the three persons of the Trinity. . . . The pathway to God 
proceeds by means of our being caught up into the narrative of the relationality of 
the trinitarian persons, which narrative is eternal yet temporal, for it transpires in 
the history of Jesus' relationship with his Father through the Holy Spirit. We 
participate in this dynamic as the Holy Spirit places us "in Christ" and thereby 
constitutes us together as co-heirs with Christ of the treasure – the love and the 
                                                             
1 SGRS, 329. 
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name – that the Father eternally lavishes on his Son. In this manner, the Spirit 
who is the personal concretization of the divine love leads us to love the Other in 
the other.2 
 This first section presents Grenz’s development of triune narrative identity 
through what can be termed conversely the “saga of the I AM” or the “saga of the triune 
name,” in his constructive push to develop a thoroughgoing trinitarian theo-ontology in 
Named God. There is first a brief primer on Grenz’s approach to narrative theology 
generally in relationship to his trinitarian theology. Second, a summary of “Part One: The 
Saga of Being” presents Grenz’s telling of the rise and demise of being in the first three 
chapters of Named God. Third, a synopsis of Grenz’s narrating of the divine name in “Part 
Two: The Saga of the I AM” (chapters three, four, and five) is given. Fourth, a summation of 
Grenz’s conclusions in “Part Three: The Saga of the Triune Name” (chapters seven, eight, 
and nine) regarding a trinitarian theo-ontology of the divine name and its implications for 
the narrative imago is offered. 
 
Grenz and the Saga of the Triune God 
 In the previous chapter we noted Karen Kilby’s proposal for an apophatic 
approach to trinitarian doctrine as a guard against projectionism.3 What may be 
unexpected is the remarkable resonance here between Kilby’s articulation of this 
suggestion in response to the perceived errors of social trinitarianism and Grenz’s overall 
narrative approach to theology. Both appeal to the nature of theology as a second order 
discipline and both reference George Lindbeck for support.4 Grenz presents his main 
engagement with Lindbeck’s cultural-linguistic approach5 in Beyond Foundationalism and 
                                                             
2 NGQB, 270, 338. 
3 See Scott Harrower’s similar worry that “strict realist” readings of Rahner’s Rule univocally read 
the economy of salvation back into the being of God (Trinitarian Self and Salvation: An Evangelical 
Engagement with Rahner’s Rule (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2012), 2, 124) Grenz’s admission that 
nothing is totally analogous to God as Trinity (TCG, 71) and the discussion on the nature of theological 
language, analogy, metaphor, and engagement with social trinitarian critiques in chapter two provides a 
Grenzian response to Harrower’s concern. 
4 See Kilby, “Perichoresis and Projection,” 443–5 for her appeal to Lindbeck. 
5 The classic volume on this is Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine. For a discussion of Lindbeck in 
relation to MacIntyre and church tradition, see David Trenery, Alasdair MacIntyre, George Lindbeck, and The 
Nature of Tradition (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2014), 140–70. 
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Renewing the Center6 to develop what he calls the “Christian belief-mosaic.” The choice of 
“mosaic” as a descriptive metaphor is explored in conjunction with Grenz’s 
postfoundationalist refiguring of the theological task in a postmodern context.7 Peter 
Leithart, though, insists Grenz’s use of this metaphor betrays a latent modern 
Cartesianism insofar as a mosaic is a static object one does not look through but looks at.8 
Mark Medley, however, rightly insists Leithart misreads Grenz at this point. Grenz refers 
to the Christian belief-mosaic in order to “stress the coherency and interconnectedness of 
theological doctrine . . . to capture the circularity, or perichoretic character, of the 
proposed theological methodology.”9  
 Medley’s mention of “coherency” gives a clue as to what Grenz’s productive 
engagement with Lindbeck is attempting. Lindbeck distinguished between two modes of 
doing theology under the conditions of modern foundationalism. The “cognitive-
propositionalist” approach claims too much in the assumed ability to make one-to-one 
first-order truth claims on a rationalist foundation. The “experiential-expressivist” 
approach conversely sees doctrine as arising from inward feelings and existential states 
and thus makes experience the foundation, even going so far at times as to see a supposed 
universal core experience common to all religions. Drawing on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 
language game theory, Lindbeck’s cultural-linguistic approach forges a coherentist 
proposal in which doctrines take on a role akin to the rules of grammar.10 As a “grammar” 
they take on a regulative function as theological rules of discourse for a believing 
community of reference. “Christian doctrines establish the ground rules for the ‘game’ of 
Christian thinking, speaking, and living.”11 Grenz puts this Lindbeckian emphasis12 to use 
                                                             
6 For Grenz’s engagement with Lindbeck, see BF, 6, 10, 20, 45–9, 51, 89, 107 and RTC, 206–7, 210–11, 
253, 276, 279, 284, 352.  
7 See BF, 3–26, 49–51, 54, 120, 165–6, 170, 187, 202, 204, 231, 233–4, 249, 273 and RTC, 187–9, 213, 255, 
351, 353. 
8 Peter J. Leithhart, “Review Essay: Stanley J. Grenz, Renewing the Center and Beyond 
Foundationalism,” Pro Ecclesia 11.3 (Summer 2002), 361. 
9 Mark S. Medley, “An Evangelical Theology for a Postmodern Age: Stanley J. Grenz’s Current 
Theological Project,” Perspectives in Religious Studies 30.1 (Spring 2003), 82. 
10 On Wittgenstein’s influence on Lindbeck, see Knowles, Beyond Evangelicalism, 33–47. 
11 RTC, 206. 
12 Extending from his adaption of Lindbeck’s post-liberalism, some have dubbed Grenz a “post-
conservative.” For a pejorative view of post-conservatives, see Millard J. Erickson, The Evangelical Left: 
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toward the articulation of the particular interconnected and coherent trinitarian “web of 
significance,”13 “matrix of meaning,” or “mosaic of beliefs” which serves to animate the 
community of Christ for the sake of mission within its situated context.14  
 The intimate relation between the church as a particular community of reference 
and the belief-mosaic point towards the narrative and communitarian character of 
Grenz’s theology.15 As a theological grammar the mosaic functions as an interpretive grid 
for the narrative production of identity. But this does not occur simply on an individual 
level. Rather narrative identity formation necessarily requires a narrative community. 
Theology for this reason is not only constructive but an ecclesial activity as well. Here 
Grenz recognizes the dangers of the enshrining of experience as the unassailable 
                                                             
Encountering Postconservative Evangelical Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1997). For a positive 
take, see Medley, “An Evangelical Theology for a Postmodern Age,” 76, 86, 92. Roger Olson contends that 
while Grenz was reluctant to take up the label (perhaps because of its pejorative use from critics!), he is 
nevertheless the epitome of post-conservativism (Reformed and Always Reforming: The Postconservative 
Approach to Evangelical Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2007), 15). Olson outlines six “family 
resemblances” for the post-conservative style of theology: 1) divine revelation aims for transformation rather 
than simply information and narrative before propositions, 2) the theological task is a pilgrimage marked by 
provisionality and the need for faithful improvisation, 3) a postmodern impulse dissatisfied with captivity to 
Enlightenment modes of thought, 4) evangelicalism as a centered-set rather than bounded-set movement, 5) 
the importance of spirituality as well as doctrine to evangelical faith, and 6) a recovery of the Great Tradition 
even while holding Scripture as the norming norm. (51–65) All in all, these seem reflective of Grenz. For a 
resonant self-described postpropositionalist, post-conservative, and postfoundationalist approach, see Kevin 
J. Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical-Linguistic Approach to Christian Theology (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2005), 265–305. See also Steven B. Sherman, Revitalizing Theological 
Epistemology: Holistic Evangelical Approaches to the Knowledge of God (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 
2008), chapters one (1–15), two (16–127), and three (128–202) and Roger E. Olson, The Journey of Modern 
Theology: From Reconstruction to Deconstruction (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2013), 640–8, which 
treat Grenz as a representative post-conservative. 
13 On Grenz’s use of the “web” metaphor in addition to “mosaic,” see Grenz, “Articulating the Belief-
Mosaic,” 113, 123–4; Grenz, “Conversing in Christian Style,” 87; BF, 25, 39, 82, 117, 136, 144, 165, 197, 204, 210, 216, 
231; and RTC, 189, 199, 213, 284. Grenz admits some pieces are more central in the mosaic than others (CFC, 
xxiv–xxvi and RTC, 213), thus his trinitarian motifs and narrative sources do appear as ordered sets. Are these 
conditions enough to cast Grenz as a soft-foundationalist? (Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. 
Grenz, 35–6, 180 and Harris, “Why Method Matters,” 10–11) The addition of the web metaphor helps show 
this need not be the case. Dan Stiver (“Theological Method,” in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern 
Theology, 172–3), referencing W. V. O. Quine, notes that in a web, while some features are more central and 
others peripheral, “unlike a foundational structure the logic relations do not proceed in just one way.” (172) 
See W. V. O. Quine and J. S. Ullian, The Web of Belief (New York, NY: Random House, 1970) which Grenz cites. 
(BF, 39 and RTC, 199) Cf. Knowles, Beyond Evangelicalism, 84, 104–5 and Smith, “A Generous Theology,” 118. 
For an additional metaphor for theological knowledge as a map, see Vanhoozer, Drama of Doctrine, 294–301. 
14 BF, 165 and Grenz, “Articulating the Christian Belief-Mosaic,” 123. See also Knowles, Beyond 
Evangelicalism, 85–6, 120, 158, 177, 180; Harris, The Theological Method of Stanley J. Grenz, 92–9, 170, 200, 211; 
and Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 45, 126, 132, 187. 
15 BF, 48–51, 203–38. 
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foundation on the experientialist side and the complete eschewing of experience on the 
side of propositionalist rationalism. The ubiquity of communal human experience, 
though, would seem to imply that it would be unwise, and indeed impossible, to somehow 
ignore in wholesale fashion. There is never a time when we are not “storied” in some 
manner or way.16 Yet Grenz observes that experience does not simply precede 
interpretation in a foundationalist manner. “Rather, experiences are always filtered by an 
interpretive framework – a grid – that facilitates their occurrence.”17 Grenz presses this 
further, however, to contend that there are no essentially generic religious or theological 
experiences. There are only identity forming experiences generated in connection to 
specific communities and traditions. All identity in this sense is not only communitarian 
in nature but in a very real sense traditioned and storied.18 
 Grenz draws on Peter Berger to explicate the nature of “socially constructed 
reality”19 in connection to narrative identity. Social communities mediate the symbols, 
metaphors, and linguistic resources which generate shared meaning and identity. 
“Theology, we might conclude, explores the world-constructing, knowledge-forming, 
identity-forming ‘language’ of the Christian community.”20 The particular Christian 
identity producing belief-mosaic takes its own shape from the activity of the triune God in 
the world as the norming biblical narrative takes on the role of what Grenz calls a 
“paradigmatic narrative.”21 Scripture narrates to us the stories or paradigmatic events that 
give shape to the identity of the Christian community. As a “people of the book”22 then, 
                                                             
16 Stanley Hauerwas (“No Enemy, No Christianity: Preaching Between ‘Worlds’,” in Sanctify Them in 
Truth: Holiness Exemplified, Second edition (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2016), 211) states regarding the 
modernist impulse: “[T]he project of modernity was to produce people who believe they should have no 
story except the story they choose when they had no story.”  
17 BF, 49. 
18 For the connection of narrative, ecclesial community, and tradition, see Grenz, “Theological 
Heritage as Hermeneutical Trajectory,” 215–39 and BF, 93–129. See also the storied, relational epistemology 
of N. T. Wright in The New Testament and the People of God (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1992), 31–46 
which Wright notes has resonance with Ricoeur’s hermeneutical and narrative arcs (44). 
19 See Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luchman, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on the 
Sociology of Knowledge (New York, NY: Anchor Books, 1967), 13, 99–104 and Peter L. Berger, The Sacred 
Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969), 3–51. 
20 BF, 53. 
21 BF, 80. 
22 Grenz, “Nurturing the Soul, Informing the Mind: The Genesis of the Evangelical Scripture 
Principle,” 21–41. 
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Christians form a narrative community gathered around the story of Jesus Christ. In Social 
God, Grenz explains that the storied identity of those who are placed “in Christ” through 
the Spirit takes its shape from the plot of the Jesus narrative.23 “By looking to the biblical 
story as constituting our own identity, we become the contemporary embodiment of 
Jesus’ narrative, and hence we are called ‘the body of Christ.’”24 
 The combination of the communitarian turn and the second order nature of 
theological construction would seem to enable both the space for the development of a 
distinctly Christian doctrine of the Trinity as well as ensuring the appropriate apophatic 
space that Kilby desires. Grenz notes a potential problem however. Does the forsaking of 
foundationalism undercut metaphysical realism? Or, what can be said about a world 
beyond our doctrinal formulations?25 The path toward answering these questions leads 
Grenz to what he terms “eschatological realism” in which the future becomes a proleptic 
narrative reality in the present through the agency of the Spirit.26 The means of 
accomplishing this goal or telos runs through the Bible as the norming narrative of the 
ecclesial community insofar as Scripture is the “instrumentality of the Spirit.”27 Grenz 
appeals to speech-act theory to explain how this can occur in a postfoundationalist 
theology.28 The biblical text itself forms the locutionary act or that which is enunciated. It 
                                                             
23 SGRS, 329. 
24 BF, 80 and Stanley J. Grenz, “Community, Interpretive,” in Dictionary for Theological 
Interpretation of the Bible, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic), 129. See also BF, 46 
and the reference to Lindbeck’s “intratextual theology” that “redescribes reality within a scriptural 
framework” which is directed toward “imaginatively incorporating all being into a Christ-centered world.” 
(The Nature of Doctrine, 118) 
25 See Jeffrey Hensley, “Are Postliberals Necessarily Antirealists? Reexamining the Metaphysics of 
Lindbeck’s Postliberal Theology,” in The Nature of Confession: Evangelical and Postliberals in Conversation, 
eds. Timothy R. Phillips and Dennis L. Okholm (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 1996), 69–80 for the view Lindbeck 
does not succumb to antirealism or relativism. For a positive case for a “conservative relativism” which 
engages Wittgenstein, Richard Rorty, and Robert Brandom, see James K. A. Smith, Who’s Afraid of Relativism? 
Community, Contingency, and Creaturehood (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2014). 
26 BF, 271–3 and RTC, 254–6. Cf. Stanley J. Grenz, “Eschatological Theology: Contours of a 
Postmodern Theology of Hope,” Review and Expositor 97.3 (2000), 339–54. 
27 RTC, 215. In line with the Grenzian grammar then, Grenz’s ontology of Scripture is fully trinitarian 
and accordingly he locates his discussion of Scripture within the section on pneumatology in TCG, 379–404. 
See also John R. Franke, “Christian Faith and Postmodern Theory: Theology and the Nonfoundationalist 
Turn,” in Christianity and the Postmodern Turn: Six Views, ed. Myron B. Penner (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos 
Press, 2005), 116. 
28 BF, 24, 72–83 and RTC, 214–5. On speech act theory, see J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 
Second edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). See also the sympathetic critique of Grenz’s 
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is then through Scripture that the Spirit performs the illocutionary act of divine address 
and action.29 These features are situated within and oriented toward the goal or telos of the 
Spirit’s speaking in which the Spirit accomplishes a particular perlocutionary act – 
namely, the Spirit’s construction of the eschatological “world” of the new humanity of the 
new creation.30 At work here is Grenz’s adaption of the ontological priority of the 
eschatological future which can thus be described as an eschatological realism.31 
 We have already seen the identity producing belief-mosaic at work in Social God as 
Grenz worked out his grammar of Trinity, community, and eschatology. And though not 
emphasized in the previous chapter, the grammar of Scripture as norming narrative,32 the 
church’s tradition as hermeneutical trajectory,33 and culture as embedding context34 is also 
present throughout Grenz’s first Matrix volume. At work within the belief-mosaic of the 
Grenzian grammar of the trinitarian motifs and the narrative sources is the Spirit who 
brings those destined to be the imago Dei “in Christ” (as the true imago) to fulfil their 
divine mandate as narrative and “linguistic” co-participants in the eschatological “world” 
formation of the Spirit’s making.35 Consistent with his thoroughgoing trinitarianism, the 
authority of both Scripture and tradition is dependent on the activity of the Spirit for the 
church’s mission in its context as the eschatological realm manifests proleptically in the 
                                                             
application of speech act theory in Kevin J. Vanhoozer, “From Speech Acts to Scripture Acts: The Covenant 
of Discourse and the Discourse of the Covenant,” in First Theology: God, Scripture, and Hermeneutics 
(Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 2002), 197–9. 
29 Grenz suggests the examples of the teaching, reproving, correcting, and instructing in 2 Timothy 
3:16 and various Psalms that instruct how we may voice our thoughts and emotions to God. (RTC, 215) 
30 See Stanley J. Grenz, “The Spirit and the Word: The World-Creating Function of the Text,” 
Theology Today 57.3 (Oct 2000), 357–74 and BF, 75–8. Cf. Stiver, Theology After Ricoeur, 63–77, 92–3, 114, 124, 
139–40, 213 for discussions of the “world behind the text,” “world of the text,” and “world in front of the text” 
in Ricoeur. 
31 Grenz states: “Where does [the created universe’s] givenness lie? Where is its actuality? . . . the 
‘objectivity of the world’ about which we can truly speak is an objectivity of a future, eschatological world. 
The ‘actual’ universe is the universe as it one day will be. And this eschatological universe is nothing short of 
a new creation. Because this future reality is God’s determined will for creation, as that which cannot be 
shaken (Heb. 12:26–28), it is far more real – and hence far more objective, far more actual – than the present 
world, which is now passing away (1 Cor. 7:31) . . . This eschatological realm breaks into the here and now as 
the Holy Spirit fashions our present in the light of God’s future.” (BF, 271–2) See also Franke, The Character of 
Theology, 78–9 for a similar approach. 
32 See in particular SGRS, chapters five and six. 
33 SGRS, chapter four. 
34 SGRS, chapters two and three. 
35 BF, 53. 
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present. Grenz specifies that setting Scripture against tradition or tradition over Scripture 
is to misconstrue the “eschatological directedness” of the Spirit in guiding the community 
of faith towards the truth of its divinely given telos.36 His postfoundationalist narrative 
construing of the Grenzian grammar locates ultimate authority in the triune God. If we 
must speak of a “foundation,” Grenz insists it can only be the triune God “who is disclosed 
in polyphonic fashion through Scripture, the church, and even the world, albeit always in 
accordance with the normative divine self-disclosure through Scripture.”37 
 This very same impulse finds its expression in Social God as Grenz works in the 
wake of the demise of the self within the postmodern milieu to develop in constructive 
fashion “a trinitarian theology of the imago Dei.”38 The result is what I positioned in the 
previous chapter as a trinitarian theo-anthropology leading to Grenz’s construction of the 
ecclesial self. The driving Grenzian trinitarian impulse likewise finds expression in Named 
God and thus, in line with the trinitarian motifs, it is fitting that the themes of community 
and eschatology play their respective integrative and orienting functions in Grenz’s 
argument and conclusions regarding an ontology of the triune divine name. However, 
though Grenz conducts a study of a trinitarian theo-ontology in Named God, he is clear in 
the introduction that his study of ontology will be conducted through a narrative lens – 
namely, that story which constitutes the saga of trinitarian narrative identity disclosed in 
the saga of the triune divine name. Grenz selects the term “saga” with intent saying, “the 
word ‘saga’ was deliberately chosen as the heading for each of the three parts of the book 
because of the narrative overtones that it conveys.”39 Because of this, the trialogue of 
narrative sources are also interwoven within the second Matrix volume just like the first.40 
Thus “the saga of being” forms a narration of the embedding contextual milieu of Western 
philosophical ontology and onto-theology. “The saga of the I AM” presents a scriptural 
exegesis of the divine name. And, in a significant move as a free church and Baptist 
                                                             
36 Grenz, “Theological Heritage as Hermeneutical Trajectory,” 237. 
37 Grenz, “Theological Heritage as Hermeneutical Trajectory,” 227. 
38 The subtitle for SGRS. 
39 NGQB, 7. 
40 Grenz was specific that the trialogue of “canonical Scripture, the theological heritage of the 
church, and the intellectual currents of the wider culture” would be present throughout the Matrix series. 
(SGRS, x) Thus the narrative Grenzian grammar is active in both SGRS and NGQB. 
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theologian, Grenz conducts a deep engagement with the church’s (trinitarian) theological 
tradition in “the saga of the triune name.”41 Each of these narrates a certain story or drama 
in Grenz’s theo-ontological argument and together they narrate an overarching story: “the 
saga of the intended interplay of the named character of God and the question of Being, 
and hence the intended interplay of theology and ontology.”42 With this we now turn to a 
descriptive summary of Grenz’s presentation of the saga of the triune God in Named God. 
 
The Rise and Demise of Being 
 In Part One of Named God – titled “The Saga of Being” – Grenz begins with a 
narrative genealogy of the rise and demise of Being.43 Forming the first act in the saga of 
Being, chapter one – “From To On to the Ipsum Esse: The Christianization of Being”44 – 
begins with the pre-Socratic philosophers. Prior to the sixth century BC, “ultimate 
questions” were answered with an appeal to a pantheon of gods. Those who would come 
to be known as philosophers sought to shift explanations concerning the diversity of 
things in the cosmos, the changeability of these things, and the resemblance of certain 
things to each other toward some sort of underlying logic (logos) which provided cosmic 
order. Thales of Miletus (625–547) posited the first principle as water. Anaximander (611–
546), however, held that the first principle was not directly observable by the natural 
senses. The constancy of change prompted Heraclitus (544–484) to propos fire as the first 
principle (though Grenz observes this may have been metaphorical). Parmenides (540–
470), however, concluded from his consideration of “what is” (to on) that a changeable 
cosmic unity is a contradiction. He averred that fundamental reality is static. Being was 
thus born, but the most that could be said about “what is,” was that “it is.”45  
                                                             
41 See Steven R. Harmon, “‘Catholic Baptists’ and the New Horizon of Tradition in Baptist Theology,” 
in Toward Baptist Catholicity: Essays on Tradition and the Baptist Vision (Waynesboro, GA: Paternoster Press, 
2006), 1–21, who notes the suspicion with which tradition is sometimes regarded in free church, Baptist 
theology and then offers his own constructive response. 
42 NGQB, 7. 
43 Throughout this survey it should be recognized that Grenz provides more depth and texture in 
his historical discussions than can be duplicated here. For Grenz’s own summary of Part One see the 
introduction to NGQB (7–8) and follow the footnotes provided here for direction to Grenz’s discussions in 
the main text. 
44 NGQB, 15–50. 
45 NGQB, 17–23. 
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Most important for Grenz’s consideration of the promotion of Being to the center 
of philosophical inquiry in this chapter are Plato (428–348) and Aristotle (384–322) and 
their subsequent link to Augustine (354–430) and Aquinas (1225–1274) respectively. Plato’s 
enormous impact on the story of ontology and Being flows primarily through his theory of 
the Forms.46 Plato distinguished between the sensible realm of changeability, appearance, 
and sense experience, and the intelligible realm of the unchangeable Forms. In addition, 
Plato held that these two realms are connected, with the objects in the sensible realm 
participating in their corresponding and proper Forms. This participation means that 
rational human knowledge of an ontological nature is possible, while the participation of 
the Forms in each other yields a hierarchy with the “Form of the Good” at the apex. In the 
quest to know the “Form of the Good,” Being achieves an “eternal reality that gives 
meaning to everything else.”47  
Concerning Aristotle’s first philosophy, or “metaphysics” as the study of Being as 
Being, we can summarize thusly.48 First, the substance of a thing contains both essential 
and accidental characteristics. Second, rather than forms existing in a separate realm, they 
instead reside in the individual things themselves. “Form is never without matter, and 
matter is never without form.”49 Third, things in the world exist as ongoing acts from 
potentiality to actuality. In reference to the changeability of substances Aristotle lists four 
causes: formal (what it is), material (from what it is made), efficient (by what or whom it is 
made), and final (the goal or telos for which it is made). Lastly, the movement of things 
from potentiality to teleological actuality presumes an unchangeable “purely actual” or an 
actus purus that is the fullness of being, the object of desire that draws the universe 
towards its natural end. This is Aristotle’s distant Unmoved Mover which exists in an 
eternal state of divine self-reflection. In Grenz’s terms, the to on of the pre-Socratic 
philosophers became the “Self-absorbed Intellect.”50 
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Some early Christian leaders were suspect of the Platonic heritage (Tertullian) 
while others were more positive (Clement of Alexandria and Origen). Grenz notes the 
most influential brand of Platonism came through the Neoplatonism of Plotinus (204–
270) in which all that is emanates (in the form of Intelligence, Soul, and corrupted Matter) 
in a cyclical movement from “the One” and back to “the One” through the interiority of the 
soul.51 While Augustine’s view of reality was determined by his Christian faith, Grenz notes 
the influence of Neoplatonism in Augustine’s emphasis on the soul and the Augustinian 
inward turn.52 Augustine’s inward turn has cognitive, affective, and volitional aspects 
which are ordered toward one proper goal; namely, real and intimate knowledge (love) of 
the true and triune God. In adapting Neoplatonic ontology to his own uses, Augustine 
replaces the impersonal “One” with the Christian God who is love, the highest good, 
eternal and all-knowing Being, and the source of all being. Thus “the Being of Greek 
philosophy became the God who is the soul’s desire. As such, the biblical God – the one 
disclosed as the great I AM – is Being itself.”53  
Aquinas viewed theology as the completion of philosophy and it is he who is 
responsible for the medieval synthesis of Christian theology with Aristotelian Greek 
philosophy.54 Aquinas emphasized that things have being insofar as they have “essence” 
and “existence.” This raises the inherent contingency of these things and that there is a 
Being who exists as the author of all things, a Being with existence as its essence and thus 
a necessary Being. In a move similar to Augustine, Aquinas linked this idea with the God 
of the Bible. Thus Being belongs to God’s own nature and God is the one who bestows 
being on everything that is. In doing this Aquinas transformed the Unmoved Mover as 
final cause of the world into the Creator God of Scripture, as not only final cause but also 
efficient cause. The triune “God is therefore the ipsum esse from whom all things derive 
their esse”55 and who knows all about every created thing and exercises providential care. 
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“As the ipsum esse, God has become the self-existent First Cause of the world, as well as 
Being qua Being.”56  
Grenz notes Aquinas’ genius was his synthesis of theology and philosophy, with 
natural theology as the point of overlap, that presented God as the “scientific God” and 
first principle necessary for both.57 The legacies of Augustine and Aquinas would cast long 
shadows but the story of Being is complicated. Grenz summarizes thusly:  
Some thinkers would pursue a pathway similar to the one that Aquinas, following 
Aristotle, had trod and offer variations and permutations of the idea of God as the 
First Cause of the world. Others, in contrast, would opt in a direction that was 
more in keeping with Plato and Augustine and appeal instead to the concept of 
the Infinite.”58 
But Grenz notes the story of Being would move to a much different place in the wake of 
the medieval synthesis, one which ultimately leads to the demise of Being. Thus, the 
subtitle of chapter two – “From the First Cause to the Infinite” – casts this second act of 
the saga of Being as “the secularization of Being.”59 
Two figures begin Grenz’s narration of the demise of the scientific God. The first is 
John Duns Scotus (1266–1308)60 who is well known for opposing Aquinas’ emphasis on 
analogical language in favor of his own theory of univocal language. However, Scotus also 
dissented from Aquinas’ distinction between existence and essence. He thus extended his 
disagreement into ontology with a defense of what would come to be called volunteerism. 
Scotus declared that God is characterized by complete liberty not contingent on anything 
beyond the divine will. This marked a first step away from God as the rational First Cause 
toward God as the “volitional Infinite.”61 The second figure is William of Ockham (1285–
1349)62 who followed the same voluntaristic trajectory and ultimately extended it. God in 
Ockham’s conception, rather than being the epitome of rationality, was simply inscrutable 
will. Thus Ockham embraced what would come to be known as nominalism in which the 
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elevation of the divine will above the divine intellect would eventually lead to his 
disjoining of theology and philosophy and even revelation and reason. In this way he 
extended the dissolution of the scholastic synthesis. 
Next on the stage was Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464)63 who agreed with the 
nominalist assertion that reason cannot lead to knowledge of God. He disagreed about the 
way forward though. Nicholas presented mathematics itself as the science of the infinite in 
a way that provided a foretaste of thinkers such as René Descartes (1596–1650). Where 
Being is concerned Nicholas advanced the idea of the “unfolding of the infinite in the 
finite and the enfolding of the finite in the infinite”64 which prefigured later developments 
in Romantic philosophy. The rise of mathematics led to the focus in the Renaissance on 
the mechanistic universe. It is true that someone like Isaac Newton (1643–1727)65 did not 
yet see philosophy/theology and the natural sciences as radically separate, and even 
viewed his work as providing evidence for the existence of God. Yet his work, fostering as 
it did the idea of the mechanistic universe, did serve – even if unwittingly – to undermine 
the scholastic synthesis and conception of Being. 
Having reduced God to an inference from mechanical causes, Grenz notes that the 
stage was set for the purging of God from the reigning scientific cosmology.66 Thus the 
question became: would there be a place for God in this new cosmology at all? In the 
American colonies, Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758)67 did the most to reconceive the Being 
of God. Edwards spoke of God as “Being-in-General” and asserted that creation arises 
continuously out of the divine infinity. Furthermore, Edwards staunchly insisted that the 
God who is Being-in-General is also none other than the God who is triune love. On the 
British and European side, though, the understanding of God was drastically different and 
more generic.68 John Locke (1632–1704), despite his own personal religious beliefs, stands 
as one for whom God was superfluous for his epistemology. David Hume (1711–1776) 
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extended this dynamic to a full blown agnostic skepticism which served to awaken 
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) from his famous dogmatic slumber. Distinguishing between 
things available to human experience (phenomena) and things beyond human experience 
(noumena) he stated we can have no knowledge of a thing in itself. In so doing, Kant also 
admitted to his stance of denying “knowledge” in order to provide space for faith.  
Ultimately Grenz judges that the God of Kant’s metaphysics is simply the 
“regulative principle of theoretical or ‘pure’ reason and the one whom practical reason 
demands as the guarantor that happiness will eventually be distributed in accordance 
with virtue.”69 However, this seems a far cry from the personal God of Edwards and the 
Christian tradition. The post-Kantian philosophers responsible for solidifying the 
Romantic Infinite are Johan Gottleib Fichte (1762–1814) and Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–
1860).70 Fichte viewed the transcendental self as characterized by the will, which was the 
connection between the finite self and the Infinite Will, and the human conscience as the 
access point to the Infinite Will. Both thinkers accepted the distinction between the 
phenomenal and noumenal realms but rejected Kant’s conclusion that we have no access 
to the latter. Schopenhauer however extended the concept of the will to the universe as a 
whole. Just as the self is an instance of a “will to exist” so the universe is a cosmic “will to 
exist” that forms the fundamental existential cosmic unity and comprises the thing-in-
itself. But the Infinite Will proposed by the Romantics indicates that the medieval 
synthesis of the Christian God and Being has been severed. “In Schopenhauer’s proposal, 
the triumph of the Infinite was complete, and with this triumph Being was completely 
secularized.”71 
Chapter three – “From Onto-Theology to Theo-Ontology: The Demise of Being” – 
forms the third and final act in Grenz’s narration of the saga of Being.72 Though the 
Cartesian substance tradition is often thought to be the epitome of modernity, Grenz 
notes that already in the Enlightenment this tradition was under critique. Descartes had 
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retained the classic principles of substance and causality and went on to posit three basic 
types of substance: mind, matter, and God. However, the dualism between mind and 
matter and the epistemological mind/body problem regarding knowledge of the external 
world led to sharp criticism. Moreover, Descartes’ successors in the rationalist tradition 
proposed that two of the three substances should be discarded, but could not agree which 
one should be kept. The subsequent critique by Hume of Cartesianism was the most 
intense, to which Kant attempted to respond. But Kant was not enough to stave off the 
Romantic Infinite and the demise of Being.73 The full demise of Being was not immediate 
however. For a time, there were attempts to reconceive God as dynamic Being.  
Grenz details the efforts of Georg W. F. Hegel (1770–1831)74 to outline an “ontology 
of the unfolding absolute.”75 Hegel transformed Fichte’s subjective idealism into his own 
thoroughgoing objective or absolute idealism and along the way he pursued his own 
synthesis of theology and philosophy, and thus of God and Being. Hegel is famous for his 
emphasis on dialectic in which thought moves through a double negation: “the negating 
that posits the opposite (antithesis) and the negating of the opposition (synthesis).”76 
Extending from this is the notion that the coming into being of truth is ultimately 
historical. That which brings all reality into a unified whole (the Absolute) he terms Geist. 
In Hegel’s dialectical sense, Geist is the (triune) God who necessarily reveals and actualizes 
himself in both rational thought and human history. Another example of the attempt to 
develop a dynamic metaphysic are the process philosophers who attempted to develop an 
ontology of “Being in the process of becoming,”77 most prominently represented by Alfred 
North Whitehead (1861–1947).78 Whitehead represented a forceful attempt to revise the 
substance ontology of a static Cartesianism. But Whitehead posited God as a supremely 
immanent “society of occasions” and principle of creativity bound to the world out of 
ontological necessity very different from traditional trinitarian theology. 
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Grenz judges that Hegel and Whitehead both “forestalled and facilitated Being’s 
eventual demise.”79 But nevertheless, by introducing becoming into Being their dynamic 
ontologies “changed the rules of the metaphysical game.”80 But the story does not stop 
with them. Thinkers such as Martin Heidegger (1884–1976) and Jacques Derrida sought to 
revision the flawed Western metaphysical tradition through the “de(con)struction of onto-
theology.”81 We can briefly summarize Heidegger’s82 contribution in three main ways. First, 
his location of fundamental ontology in the existential concept of Dasein (“Being-there” or 
“being-in-the-world”) through which human existence is thrown into existence, being the 
heir to a past and oriented toward the future. Second, Heidegger makes a move beyond 
conceptual discourse to the aesthetic as the vehicle for the revelation of truth in which art 
in a sense creates its own world. Joining up with Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), 
however, he moves to language as even more powerful in world-creation than art. But 
beyond Nietzsche, Heidegger then posits that we do not simply create language but exist 
within it. Thus language itself constructs human existence and “our ‘being-in’ language 
allows us to discover that language gives itself to us, and hence is reality or Being.”83 Third, 
these moves are aimed at critiquing and correcting the story of concealment and 
forgetfulness that lay at the heart of the Western onto-theological tradition. Under the 
conditions of onto-theology God exists at the behest of a philosophical system. The God of 
onto-theology remains a servant pressed into service at the direction and dictates of a 
philosophically constructed metaphysics. Such a critique was not meant as the 
suppression of all God-talk, but rather its truly authentic re-awakening. 
While Heidegger purportedly sought a new beginning for the religious, it is 
doubtful the same can be said for Derrida.84 Grenz focuses his discussion of Derrida on 
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three main features. The first is Derrida’s questioning of “logocentricism” (in which the 
word or language as logos is thought to be the carrier of meaning) aimed at undermining 
Being altogether. Derrida attacks not only all realist epistemologies, but also the 
“metaphysics of presence” (whereby a domain of things exists to which there is direct 
epistemological access) as essentially foundationalist. Derrida suggests instead that 
language or systems of thought lack any ultimate grounding. The second feature is 
Derrida’s shift of emphasis from “difference” to différance which playfully exposes the 
instability inherent in language and even writing. Not only is the outward form of the 
word changeable but it suggests an indeterminate dual meaning of “to differ” and “to 
defer.” Because language derives meaning within the full context and relation of signifiers 
that defer to the others, meaning itself can be said to dependent on difference. 
Accordingly, the drive to attribute final, determinate meaning must be tempered. This in 
turn functions as a radical critique of a stable self apart from its context. “There is no self 
that stands beneath or precedes linguistic activity. . . . Through language and concepts we 
impose the sense of objective meaning on the flux of experience.”85 The final feature is 
Derrida’s deconstruction. Grenz states that, unlike Heidegger, Derrida does not seek to 
become yet another mythmaker. This facet of Derrida’s approach is evident in the way he 
places obstacles in way of defining deconstruction itself. The closest we may come is to say 
deconstruction is an all-out assault on anything remotely logocentristic – whether 
thought, writing, presence, or the whole of the Western metaphysical tradition itself – 
without any attempt to leave something substantive in its place. There only remains the 
free play of meaning and the play of the world.86 In Grenz’s words, “Derrida’s 
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deconstruction of the Western philosophical tradition marks the demise of Being, at least 
as Being has been understood throughout much of history.”87 
 
Narrating the “I AM” 
Grenz states in his introduction: “‘The Saga of Being’ raises the crucial ontological 
question: Was the invention of ‘Being’ a mistake? And if so, what are the implications for 
its demise? This question forms, at least initially, the central problem [Named God] sets 
itself to address.”88 We may further ask whether Derrida has laid waste to theology as well, 
particularly any theology which “draws its vision of God from the image of the originating 
Father who speaks his Logos in creation and incarnation.”89 Yet there is hope that the 
death of onto-theology and the victory of Derridean indeterminacy is itself the occasion 
for the rebirth of a theology which looks to the self-naming triune God, rather than a 
philosophically determined conception of Being, for the formation of a theo-ontology. In 
Grenz’s estimation “the quest for such a theo-ontology is the task that the demise of Being 
bequeaths to theology.”90 And in a manner similar to other Christian theologians from 
Augustine to Aquinas, Grenz suggests the theo-ontological path must go through the 
biblical assertion that the triune God of Scripture is the great I AM. Thus, in Part Two of 
Named God – titled “The Saga of the I AM” – Grenz, drawing on the biblical narrative 
themes of intertextuality and the structure of promise and fulfillment, begins his pursuit of 
a trinitarian theo-ontology through an exegetical narration of the divine name.91 
Chapter four – “From Exodus to Exile: The Covenanted I AM”92 – forms the first act 
of the central section of Named God and moves through three scenes. The first scene 
presents a detailed exegesis of Exodus 3:14–15 and concentrates on the revelation of 
                                                             
87 NGQB, 130. 
88 NGQB, 8. 
89 NGQB, 130. 
90 NGQB, 130. 
91 Throughout this survey it should be recognized that Grenz provides more depth and texture in 
his exegetical discussions than can be duplicated here. For Grenz’s own summary of Part Two see the 
introduction to NGQB (8–10) and follow the footnotes provided here for direction to Grenz’s discussions in 
the main text. 
92 NGQB, 133–73. 
 124 
Yahweh as the great I AM.93 In response to the query of Moses of what to say to Pharoah 
when asked who sent him, Grenz notes Yahweh offers three self-designations: I AM WHO 
I AM (’ehyeh ’aser ’ehyeh), I AM (’ehyeh), and “Yahweh, the God of your ancestors, the God 
of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.” Grenz notes a sense of evasiveness 
and even indeterminateness related to the essential incomprehensibleness of Yahweh in 
this response. Yahweh does not receive his name from anyone else but remains sovereign 
in self-naming and self-revealing. Furthermore, Grenz presses beyond philosophically 
oriented views of the Hebrew root (’hyh) for the I AM as indicating static existence (“I am 
the one who is”), toward a view of the divine name as revealing active and dynamic 
existence in the sense of a purposeful and faithful “being there,” a “being present,” and a 
“being with.”94 Because of this, the act of giving the divine name is bound up in 
relationship and covenant in which Yahweh as the I AM becomes known narratively. The 
drama of Israel in exodus from Egypt and entrance to Canaan “becomes the theater in 
which the name – and hence the character – of Yahweh unfolds . . . Yahweh links himself 
to his people and to their story.”95 
The joyous first scene, in which the great I AM is disclosed through compassionate 
covenantal revelation and relation in deliverance and exodus, soon gives way to tragedy in 
exile and the revocation of the divine name in scene two. Here Grenz turns his attention 
to Hosea 1:2–9.96 This passage is part of a recapitulation of the exodus narrative and 
contains an explicit invocation of Exodus 3:14. Yet the recollection of the divine name 
occurs in the context of the infidelity of Israel and is “invoked so that it might be 
revoked.”97 In Hosea the nation of Israel finds itself having capitulated to the syncretistic 
allure of Baal worship and therefore unfaithful to Yahweh. The marriage of Hosea to the 
prostitute Gomer served as a living parable for the narrating of the relationship between 
Yahweh and Israel. The disloyalty of Israel comes through tragically in the names of Hosea 
and Gomer’s children: the first being named Jezreel (or “God will sow”), the second “Not 
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Pitied” or “No Compassion” (lo’ ruhamah), and the third “Not my people” (lo’ ‘ammi). The 
third, most poignantly, is attached to the last clause of verse 9 which declares quite 
literally “I (am) not I am to you,” or more strongly, “I am not your I AM.”98 Thus with Hosea 
1:9 we see the negation of the divine name which leads to exile. 
The book of Hosea is not only concerned with judgement however. Within the 
revocation of the divine name a message of hope still yet resides wherein the names of 
Hosea’s children will be reversed (2:21–23). Yahweh will sow Israel in the land, will have 
compassion on “Not Compassion,” and will say to “Not my people” that “you are my 
people.” Grenz terms this the “negation of the negation.”99 The final scene then moves to a 
survey of Isaiah 40–55 (also known as Second Isaiah) with particular focus on passages 
related to deliverance in which Yahweh declares “I am he” and “I am the first and I am the 
last.”100 Grenz exegetes six instances of the “I am he” sayings (43:10, 13, 25; 46:4; 48:12; 51:12) 
concluding that these contain an echo of Deuteronomy 32:39 (“I, I am he; there is no God 
besides me”) and form a revocation of the revocation of the covenant and a reconstituting 
of the divine name.101 Moving on to a consideration of three “first and last” sayings (Isaiah 
41:4; 44:6–8; 48:12)102 Grenz finds that these references are not concerned primarily with a 
philosophically weighted sense of God’s eternality. Rather, these as well are concerned 
with the reassertion of the divine name in which Yahweh, as the eternal I AM and the 
dynamic “Be-ing One,”103 is present in all creation (and thus the human story as a whole) 
from beginning to end. More particularly though, as the God “who is with,” Yahweh 
encloses the entire story of Israel (exodus, exile, and new exodus) with faithful divine 
presence. “In this sense, God’s be-ing involves being ‘first’ and ‘last.’”104  
Chapter five – “From Jacob’s Well to Calvary’s Cross: The Incarnate I AM”105 – 
forms the central chapter in Named God as a whole and comprises the second act in “the 
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saga of the I AM.” In this chapter, Grenz moves from the covenanted I AM in the Old 
Testament to the incarnate I AM as concentrated in the person of Christ with a focus on 
the ego eimi sayings in the Gospel of John. While recognizing the exegetical difficulties of 
connecting the incarnate Christ to the Old Testament mentions of the I AM, Grenz notes 
the tendency of patristic witnesses such as Ambrose to view the “burning bush” event with 
Moses as a Christophany. Additionally, the phrase ego eimi in the Greek Septuagint was 
the usual rendering for both the Hebrew ’ehyeh (I AM) and for the “I am he” sayings in 
Isaiah 40–55. Grenz suggests that the ego eimi then becomes a useful device for the New 
Testament writers to connect the incarnate Jesus to the Hebrew expressions of the divine 
self-designation. Concerning John’s gospel, Grenz states, “The ego eimi, replete with its Old 
Testament overtones, is found repeatedly in John.”106 
In John’s telling, the ego eimi sayings do not simply form a way for Jesus to identify 
who he is in the normal everyday usage of the phrase, but for Jesus to boldly associate 
himself with the God of Israel. The ego eimi utterances are often referred to as the “I AM 
sayings of Jesus” and occur in two grammatical forms: those followed by a predicate and 
those without a predicate. The second form can also be subdivided into occurrences with 
and without an implied predicate (the latter being referred to as “the absolute sense”). 
There are a great many ego eimi-plus-predicate instances in which Jesus claims “I am the 
bread of life,” “the light of the world,” “the resurrection and the life,” “the true vine,” etc.107 
These references represent a copulative use of the ego eimi which Grenz judges to not be 
primarily ontological but soteriological, and therefore not calling to mind the divine name 
directly. Nevertheless, they do still communicate Jesus’ claim to be the Father’s agent of 
salvation for his people and the one who dispenses true life, giving some insight into his 
connection to the I AM.108 
At first, the ego eimi-without-a-predicate occurrences do not seem to have much 
to offer. If these can be held to “everyday use” there is likely no reference to the divine 
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name (especially in 9:9 when someone other than Jesus utters it). Yet some of these 
references seem to fall into the “implied predicate” category in which they come to carry a 
double meaning only the eyes of faith can see (which is common for John’s Gospel). Grenz 
discusses three such passages: “the I AM in Samaria” (4:26), “the I AM on the Sea of 
Galilee” (6:20), and “the I AM in the garden” (18:5, 8).109 Grenz detects a connection to 
Second Isaiah in 4:26, the presence of a divine epiphany or theophany in 6:20, and he 
identifies a revelatory event that functions as an “epiphany of Deity” and an “acted 
parable” of who Jesus is in 18:5 and 18:8.110 As such these may constitute instances of double 
entendre which express a deeper identity in regards to the incarnate Christ. 
Other ego eimi references in John seem to function without an implied predicate, 
though there is some ambiguity whether they can be taken in the absolute sense. Two of 
these are found in 8:24 and 8:28 in the midst of Jesus’ interrogation by the Pharisees and a 
third is found in 13:19 in the context of the Last Supper.111 These references are discussed 
under the heading “The I AM Lifted Up” in which Grenz finds exegetical warrant to 
connect them to the “I am he” sayings of Second Isaiah. These ego eimi occurrences (and 
their surrounding context) then give expression to not only the close relation of the Father 
and Jesus, but Jesus as the bringer of life and salvation to Israel and humankind. Beyond 
this however, these appear to have a specific revelatory function as a connection is 
established between the crucifixion of Jesus as the fulfilment of prophecy and Jesus as the 
I AM incarnate. “[Christ] is linking himself with the saving God of Israel in the closest 
possible way. In short, that he is the I AM will be most fully disclosed in his death on the 
cross, by which he makes salvation available to all who believe in him.”112 
The final ego eimi saying discussed in this chapter is John 8:58: “Very truly, I tell 
you, before Abraham was, I am,” which has no possible implied predicate. This ego eimi is 
therefore a clear example of the absolute sense. This “Absolute I AM” is thus definitive for 
understanding the manner in which Jesus takes on the divine name.113 According to Grenz, 
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John 8:58 gathers all the other ego eimi sayings into the narrative of the incarnate I AM. 
The bold claim of the “Absolute I AM” is that Jesus is the incarnation of the sovereign, 
salvific, and active be-ing present of Yahweh which stretches back even before Abraham.114 
Furthermore, central to Jesus’ I AM declaration is his claim to possess and participate in 
God’s divine life. Having the unique authority to mediate that life to others, the mission of 
Jesus is the disclosing of the divine name that he bears.115 The famous “high priestly prayer” 
of John 17 contains four instances (17:6, 11, 12, 26) where Jesus speaks of his “name” (onoma) 
along with the “name” of the Father, and in which Jesus is gifted with the divine name by 
the Father.116 Grenz finds this name to be none other than the name of the covenanting 
God of the Old Testament – the tetragrammaton (YHWH), the divine I AM. Yet the Father 
and Son are not simply identical. Jesus reveals the divine name precisely in his distinctive 
Sonship, wherein the Father is the Father of the Son and the Son is the Son of the Father. 
Evident here is the intimate unity, mutual indwelling (10:30, 38), and reciprocity shared 
between the Father and Jesus as his Son (and which ultimately is theirs in the Spirit). This 
dynamic relation suggests to Grenz the presence of pre-trinitarian echoes as “distinct 
‘persons’ exist in mutual interrelatedness within the godhead.”117 
Chapter six – “From the Future to the Eternal: The Exalted I AM”118 – comprises the 
third and final act of “the saga of the I AM.” Grenz presents his discussion in three main 
sections wherein the I AM takes on an eschatological character. The first section – “The I 
AM of the Future” – treats the rare appearance of the ego eimi in the Synoptic Gospels.119 If 
Acts is included the phrase with an explicit predicate occurs only five times. Without a 
predicate the phrase occurs six times, two of which are the Synoptic parallels (Mark 6:50, 
Matthew 14:27) to Jesus walking on the Sea of Galilee in John 6:20 which carries strong 
theophanic associations. More important for Grenz’s purposes, though, are a group of 
three verses which contain the ego eimi: Mark 13:6, Luke 21:8, and Matthew 24:5. The 
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Matthew text adds an explicit predicate (to read: “I am the Messiah”) while the Mark and 
Luke texts are without a predicate. Grenz posits that by the time of the writing of Mark’s 
gospel, the ego eimi had already taken on the status of a technical formula. Furthermore, 
these texts, which warn of imposters who will attempt to usurp the “name” of the Messiah, 
form an indirect claim by Jesus to the ego eimi/I AM self-designation for which the 
disciples were to wait “for his own decisive, eschatological reiteration of the divine 
name.”120 Most significant, however, is the ego eimi-without-predicate which occurs in the 
context of Jesus’ trial before the Sanhedrin in Luke 22:70 and Mark 14:62. Grenz judges the 
Luke passage in this case not to be a direct allusion to the divine name. In the context of 
the Mark passage though, Grenz finds that Jesus comes to associate himself with the 
eschatological vindication of the Son of Man.121 According to Grenz, the three instances of 
the ego eimi in Mark (6:50; 13:6, 14:62) read together indicate that “our gaze rests on a 
future time when the divine name will be fully known, because all will see the enthroned 
Jesus who as such is the ego eimi.”122 
The second section covers the eschatological “I AM for All Time” as it culminates 
in the ego eimi sayings of the risen and ascended Lord Jesus in the book of Revelation.123 
The first two instances in Grenz’s discussion (22:16 and 2:23) do not by themselves make 
obvious reference to the divine name. They do however, yield an implicit claim of the 
exalted Lord Jesus to a close eschatological identification with the divine prerogative of 
Yahweh in the Old Testament. More explicit is the ego eimi associated with three similar 
phrases in the Apocalypse in which the risen Jesus exclaims: I am “the first and the last, 
and the living one” (1:17–18), “the Alpha and Omega” (22:13), and “the beginning and the 
end” (21:6). Grenz finds within these references more direct lines of connection to the “I 
am he” sayings of Second Isaiah. He likewise discerns a resonance between Jesus as the 
“living one” who possesses and bestows life eternal on others and Yahweh as the true 
“Living God.” Christ therefore wields divine creative power and is identified with the 
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Creator God as the “ground and goal of all that is,”124 the one whose eschatological 
vindication confirms him as the cosmic sovereign I AM over all history.  
Grenz culminates this section by exploring the three-fold divine source of grace 
and peace in the greeting of Revelation 1:4–5. Noting the exegetical difficulties involved, 
Grenz judges this to be another pre-trinitarian resonance – a “trinitarian I AM.”125 The 
third reference in the greeting explicitly names Christ as the faithful witness, the firstborn 
from the dead, and the ruler of all kings. The middle reference to the seven spirits is more 
complicated. This could refer to seven angels, though Grenz notes the unlikeliness of non-
divine agents being referenced between two divine references. Highlighting that the 
number seven functions symbolically for wholeness and fullness in the Apocalypse, Grenz 
connects this to the prophecy in Isaiah 11:1–2 where the Spirit will come to rest on the 
“shoot . . . from the stump of Jesse.” Additionally, the activity of the “seven spirits” in 
Revelation 1:4, 3:1, and 5:6 reveals an intimate relationship with Jesus. Grenz determines 
this cryptic designation thus refers to the presence and fullness of the Holy Spirit. The first 
reference in 1:4 to “him who is and who was and who is to come” is then linked to the 
following ego eimi “Alpha and Omega” saying in 1:8, which repeats the three-tense 
designation from 1:4 and adds “the Almighty” – all of which is attributed to the Lord God.126 
The allusion here is to the divine name of Exodus 3:14 and Yahweh as eschatologically 
sovereign over history and everywhere present in time, thus transcending time itself. 
Viewed as a whole, the threefold divine designation found in Revelation 1:4–5 resembles 
the triune benediction in 2 Corinthians 13:13 and presents the Spirit and Christ as co-
participants “in the eternality of the one who is and who was and who is to come.”127 
The threefold source of blessing in John’s greeting to the Apocalypse contains the 
seeds for a trinitarian approach to the I AM divine self-designation, which Grenz pursues 
in Part Three. Before that however, Grenz’s closes with a consideration of “the bestowal of 
the divine name.”128 In Revelation 19:11–13, 16 the exalted Jesus appears with three names: 
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“Faithful and True,” “the Word of God,” and “King of kings and Lord of lords.” These names 
apply the covenant faithfulness and sovereign being present of Yahweh to Christ. 
However, Christ is also inscribed with a fourth name only he knows. This secret name 
suggests to Grenz that Christ’s full vindication of his followers awaits the eschatological 
future as “its full content can only become evident as history comes to its culmination in 
the completion of that mission.”129 Regarding the content of this name, Grenz returns to 
the climactic ego eimi saying where the exalted Christ appropriates for himself the “Alpha 
and Omega” designation as well as the I AM itself (22:13). Grenz thus posits the unknown 
name is nothing other than the divine name itself. Yet it is not simply the exalted Lamb 
who is bestowed with the (triune) divine name. As the very embodiment of the living 
Word of God, Christ will prove faithful to the promises of Yahweh, an act which the 
Apocalypse pictures as the sharing of the eschatological divine name with those who have 
overcome.130 “In this way, the promise of a never-ending presence of the covenanting God 
with the covenant people emerges in the Apocalypse as the central significance of the 
divine eternality disclosed in the ego eimi.”131 The Scriptural saga of the I AM thus reveals 
an overarching story where the Old Testament divine name comes to be Christologically 
narrated as it comes to rest on Christ and as it is eschatologically shared with those “in 
Christ,” as well as gesturing in anticipation toward its ultimate trinitarian character. 
 
The Triune Name, Storied Divine Identity, and the Narrative Imago 
 We now move to Part Three of Named God – “The Saga of the Triune Name” – in 
which Grenz narrates a three-part theological saga.132 Chapter seven – “From the I AM to 
the Trinity: The Meaning of the Divine Name” – begins the constructive moment in the 
quest for a thoroughly trinitarian theo-ontology of the divine name.133 Grenz begins by 
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highlighting the subdued interest in explicating the divine name as it is unveiled in 
Scripture, revealed in the tendency of theologians to succumb to philosophical categories 
of Being. Grenz also notes a modern trend to assert the Old Testament divine name has 
been superseded in the New Testament.134 Grenz contests this with his own study of the 
tetragrammaton in the New Testament evidenced in the use of kyrios as a circumlocution 
of adonai (the reverential Old Testament stand in for Yahweh), the presence of the divine 
passive, and the numerous ego eimi/I AM sayings of Jesus.135 As the incarnate Son, Christ 
reveals the Father, with whom he enjoys intimate unity as the embodiment of the divine 
name. But as well, Grenz interprets the triadic formula, “in the name of the Father and of 
the Son and of the Holy Spirit,” in Matthew 28:19 as a single proper name in support of his 
contention that the divine name is triune.136 The divine name is therefore a shared name 
among all three trinitarian persons. “The saga of the I AM is ultimately the narrative of ‘the 
Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.’ The saga of the divine name, in other words, is the 
saga of the relationship among the three persons of the Trinity.”137 
 For Grenz, the biblical trajectory of the divine name and the incarnation of the I 
AM in Christ open up into a trinitarian conception of the divine name. He now focuses on 
what it might mean for the biblical God to have a name that is triune. To address this, 
Grenz first turns to the philosophical debate over the significance of naming, beginning 
with John Stuart Mill (1806–1873). Mill proposed a theory of direct reference in which 
proper names directly refer to their bearers but are nevertheless mere identification tags 
and carry no actual meaning. Others such as Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) and Bertrand 
Russell developed a descriptivist theory of naming whereby a “proper name refers to its 
referent by means of descriptions associated with the referent.”138 However, advocates of 
these two theories of naming found themselves at an impasse. The most significant 
attempt to address this divide in Grenz’s view was the proposal by Gareth Evans who held 
that proper name-using practice is a shared activity between “producers” and “consumers” 
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of a name. Thus Evans opens up a communal focus as certain information becomes 
associated with a given proper name within the community of name-users.139 
 Grenz moves on from the debate over naming by observing that in each theory 
surveyed proper names are not self-given but passively received. Figures such as Dionysius 
the Areopagite and Aquinas were correct to assert our names for God will always only be 
inadequate. Yet that human attempts to name God are frustrated does not mean that God 
is therefore nameless.140 “The import of the biblical witness is not that the God of the Bible 
is unnamed, but that God is self-named.”141 Yet the divine name given to Moses was still yet 
anticipatory and awaited connotative definition. The divine self-naming consequently 
took the form of a narrative in which the divine name gathered content in a history of 
relationships within the be-ing present of Yahweh in the history of Israel, Jesus as the 
incarnate bearer of the divine name, and the eschatological bestowal of the name on the 
redeemed. Yet the story of the divine name is most fundamentally revealed to be the 
narrative of the communion of Father, Son, and Spirit in which God is both passive and 
active recipient of the divine self-naming. This “saga of God naming God”142 is comprised of 
the relationship of the Father and the Son whereby the Father shares his very own deity, 
inheritance, and name with the Son in the love of the Spirit, which the Son then returns to 
the Father in the love of the Spirit, who then becomes the Spirit of love shared by the 
Father and the Son.143 In this manner, the giving, receiving, and returning of the glorified 
divine name proceeds in the triune act of “Naming, Being Named, and Name Sharing”144 in 
which all three trinitarian persons are reciprocally constituted.145 
 Chapter eight – “From the Trinity to Being: The Ontology of the Divine Name” – 
addresses the question of what kind of theo-ontology arises from divine triune name.146 
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Grenz begins with a summary of the historical development of orthodox trinitarianism.147 
The New Testament writers were theologically concerned to integrate the doctrine of the 
one God with the distinctive revelation of this God in Jesus and the giving of the Spirit to 
the church. The subsequent development of the doctrine of the Trinity, however, took 
place within the embedding Neoplatonic context of the patristic era.148 The Cappadocian 
Fathers’ connection of hypostasis and prosopon, thus meaning “to be” and “to be in 
relation” are identical, thereby making Being itself relational, was a watershed moment. 
They likewise provided language facilitating the orthodox distinction of the triune 
hypostases (the divine persons or “whoness”) and the divine ousia (the shared essence or 
“whatness”).149 The Western high water mark culminates in Augustine with his noetic triad 
(memoria, intelligentia, and voluntus) and purported “psychological” analogy of the Trinity, 
his inward turn to the soul as the path to knowledge of God, and his conception of the 
Holy Spirit as the consubstantial bond and mutual love of the Father and Son.150 As well, 
Western theologians tended to view God as actus purus, in which essence and activity are 
not sharply distinguished. However, the Eastern trajectory extending through the 
Cappadocians, John of Damascus, and Gregory Palamas developed a distinction between 
the essence and energies. God is unknowable in the divine essence but indwells creation 
actively in the divine energies. Thus, God is known not in the ineffable supraessence of the 
inner divine being (the immanent Trinity), but rather within the activity of God within the 
divine economy (the economic Trinity).151 
 The doctrine of the “essence and energies” is connected to the rise of apophaticism 
in the East. While the cataphatic way contemplates God’s activity in creation, the 
apophatic extends from the incomprehensibility of the divine essence and seeks to say 
what God is not. In the East the apophatic is primary, with the cataphatic only a prelude. 
Yet the West also displays an apophatic thread, seen in Augustine and Aquinas, though it 
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has a second place in the Western tradition. In the wake of Derrida, Grenz notes the 
apophatic way can take on a radical stance which could lead to absolute silence. Yet it 
need not. An apophatic approach can instead produce a reverential silence in the face of 
divine mystery which anticipates divine revelational self-naming and thus undercuts onto-
theology.152 Moreover, the concern for divine “Otherness” (which Grenz develops in 
conversation with Lévinas’ concern for the Other) which ontologically distinguishes the 
one God from all creatures need not be seen merely as a “mysticism of the One.”153 The one 
God, who is not merely a being among all other beings, is Other even within the divine 
transcendence, an Otherness that is eternal and triune. “While God remains always 
incomprehensible, there is no God ‘above’ the unity-in-multiplicity or the multiplicity-in-
unity disclosed in the revelational saga of the divine name.”154 Furthermore, the divine 
Oneness and Otherness are not in competition but reciprocally related – to contemplate 
the One is to be illumined by the Three, envisioning the Three leads to the One.155 
 The final portion of this chapter delineates the character of Grenz’s trinitarian 
theo-ontology.156 Grenz concludes that the triune self-naming is a narratival, communal, 
and eschatological reality. The narrative “act of self-naming is both communal and 
eschatological, for it involves the dynamic of the relationality of the three trinitarian 
persons.”157 Scripture narrates a trinitarian story whereby the story of God disclosed in the 
saga of the I AM provides an icon revealing “an eternal self-naming within the immanent 
dynamic of the triune life.”158 Thus the communal and eschatological aspects of the divine 
self-naming are present already in the eternal triune relationality even as they become 
visible in the narrative of Father, Son, and Spirit within history. The narrative of divine 
self-naming is therefore a noetic act of the coming to be known of the eternal Trinity 
specifically disclosed to us in the incarnate Christ and Holy Spirit. The ethos of this triune 
dynamic is best captured with the biblical term agape.  
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Grenz now returns to Augustine to develop the theme of triune love.159 The 
supposed Augustinian psychological analogy of the Trinity, in Grenz’s view, should instead 
be viewed as noetic.160 The coming to know the Trinity centered on love yields the triad: 
Lover, Beloved, and (the) Love (that is shared).161 The path to knowledge of God thus 
traverses the via amoris which “goes beyond the apophatic method, [but] does not bypass 
that method.”162 In this, the noetic movement from exterior to interior (creation to the 
soul) and inferior to superior (through the soul to God) is servant of the agapaic, and the 
via amoris comes to complete the apophatic moment. Grenz once again, though, critiques 
Augustine’s inward turn, saying: “God is not primarily found in the interiority of the soul, 
but in the exteriority of the other . . . It is in our relationality that we find the imago Dei 
and thus come to know the triune God who is love.”163 The telos of Grenz’s theo-ontology 
then is nothing short of triune love, such that “knowing” subjects are transformed into 
participants within the dynamic of trinitarian naming by being placed “in Christ” through 
the eschatological shared “Gift” of the Spirit. The self-naming God who is wholly Other in 
the divine relationality constitutes the “to be” of a community of others. “Viewed from this 
theo-ontological perspective, Being itself takes on the connotations of gift, and as a 
consequence becomes the Gift of Being.”164 
In Chapter nine – “From God’s Triune Be-ing to Human Being: Our Inclusion into 
the Divine Name” – Grenz now turns to the final chapter in the saga of the triune name.165 
This chapter begins with an exegesis of Paul’s Areopagus “unknown God” speech in Acts 
17:22–31.166 Grenz focuses on three phrases: God as the giver of “life and breath and all 
things” (25), that in God “we live and move and have our being” (28a), and “we too are his 
offspring” (28b). While Luke presents Paul as a new Socrates, Grenz suggests the speech 
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still has an essentially Jewish flavor couched in Hellenistic language. Grenz explores a 
possible resonance between the “life, breath, all things” triad and Isaiah 42:5. He concludes 
that Paul’s designation of God as the giver of these things marks the God of Israel as the 
maker of all that exists. The second and third phrases then do not evoke Stoic pantheism 
but God as the ultimate Creator. Grenz also connects humans as God’s offspring to the 
phrase in 17:26, “From one (ex honos) . . . he made all.” A likely candidate for the unnamed 
one here is Adam with reference to Luke 3:38 and the second Genesis creation narrative. 
But also in view is the first Genesis creation narrative which focuses not simply on a single, 
first progeny but the creation of humanity in the divine image (Genesis 1:26–27). Having 
been made ex honos as God’s offspring then “is connected to our status as the imago Dei.”167 
Combined with the anti-idolatry injunction, there is a strong message against any natural 
or philosophical theology (i.e., onto-theology) which purports to find God through human 
striving alone. Yet the Creator God is not far off. In 17:30–31 Paul calls his hearers to 
repentance in light of the one who has been resurrected from the dead. The no-longer-
unknown God is thus unveiled in Christ – the just judge and our true progenitor. In this 
manner, Paul presents a “christologically centered” and “eschatologically oriented”168 
notion of our being in God169 
This Pauline insight forms the bridge to Grenz’s capstone discussion of “God’s Be-
ing as the basis for our being.” 170 Here he picks up his prior discussion of the divine image 
in Social God in order to explore the manner in which his theo-ontology supports a theo-
anthropology.171 Grenz begins his discussion in this portion of Named God by connecting 
our being “in God” to our being “in Christ.”172 The creation of humankind as the imago Dei 
indicates that in some manner humanity “mediates within creation the immanence of the 
transcendent Creator.”173 The human vocation of the first Adam to image God, however, 
points beyond itself to Jesus himself as the true imago. The imago Dei then is ultimately 
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our vocation to be “in Christ.”174 This vocation comprises a storied reality definitive of our 
very being thus constituting what I term the “narrative imago” by being eschatologically 
conformed to the image of Christ, who is the Second Adam and the true narrative imago. 
“God desires that we find our being as we are caught up in the narrative of the Son. In this 
manner, the imago Dei [or narrative imago] emerges as the christologically focused and 
eschatologically oriented human vocation.”175 That the narrative imago is eschatological 
gestures as well to the cosmic role of Christ in establishing new creation. In view here is 
the fulfilment of the divine goal of human being “in Christ” as nothing less than triune 
participation in God – i.e., theosis or deification (2 Peter 1:4).176 In an ontological sense 
deification should be understood as Christification in which “the company of humans who 
by the Spirit are in the Son participate in the reciprocal dynamic [of triune love] that 
characterizes the eternal divine life,” thus constituting the narrative imago as well as the 
new humanity of the new creation.177 
The intimate connection between human being “in Christ” and the activity of the 
Spirit leads to a concluding discussion of the “gift of the Spirit and being named ‘in God.’”178 
Grenz delineates the Spirit as the “gift of life.”179 In general, all that possesses life does so 
because of God’s ruach or pneuma. But more specifically, Grenz presses further toward the 
reciprocal self-giving of the Father, Son, and Spirit. “This relationship between the Father 
and the Son is constituted by the Holy Spirit, who as the gift of life shared between the 
Father and the Son is the [personal] concretization of the essence of the triune God, 
namely, life.”180 The narrative imago then receives being by sharing in the Spirit who 
bestows the gift of the triune name.181 The story of Jesus as the true narrative imago and 
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bearer of the divine name culminates in the eschatological pouring out of the Spirit, who 
shares the triune name and will share that same name with the new humanity of the new 
creation. The eschatological gift of the Spirit, which is a present storied reality “in Christ,” 
is also the goal or telos by which the narrative imago and human being itself is constituted 
by being brought into participation in the dynamic of the triune Name-sharing, and thus 
theotic triune participation in God. Thus named by the self-naming God, the narrative 
imago finds its true (ecclesial) be-ing in receiving the Gift of Being, that is, “the gift of the 
be-ing present of the Spirit who, together with the Father and the Son, is the I AM.”182 We 
echo along with Grenz: “Thanks be to God for this indescribable gift!” (2 Corinthians 9:15) 
 
Critical Detour: The Narrative Self, Christo-Anthropology, and the Imago Dei 
 We have now charted in the first section the “main road” of a primer on Grenz’s 
narrative theology and a summary of his argument for a trinitarian theo-ontology. At work 
throughout Named God is the trialogue of narrative sources (Scripture, tradition, and 
culture) and the trio of trinitarian motifs (Trinity, community, and eschatology). In this 
manner, Grenz’s final volume becomes the culminating application of the Grenzian 
grammar. In keeping with the narrative theme of this chapter, we are working toward a 
consideration of the narrative imago (gleaned from the discussion of the last chapter of 
Named God) in relation to gender in the third section of this chapter. Before arriving there 
though, we take a critical detour in three parts. The first considers where Named God 
stands in continuity with Grenz’s prior work. The second treats the Ricoeurian narrative 
self as a critical supplementation of the Grenzian narrative imago. And the third presses 
the previously developed theo-anthropology into a cruciform Christo-anthropology to 
chart the path into the discussion of the narrative imago in relation to gender. 
 
Named God and the Question of Continuity 
 We consider first two questions in relation to the continuity or discontinuity of 
Named God, specifically in relation to foundationalism and Grenz’s social trinitarianism. 
In regards to foundationalism, we ask whether there is a tension between his earlier 
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naming of the Christian story as a metanarrative and his claim to have developed a theo-
ontology? Does the earlier claim leave Grenz susceptible to the charge of foundationalism 
or is there something in his theo-ontology which alleviates such a concern? Regarding 
Grenz’s development of the social Trinity, we place under consideration Jason Sexton’s 
thesis that Grenz had moved beyond the social Trinity by the end of Named God. In short: 
is Grenz’s God still social? 
 
Grenz and the Question of Metanarratives 
 In Grenz’s judgement, the postmodern cultural phenomenon holds not simply 
peril but also offers promise out of which can emerge meaningful constructive theology. In 
Beyond Foundationalism the demise of Enlightenment foundationalism presents the 
opportunity for a postfoundationalist theological method. In Social God the postmodern 
condition of the self in the wake of Foucault offers the occasion for the articulation of the 
ecclesial self and a trinitarian imago Dei theo-anthropology. In Named God the 
deconstruction of onto-theology and demise of Being after Derrida produces the crisis out 
of which a trinitarian theo-ontology can be developed. In accordance with the importance 
he gave to engaging postmodern thought Grenz also conducts a discussion of Jean-
François Lyotard’s now (in)famous declaration, “Simplifying to the extreme, I define 
postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives.”183 Grenz begins with a juxtaposition of 
the Enlightenment focus on universal scientific laws and the quest for objective 
knowledge of the world, along with the subsequent twentieth century anthropological 
focus on the foundational importance of myths for social cohesion. Myths are not merely 
primitive stories but become a means of sustaining social relations.184 
Lyotard points out that in the drive of Enlightenment science to dispel all myths, 
the architects of this venture failed to notice their own captivating myths. Lyotard names 
specifically the modernist myth of progress,185 which is that metanarrative that legitimates 
                                                             
183 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, xxiv. Emphasis original. See Grenz, A Primer on 
Postmodernism, 39, 45–9, 164; RTC, 27, 179–82, 225, 257, 291; BF, 19, 197, 239, 260; and Grenz, “The Universality 
of the ‘Jesus Story’,” 85–111 for Grenz’s interaction with Lyotard and metanarratives. 
184 RTC, 180. 
185 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 29, 31–6. 
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scientific advancement for the betterment of all and “which served to unite the smaller 
stories of the sciences into one, unified history.”186 However, losing their credibility and 
power, the legitimizing metanarratives of progress aren’t what they once were and no 
longer hold their former dominant sway. A fragmentation evidenced by the splintering 
apart of the scientific enterprise itself is underway.187 And while earlier epochs have seen 
older mythic narratives lose favor only to be replaced by another, Grenz notes that for 
Lyotard, “the postmodern ethos entails the end of the appeal to any central legitimating 
myth whatsoever.”188 Furthermore, in the awareness of the proliferation of competing 
narratives and “language games”189 vying for our allegiance, the metanarrative as that 
grand story which produces legitimating universal claims has suffered its demise under 
the postmodern “war on totality.”190 
The above is Grenz’s basic description of what Lyotard means by the “incredulity 
toward metanarratives.” It is one which is very similar to that offered by Richard J. 
Middleton and Brian J. Walsh.191 According to Middleton and Walsh, metanarratives are 
foremost universal stories that lead to totalizing marginalization. The central 
characteristic of a metanarrative is therefore its scope, or that it is a grand story. Second, 
they emphasize what they see as the socially constructed nature of metanarratives, which 
in essence makes them local stories with pretensions to universality. Third, Middleton and 
Walsh contend that metanarratives are beset with the ethical problem that their totalizing 
hegemony lends them to violent exclusion.192 According to James K. A. Smith this 
                                                             
186 Grenz, “The Universality of the ‘Jesus Story’,” 93. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, xxiii–xxiv. 
187 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 39–41. 
188 RTC, 181. Grenz cites Walter Truett Anderson, Reality Isn’t What It Used to Be: Theatrical Politics, 
Ready-to-Wear Religion, Global Myths, Primitive Chic, and Other Wonders of the Postmodern World (San 
Francisco, CA: Harper and Row, 1990), 243–4 who offers six competing stories in postmodernity: Western 
human progress, Marxist revolution, Christian social reconstruction, Islamic fundamentalism, Green 
ecology, and the “new paradigm” about a sudden leap forward in understanding our world. 
189 See the reference to Wittgenstein in Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 10, 40–1, 73. 
190 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 82. 
191 Richard J. Middleton and Brian J. Walsh Truth is Stranger than It Used to Be: Biblical Faith in a 
Postmodern Age (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 1995), chapters four and five. 
192 Middleton and Walsh, Truth is Stranger than It Used to Be, 69–73. Terry Eagleton, “Awakening 
from Modernity,” Times Literary Supplement (20 February 1987), 194 also evinces the ethical interpretation, 
speaking of the “terroristic function” of metanarratives and the “manipulative reason” of the “nightmare of 
modernity.” Cited in RTC, 181–2. See also Terry Eagleton, The Illusions of Postmodernism (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1996). 
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approach to Lyotard commits a critical error in the reduction of metanarratives to how big 
they are, or their scope. This is then played off as an inherent conflict between universal 
and local stories. Smith argues this is an insufficient understanding of what Lyotard means 
by metanarrative.193 For Lyotard, metanarratives are such not simply because of their size 
but due to the manner in which they claim justification or legitimization; namely, by 
appeal to modernist universal reason.194 This becomes a problem when Middleton and 
Walsh seek to assess the manner in which the biblical narrative can be considered a 
metanarrative. In the process, they argue for a Christian metanarrative that is non-violent 
and avoids totalization, which is progress.195 However, they seem not to notice that when 
the legitimization of metanarratives is in view and not simply their scope, that the biblical 
narrative is not a metanarrative in Lyotard’s sense.196 Such an observation is able to relieve 
much of the tension regarding the relationship between the postmodern critique as 
“incredulity toward metanarratives” and the Christian faith. 
When we turn attention back to Grenz, we find agreement with Knowles that 
Grenz offers a generally close reading of Lyotard.197 However, it is also apparent that Grenz 
falls into the same trap of reducing metanarratives to any grand story that stakes a claim 
to universality.198 This is seen in Grenz’s earlier Primer on Postmodernism when he says, 
[W]e cannot totally affirm the central tenant of postmodernism as defined by 
Lyotard – the rejection of metanarrative. . . . There is a single metanarrative 
encompassing all peoples and all times. As Christians we claim to know what that 
grand narrative is. It is the story of God’s action in history for the salvation of fallen 
humankind and the completion of God’s intentions for creation.199 
                                                             
193 See James K. A. Smith, “A Little Story about Metanarratives: Lyotard, Religion, and 
Postmodernism Revisited,” in Christianity and the Postmodern Turn, 123–40 and Smith, Who’s Afraid of 
Postmodernism?, 59–79. 
194 Smith, “A Little Story about Metanarratives,” 125. Smith notes Lyotard means “science” in a broad 
sense of “theoretical” discourse (Wissenschaft) and not simply the natural sciences. (137) See also Merold 
Westphal, Overcoming Onto-Theology: Toward a Postmodern Christian Faith (New York, NY: Fordham 
University Press, 2001), xiii. 
195 Middleton and Walsh, Truth is Stranger than It Used to Be, 87–107. 
196 Knowles, Beyond Evangelicalism, 17 
197 Knowles, Beyond Evangelicalism, 78. 
198 For this judgement, see Smith, Who’s Afraid of Postmodernism?, 64, 69 and Knowles, Beyond 
Evangelicalism, 14, 30, 78–9. 
199 Grenz, Primer on Postmodernism, 164. 
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This misunderstanding of metanarrative as referring primarily to scope seems to have 
been carried over to his later work as well, particularly in Renewing the Center when he 
frames his discussion of Lyotard as “the move from grand metanarratives to local 
stories.”200 This places Grenz in the position of needing to affirm the (so-called) 
“metanarrative” status of the Christian story precisely because he rightly perceives its 
universal scope.201 A potential concern here for Grenz’s aim for a postfoundationalist 
theology is that the linguistic confusion could serve as a basis for the charge of a latent 
foundationalism since metanarratives in Lytotard’s sense are legitimated by the appeal to 
universal reason.202 Grenz, however, does supply himself with an important qualification 
when he states, “Ultimately the metanarrative [Christians] proclaim lies beyond the pale 
of reason either to discover or evaluate.”203 While there seems to be an equivocation 
regarding “metanarrative” in relation to Lyotard’s actual intent, this statement 
nevertheless prefigures Grenz’s subsequent theological development.204 
Merold Westphal provides a helpful correction of terminology at this point. In 
addition to the clarifications regarding the scope of metanarratives and their means of 
legitimation discussed above, Westphal avers that Christianity is more properly called a 
meganarrative rather than a metanarrative due to their respective originations. Connected 
to the appeal to reason and theoretical discourse, metanarratives onto-theologically205 
originate from the prognostications of (especially Western Enlightenment) science, 
philosophy, technology, politics, and so on. By contrast, Christianity is wholly revelational 
                                                             
200 RTC, 179. 
201 See this in BF, 23, 239, 261; RTC, 27, 225, 291; and Grenz, “The Universality of the ‘Jesus Story’,” 95–
6 where he states: “Must the Christian community be content with viewing the Jesus-narrative as nothing 
more than one local story among others? Finding an answer to this question necessitates a return to the 
specific metanarrative that Christian’s espouse.” 
202 Knowles, “Postmodernism: Reasons to Be Cheerful,” in Transforming Exclusion: Engaging with 
Faith Perspectives, eds. Hannah Bacon and Wayne Morris (London: T&T Clark, 2011), 1–21 contends that 
“metanarrative” properly applies to Enlightenment (and thus foundationalist) Christianity. See Westphal, 
Overcoming Onto-Theology, xv–xvi for a similar suggestion. 
203 Grenz, Primer on Postmodernism, 164–5. 
204 John Franke follows Westphal below in correcting his use of metanarrative and then adopts 
Westphal’s language of meganarrative in reference to Christianity. (The Character of Theology, 17–19) 
205 See Westphal’s critique of onto-theology in Overcoming Onto-Theology, 1–28. 
 144 
and is narratively legitimized solely by the story of the Kingdom of God.206 I suggest 
Westphal’s notion of the “Christian meganarrative” not only serves to reduce linguistic 
confusion but is descriptive overall of Grenz’s postfoundationalist and theo-ontological 
posture. As such, the trajectory Grenz traces in Social God and Named God show that while 
in critical conversation with them, he looks to neither modern nor postmodern culture or 
theory for the legitimization or delegitimization of his proposals.207 His thoroughgoing 
trinitarian theo-anthropology and theo-ontology, therefore, succumb neither to the charge 
of foundationalism nor the Lyotardian “incredulity toward metanarratives.” 
 
Is Grenz’s God Still Social? 
The previous chapter conducted a review of critiques directed at social 
trinitarianism and some of the strengths of Grenz’s theology in response. Now that the 
preceding summary of Named God has brought us to the end of Grenz’s corpus, a response 
is in order to Jason Sexton’s thesis of a purported move beyond the social Trinity in 
Grenz’s last two monographs.208 I am in agreement with most of Sexton’s analysis of the 
strengths of Grenz’s trinitarian theology and the value of Sexton’s scholarship for Grenz 
studies. For this reason, I am willing to accept the presence of most all the factors Sexton 
(mis)interprets as indicating Grenz’s purported move beyond the social Trinity – such as, 
a robust Christocentric approach,209 a consistently thick application of divine 
transcendence,210 a concern to uphold the divine unity,211 and the pro-Augustinian flavor of 
                                                             
206 Westphal, Overcoming Onto-Theology, xii–xvi. Thus, in Westphal’s telling, N. T. Wright’s 
statement, “The whole point of Christianity is that it offers a story which is the [true] story of the whole 
world” (The New Testament and the People of God, 41–2) should be understood in meganarrative terms. 
207 This is evident in chapters two and three of SGRS (leading to the postmodern self) and Part One 
of NGQB (leading to the demise of Being) in which Grenz takes seriously culture as “embedding context” in a 
way that does not capitulate. See also Stanley J. Grenz, “The Hopeful Pessimist: Christian Pastoral Theology 
in a Pessimistic Context,” Journal of Pastoral Care 54.3 (September 2000), 297–311 which deconstructs 
therapeutic, psychological foundationalism and then offers Grenz’s own proposal for a postfoundationalist 
theology of hope. 
208 See Jason S. Sexton, “Beyond Social Trinarianism: The Baptist, Trinitarian Innovation of Stanley 
J. Grenz,” Baptist Quarterly 44.8 (October 2012), 473–86; Sexton, “The State of the Evangelical Trinitarian 
Resurgence,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 54,4 (December 2011), 792–3; and Sexton, The 
Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 102–4. 
209 Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 111, 115–8, 131–2. 
210 Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 95–9. 
211 Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 82–3, 104, 116. 
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Grenz’s theology.212 I contend, however, that Sexton simultaneously over-reads these 
features and downplays other factors which mitigate his thesis. 
Turning first to Rediscovering the Triune God, Grenz’s one-chapter treatment of the 
trinitarian renaissance in Social God now appears in book length form.213 In addition to 
“the Trinity as the fullness of history” in Pannenberg, and the triumph of relationality in 
Zizioulas, Grenz draws on T. F. Torrance in particular as representative of “the return of 
the immanent Trinity.”214 The guiding methodological principle Grenz gleans from his 
study of the epistemological priority of the economic Trinity and the ontological primacy 
of the immanent Trinity was dubbed by Sexton as the “Grenz Grundaxiom.”215 However, 
while arguably applied most fully in Named God, this feature nevertheless makes its 
presence known throughout Grenz’s work.216 This central axiom represents Grenz’s 
concern not merely to uphold the ontological divine unity on the one hand, and the 
undivided operations of the triune persons in the world on the other – but, as well, the 
unity of God in revelation and God in se together as the basis for both his communal theo-
anthropology and trinitarian theo-ontology.217 
This method appears in Named God as Grenz traces the “saga of Being” throughout 
philosophical and cultural history, ultimately concluding that human “be-ing” arises from 
triune divine “be-ing” – “in Christ” and through the Spirit – by means of being brought into 
participation in the triune divine name bestowed on Christ by the Father in the love of the 
Spirit. Grenz’s theo-ontology is then joined with his imago Dei theology, making specific 
reference back to Social God.218 But there is as well the continuation of Grenz’s earlier 
                                                             
212 Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 77–80, 82–5, 99, 106–8, 111, 146. 
213 SGRS, 23–57. 
214 RTG, 200–15. 
215 Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 81, 100. Sexton observes that in addition to 
Torrance’s influence: “With Barth, Grenz saw the economic Trinity serving as the noetic starting point while 
the immanent Trinity retains ontic priority. . . . With Balthasar, divine missio becomes the means of 
epistemological access to the processio, which in turn is the ontological basis of the missio.” (The Trinitarian 
Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 118) 
216 See TCG, 66–7, 83 and BF, 190–2 for statements prefiguring Grenz’s later Grundaxiom.  
217 Contra John G. Flett, The Witness of God: The Trinity, Missio Dei, Karl Barth, and the Nature of 
Christian Community (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 29 who views Grenz’s Grundaxiom as 
“disjunctive.” 
218 NGQB, 361. 
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postfoundationalist posture, evidenced in his resistance to theology’s need for any sort of 
external philosophical (or cultural) legitimization. Grenz deconstructs any onto-
theological pretensions and instead proposes a thoroughgoing trinitarian theo-ontology. 
In a manner consonant with Social God, by reserving ontological primacy to the nature of 
the eternal triune God, rather than projecting anthropology back into the divine life, 
Grenz works in the other direction. Such is indicative of the methodological continuity 
between Social God and Named God, mitigating what is perhaps an implicit claim of 
discontinuity in Sexton’s thesis of a move beyond the social Trinity. 
Sexton also posits a combination of other factors for his thesis that may actually 
demonstrate the opposite. For instance, he proposes what he regards as the diminished 
influence of Colin Gunton along with Grenz’s positive use of Augustine as illustrative of 
the move beyond the social Trinity. However, important to note is that Sexton derives his 
conclusion regarding Gunton’s decline solely from unpublished draft outlines of 
Rediscovering the Triune God, where Gunton had a chapter initially that was ultimately 
dropped. However, Sexton neglects to establish Gunton’s place in Grenz’s theology more 
broadly as a baseline to support his conclusion of Gunton’s “vanishing role.” 219 As well, it is 
true Grenz never gave the kind of trenchant critique of Augustine for which Gunton has 
been taken to task.220 Even so, in his critique of the Augustinian inward turn in Social God, 
explicit reference is made to Gunton (along with Richard of St. Victor).221 In Named God, 
while Gunton may not be directly identified, a strikingly similar critique of the turn 
inward appears as a corrective of Augustine’s via amoris, a point Sexton fails to mention.222 
                                                             
219 Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 100. See also Jason S. Sexton, “Stanley Grenz’s 
Relatedness and Relevancy to British Evangelicalism,” The Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical Theology 28.1 
(Spring 2010), 73 and Sexton, “Beyond Social Trinitarianism,” 7–8. 
220 For a sympathetic critique of Gunton’s treatment of Augustine, see Joshua McNall, A Free 
Corrector: Colin Gunton and the Legacy of Augustine (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2015). For Augustine 
as a “negative foil” for Gunton, see Robert Jenson, “A Decision Tree of Colin Gunton’s Thinking,” in The 
Theology of Colin Gunton, ed. Lincoln Harvey (London: T&T Clark International, 2010), 11. 
221 SGRS, 31, 51, 60, 67, 317, 326. While dissatisfied with such categorizations, Gunton admitted to 
producing a “social” account in contrast to a “psychological” approach. (The Promise of Trinitarian Theology 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 163–4. 
222 See Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 106–7 where he briefly mentions the 
Augustinian via amoris but overlooks Grenz’s specific critique of the inward turn in NGQB, 336–9. 
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 Sexton also cites an insistent Augustinianism as evidence of Grenz’s “enduring 
‘Western’ emphasis.”223 Though Augustine received sharp critique elsewhere in the 
trinitarian renaissance, this suggestion by Sexton regarding Grenz is not incorrect. My 
concern is that Sexton emphasizes this such that Grenz’s important Eastern influence is 
regrettably minimized. Sexton acknowledges the impact of Zizioulas and the Cappadocian 
Fathers for Grenz in Social God, though he as well overlooks here Grenz’s significant use of 
Panayiotis Nellas (for instance) in reference to theosis.224 He also mentions Grenz’s 
examination of the Eastern and Western positions on the filioque, with Grenz finding 
elements to commend in both, though ultimately siding with the West. Curiously though, 
Sexton fails to mention the deep engagement with both Western and Eastern traditions 
evidenced in Named God.225 Nor does he mention here the specific use of Nellas and 
Gregory Palamas in conjunction with Augustine in Grenz’s refiguring of the via amoris that 
leads into theosis.226 Though admittedly Western and Augustinian, Grenz displayed a vital 
and even essential reliance on key Eastern influences as well.227 
 Sexton also rightly notes the importance of Grenz’s Christology to his trinitarian 
imago Dei theology that issues into a “theo-eschatological-realist-ontology – a trinitarian 
                                                             
223 Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 82–6 (82). 
224 Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 61, 77, 79, 135. Sexton (85) also notes an 
apparent compromise around Richard of St. Victor between John Franke’s Eastern influenced perspective 
and Grenz’s Augustianism in BF, 169–202. (Cf. Brian S. Harris et al., “Stanley J. Grenz: A Theological 
Biography,” in Revisioning, Renewing, Rediscovering the Triune Center, 24) Nevertheless, see Richard’s 
appearance in SGRS, 31 along with the synthesis of Western and Eastern influences represented by 
Augustine, Gregory of Nazianzus, Zizioulas, along with Nellas in SGRS, 312–25. See this also in Stanley J. 
Grenz, “What Does It Mean to Be Trinitarians?,” Baptist World Alliance Doctrine Commission, 
Charlottetown, PEI (5 July 2001), 5–6, 11–12, 15–16, file ‘Trinity.bwa.essay.wpd’ at the JRA. 
225 Sexton cites Grenz on the filioque (TCG, 69–72) in The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 78. 
However, Sexton (84, 106) neglects Grenz’s synthesis of apophatic and cataphatic approaches and reliance 
on Western and Eastern sources (NGQB, 291–335) which leads into his revisioning of the via amoris. 
226 NGQB, 317–9, 336–40, 365. See also Grenz’s discussions of all three Cappadocian Fathers (300–3, 
318, 321, 323, 331), Zizioulas (300–1), and Thomas Hopko (317). 
227 Grenz acknowledges legitimate distinctions between “East” and “West” without sharply dividing 
them. (NGQB, 320) He seems especially interested in forming a rapprochement and synthesis where 
possible. For instance, his support of the filioque is more muted in NGQB, seeking instead a pneumatological 
link between Augustine and Gregory Palamas regarding the Spirit as triune love. (NGQB, 336–7) See also 
Boris Bobrinskoy, The Mystery of the Trinity: Trinitarian Experience and Vision in the Biblical and Patristic 
Tradition (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1999), 66, 68, 77, 285, 301–2 for a positive view of the 
Spirit as “bond of love” from an Eastern theologian. For a favorable treatment of Grenz’s pneumatology 
alongside T. F. Torrance’s trinitarian “onto-relations,” see Myk Habets, “Getting Beyond the Filioque with 
Third Article Theology,” in Ecumenical Perspectives on the Filioque for the 21st Century, 211–30. 
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theology of the whole, informed by, unfolded in, and built on the revelatory event/s of 
divine self-naming.”228 Grenz admits to his desire to have developed a stronger connection 
between his Christology and imago Dei theology in his early work.229 Sexton, though, 
tenuously interprets the later movement of Grenz’s theology toward a more substantial 
Christology itself as a move past his earlier social trinitarianism. However, Grenz explicitly 
connected his Christology with his social trinitarianism the same year as (and prior to) his 
Social God volume, noting the incarnate Christ “reveals the truest vision of the nature of 
God, namely, that God is the Triune one and hence inherently social.”230 Furthermore, 
Social God itself displays a central Christological focus. The middle chapter of the middle 
section proposes a Christo-anthropology. This move is replicated in Named God, where the 
central chapter of the central section narrates the incarnate I AM.231 Grenz’s developing 
Christology then does not absorb his social trinitarianism as Sexton claims.232 Rather, his 
Christology develops alongside, extends, and deepens it.233 
                                                             
228 Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 115–20 (119) and see 121–40 for his treatment 
of Grenz’s imago Dei theology. See also Jason S. Sexton, “The Imago Dei Once Again: Stanley Grenz’s Journey 
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229 Grenz, “Jesus as the Imago Dei,” 625. Grenz’s Christology is strengthened subsequent to TCG, 
294–314 where he displays ambivalence to the post-Chalcedonian logos asarkos (or the Logos apart from the 
historical person of Jesus), wanting to avoid any hint of adoptionism. In his earlier efforts to balance his 
“from below” and “from above” approach, he potentially leaves himself open to charges of over-historicizing 
his Christology at this point. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out Grenz has always affirmed the eternal 
Trinity, divine (triune) transcendence apart from the world, eternal generation, and the full divinity and 
humanity of Christ. These features, the emphasis on the cosmic Christ in SGRS and NGQB, and Grenz’s 
Grundaxiom provide resources for a Grenzian narrative Christology that avoids the danger of over-
historization. (Cf. TCG, 270–1) See also Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, Christology: A Global Introduction (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2005), 171–8; Myk Habets, The Anointed Son: A Trinitarian Spirit-Christology 
(Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2010), 16, 27, 32–6, 39, 46–7, 229–30, 235–6, 241–2, 245, 267; and Sexton, 
The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 115–17, 131–2, 156, 161. 
230 Grenz, “The Universality of the ‘Jesus Story’,” 109 (Cf. TCG, 270). Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology 
of Stanley J. Grenz, 132 even references this quote and elsewhere remarks on the relation of Christ and the 
inherent relationality of God in reference to T. F. Torrance. (98–9) 
231 SGRS, 183–222 and NGQB, 174–206. 
232 Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 115–17. 
233 See TCG, 80, 86–7 for statements which reference the social Trinity and prefigure Grenz’s 
argument in NGQB. See also Grenz, “Jesus as the Imago Dei” which appeared between SGRS and NGQB. This 
article evinces the strong Christology of NGQB and similar Christological exegesis as is found in SGRS and 
the last chapter of NGQB. As such, it forms something of a bridge linking the two monographs. 
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Lastly, Sexton cites the lack of explicit reference to God as the “social Trinity” in 
Grenz’s later publications.234 Yet we have seen that the statement “God is love” forms the 
heart of Grenz’s social trinitarian vision. Arguably, Named God, which evidences both 
Grenz’s abiding Augustinian focus and continued Eastern influence, contains his most 
thorough development of this idea. As well, a 2005 series of lectures delivered by Grenz 
just before his passing contain references to God as “the social Trinity,” “the divine 
community characterized by love,” and the “divine community of love.”235 Furthermore, 
Sexton himself even recognizes that Grenzian phrases which speak of the triune God as 
the eternal “community of love” and/or the “divine community” were other ways Grenz 
made reference to his particular conception of the social Trinity.236 Combine this with the 
appearance of the phrase “divine community” itself in Grenz’s first book published in 1985, 
and a twenty-year history for Grenz’s use of these designations is established.237 In light of 
these considerations, and along with the discussion in chapter two of this dissertation, 
instead of a move beyond the social Trinity, I suggest that Grenz rather presents us 
ultimately with a revisioned and strengthened social trinitarianism. 
 
Grenz, Ricoeur, and the Narrative Self 
 The above determination serves to establish the continuity of Grenz’s trinitarian 
theological vision evident in Social God and Named God. Thus, at the end of Named God, 
Grenz’s trinitarian theo-ontology – which comes into being through the dynamic of the 
divine triune self-naming, and thus the narrative of the communion of the Father, Son, 
and Spirit – turns to his characteristic focus on the imago Dei. As discussed in chapter two, 
in Social God this focus yielded the social imago. Now, in Named God, as those who are 
caught up into the story of the triune name find themselves “in Christ” through the Spirit, 
                                                             
234 Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz, 102–3. 
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the narrative imago is thus constituted. The manner in which Grenz’s theo-anthropology 
thus leads into a Christo-anthropology will be investigated below. For now, we take a 
detour as we revisit Ricoeur’s narrative self. At the beginning of Oneself as Another, 
Ricoeur mentions three aspects of his hermeneutics of the self.238 There is first “the detour 
of reflection by way of analysis.” But as has been seen, this is not a return to the centrality 
of the modernist cogito, that “centered self” which constitutes itself by its own self-
awareness. In fact, self-awareness is not Ricoeur’s starting point, but the end goal of his 
hermeneutics.239 Ricoeurian reflexivity means the cogito does not escape critique or the 
hermeneutic of suspicion. But neither does Ricoeur decimate the self as in much radical 
postmodern theory. Ricoeur presents a wounded cogito that is at once a capable self.240  
Second, Ricoeur mentions “the dialectic of selfhood and sameness.” This is 
composed of the interplay of idem, or that which corresponds to the “what” of identity, 
and ipse, or that which corresponds to the “who” of identity. James Carter notes that the 
relation of the factual persistence of idem-identity and the narrative reflexive self-
constancy of ipse-identity is less like the reciprocal relation between opposing poles as it is 
the dialectical interplay between a straight line and a circle.241 While sameness (idem) is 
manifest through continuity over time, selfhood (ipse) is akin to a circle (or perhaps a 
spiral) of reflexivity in which the self remains true to itself in the face of change. The bond 
between idem and ipse is the narrative self in which identity is revealed through 
character.242 Third, there is “the dialectic of selfhood and otherness.” This dynamic is even 
implied in the title – Oneself as Another – which can be rendered “oneself inasmuch as 
other.”243 The focus then for Ricoeur here is not the autonomous self-creation of narrative 
                                                             
238 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 16. 
239 James Carter, Ricoeur on Moral Religion: A Hermeneutics of Ethical Life (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 110. 
240 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 1–23 and Ricoeur, “The Question of the Subject,” 243. See as well 
Paul Ricoeur, “The Addressee of Religion: The Capable Human Being,” in Philosophical Anthropology, 269–
89. 
241 Carter, Ricoeur on Moral Religion, 111. See also Paul Ricoeur, “Individual and Personal Identity,” in 
Philosophical Anthropology, 222. 
242 David Rasmussen, “Rethinking Subjectivity: Narrative Identity and the Self,” in Ricoeur as 
Another, 57–69. 
243 Pamela Sue Anderson, “Agnosticism and Attestation: An Aporia Concerning the Other in 
Ricoeur’s Oneself as Another,” The Journal of Religion 74.1 (January 1994), 67. 
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identity. The narrative self does not write its own story in simple fashion.244 Rather, 
narrative identity is received in irreducible relation to an other.245 The narrative self 
implies the relational self, and vice versa. 
Yet the human “other” is not the only one on the horizon of narrative identity. 
There is also the Divine Other.246 Ricoeur gets at this in an essay titled “Naming God.”247 
The act of naming God is one which “dislocates our imagination so as to reorient it toward 
the Wholly Other.”248 This is a God who is ultimately not subject to the whims of human 
narration, a God beyond Being who is instead the transcendent ground for any narrative 
meaning at all.249 Here we see a similarity between Grenz and Ricoeur in the naming of 
God that simultaneously outstrips and constitutes human capability. For instance, Ricoeur 
states, “I can name God in my faith because the [biblical] texts preached to me have 
already named God.”250 Furthermore, this contingent stance of the human subject in the 
face of divinity involves a listening that “excludes founding oneself,” the abandoning of the 
pretensions of onto-theological speculation, a “narrative confession,”251 and the giving up 
of the will to self-mastery, sufficiency, and autonomy.252 “The Gospels’ statement that 
‘Whosoever would save his life will lose it’ applies to this giving up.”253 
                                                             
244 See Blundell, Paul Ricoeur between Theology and Philosophy, 83–93, 102, 150, 190 on emplotment. 
245 Carter, 112 and Stiver, Theology After Ricoeur, 168. Grenz states: “[A] personal proper name 
comes to take descriptive meaning through a narrative of personal relationships.” (NGQB, 282) See Grenz on 
the narrative and communal character of naming in NGQB, 271–89, 370–1 and on Lévinas and otherness in 
NGQB, 329–30, 335, 340. Cf. John Wall, Moral Creativity: Paul Ricoeur and the Poetics of Possibility (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 123. 
246 See NGQB, 331 for Grenz on God’s distinctive triune Otherness. 
247 Ricoeur, “Naming God,” in Figuring the Sacred, 217–35. 
248 John Wall, “The Economy of the Gift: Paul Ricoeur’s Significance for Theological Ethics,” The 
Journal for Religious Ethics 29.2 (2001), 240. 
249 Wall, Moral Creativity, 49–52. 
250 Ricoeur, “Naming God,” 218. Ricoeur states, “The naming of God, in the original expressions of 
faith, is not simple but multiple. It is not a single tone, but polyphonic. . . . The whole of contemporary 
exegesis has made us attentive to the primacy of the narrative structure in the biblical writings.” (“Naming 
God,” 224) See also Mark I. Wallace, “Can God Be Named Without Being Known? The Problem of Revelation 
in Thiemann, Ogden, and Ricoeur,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 59.2 (1999), 296–7. 
251 Quotes from Ricoeur, “Naming God,” 224–5. Such a confession can be thought of as a wager in 
which “the God who is named in the Bible [can] be experienced again in contemporary communities of 
interpretation” through “project[ing] a world of unimagined possibilities for the believer-reader.” (Wallace, 
The Second Naiveté, 30, 50) See also Ricoeur, “Naming God,” 223 and Wall, Moral Creativity, 50. 
252 Ricoeur, “Naming God,” 224–5. Cf. W. David Hall, “On the Possibility of (Un)Naming God: 
Thinking Theologically Along the Lines of Literature,” Literature & Theology 29.2 (June 2015), 172–5. 
253 Ricoeur, “Naming God,” 224. 
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Yet there also appears a significant dissimilarity. We have already noted Grenz’s 
dissent with theologians who seek to respect divine incomprehensibility by leaving God 
unnamed. Ricoeur does not seem to take exactly this same route. In reference to Exodus 
3:13–15 he seeks to safeguard the narrative anticipation of the “I AM WHO I AM” saying 
that it “protects the ‘in-itself’ of God” and directs us toward the revelatory narrative of 
naming in Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.254 This is basically resonate with Grenz’s notion of 
the “being with” of God unfolded in Named God. Yet Ricoeur also notes that, insofar as to 
know the name of a god was to have power over that god, he resorts to the designation 
“Unnameable Name” in reference to the naming of God.255 It is at this point that Grenz 
would remind us that the trinitarian act of divine self-naming revealed in the trinitarian 
history of the Father, Son, and Spirit results in a triune narrative identity in which the God 
of the Bible does not remain unnamed, but is rather self-named.256 
The disjunction between Ricoeur and Grenz at this point is not an occasion for 
despair however. It is another instance of the philosophical humility of Ricoeur 
recognizing due limits. However, Grenz once again does not have such limits and is able to 
forge his distinctly trinitarian theo-ontological path which in due course comes into 
contact with his imago Dei theology. It is here that his theo-anthropology issues forth into 
a Christo-anthropology. On this point we return to Social God where Grenz makes specific 
reference to Ricoeur’s notion of narrative identity in relation to the ecclesial self and the 
Jesus story.257 Grenz notes that the self can be thought of as a “self-in-process” which, taken 
                                                             
254 Ricoeur, “Naming God,” 228. Regarding divine revelation, Stiver (Theology After Ricoeur, 128–31) 
points out Wolterstorff’s misunderstanding of Ricoeur. Wolterstorff takes Ricoeur’s “manifestation” 
(“Naming God,” 223) approach to be “projective” such that divine discourse is undercut. Stiver contends 
Ricoeur remains open to a more traditional view of Scripture as God’s written Word. What Ricoeur resists is 
a disincarnated view of divine dictation which elides the need for interpretation. Ricoeur likewise assumes 
both human and divine authorship of Scripture, “which as a whole names God in manifold ways as well as 
reveals God’s promises, assurances, and other speech acts.” (Theology After Ricoeur, 130) See also Paul 
Ricoeur, “Toward a Hermeneutic of the Idea of Revelation,” in Essays on Biblical Interpretation, 73–118. For 
Wolterstorff’s critique, see Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim That God Speaks 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 28. For a concern similar to Wolterstorff’s, see Vanhoozer, 
Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 122. 
255 Ricoeur, “Naming God,” 228, 230, 233. 
256 NGQB, 281. 
257 See Ricoeur, “Naming God,” 230–2 for his own Christological turn. Cf. Michael W. DeLashmutt, 
“Paul Ricoeur at the Foot of the Cross: Narrative Identity and the Resurrection of the Body,” Modern Theology 
25.4 (October 2009), 589–616. For a philosophical treatment of Ricoeur in reference to the cross of Christ, see 
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as a whole, forms a narrative.258 In agreement, Ricoeur suggestively observes that the self 
which forms a human life, is “a story in search of a narrator.”259 But it is not that the self 
simply has or makes up a narrative however. The self in a significant sense is formed and 
arises by connection to a particular narrative that shapes storied identity. This occurs as 
the narrative framework provides the hermeneutical schema which produces the plot for 
one’s sense of self.260 Connecting back to the opening quote of this chapter, the ecclesial 
sense of self for those “in Christ” arises from a particular form of emplotment which forms 
the narrative imago.261 This dynamic “involves retelling one’s own narrative, and hence 
making sense out of one’s life, by means of the plot of the Jesus narrative.”262 We noted 
above the importance of Ricoeur’s notion of “character” in the dialectical relation of 
sameness and selfhood in the formation of narrative identity. The question thus presents 
itself: what is the particular character (or perhaps shape) of the narrative imago which has 
been brought into theotic triune participation through inclusion into the Jesus story by 
the gift of the Spirit? It is to this question that we now turn. 
 
Grenzian Christo-Anthropology and Cruciform Community 
The question above occasions a return to Grenz’s integrative motif of community 
with the intention of focusing the previously articulated theo-anthropology into a Christo-
anthropology. The Christological focus is not foreign to Grenz’s social trinitarianism. 
Already in Theology for the Community of God Grenz states: “In Jesus of Nazareth we do 
indeed encounter the great ‘I AM,’ the ultimate reality who is active in history from 
beginning to end.”263 Not only this, but the relational God – “the Father who desires that 
we might enjoy fellowship with him, the Son in whose fellowship with the Father we are 
                                                             
Brian Gregor, A Philosophical Anthropology of the Cross: The Cruciform Self (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 2013), 24–31, 56–67, 142–51, 176–84. 
258 SGRS, 310. Grenz cites Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 140–68. 
259 Paul Ricoeur, “Life: A Story in Search of a Narrator,” in On Psychoanalysis: Writings and Lectures 1, 
trans. David Pellauer, ed. Jean-Louis Schlegel (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 187–200. 
260 SGRS, 329. Cf. George W. Stroup, The Promise of Narrative Theology (Atlanta, GA: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 1981), 101–15. 
261 SGRS, 328–31 and NGQB, 361–4. On emplotment, see Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 140–9, 162. 
262 SGRS, 329. 
263 TCG, 87. 
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called to share, and the Holy Spirit who as the bond of the divine fellowship brings us into 
participation in that relationship” – revealed in the triune I AM constitutes the people of 
God.264 Furthermore, Grenz states that Christology is the study of the identity and mission 
of Christ, in whom rests the disclosure of the divine intent for humanity as life-in-
community. Christ is the revealer, effector, and originator of the proleptic, eschatological 
community belonging to the triune God.265 This early perspective contains the seeds for 
Grenz’s later development of these themes which culminate in Named God with the imago 
Dei as the “in Christ” vocation of the (ecclesial) new humanity, having already been 
developed in central fashion in the self-designated “Christo-anthropology” of Social God.266 
Grenz’s Christology is connected to both the social imago and the narrative imago, 
evidenced in the numerous appearances of the phrase “in Christ and through the Spirit” 
(or a variation thereof) throughout this study.267 At the core of Grenz’s trinitarian theo-
ontological theo-anthropology is a Christo-anthropology. 
The social imago and narrative imago mutually imply one another. However, a 
focus on the narrative aspect of Grenz’s communal imago Dei theology will help sharpen 
the focus of the character of storied participation in Christ in a way that extends Grenz’s 
own insights. A 2004 essay, “Jesus as the Imago Dei,” provides a summarization of key 
themes in his imago Dei theology in relation to Christology.268 Already noted is the manner 
in which Grenz’s theology of the imago Dei points beyond creation to eschatological new 
creation in a way that avoids simply bypassing creation. In this essay, Grenz presents an 
exegesis of New Testament passages very similar to what can be found within Social God 
                                                             
264 TCG, 87. 
265 TCG, 245, 350 and Grenz, “The Universality of the ‘Jesus Story’,” 96–102. 
266 NGQB, 361 and SGRS, 183–222. 
267 See also Grenz’s sympathy towards Robert Jenson’s emphasis of the narrative dimension of 
Christology and the social character of both deity and humanity in relation to Christology. However, despite 
noting this as a key insight of Jenson’s, Grenz also displays “queasiness at Jenson’s idea that God – and not 
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three persons of the Trinity.” (“The Divine Fugue: Robert Jenson’s Renewed Trinitarianism,” Perspectives in 
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need fear.” (The Christian Doctrine of God, 177) 
268 Grenz, “Jesus as the Imago Dei,” 617–28. 
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and Named God. This exegesis focuses on the themes of an imago Dei Christology, in which 
creation and new creation come to find their coherence in Christ as the true imago and 
truly human one, as well as Grenz’s characteristic link between the vocation of 
humankind and the divine intent of the imago Dei (now concentrated in Christ).269 
Commenting on Wayne Grudem, Grenz expresses dismay at the paltry treatment of the 
imago Dei in evangelical systematic theologies. He notes that Grudem primarily relegates 
the imago Dei to creation such that it merely funds a creational anthropology rather than 
one Christologically conceived.270 
Grenz comments similarly regarding the approach of Millard Erickson, whose 
exposition of the imago Dei is also sparse. This is evident especially in Erickson’s dedicated 
treatise on Christology which contains no sustained treatment of the divine image.271 
Grenz states, “Erickson’s chief concern is not to set forth an understanding of Jesus as the 
image of God that can inform anthropology, but to do the exact opposite – to argue that 
the creation of humankind in the divine image opens the way for the incarnation.”272 
Grenz contends this unveils a common assumption that human ontology is located 
primarily in the primordial past. The drawback is that this kind of imago Dei anthropology 
risks becoming overdetermined by human sinfulness such that Jesus becomes a mere 
remedy to a human problem.273 Such a move serves to narrate Christology, the incarnation, 
and anthropology primarily through the fall of humankind rather than the vocation of 
Jesus as the true imago Dei in the divine program. The result is an onto-theological 
anthropological Christology rather than a Christ determined theo-ontological Christo-
anthropology.274 Grenz suggests that Christology should not simply be the third topic in a 
                                                             
269 See Grenz, “Jesus as the Imago Dei,” 618–24; TCG, 279–86; SGRS, chapters five and six; and NGQB, 
361–7. 
270 Grenz, “Jesus as the Imago Dei,” 624–5. Grenz is commenting on Grudem, Systematic Theology, 
444–5. See Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, Volume two, 938 for agreement with the Christocentric vs creation-
centric imago Dei.  
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Flesh: A Contemporary Incarnational Christology (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1991), 544–5. 
272 Grenz, “Jesus as the Imago Dei,” 625. 
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274 See Grenz’s related concern regarding Robert Neville’s neo-liberal Christology: “I fear that to 
transform the resurrected Jesus from a living person who journeys with the church toward the eschatological 
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list of systematic loci, but a theology-informing locus. In this way, Christ as the imago Dei 
comes to inform the doctrine of God, creation, anthropology, and so on.275 
Christ as the incarnate I AM, truly human one, Lord, and true narrative imago, 
then “completes the human vocation to be the imago Dei.”276 Those who are “to be the 
image of God according to the pattern disclosed by Jesus,” and thus “conformed to the 
imago Christi,”277 receive a narrative identity from outside themselves such that they are, in 
David Kelsey’s descriptive phrase, characterized by an “eccentric existence.”278 As such, 
Christ as the true imago is at once also the norming narrative imago. Determinative then 
for the “in Christ” eccentric community of the triune God, which comprises the prolepsis 
of the eschatological goal of the new humanity of the new creation, is the Jesus story. 
Grenz specifies this story is specifically the narrative of the suffering, crucified, and risen 
Jesus. To be united with Christ through the Spirit is to take on the life, death, and 
resurrection of Jesus as the centrally formative catalyst for narrative identity.279 The shape 
or character of the narrative identity arising from this eccentric “narrative spirituality of 
the cross” has been aptly described as “cruciformity,” which is nothing other than 
conformity to the person and story of Christ.280 It is this cross shaped, cruciform story that 
is to shape the ongoing narration of the Christ constituted community. The result is a 
                                                             
future into a symbolic focal point for courageous living in the present is to reduce the Christian faith to 
psychology and to reduce Christology to anthropology.” (“Jesus as Symbol: Robert Neville’s Christology and 
the Neo-liberal Theological Project,” Modern Theology 20.3 (July 2004), 473) Grenz’s statement here would 
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280 Michael J. Gorman, Cruciformity: Paul’s Narrative Spirituality of the Cross (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2001), 4 and Gorman, “Paul and the Cruciform Way of God in Christ,” Journal of Moral Theology 
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Harris, “Beyond Bebbington: The Quest for Evangelical Identity in a Postmodern Era,” Churchman 122.3 
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sharpening of Grenz’s notion of community. In Ricoeurian terms, the eschatological 
community of Christ in the Spirit takes on a specific productive plot. Those who by the 
Spirit are brought into (theotic) storied participation in the Jesus narrative and receive 
their identity extra se in Christo, therefore, exist eccentrically not simply as “community” 
but as a particularly emplotted cruciform community. 
 
The Narrative Imago, Gender, and Storied Participation 
 We now come to the second of three dedicated sections working toward a 
constructive account of the interrelation between the imago Dei, gender, and triune 
participation in Grenz’s thought that can contribute to a hermeneutical ecclesiology. This 
section is devoted to a treatment of Grenz and gender from a Christological focus 
progressing through three moments. The first considers the notion of “headship” as it 
arises in Grenz’s contested evangelical context, finding a suggestive Grenzian move to 
figure headship Christologically rather than lexically. The second moment comprises a 
detour to focus this suggestion. This is done in conversation with Sarah Sumner’s work on 
the metaphorical function of headship in 1 Corinthians 11:3 and Ephesians 5:23 signifying 
union and oneness. Subsequently, this focus on union leads into a discussion of Michael 
Gorman’s notion of cruciform theosis. The final moment concludes with a consideration of 
union with Christ as a theotic storied participation characterized by embodied and 
cruciform female/male mutuality. 
 
The Narrative Imago and Female/Male Mutuality in Grenz 
 The previous section on gender mentioned the attempt by some in Grenz’s 
evangelical context to ground a top-down hierarchy of male authority and female 
submission within an asymmetrical (or hierarchical) model of the Trinity wherein the Son 
is unilaterally subordinated to the Father.281 Concerning such a subordinationism, Khaled 
                                                             
281 A representative apologetic for the “eternal functional subordination” (EFS) of the Son as a basis 
for male-female hierarchy is Bruce Ware, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit: Relationships, Roles, and Relevance 
(Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2005). See also Ware’s recent “Equal in Essence, Distinct in Roles: Eternal 
Functional Authority and Submission among the Essentially Equal Divine Persons of the Godhead,” in The 
New Evangelical Subordinationism?, 13–38. For rejoinders, see Kevin Giles, The Trinity and Subordinationism: 
The Doctrine of God and the Contemporary Gender Debate (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 2002); Giles, Jesus and the 
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Anatolios expresses concern that this sort of move risks conflating the economic Trinity 
and the immanent Trinity.282 The Grenzian response to the trinitarian subordinationism of 
his day was his emphasis on reciprocal relational trinitarian personhood and the dynamic 
of triune mutuality, oneness, and dependence. As the complementary relations among the 
Father, Son, and Spirit are marked not by hierarchy but mutuality, so also the 
complementary relationship of “male and female” should be characterized by relational 
oneness expressed not in hierarchy but mutuality.283 As well, we have seen that Grenz 
presents a thorough working out of the Grenz Grundaxiom, enabling him to avoid the 
conflation of the economic Trinity and immanent Trinity that worries Anatolios. 
However, another plank in the evangelical hierarchialist schema of top-down 
male-female relations of authority-submission relates to the doctrine of “headship.” 
Kephale (“head”) taken as “authority over” comes to underwrite an authority-submission 
structure of “God-Christ, Christ-man, and man-woman” in 1 Corinithians 11:3284 and a 
hierarchy of husband-wife in Ephesians 5:23. An egalitarian reading though takes “head” in 
terms of “source” in an effort to undercut the subordinationist reading.285 Grenz argues 
                                                             
Father: Modern Evangelicals Reinvent the Doctrine of the Trinity (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2006); and 
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285 See Wayne Grudem, “Does Kephale (‘Head’) Mean ‘Source’ or ‘Authority Over’ in Greek 
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vigorously against a unilateral submission of women to men that is based on a reading of 
“head” as “authority over.” He concludes his contextual exegesis of 1 Corinthians 11:3–16 by 
noting the radical assumption in this passage is that female voices would, in fact, be 
praying and prophesying in the early church’s public gatherings. In a social context that 
marginalized women, the gospel opened up their freedom of participation to such an 
extent that they became instruments whom the Spirit used to deliver authoritative 
messages to the whole community.286 Additionally, contra the hierarchialist reading, 
Grenz notes that in context Ephesians 5:21 frames the whole passage (5:21–33) with the 
overarching principle of mutual submission.287 Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, while 
Grenz seeks to undermine headship in terms of “authority over” for a more mutualist 
reading, he still doesn’t offer unqualified support for headship as “source,” noting that 
scholars still had yet to reach a consensus.288 But if Grenz does not fully accept the 
egalitarian reading of headship as “source,” how does he suggest it be rendered? 
In a lexical sense, Grenz never resolved the meaning of kephale itself. Rather, he 
sought to take a Christological focus in relation to a passage such as Ephesians 5:21–24 in 
which headship and (mutual) submission are mentioned in close proximity.289 Grenz thus 
looked to the life of Christ itself for the clue as to the shape of submission in Christian 
social relations. The life of Jesus encourages not the reification of headship as emblematic 
of an authority-submission structure in male/female relations but rather issues forth the 
high calling for all God’s people: mutual submission one to another.290 Whatever the 
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the dependency of the Father on the Son. The application of the transcendent mutuality within the divine 
dynamic to the human sphere leads quite naturally to an emphasis on the interdependency of, and 
mutuality between male and female.” (88) See also Wesley Hill, Paul and the Trinity: Persons, Relations, and 
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proper rendering of kephale in a lexical sense, we know that for Grenz it takes its meaning 
in the context of mutual submission and thus does not mean “authority over.”291 Beyond 
this, however, Grenz indicates his Christological focus another way. Christ himself, who 
we have identified as the true and norming narrative imago, is the “head” of the new 
humanity destined to be formed according to God’s intent for the creation of the 
community of “male and female” as the imago Dei from the beginning.292 This move to a 
Christological focus for headship, both in terms of Christ’s example as paradigmatic for 
female-male mutual submission as well as Christ himself as “head,” is suggestive of Grenz’s 
Christo-anthropology of Christ-shaped conformity through inclusion in the Jesus 
narrative. We now move to focus this suggestion and uncover its further meaning for 
female/male community in union with Christ. 
 
Sarah Sumner and Michael Gorman on “Headship” and Cruciform Theosis 
 The debate on the meaning of kephale unfortunately stalls too often in the attempt 
to define it as one of two options, whether it be “authority over” or “source.” One reason is 
that, as seen in Grenz’s treatment of 1 Corinthians 11:3–16 and Ephesians 5:21–33, the 
meaning of “head” is highly contextual. Extending this basic insight exegetes such as 
Gordon Fee also point to the metaphorical nature of kephale in which the use of “head” 
assumes a “body” of some sort.293 Lynn Cohick offers the suggestion that kephale is 
polyvalent and can serve more than one signifying purpose, suggesting “preeminent” as 
                                                             
the Pauline Letters (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2015), 129–34 for his more guarded notion of “asymmetrical 
mutuality” between the Father and Son. 
291 See also Padgett, As Christ Submits to the Church, 58–68. 
292 See SGRS, 18, 224, 225–6, 232, 256, 268, 330 and NGQB, 362–3. See also Colossians 1:18 and 
Bilezikian, Beyond Sex Roles, 121–2. The move to an ecclesial focus is consistent with Grenz’s insistence that 
the marital “one flesh” instantiation of “male and female” in the imago Dei is penultimate, pointing toward 
the divine communal intent for the imago Dei located on both the ecclesial and eschatological horizon. 
(Grenz, “Is God Sexual?,” 211–12) Insofar as marriage (and singleness) is “in Christ” and through the Spirit, it is 
marked as a specific form of ecclesial relation. 
293 See this in Gordon D. Fee, “Praying and Prophesying in the Assemblies: 1 Corinthians 11:2–16,” in 
Discovering Biblical Equality, 149–55. Fee holds 1 Corinthians 11:3 as a possible exception to this norm in the 
metaphorical use of kephale. The metaphorical use produces a pluriform range of meaning depending on 
context for Fee. Ephesians, 4:15–16 and Colossians 2:19 suggest life-giving in relationship to the church, 1 
Corinthians 11:3 suggests kephale as “source,” Colossians 1:18 suggests intimate connection to the body of 
Christ, and Ephesians 5:22–24 suggest life-giving dependence. Colossians 2:10, 15 speaks of Christ as “head of” 
(= over) the powers and authorities. 
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another possible meaning.294 And in agreement with Fee’s contention for the metaphorical 
quality of kephale, Cohick states that it “represents a synecdoche whereby the specific part 
(head) stands for the whole.”295 Sarah Sumner is another scholar who picks up this 
metaphorical use of headship. She holds that exegetes in the evangelical gender debate 
have been too quick to strictly define kephale. Pointing to the need to resist the 
temptation to transform biblical metaphors into too clear cut definitions which effectively 
demystify the mysteries of God she asserts the necessity of learning to “think 
metaphorically.296  
For Sumner the relation of Christ to the church, marriage, and headship are 
among these mysteries for which metaphorical language is particularly apt. Thus, in 
substantial agreement with Fee, she contends kephale is meant to be a visual image – a 
word picture of sorts – of a head and body. She specifies what she thinks this means for 1 
Corinthians 11:3 and Ephesians 5:23 saying, “Christ is the head of every man, man is the 
head of woman, God is the head of Christ, the husband is head of the wife, and Christ is 
head of the church. Each represents a mystery. In every case, the head and body are vitally 
connected as one.”297 Sumner provides us here with a way of viewing the metaphorical 
function of kephale as a picture of “organic” union and oneness that has great resonance 
with Grenz’s relational paradigm of trinitarian and female-male mutuality outlined thus 
far.298 Furthermore, insofar as this union and oneness maintain a Christological ground 
                                                             
294 Lynn H. Cohick, “Prophecy, Women in Leadership, and the Body of Christ,” in Women, Ministry, 
and the Gospel: Exploring New Paradigms, eds. Mark Husbands and Timothy Larsen (Grand Rapids, MI: IVP 
Academic, 2007), 94–9. Bilezikian, Beyond Sex Roles, 119–25 also suggests “fountainhead” as a possible 
meaning. 
295 Cohick, “Prophecy, Women in Leadership, and the Body of Christ,” 94. 
296 Sarah Sumner, Men and Women in the Church: Building Consensus on Christian Leadership 
(Grand Rapids, MI: IVP, 2003), 152–3, 182–3. In the context of metaphorical language, Sumner cites McFague, 
Metaphorical Theology, 15. See also Bilezikian, Beyond Sex Roles, 119 who warns concerning the dangers of 
imposing current meaning on ancient vocabulary. 
297 Sumner, Men and Women in the Church, 183. Emphasis mine. See 139–53, 154–71, 173–89 for her 
discussions of headship. We should note however that Sumner is not convinced along with Fee above that 
kephale means “source” in 1 Corinthians 11:3. (150) See also Cynthia Long Westphal, Paul and Gender: 
Reclaiming the Apostle’s Vision for Women and Men in Christ (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2016), 94–5 
on the “one flesh” and “head-body” metaphor in relation to headship in Ephesians 5:21–33. 
298 Sumner (Men and Women in the Church, 167) speaks of the “organic unity that bonds a husband 
and wife” signified metaphorically by the “headship” and “one flesh” word pictures. In relation to Ephesians 
5:23, headship becomes connected to the dynamic of mutual submission (Ephesians 5:21) in the context of 
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with Christ as the “head” of the new community, it directs our attention to the theme of 
“union with Christ.”299 
In Grenz’s Christo-anthropology, the dynamic reality of “being” in Christ (which 
can also be spoken of effectively as union with Christ) constitutes an eccentric narrative 
identity received through inclusion in the Jesus story. This dynamic comprises a triune 
participation as well as a Christ constituted storied participation. Because this is a 
participation in the story of Christ, it necessarily has a cruciform character to it. The 
community of Christ is therefore a cruciform community. It is here that Michael Gorman’s 
insight of cruciform theosis can help to refigure Grenz’s notion of community arising from 
theotic triune participation even further. Two things make Gorman a good fit in 
conversation with Grenz at this point. One is that Gorman is a biblical scholar who can 
provide support to Grenz’s creative trinitarian theological reading of Scripture and the 
intimate connection of his Christology to his trinitarian theology. For example, Gorman 
concludes that “Paul’s famous phrase ‘in Christ’ is shorthand for ‘in God/in Christ/in the 
Spirit.’ That is, his christocentricity is really an implicit trinitarianism.”300 The second is 
                                                             
husband and wife as (described in another metaphor of relational union) “one flesh.” This is supported by 
the fact that Ephesians 5:22 assumes the Greek verb for “submit” from 5:21 in the context of submitting one 
to another, thus framing 5:22–33 with the posture of mutual submission. (See Westphal, Paul and Gender, 22, 
92–3, 100–2, 164–6; Payne, Man and Woman, One in Christ, 277–83; and Marshall, “Mutual Love and 
Submission in Marriage,” 195–204 for support.) Furthermore, in Grenzian terms, the “headship” of God to 
Christ reveals the dynamic of trinitarian oneness and communion whereas the metaphorical “headship” of 
the husband to the wife reveals the outworking of the communal imago Dei in the context of the “one flesh” 
marriage relationship. As a reflection of the divine image, the oneness of husband and wife is characterized 
not by hierarchy but mutual submission and interdependence. See Grenz, “Theological Approaches for 
Male-Female Relationships,” 86, 88–94. See also Margaret Kim Peterson, “Identity and Ministry in Light of 
the Gospel: A View from the Kitchen,” in Women, Ministry, and the Gospel, 162–3 and Westphal, Paul and 
Gender, 94–5 for the theme of mutuality in reference to headship. 
299 For the connection between Christ’s headship and union with Christ, see Constantine R. 
Campbell, Paul and Union with Christ: An Exegetical and Theological Study (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 
2012), 275–6 which occurs within a larger conversation regarding the Apostle Paul’s “body of Christ” 
metaphor. (268–89) Campbell states: “This is no decapitated body! It belongs to its head, who shares with it, 
shapes it, promotes its growth, and cares for it. The body is ‘in Christ’ (Romans 12:5), and it also grows into 
Christ, its head (Ephesians 4:15). While the prepositional language that is associated with union with Christ 
is frequently absent with respect to the body metaphor, the concept of union is never far away and, in fact, is 
always implied by the metaphor itself.” (288–9) 
300 Michael J. Gorman, Inhabiting the Cruciform God: Kenosis, Justification, and Theosis in Paul’s 
Narrative Soteriology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 4. This offers a suggestive response to the 
proposal from social trinitarian critics such as Stephen Holmes and Kathryn Tanner that we look to 
Christology instead of the Trinity to guide ecclesiology. (Holmes, “Three Versus One?,” 82–4 and Tanner, 
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that Gorman develops his own exegetically sensitive theological reading of theosis, which 
both complements as well as offers a promising critical supplementation of sorts to 
Grenz’s notion of community. 
Gorman unpacks his argument by first examining Philippians 2:6–11 as Paul’s 
“master story” to show that the kenotic self-emptying of Christ reveals the character of 
God. In this, a counterintuitive narrative divine identity is revealed in which cruciformity 
actually means theoformity.301 He then turns to an examination of justification, or what he 
terms “justification by co-crucifixion”302 which also necessarily entails co-resurrection, and 
contends that “it is participation in the covenantal and cruciform narrative identity of 
Christ, which is in turn the character of God . . . justification is itself theosis.”303 Gorman 
then turns to the nature of holiness for Paul, concluding that it comes to be redefined as 
entailing both a participation in and conformity to the cruciform character of the 
cruciform God. Important to Gorman’s delineation is that holiness is not merely a 
supplement or “add on” attached to justification. Rather, holiness represents the 
actualization of justification, such that it can itself also be included in the idea of theosis.304 
Gorman thus summarizes what may variously be called Christification,305 Christosis, 
deification, or theosis: “Theosis is transformative participation in the kenotic, cruciform 
                                                             
“Trinity,” 329) For Grenz, as seen in the narrative of the triune name, to be Christological (and/or 
pneumatological) is at once also to be trinitarian, and vice versa. 
301 Gorman, Inhabiting the Cruciform God, 9–39. Gorman states Philippians 2:6–8 forms a narrative 
pattern of “although/because [x], not [y], but [z]” gleaned from the rendering “although/because [in the 
form of God], did not [exploit equality with God], but [emptied himself . . . humbled himself].” (16–25, 
brackets original) Gorman further states: “In Christ’s preexistent and incarnate kenosis we see truly what 
God is truly like, and we simultaneously see truly what Adam/humanity truly should have been, truly was 
not, and now truly can be in Christ. Kenosis is theosis.” (37, emphasis original) Additionally, see NGQB, 201–2 
for Grenz’s suggestion that the “name” of Jesus in Philippians 2:9–11, which is above all other names and at 
which everyone will ultimately bow, represents the holy divine name which Jesus possesses. For agreement, 
see R. Kendall Soulen, The Divine Name(s) and the Holy Trinity, Volume 1: Distinguishing the Voices (Louisville, 
KY: Westminster John Know, 2011), 208–10; Richard Bauckham, “Paul’s Christology of Divine Identity,” in 
Jesus and the God of Israel: God Crucified and Other Studies in the New Testament’s Christology of Divine 
Identity (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008), 199; and Charles Gieschen, “The Divine Name in Ante-Nicene 
Christology,” Vigiliae Christianae 57.2 (2003), 128–30. 
302 Gorman, Inhabiting the Cruciform God, 40–104. 
303 Gorman, Inhabiting the Cruciform God, 2. See also 90–101. 
304 See Michael J. Gorman, “‘You Shall Be Cruciform for I Am Cruciform’: Paul’s Trinitarian 
Reconstruction of Holiness,” in Holiness and Ecclesiology in the New Testament, eds. Kent E. Brower and Andy 
Johnson (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007), 148–66 and Gorman, Inhabiting the Cruciform God, 105–28. 
305 “Christification” comes from Nellas, Deification in Christ, 24, 39–40, 121–4, 134–5, 138. 
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character and life of God through Spirit-enabled conformity to the incarnate, crucified, 
and resurrected/glorified Christ, who is the image of God.”306  
The cruciformity that comprises theoformity in Gorman’s conception thus comes 
through inclusion “in Christ” and is therefore a Christo-formity bound up in an 
inhabitation of the triune, cruciform God. Cruciform theosis in this view comprises a 
narrative soteriology or a “living exegesis of the Crucified [One], who is the image of 
God.”307 It is in this manner that the ecclesial community inhabits the cruciform God and 
who is inhabited in turn by the cruciform God. Thus the church, as that body constituted 
through ecclesial relation “in Christ” and through the Spirit, comes to be shaped by and 
embody the cruciform narrative identity of the triune God.308 The reality of union with the 
cruciform Christ as head of the cruciform community constitutes the ecclesial relation of 
“male and female” within the context of a triune participation that is at once a storied 
participation. Gorman’s theme of cruciform theosis in contact with Grenz’s theotic triune 
participation suggests that those who are “in Christ” through the Spirit also inhabit the 
triune, cruciform God. The result is not simply “community” in general terms but an 
ecclesial community of “male and female” that is characterized by an eccentric and 
cruciform existence.  
 
Female/Male Mutuality and Storied (Ecclesial) Participation 
In Grenz’s Christo-anthropology, human be-ing arises from inclusion “in Christ” 
through the Spirit. As John Zizioulas reminds us, “[T]he mystery of [humanity] reveals 
itself fully only in the light of Christ.”309 Yet this is a fully trinitarian reality as well, as our 
study of Grenz’s theo-ontology in this chapter has shown. For instance, Grenz states:  
At the heart of the narrative of the I AM through which God's self-naming occurs is 
the act of naming that occurs between God and Jesus, and in which the Spirit 
participates. . . . The communal, eschatological aspects of the dynamic of naming 
lie at the heart of the act of self-naming of the self-naming God and even arise 
                                                             
306 Gorman, Inhabiting the Cruciform God, 7, 125, 162. 
307 Gorman, Inhabiting the Cruciform God, 172. 
308 Gorman, Inhabiting the Cruciform God, 161–73. 
309 Zizioulas, “Human Capacity and Human Incapacity,” 433. “Humanity” adapts a generic 
masculine from the original. 
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from this dynamic. God's act of self-naming is both communal and eschatological, 
for it involves the dynamic of the relationality of the three trinitarian persons.310 
Extending from this dynamic of transcendent triune self-naming, Christ, as the bearer and 
bestower of the divine name, is the head of a new humanity destined to be formed 
according to his image.311 Jesus as the true and norming narrative imago is the 
“‘grammatical paradigm’ of human being”312 through which the narrative imago of those 
“in Christ” is constituted and takes shape. The resulting ecclesial communion becomes the 
place in which the triune life of Christ grants life to its members in the Spirit. “Christ is not 
a simple liberator who abandons [persons] to their own devices after liberation, after 
entrusting them with his wise teaching. More radically, he creates a new place for them in 
which to live. And this place is His body.”313 Because this body is Christoform, it is 
cruciform.314 
 Furthermore, Christ exists as the true imago in both his divinity and his true 
humanity such that through participation in him our own true humanity is constituted 
and we receive “our primary ontological determination as those created to be in the image 
of God.”315 Or as Bonhoeffer states, “In Christ’s incarnation all of humanity regains the 
dignity of bearing the image of God,” such that, “In community with the incarnate one, we 
                                                             
310 NGQB, 283, 334. See also David Kelsey’s communal and eschatological trinitarian taxis: “In 
relating creatively, ‘the Father creates through the Son in the power of the Spirit’; in relating eschatological 
blessing, ‘the Spirit is sent by the Father with the Son’; in relating to reconcile, ‘the Son is sent by the Father 
in the power of the Spirit.’” (Eccentric Existence, Volume two, 915) 
311 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Discipleship, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, Volume 4, trans. Barbara Green 
and Reinhard Krauss, eds. Geffrey B. Kelley and John D. Godsey (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2001), 
284–5. 
312 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, Volume two, 1009. Kelsey speaks here of eccentric existence as an 
“imaging of the image of God.” (1008–51) We can also discern here an “intertextual” intersection in Grenz’s 
theo-ontology between Scripture as paradigmatic “norming narrative” and Christ as paradigmatic “norming 
narrative imago.” 
313 Nellas, Deification in Christ, 113–14. “Persons” adapts a generic masculine from the original. 
314 Jones, Marks of His Wounds, 110–14. 
315 See this emphasis in Suzanne McDonald’s discussion of Barth, Jesus as “Elect God” and “elect 
man,” and the homoousion in Re-Imagining Election: Divine Election as Representing God to Others and Others 
to God (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 51–4, 124 (54). For the theme that in the incarnation we learn 
that divinity and humanity are not inherently opposed and that Christ (and not sin) is definitive of true 
humanity, see Donald Fairbairn, Life in the Trinity: An Introduction to Theology with the Help of the Church 
Fathers (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2009), 145–8. See also Cortez, Christological Anthropology in 
Historical Perspective, 220–3 for his concern to still recognize the value of anthropology and Christology 
remaining distinct systematic loci and the need for an anthropology that is fully Christological while not 
being Christomonistic. 
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are once again given our true humanity. With it, we are delivered from the isolation of sin, 
and at the same time restored to the whole of humanity.”316 In view of this reality, theosis 
can be said to comprise anthroposis as well.317 Yet, we are met with a question concerning 
embodied maleness and femaleness at this point. How can it be maintained that the true 
humanity for those in the ecclesial community of male and female is to be found in the 
specifically male Christ? We should immediately warn here against the muting of Jesus’ 
maleness in a spirit of inclusiveness, just as it would be improper to erase his Jewishness.318 
In fact, it is precisely the particularly male and Jewish Jesus, who, in Grenz’s words, is the 
“universal human” showing and mediating the way to true life-in-community for all 
peoples.319 
Beth Felker Jones helps to delineate this further.320 She points out that the “marks 
of his wounds” are also a part of the concreteness and particularity of Christ. If one wants 
to know what is godly, one should look at the wounds of Christ. In this view, to be 
Christoform is to be cruciform, but not necessarily male-form. Jones states: 
The church, itself, the body of Christ, includes the bodies of women and men as 
they are incorporated into Christ, even while the irreducible maleness and 
Jewishness of this Lord mysteriously make way for our own irreducibilities. The 
                                                             
316 Bonhoeffer, Discipleship, 285. 
317 Peter M. Candler, “The Logic of Christian Humanism,” Communio 36.1 (Spring 2009), 86. For the 
attribution of anthroposis (but not theosis) to the preceding Bonhoeffer quote, see Tom Greggs, “Bearing Sin 
in the Church: The Ecclesial Hamartiology of Bonhoeffer,” in Christ, Church, and World: New Studies in 
Bonhoeffer’s Theology and Ethics, eds. Michael Mawson and Philip G. Ziegler (London: Bloomsbury T&T 
Clark, 2016), 89 who states: “For Bonhoeffer, salvation is by anthroposis not theosis.” I follow Candler in not 
setting theosis and anthroposis in opposition in this manner. See also Gorman, Inhabiting the Cruciform God, 
37 who says, “To be like Christ crucified is to be both most godly and most human. Christification is 
divinization, and divinization is humanization.” 
318 See Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, Christ and Reconciliation (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2013), 79–96 
regarding Christ’s particularity in relation to feminist, liberationist, and postcolonial concerns, and 42–4, 
238–41 on the importance of Jesus’ Jewishness. See also Elaine Storkey, “Who is the Christ? Issues in 
Christology and Feminist Theology,” in Gender and the Gospel, 106–23 who warns: “It may be that liberation 
feminism has been bewitched by the very anthropomorphism which it warns against. For it needs to 
recognize that, though Christ is God-with-us in our humanity, pain, new life and our joy, God in Christ is not 
ultimately like any of us. There is no need to hold against the features of Christ’s particularity some checklist, 
so that we can be assured of our inclusion in the mystery of divine love. . . . God does not need to be re-
imagined in our image.” (122) In agreement with Storkey, a Grenzian approach calls for a Christo-
anthropology in theo-ontological (versus onto-theological) terms.  
319 TCG, 272–93 (especially 286–93). See also CFC, 86–92 for Grenz’s discussion of Jesus as “truly 
human,” “the True Human,” and “the New Human.” 
320 Jones, Marks of His Wounds, 111–14. 
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rightly ordered [female or male] body finds its direction and telos in this specific 
Lord.321 
The materiality of Christ’s body ensures his availability to his people such that 
participation in his body allows female and male bodies to become iconic, both 
individually and corporately. Specificity and particularity, whether ours as male and 
female or Christ’s as the cruciform true human, should not be dissipated. Such would 
undermine the incarnation and be soteriologically (and ecclesially) deleterious.322 In 
addition, “both Jesus’ own resurrection and the doctrine of the resurrection in general 
indicate that human [female and male] sexual distinctions (albeit in transformed manner) 
are taken into existence in the [eschatological] community of God.”323 “Male and female” 
then derive their ecclesial and eschatological being from the “wounded side” of the 
crucified and resurrected Christ.324 
                                                             
321 Jones, Marks of His Wounds, 111. Jones states additionally: “We are returned to the patristic 
maxim, ‘what is not assumed is not saved.’ Humanity, then, had best hope that particularity is assumed. The 
assumption of particularity is accomplished in the multiplicity of the true body of Christ. He assumes human 
historical particularity in the incarnation and all of our diverse particularity in the ecclesia. It is not, then, as 
[Judith] Butler suggests, that particularities like the sexed or gendered body are dissolved in performativity. 
Rather, in faithful performance, exemplified in Christ’s saving work, those bodies are made more concrete, 
more bodily.” (112) 
322 Jones, Marks of His Wounds, 112. I would suggest attempts to construct a “multi-gender” Christ 
(Graham Ward, “Bodies: The Displaced Body of Jesus Christ,” in Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology, eds. 
John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward (London: Routledge, 1999), 163–81) or suggestions of 
the possibility of an “intersex Christ” (DeFranza, Sex Difference in Christian Theology, 279), in their laudable 
effort to affirm the particularity of some, regrettably risk diminishing Christ’s particularity. Not only would 
this yield an improper onto-theological anthropological Christology rather than a properly theo-ontological 
Christo-anthropology, but to mitigate Christ’s particularity for any reason, however noble, risks undercutting 
the very basis for participation and particularity “in Christ.” Regarding Ward’s “multi-gender” Christ, Jones 
states: “Ward would not need to make Jesus’ fully human body ‘multi-gendered’ if he began with the 
recognition that Christ’s body is fully a body in multivalent ways – in Nazareth, on the altar, and in the 
church. Difference is included in the latter two valences but can only be properly so included because it is 
real in the first.” (Marks of His Wounds, 142) 
323 SE, 250–1 (250). Jones states, “Our bodies now must refer to the resurrection bodies to come. The 
doctrine of the bodily resurrection points to the need to understand the signs of our created difference not 
as unimportant physical superfluities but as central to our theological anthropology and ethics.” (Marks of 
His Wounds, 114) See also Kärkkäinen, Christ and Reconciliation, 134–8 for the manner in which Jesus’ 
humanity is confirmed in the resurrection. 
324 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 190. Volf gives four marks of cruciform gender relations: 1) the 
“irreducible duality of genders” exist in equal dignity without hierarchy. The male does not connote fullness 
and authority and the female lack and obedience. Both reciprocally command and obey and both 
experience fullness and lacking. 2) The construction of gender identities rooted in sexed bodies flows from 
both male to female and female to male. Each needs the other. 3) Female and male are not to be without the 
other as each gains identity in relation to the other. 4) “The affirmation of equal dignity of genders, the 
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 In the community of “male and female” constituted by means of ecclesial relation 
“in Christ” and through the Spirit, the social imago and the narrative imago receive their 
theo-ontological be-ing through inclusion in the Jesus narrative. In this manner, the triune 
participation of the previous chapter and the storied participation of the present chapter 
are gathered up together and exhibit a fundamental unity as they point toward and 
mutually constitute ecclesial personhood. In addition, triune participation comes to be 
mediated by the storied participation derived from union with Christ.325 Together both 
comprise a theotic (storied and communal) triune and ecclesial participation in which the 
churchly community of “male and female” as the eschatological prolepsis of the imago Dei 
finds inclusion in the cruciform Jesus story and incorporation into the divine triune life.326  
The result is a peculiar ecclesial community constituted by cruciform theosis and 
characterized by cruciform mutuality, which in its eccentric manner of being in the world, 
seeks to manifest the practical wisdom contained within the command Christ’s people 
have received from the triune, cruciform God which they inhabit: “You shall be cruciform, 
for I am cruciform.”327 Such provides further insight for the articulation of a hermeneutical 
ecclesiology. In addition to the trinitarian shape of the ecclesial community and the 
corresponding grammar of mutuality, we can now add – extending from the divinely 
intended reality of “the imago Dei as our vocation to be in Christ”328 – a Christoform 
narrative shape with a corresponding grammar of cruciformity, comprising for us a 
grammar of mutual cruciformity and cruciform mutuality as vital to the ecclesial existence 
by which the triune God is made known in the world. 
                                                             
symmetry in construction of gender identities, and the presence of the other in the self . . . is kept in place by 
self-giving [triune, cruciform] love.” (190) 
325 See NGQB, 364–73 on “being ‘in Christ’” through the gift of the Spirit as “participation in God.” 
326 Note again that the communal, ecclesial self is already a narrative self in SGRS, 304–36. Also, the 
notion of cruciform theosis at the heart of this dynamic works well to draw together the matrix Richard B. 
Hays identifies at the center of New Testament ethics of community/cross/new creation. (The Moral Vision of 
the New Testament: Community, Cross, New Creation – A Contemporary Introduction to New Testament Ethics 
(San Francisco, CA: HarperCollins, 1996), 5, 193–205) 
327 Gorman, Inhabiting the Cruciform God, 106, 164. 




FROM MISSIONAL GOD TO ECCLESIAL IMAGO: 
THE MISSIONAL SHAPE OF THE HERMENEUTICAL COMMUNITY 
 
 This fourth, and final, chapter presents a consideration of the contribution which 
Grenz’s trinitarian and communal ecclesiology can make to how we understand the 
connection between church and mission. In this manner, it seeks to go “from missional 
God to ecclesial imago.” Thus far we have traversed through the trinitarian “main road” of 
chapter two and the narrative Christological critical detour of chapter three. This present 
chapter takes its place as an ecclesial return moment completing the structural matrix at 
the heart of this study of Trinity, narrative, and (ecclesial) mission. The first section of this 
chapter presents as its “main road” a descriptive summary of Grenz’s later and mature 
ecclesiology, its relation to mission, and a proposed grammar towards articulating a 
hermeneutical ecclesiology. The second section provides the critical moment aimed at 
extending Grenz’s theo-anthropology (chapter two) and Christo-anthropology (chapter 
three) into a missio-anthropology. The final section completes the movement with a 
suggestive proposal that the ecclesial imago and proposed hermeneutical ecclesiology find 
concrete manifestation within the ecclesial relation of “male and female” marked by 
mutual hospitality and ecclesial friendship. 
 
The Missional God and the Imago Dei 
[T]he community of love the church is called to be is no ordinary reality. The 
fellowship we share with each other is not merely that of a common experience or 
a common practice, as important as these are. Our fellowship is nothing less than 
our common participation in the divine communion between the Father and the 
Son mediated by the Holy Spirit.1 
The church’s vocation to be the imago Dei finds its . . . fundamental existence “in 
Christ.” Being in Christ brings the church to its true identity as the fellowship of 
those who participate in the life of the triune God. The facilitator of this 
participation is the Holy Spirit, who is the agent of the new birth. . . . By placing 
                                                             
1 Grenz, “Restoring a Trinitarian Understanding of the Church in Practice: An Evangelical Response 
to Ferguson, Holloway, and Lowery,” in Evangelicalism and the Stone-Campbell Movement, ed. William R. 
Barker (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 2002), 233. 
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believers “in Christ,” therefore, the Spirit brings them to participate in the 
fellowship of the eternal Son with the eternal Father. Ultimately, then, we enjoy 
the fullness of community as, and only as, God graciously brings us to participate 
together in the fountainhead of community, namely, the life of the triune God.2 
 This first section presents a treatment of Grenz’s trinitarian ecclesiology in 
relation to the ecclesial imago and mission in the effort to explore the ramifications for a 
hermeneutical ecclesiology. Proceeding in three parts, the first is a descriptive summary of 
Grenz’s mature ecclesiology. Grenz would have produced his most definitive statement on 
the church in the ecclesiology volume of the Matrix series which he was tragically unable 
to complete. In light of this, my summary will be drawn primarily from his 2003 essay, 
“Ecclesiology,” in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology, which is the last 
dedicated academic treatment of length that Grenz produced on the church.3 The second 
part explores the intersection of the ecclesial imago, theosis, triune participation, and 
ecclesial mission in Grenz. Extending from this discussion, the third section proposes a 
three-part missional grammar (complementary to Grenz’s three-part trinitarian and 
narrative grammars) for the articulation of a hermeneutical ecclesiology.  
 
Grenz and the Ecclesial Community 
 The prior investigations of the development of Grenz’s notion of the social imago 
extending from his revisioned social trinitarianism and emphasis on community, and the 
emergence of the narrative imago in relation to the triune divine identity and Christo-
anthropology in Grenz, set the stage for our investigation into Grenz’s ecclesiology. Both 
the social imago and narrative imago are intertwined in what can now be called the 
                                                             
2 Grenz, “Ecclesiology,” 268. 
3 While the church is a constant theme for Grenz, his most concentrated ecclesiological 
investigations of at least chapter or essay length are, “Ecclesiology,” 252–68 (2003); “Restoring a Trinitarian 
Understanding of the Church in Practice,” 228–34 (2002); SGRS, chapter eight, 304–36 (2001, covering the 
ecclesial self); RTC, chapter nine, “Evangelical Theology and the Ecclesiological Center,” 295–332 (first 
edition, 2000); CFC, chapters nine and ten, 169–212 (first edition, 1996); TCG, Part 5 (on ecclesiology), 461–
570 (first edition, 1994); RET, chapter seven, 163–89 (1993); and The Baptist Congregation (1985). See also 
Grenz’s less academic articles composed for pastors and focused on the church, “Being There for Each Other: 
The Church as Genuine Community?” Enrichment 10.4 (Fall 2005), 124–6; “What Does It Really Mean to be 
Postmodern?” Enrichment 10.3 (Summer 2005), 112–14; and “Does Evidence Still Demand a Verdict? The 
Church’s Apologetic Task and the Postmodern Turn,” Enrichment 10.2 (Spring 2005), 104–7. See as well 
Sexton, “Stanley Grenz’s Ecclesiology: Telic and Trinitarian,” 20–43. 
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ecclesial imago, which in turn is wrapped up in and find expression as what Grenz calls 
the ecclesial self.4 When we turn to Grenz’s “Ecclesiology” essay, these same 
social/communal and narrative aspects are present. Grenz begins with an exploration of 
the theme of “community” as it appears in contemporary communitarian (Peter Berger 
and Robert Bellah) and narrative (Alasdair MacIntyre, and George Stroup) scholarship.5 
On a most basic level, a community provides persons with a similar linguistic frame of 
reference and symbolic means of world-construction, a cohesive sense of group identity 
and solidarity, and a chief source of “personal” (i.e., relational) identity formation. 
Whatever “communities of reference” one inhabits contribute to the “formation of the 
‘self’ by mediating the communal narrative necessary for personal identity formation.”6 
Such communal reference groups function as interpretive communities as they act as 
“communities of memory” and “communities of hope,” providing the constitutive 
narrative through which persons interpret themselves and the world, and by which they 
draw their lives (past, present, and future) into a meaningful whole.7 For Grenz, the theme 
of communal identity formation functions as the “central function of community”8 and is 
identified by him as the most germane for the theological task of ecclesiology. 
 Grenz’s communitarian exploration of community raises for him the 
ecclesiological question: what is the church? Here he expresses concern about the ways in 
which modernist individualism and voluntaristic social contract theory becomes 
replicated in the “contractual” ecclesiology of the free church evangelicalism of his own 
context.9 Under such contractualism, rather than the church constituting its members, the 
church is instead a voluntary association of individual believers who are somehow 
complete spiritual selves prior to and apart from church membership.10 The sociological 
                                                             
4 See SGRS, 312–31 on the social/communal and narrative aspects of the ecclesial self. 
5 Grenz, “Ecclesiology,” 253–7. See also BF, 203–223. 
6 Grenz, “Ecclesiology,” 255. 
7 Grenz, “Ecclesiology,” 255–6 (255). 
8 Grenz, “Ecclesiology,” 254. 
9 Grenz, “Ecclesiology,” 257. For Grenz’s connection of an individualist, contractual ecclesiology to 
his own evangelical context, see RTC, 295–316, 322–3. Cf. Brian Harris, “Beyond Individualism: Stanley 
Grenz’s Contribution to Baptist Theology,” Pacific Journal of Baptist Research 6.1 (April 2010), 5–19. 
10 Grenz laments the co-opting effect an individualist posture on the traditional Baptist emphasis of 
the priesthood of all believers. (“Ecclesiology,” 257 and BF, 225) For a Ricoeurian revisioning of Baptist 
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language of community offers a beginning resource to resist the reduction of the church 
into such a lifestyle enclave. The church as “community” insists the church is more than an 
aggregate of individual members by presenting them with the particular “community-
constituting” biblical narrative through which the church becomes an alternative 
community understood as participating in the transcendent work of God and “sharing 
together in a storied life of obedient service to and with Christ.”11 
 As promising as communitarian insights are, Grenz realizes that a bare 
sociological description of the church as community eventually exhausts itself. Grenz 
firmly rejects any lapse into a sociological foundationalism in which sociology is granted 
priority as a scientific discipline to set the agenda and method for theological reflection 
and that treats the church as merely a specific instantiation of the more generic reality 
called “community.”12 The question which arises then in the postmodern context is: in 
what sense can the church be spoken of as a community? The very nature of the church 
demands that this question can only be fully answered theologically. In this regard, Grenz 
appeals to John Milbank’s insight that theology is “itself a social science, and the queen of 
the sciences for the inhabitants of the alterna civitas, on pilgrimage through this 
temporary world.”13 Thus true to his theo-ontological perspective in Named God, Grenz is 
insistent that the ultimate basis for any talk of the church as community must be a 
distinctly trinitarian theological ecclesiology. 
Accordingly, for Grenz the church is a community, not because it meets the 
demands of sociology, but because “it has a special role in the divine program, at the heart 
of which, according to the Bible, is the establishment of community.”14 Elsewhere, Grenz 
describes the brokenness wrought by sin in the world as the “destruction of community” 
that results in human alienation and in which we labor under the weight of enslavement 
                                                             
principles away from individualism, see Timothy Donald Fletcher Maddox, “Revisioning Baptist Principles: A 
Ricoeurian Investigation” (PhD Diss., The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1997). 
11 Grenz, “Ecclesiology,” 257–8 and Grenz, “Community, Interpretive,” 128–9. The long quote is from 
James William McClendon Jr. Ethics: Systematic Theology, Volume 1 (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1986), 28. 
12 BF, 226–7 and Grenz, “Ecclesiology,” 258. 
13 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1990), 
382. 
14 Grenz, “Ecclesiology,” 258. 
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(a reality in which Scot McKnight evocatively describes humans as “cracked eikons”).15 
However, as noted in the previous chapter, sin is not ultimately defining of human being 
nor is the primordial divine communal intent ultimately thwarted. Rather the communal 
intent storied within the norming narrative of Scripture is recovered and given full 
trinitarian expression “in Christ” (as the truly human16 imago) and through the Spirit by 
which the church is constituted and all claims to “community” are to be evaluated. 
Nevertheless, Grenz warns against idealism with a reminder that the present experience of 
ecclesial community is proleptic and eschatological, and thus incomplete, as we wait 
expectantly for God as the triune Divine Community to complete the divine program.17 
The ecclesial community brought into being as the embodiment of the biblical 
narrative of God working to bring about the divine communal intent endemic to the 
imago Dei functions as a peculiarly theological interpretive community that is at once a 
“marked” community.18 The four traditional marks which form the ecclesiological 
inheritance of the Nicene Creed speak of the church as “one, holy, catholic, and apostolic.” 
Grenz notes that the Reformers accepted these marks as notae ecclesiae but nevertheless 
radically deemphasized them. The reason for this was because, in the Reformers’ 
perspective, the creedal marks could not locate where the presence of the true church was 
to be found. The Reformers thus turned to and came to emphasize two additional marks; 
namely, word and sacrament. This move served to bring about a renewed emphasis on the 
local church as that visible community brought into being by the Holy Spirit through the 
dual marks of word and sacrament. 
That the Holy Spirit creates the ecclesial community through word and sacrament 
draws upon Grenz’s notion of the “instrumentality of the Spirit” discussed in the beginning 
                                                             
15 TCG, 181–212 and CFC, 59–75. On humans as “cracked eikons” see Scot McKnight, A Community 
Called Atonement (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2007), 15–24. 
16 See this within Grenz’s discussions found in SGRS, 18, 203–22; TCG, 272–93 (especially 273–85); 
and CFC, 86–92. 
17 Grenz, “Ecclesiology,” 260 and BF, 229–30. Thus ecclesial existence in its present “cracked” 
condition is lived out in the midst of an eschatological “already/not yet” tension (what might be called the 
“in betweens”) as well as ultimate eschatological hope. See also TCG, 477–9; MQ, 238; and SGRS, 224, 322, 
331–6. See also C. René Padilla, “The Mission of the Church in Light of the Kingdom of God,” Transformation 
1.2 (1984), 17. 
18 Grenz, “Ecclesiology,” 260–4 and RTC, 317–27. 
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section of the previous chapter. The Spirit creates the church by speaking through the 
written and proclaimed word to form a people who inhabit and embody the new, 
eschatological world of Jesus Christ, the living Word. Rather than being a mere aggregate 
of spiritual individuals, the church is shaped as a community that draws its identity from 
the constitutive cruciform narrative of Christ as testified to in the biblical narrative of the 
triune God at work bringing creation to its divinely given telos. In this manner, the church 
is a people “focused on the Word and gathered around the word.”19 Not only this but the 
sacramental practice of baptism and the Eucharist (or Lord’s Supper) serve to accentuate 
the constitutive narrative of the church as these rites come to be visual sermons and thus 
the Word of God proclaimed in sign, symbol, and story.  
Furthermore, Grenz specifies these practices are more than mere memorial, but 
full sacraments wherein believers are brought into storied participation in the cruciform 
narrative of Christ and the eschatological world brought about through the 
instrumentality of the Spirit.20 In this manner, the ecclesial community, in union with 
Christ, becomes an interpretive and proleptic community in the present.21 Grenz discerns 
herein a clue to the way in which the church is local as well as universal. The church is 
local for it is in the ecclesial embodiment represented by the local fellowship that 
believers gather around word and sacrament. Nevertheless, the constitutive narrative of 
the triune God in the world embedded within word and sacrament is not the exclusive 
possession of any one ecclesial community. This narrative is rather a shared narrative 
which serves to unite, into what might be called a “Community of communities,”22 local 
expressions of ecclesia with all other congregations of the faithful. “The church, which is 
fundamentally the particular, local congregation gathered around word and sacrament, 
nevertheless simultaneously transcends any one local congregation and all 
congregations.”23 
                                                             
19 Grenz, “Ecclesiology,” 262. 
20 See Stanley J. Grenz, “Baptism and the Lord’s Supper as Community Acts: Toward a Sacramental 
Understanding of the Ordinances,” in Baptist Sacramentalism, eds. Anthony R. Cross and Philip E. Thompson 
(Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2003), 76–95. Cf. NGQB, 372–3. 
21 RTC, 326. 
22 RTC, 320. 
23 Grenz, “Ecclesiology,” 263. 
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Following on from this, Grenz now seeks to bring missional theology into 
conversation with the four traditional marks in a discussion of the church as “missionally 
marked.”24 Grenz remarks that the Reformers tended to see the creedal marks as 
eschatological goals bound up in the fullness of the church invisible rather than attributes 
achievable by the church on the earth. Grenz, though, views ecclesiology as going astray if 
the creedal marks are pushed off into an invisible church disjointed from the visible 
church in the world. The eschatological directedness of the creedal marks suggests to 
Grenz that they should be taken in a dynamic rather than a static sense as comprising the 
shared task of the people of God as a whole. Grenz suggests this extends from a distinctly 
missional ecclesiology “which ultimately arises from the mission of the triune God in the 
world”25 as the church is sent into the world with the gospel and is therefore a missionary 
church by nature. Drawing on the work of missiologist Charles van Engen,26 Grenz 
suggests the notae ecclesiae are better rendered as adverbs than adjectives and in reverse 
order as a reminder of the direction of the missional task. The missional church is 
therefore a “proclaiming, reconciling, sanctifying, and unifying” expression of ecclesial 
community and proleptic witness to God’s eschatological new creation.27 
Extending this further, Grenz suggests this missional rendering of the creedal 
marks is derived from the commissioning lordship of Christ and is bound up in the 
mission of the triune God. Such a theological ecclesiology for Grenz serves to forge the link 
between the invisible church (the nature of the church in eschatological fullness) and the 
visible church (the church in the world). To explicate this link, Grenz turns to his familiar 
trinitarian imago Dei theology. The fundamental calling and mission of the church to be 
the foretaste of the communal divine intent of the imago Dei “determines the church’s 
proclaiming, reconciling, sanctifying, and unifying mission in the world.”28 The vocation 
endemic to the imago Dei points forward beyond creation toward its realization in 
                                                             
24 Grenz, “Ecclesiology,” 264–8 and RTC, 327–32. 
25 Grenz, “Ecclesiology,” 265. 
26 Charles van Engen, God’s Missionary People: Rethinking the Purpose of the Local Church (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1991), 66. 
27 Grenz, “Ecclesiology,” 265–6 and Darrell L. Guder and Lois Barrett, Missional Church: A Vision for 
the Sending of the Church in North America (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998), 255. 
28 Grenz, “Ecclesiology,” 267. 
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ecclesial relation constituted “in Christ” and through the Spirit. The reality of the ecclesial 
communion therefore goes beyond a mere shared experience and is constituted by 
nothing less than a shared participation “in the perichoretic community of trinitarian 
persons.”29 In this manner, the social imago and narrative imago of the previous chapters 
becomes the ecclesial imago in which participation in the divine triune life marks and 
constitutes the true church. “And being a people whose life is hidden with Christ (and 
hence the invisible church) even as it lives in the world (and therefore remains the visible 
church) is the present calling of those whose lives have been, and are being, transformed 
by the Spirit”30 into the ecclesial and eschatological new community. 
 
Theosis, Triune Participation, and Ecclesia 
We have previously noted the importance of the crucial insight of what Jay Smith 
refers to as Grenz’s trinitarian “theo-epistemology” which is ultimately fully realized as the 
revisioning of the convertive piety of Grenz’s Baptist and Pietist inheritance itself as 
“trinitarian participation”31 – what in this dissertation has been more extensively 
developed along somewhat different lines as theotic triune participation. We have also 
already explored the manner in which Grenz’s trinitarian interpretation of humans as 
created in the imago Dei yields an emphasis on relationality. But Grenz, while not leaving 
creation behind, nevertheless does not remain merely at the creational moment of human 
community in the imago Dei.32 For Grenz, this creational ideal looks ahead to the 
community of those redeemed persons who have been brought into participation in the 
divine triune life, meaning that creational human community in general anticipates the 
                                                             
29 RTC, 331. 
30 Grenz, “Ecclesiology,” 268. 
31 See the subtitle to Smith, “A Generous Theology: Reinterpreting Convertive Piety as Trinitarian 
Participation in Stanley J. Grenz,” and in particular 3–6, 111, 117, 122–8, 223–6, 235. 
32 Richard B. Hays states: “God’s ‘apocalyptic’ act in Christ does not simply shatter and sweep away 
creation and covenant; rather, it hermeneutically reconfigures creation and covenant, under the guidance of 
the Spirit, in light of the cross and resurrection.” (“Apocalyptic Poiēsis in Galatians: Paternity, Passion, and 
Participation,” in Galatians and Christian Theology: Justification, the Gospel, and Ethics in Paul’s Letter, eds. 
Mark W. Elliott et al. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2014), 205) Likewise, though the creational 
moment points beyond itself, Dennis P. Hollinger offers a reminder that, “An ecclesial ethic begins at 
creation and does not annul or contradict what God established at creation.” (“Creation: The Starting Point 
of an Ecclesial Ethic,” in Ecclesia and Ethics: Moral Formation and the Church, eds. E. Allen Jones III et al. 
(London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2016), 19) 
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realization of the ecclesial imago in particular and thus points forward to the ecclesial 
community.33 As well, Grenz’s emphasis on Trinity and community yield a theological 
anthropology not only marked with a distinctly ecclesial shape but an eschatological 
orientation as the church functions as a foretaste of the new humanity of the new 
creation. For this reason, the later pages of Social God are devoted to what Grenz calls the 
“ecclesial self” which becomes constituted by triune love.34 
To summarize what has been explicated in previous chapters, the mystery of the 
Christian life in the New Testament according to the Apostle Paul is encapsulated in the 
simple designation “in Christ.” According to this, the company of those redeemed “in 
Christ” are not only constituted relationally in general terms, but are likewise constituted 
by participation in Christ’s own life, who as the origin and final purpose of creation and 
Truly Human One is the very image of God.35 In this way ecclesial identities come to be 
constructed extra se in Christo as ecclesial persons are incorporated into the divine life by 
the Spirit. Theological anthropology on this reckoning is very closely tied to ecclesial 
existence, which can be well described in Grenzian terms as having to do with our mutual 
participation in the triune perichoretic life accomplished “in Christ” and incorporated 
through the Spirit. Furthermore, while this is a present reality, the participation that 
constitutes the ecclesial self in triune love awaits the eschatological future for its 
fulfillment and is thus present now in a proleptic manner. As the Spirit constitutes those 
“in Christ” and thereby shapes the ecclesial community in the pattern of triune love, the 
church is likewise constituted as the prolepsis of the divine image.36 
                                                             
33 Indeed, we might even say Grenz moves beyond a simple “analogy of relation” toward his own 
version of what Gerald Mannion, Ecclesiology and Postmodernity: Questions for the Church in Our Time 
(Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2007), 175–91, 233–4 has called the analogia ecclesiae. See also Gerald 
Mannion, “Hermeneutical Investigations: Discerning Contemporary Christian Community,” in Christian 
Community Now: Ecclesiological Investigations, eds. Paul M. Collins et al. (London: T&T Clark, 2008), 74. 
34 See chapter two of this dissertation for the full discussion. 
35 SGRS, 18, 203–22 and CFC, 86–92. Regarding Christ as the origin and final purpose of creation, 
David Fergusson states eloquently: “No longer understood as an emergency or secondary measure to 
counteract the effects of sin and evil, though this remained an integral feature, the incarnation was the 
fulfillment of an eternal purpose. The world was made that Christ might be born.” (Creation (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2014), 8, emphasis mine) 
36 SGRS, 312–36. Cf. Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 49–65. 
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Grenz focuses the ecclesial orientation of triune participation further in a 2003 
essay titled “Celebrating Eternity.”37 In this essay Grenz surveys common Protestant 
definitions of worship that focus on attributing ultimate worth to God, as offering a 
response to the saving acts of God in history, or that humans have been created to bring 
God ultimate glory. Grenz is appreciative of these themes and finds Scriptural warrant for 
them. Nevertheless, he finds that the standard definitions remain lacking. Grenz insists a 
more trinitarian approach is needed and looks to theosis (and deification) for help.38 Grenz 
states, “Christian worship . . . entails glorifying the God disclosed in the biblical narrative 
who, in accordance with the divine eternal intention, glorifies us in Christ by the 
indwelling presence of the Spirit who brings us to participate in the divine life.”39  It is 
through this theotic triune participation that those incorporated into Christ – the one in 
whom all things hold together (Colossians 1:17) – come to share in the filial relation and 
communion of Christ with the one he called “Father” or “Abba” by means of the indwelling 
presence of the glorious divine love who is the Holy Spirit.40 Thus in the doxological 
practice of Christian worship and liturgy, and in the sacramental observance of baptism 
and holy communion, the company of humans who by the Spirit are “in the Son” 
participate in a proleptic fashion in the reciprocal dynamic of the sharing of triune love 
which characterizes the eternal divine life as a foretaste of the theotic triune participation 
                                                             
37 Grenz, “Celebrating Eternity,” in Semper Reformandum, 378–91. This essay was also republished 
under the same title in The Asbury Theological Journal 60.1 (Spring 2005), 43–53. 
38 In Grenz’s own discussions he does not sharply distinguish theosis and deification, and much like 
Michael J. Christensen, “The Problem, Promise, and Process of Theosis,” in Partakers of the Divine Nature: The 
History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions, eds. Michael J. Christensen and Jeffrey A. 
Wittung (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2007), 32–46 treats them as interchangeable. For treatments 
which seek to distinguish theosis and deification and/or find deification problematic, see Myk Habets, 
“Theosis, Yes; Deification, No,” in The Spirit of Truth: Reading Scripture and Constructing Theology with the 
Holy Spirit, ed. Myk Habets (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2010), 124–49 and Bruce L. McCormack, 
“Participation in God, Yes, Deification, No: Two Modern Protestant Responses to an Ancient Question,” in 
Denkwürdiges Geheimnis: Beiträge zur Gotteslehre. Festschrift für Eberhard Jüngel zum 70. Geburtstag, eds. 
Ingolf U. Dalferth, Johannes Fischer, and Hans-Peter Großhans (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 347–74. See 
also Roger Olson’s insistence that Grenz’s use of theosis/deification “falls short of the strong doctrine of 
Eastern Orthodoxy.” (“Deification in Contemporary Theology,” Theology Today 64.2 (July 2007), 197) See as 
well Medley, “Participation in God,” 212–16 for a brief description of Grenz’s approach. 
39 Grenz, “Celebrating Eternity,” in Semper Reformandum, 383. 
40 Grenz, “Celebrating Eternity,” in Semper Reformandum, 383–88. See also Fairbairn, Life in the 
Trinity, 6–12, 33–5 for a similar rendering of theosis/deification. 
 179 
(theosis) that awaits them in the communal culmination of the new humanity.41 For this 
reason, having been linked to theosis and triune participation in God, doxology in some 
form is fundamental to even eschatologically redeemed human being and will continue on 
into the new creation.42 
 Grenz recapitulates many of these same themes in Named God, but with a 
different emphasis.43 Whereas Social God aimed for a “trinitarian theology of the imago 
Dei,” in Named God Grenz aims for a “trinitarian theo-ontology” in which human “being” is 
constituted by divine triune being. Grenz adapts Augustine’s via amoris, or “way of love,” 
as a means to develop his conception of triune participation. Grenz provides a lengthy 
discussion toward his synthesis of apophatic and cataphatic approaches to knowledge of 
God, in which both are needed. Without the cataphatic we may never say anything at all 
about God. Without the apophatic we may be tempted to say too much! Grenz notes that 
while the via amoris goes beyond the apophatic, it does not bypass it either. Augustine 
admits divine incomprehensibility but contends a way to God is through the imago Dei. In 
this, the noetic journey moves from creation to the soul and then through the soul, where 
the divine image is located, to knowledge of the transcendent God. But wanting to press 
beyond knowledge per se, Grenz directs his focus to the dynamic of triune love which 
characterizes the Father, Son, and Spirit and concludes that the noetic is a servant to the 
agapaic. The way of love then becomes the completion of the way of negation.  
At a vital point, though, that of Augustine’s turn inward, Grenz offers a crucial 
correction; namely, that God is not found merely in the interiority of the soul but in the 
exteriority of the other. It is in our relationality that we find the imago Dei. Grenz then 
makes his move beyond a trinitarian theo-epistemology (though while not leaving this 
behind either) and presses his reconceived via amoris forward even further as leading 
ultimately to theosis or triune participation.44 Herein Grenz finds the makings of a theo-
                                                             
41 Grenz, “Celebrating Eternity,” in Semper Reformandum, 386, 388, 390. Cf. NGQB, 372. 
42 Grenz, “Celebrating Eternity,” in Semper Reformandum, 388–91. 
43 See chapter three of this dissertation for the full discussion. 
44 NGQB, 335–41, 364–5. On the theme of theosis/deification in Augustine’s theology, see David 
Vincent Meconi, The One Christ: St. Augustine’s Doctrine of Deification (Washington, DC: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 2013). 
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ontology that issues forth into a theo-anthropology where human being is constituted by 
divine triune being. But this occurs in a very distinct way and Grenz specifically notes that 
what is involved here is not limited to external imitation or mere ethical improvement. 
Quoting Maximus the Confessor that “God the Divine Logos wishes to effect the mystery 
of His incarnation always and in all things,” Grenz presses forward to speak of the imago 
Dei in ontological terms as our vocation to be “in Christ” (who is himself the true imago) 
having been incorporated into the divine life by the eschatological gift of the Spirit.45 
Grenz’s theological anthropology thus exhibits a basically ecclesial orientation as human 
“being” is therefore constituted “in Christ” and through the Spirit. Yet Grenz would remind 
us that the church within time is itself not the final goal or telos. Rather, our present 
ecclesial existence and participation in God marked by doxological worship is but a 
proleptic foretaste of the full realization of theosis, and of the communal and 
eschatological participation in God anticipated within the new humanity of the new 
creation. 
What becomes evident now is that on the other side of his critique of the 
individualist character of the evangelical ecclesiology of his own context, through his 
emphasis on triune participation and theosis, Grenz proposes his own revisioned 
trinitarian ecclesiology and gestures toward the articulation of a communion 
ecclesiology.46 Accordingly, Grenz cites Zizioulas approvingly: “The Church is primarily 
communion, i.e. a set of relationships making up a mode of being.”47 Within this move, the 
trinitarian theology of the imago Dei which sits at the core of Grenz’s theology, moves 
                                                             
45 NGQB, 335–41, 360–73 (365). 
46 I suggest this places Grenz in close company with those who comprise the movement toward 
“Baptist sacramentalism” and/or “Baptist catholicity,” such as Steven R. Harmon, Baptist Identity and the 
Ecumenical Future: Story, Tradition, and the Recovery of Community (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2016); 
Harmon, Toward Baptist Catholicity: Essays on Tradition and the Baptist Vision (Waynesboro, GA: Paternoster 
Press, 2006); Curtis W. Freeman, Contesting Catholicity: Theology for Other Baptists (Waco, TX: Baylor 
University Press, 2014); Paul S. Fiddes, Brian Haymes, and Richard Kidd, Baptists and the Communion of the 
Saints: A Theology of Covenanted Disciples (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2014); and Barry Harvey, Can 
These Bones Live? A Catholic Baptist Engagement with Ecclesiology, Hermeneutics, and Social Theory (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2008). For a positive evaluation of Grenz’s communion ecclesiology, see Paul S. 
Fiddes, “The Church Local and Universal: Catholic and Baptist Perspectives on Koinonia Ecclesiology,” in 
Revisioning, Renewing, Rediscovering the Triune Center, 97–120. 
47 SGRS, 334 and John D. Zizioulas, “The Doctrine of God the Trinity Today: Suggestions for an 
Ecumenical Study,” in The Forgotten Trinity, 27–8. Emphasis original. 
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beyond simply being “relational.” Instead, Grenz delivers an imago Dei theology that is 
multifaceted, pluriform, and ecclesial in shape.48 The social imago and narrative imago 
point forward towards and intertwine to generate the ecclesial imago. This dynamic for 
Grenz gives rise to the ecclesial self which is constituted within ecclesial relation (or that 
relation which can be named “‘in Christ’ and through the Spirit” by which the church is 
brought into being), having been brought into theotic (storied and communal) 
participation in the divine triune life.  
Within this dynamic the ecclesial community is constituted as the prolepsis of the 
imago Dei and foretaste of the new humanity of the new creation. Thus Grenz’s trinitarian 
theology of the divine image contains vocational, representational, communal (beyond 
just “relational”), and eschatological elements. The ecclesial imago forms a present reality 
shared by all those “in Christ,” a special calling and task for those “in Christ,” and the 
proleptic goal and destiny for all those “in Christ” through the gift of the Spirit. Drawing 
from Grenz’s resulting dynamic understanding of ecclesial existence, I propose that the 
church serves as God’s hermeneutic in the world insofar as it is: 1) the cruciform “storied” 
interpretive community of God, 2) the sign of God’s triune way of being in creation, and 3) 
the sacrament of triune love and communion as it comes to comprise the “human coming-
to-representation of the mutual indwelling of the persons of the Trinity.”49 
 
A Missional Grammar for Hermeneutical Ecclesiology 
The mission of the church is to be the image of God and to carry on the mission of 
God in the world. Thus, the missional vocation of the church is to be the 
community of God, the representative of God in the world. As such, this 
                                                             
48 This seems somewhat contra to David Fergusson, “Humans Created According to the Imago Dei: 
An Alternative Proposal,” Zygon 48.2 (June 2013), 439–53 who, while granting certain advantages to Grenz’s 
approach, still sees him as not moving beyond a “relational” approach. I would venture to suggest that 
Grenz’s imago Dei theology in full view actually takes strides towards answering Fergusson’s concerns about 
views of the divine image based on “a single determining characteristic or essential attribute” and his desire 
for a more “diffuse” approach. See also Anthony Thiselton’s consternation over singularly relational 
approaches to the imago Dei in “The Image and Likeness of God: A Theological Approach,” in The Emergence 
of Personhood: A Quantum Leap?, ed. Malcolm Jeeves (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2015), 184–201, to which 
Grenz offers a positive response. See also chapter two, footnotes 112 and 260 on Grenz’s multi-layered view of 
the imago Dei. 
49 The description of the church as sign, sacrament, and “storied” community is taken from SGRS, 
328–36 (336). 
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community is a particular community, namely, a missional community in keeping 
with the missional character of God.”50 
This statement can be considered a missional positioning of my rendering of the 
ecclesial imago in Grenz. Citing the missional pattern in the words of Jesus in John 20:21 
(NRSV), “As the Father has sent me, so I send you,” John Franke follows the lead of David 
Bosch to ground the missio Dei in the divine triune communion. The dual classical 
movement of the Father sending the Son, and the Father and Son sending the Spirit may 
be extended into yet another movement wherein Father, Son, and Spirit send the church 
into the world to gather others into the triune mission.51 As such the church is “the socially, 
historically, and culturally embodied witness to the gospel of Jesus Christ and the tangible 
expression of the mission of God.”52 The vocation of the church then is to be the 
instrument of the triune God’s mission in the world.53 All this coheres well with Grenz’s 
own exploration of a trinitarian ecclesiology wherein the church derives its essential 
nature from the divine (triune, missional) essence.54 The Christian life, inseparable from 
ecclesial existence within the missio Dei, is to be understood “as a sharing in the trinitarian 
practice of God.”55 
Thus, in a very real sense the missio Dei not only precedes but also initiates, 
defines, and sustains the church. Thus mission does not exist because there is ecclesia; 
rather, there is ecclesial existence because mission exists already in the missional praxis of 
                                                             
50 Franke, The Character of Theology, 174. 
51 David Bosch, Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts in Theology of Mission, Twentieth anniversary 
edition (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2011), 381, 529. Stephen Seamonds states: “God is therefore in his very essence 
a missionary God. The Father is the first missionary, who goes out himself creating the world and sending 
the Son. The Son is the second missionary, who redeems humanity and all creation. The Holy Spirit is the 
third missionary, who creates and empowers the church, the fourth missionary, to go into the world.” 
(Ministry in the Image of God: The Trinitarian Shape of Christian Service (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 2005), 161) 
The dual movements of sending out and drawing in work to create a corresponding dual centripetal and 
centrifugal dynamic. Cf. Fiddes, Participating in God, 75. 
52 Franke, “Afterword: An Agenda for the Future of Evangelical Theology,” in RTC, 362. 
53 Franke, “Afterword,” 363. See also John R. Franke, “Good News for All People: Trinity, Plurality, 
and Mission,” in Revisioning, Renewing, Rediscovering the Triune Center, 59–78. 
54 See for example Grenz, “Restoring a Trinitarian Understanding of the Church in Practice,” 233. 
55 Andrew Purves, “The Trinitarian Basis for a Christian Practical Theology,” International Journal of 
Practical Theology 2.2 (1998), 226, 235. See also Jonathan R. Wilson, Why Church Matters: Worship, Ministry, 
and Mission in Practice (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2006), 49–58 for the trinitarian practice and 
grammar of ecclesial existence and worship. 
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God within and flowing from the triune relations. It is God’s own missional practice, 
grounded in participation in the divine life, that we are invited to participate such that 
missional existence is comprised of “our committed participation, at God’s invitation and 
command, in God’s own mission within the history of God’s world for the redemption of 
God’s creation.”56 Missional existence then implies ecclesial existence, and ecclesial 
existence implies missional existence. Both are necessarily bound up in and inseparable 
from the other. Our ecclesial participation in the triune movement of missional 
community flows from our being “in Christ” through the Holy Spirit, “a relationship that 
allows us to enter into the trinitarian circle and be caught up in the motion of other 
centered love between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit flowing out to the world.”57  
These considerations lead to the conclusion that, in the words of Stanley 
Hauerwas, “the church does not have a mission, but rather is mission.”58 The church as the 
“pilgrim community”59 of the triune God, which in its ecclesial existence in the world 
comprises a “faithful presence,”60 in this view then is essentially missional at its very core.61 
                                                             
56 Christopher J. H. Wright, The Mission of God: Unlocking the Bible’s Grand Narrative (Downers 
Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2006), 23. 
57 Seamonds, Ministry in the Image of God, 162–4. Cf. Wilson, Why Church Matters, 5. See also Ross 
Hastings, Missional God, Missional Church: Hope for Re-evangelizing the West (Downers Grove, IL: IVP 
Academic, 2012) who argues for the missional nature of ecclesial existence through a theological and 
missional reading of the Gospel of John, in particular John 20:19–23.  
58 Hauerwas, “Beyond the Boundaries,” 55. Emphasis original. This statement replicates the similar 
logic in Hauerwas’ statement: “The church doesn’t have a social strategy, the church is a social strategy.” 
(Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1989), 43, emphasis original) See 
also Stanley Hauerwas, “Sent: The Church is Mission,” in Working with Words: On Learning to Speak Christian 
(Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2011), 164–9. 
59 Robert Sherman, Covenant, Community, and the Spirit: A Trinitarian Theology of Church (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2015), 211–23. 
60 The phrase “faithful presence” comes from James Davison Hunter, To Change the World: The 
Irony, Tragedy, and Possibility of Christianity in the Late Modern World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), 197–286 as hopefully descriptive of what I am proposing. Of note is Hunter’s worry that, despite 
protests to the contrary, the neo-Anabaptist ecclesiology of someone like Hauerwas nets a sectarian 
withdrawal in its “sociological effect.” (150–66) But Hauerwas insists, “the church is at her missionary best 
when she does those things that make her a faithful witness to the gospel of Jesus Christ” and that “her first 
missionary task is to be a witness in and to the worlds in which she finds herself. All missionary tasks are in 
that sense local.” (“Beyond the Boundaries,” 57) These statements would seem to mitigate Hunter’s concern. 
That the church is mission necessarily requires faithful witness and presence in the world even if the church 
is still yet not of the world. 
61 Graham Hill, Salt, Light, and a City: Introducing Missional Ecclesiology (Eugene, OR: Wipf and 
Stock, 2012), xvii. David Bosch states: “The missio Dei institutes the missiones ecclesiae.” (Transforming 
Mission, 379–80) And John Thompson reminds us: “As the church belongs to God, is the body of Christ, the 
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Lesslie Newbigin echoes this by also declaring that insofar as the church is the primary 
instrument and vehicle of the activity of the Spirit in the world in the fulfillment of its 
vocation as a foretaste of God’s kingdom on earth, “the church is the mission” and 
embodiment of the missio Dei.62 Newbigin here is suggesting that the reality of the gospel 
of Christ can only become manifest bodily, in a people. So, when faced with the question 
of how the gospel might be credible, he insists “the only hermeneutic of the gospel, is a 
congregation of men and women who believe it and live by it.”63  
With this understanding of a missional ecclesiology of the church as mission in 
place, we can now draw on the nature of ecclesial existence as storied, sacrament, and sign 
and suggest the corresponding triad of “church, gospel/atonement, and kingdom” as 
comprising a missional grammar for hermeneutical ecclesiology. First, insofar as it is a 
cruciform storied community, the church is God’s manner of being known in the world. 
This draws on Grenz’s notion of the church as the interpretive community already 
explored. The storied nature of ecclesial existence though takes on a hermeneutical and 
missional character in two ways. The church is an interpreting and interpreted 
community as it seeks not only to read the norming biblical narrative missionally,64 but as 
it also receives its narrative identity from storied participation and inclusion in the 
cruciform narrative of Christ, who is himself the norming narrative imago. This cruciform 
                                                             
temple of the Holy Spirit, so mission belongs to the very being of the church.” (Modern Trinitarian 
Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 73) 
62 See Lesslie Newbigin, One Body, One Gospel, One World: The Christian Mission Today (London: 
The International Missionary Council, 1958), 42 (emphasis original) and Bosch, Transforming Mission, 379–
80. 
63 Lesslie Newbigin, The Gospel in a Pluralist Society (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1989), 224–35 
(227). See also John G. Flett, “What Does It Mean for a Congregation to Be a Hermeneutic?,” in The Gospel 
and Pluralism Today: Reassessing Lesslie Newbigin in the 21st Century, eds. Scott W. Sunquist and Amos Yong 
(Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2015), 195–213; Jeppe Bach Nikolajsen, The Distinctive Identity of the 
Church: A Constructive Study of the Post-Christendom Theologies of Lesslie Newbigin and John Howard Yoder 
(Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2015), 15–6, 18, 63, 67, 76, 79, 181; and Jason S. Sexton, “A Confessing 
Trinitarian Theology for Today’s Mission,” in Advancing Trinitarian Theology, 179–89. 
64 For two proposals of “missional hermeneutics” in the reading of the biblical narrative, see Wright, 
The Mission of God as well as Dean Flemming, Recovering the Full Mission of God: A Biblical Perspective on 
Being, Doing, and Telling (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2013). See also the implication in N. T. Wright, 
“Paul and Missional Hermeneutics,” in The Apostle Paul and the Christian Life: Ethical and Missional 
Implications of the New Perspective, eds. Scot McKnight and Joseph B. Modica (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Academic, 2016), 184–5, 190–2 that “missional hermeneutics” in Pauline theology is necessarily ecclesial in 
shape and character. 
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storied ecclesial existence constituted by the Christoform incarnational union of the 
divinity and humanity of Christ, and the following after Christ as its very paradigm for 
mission, forms the hermeneutic of God’s way of being in the world.65 
 Second, the ecclesial community is a sacrament of triune love as it is constituted 
as the “community called atonement”66 which, within the mode of its ecclesial existence, 
becomes the embodiment of the gospel.67 Important here is a lecture by Grenz titled 
“What Does It Mean to Be Trinitarians?” This essay contains the same trinitarian, 
Christological, and ecclesial emphasis connected to his imago Dei anthropology and 
theology of theotic triune participation, wherein believers share in Christ’s filial 
relationship and inheritance from the Father by the mediation of the Spirit, which has 
already been explored within this study. Of significance in this essay is Grenz’s explicit 
linking of theosis to soteriology. Citing Athanasius and John of Damascus, Grenz pictures 
“salvation as participation in the divine life or glory (2 Peter 1:3–4), a perspective often 
denoted ‘deification’ (theosis).”68 Following his connection of atonement, salvation, and 
                                                             
65 On Jesus as the paradigm of mission, see Darrin W. Snyder Belousek, Atonement, Justice, and 
Peace: The Message of the Cross and the Mission of the Church (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012), 614–15, 
630–42 and Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament, 208–9. See also Gregory J. Liston’s exploration of a 
Chalcedonian and Christological third article ecclesiology. Liston states: “the church is revealed as being 
tripartite in nature (the pneumatological union between Christ and church), relational in identity, unique in 
context, Christ-centered in orientation with a Christotelic momentum, indivisible in constitution, cruciform 
in shape, missional in purpose, and narrative in character.” (The Anointed Church: Toward a Third Article 
Ecclesiology (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2015), 123–4) See as well David E. Fitch and Geoffrey Holsclaw, 
“Mission amid Empire: Relating Trinity, Mission, and Political Formation,” Missiology: An International 
Review 41.4 (2013), 396–9 for an “incarnation-centered view of mission” described in part as the church’s 
“participation and discernment of the kingdom by neither blending in nor remaining separate from the 
world. God’s reign is manifest in the midst of the church as a foretaste of what is to come in the world. It can 
do this because in a real sense the church precedes the world epistemologically.” (399) 
66 This phrase comes from McKnight, A Community Called Atonement. 
67 See Michael J. Gorman, Becoming the Gospel: Paul, Participation and Mission (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2015) on the church as the cruciform embodiment of the gospel (in particular 297–305). On 
sacramental ecclesiology, see also Ellen T. Charry, “Sacramental Ecclesiology,” in The Community of the Word: 
Toward an Evangelical Ecclesiology, eds. Mark Husbands and Daniel J. Treier (Downers Grove, IL: IVP 
Academic, 2005), 201–16. 
68 Grenz, “What Does It Mean to Be Trinitarians?,” 15–20 (16). Though not explicit in Grenz here, we 
may also reference the patristic emphasis on Christ’s act of “recapitulating” all of humanity and thus drawing 
humanity into union with the triune God (and so completing the divine triune intent and vocation of 
humanity) stemming from the Athanasian and Irenaean soteriological formula “The Word was made man in 
order that we might be made divine” (16) as closely linked to theosis. On recapitulation and theosis and the 
Christological dynamic of “identification for incorporation,” see McKnight, A Community Called Atonement, 
100–14. 
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theosis, he then moves further to connect the life of the church (i.e. ecclesial existence) 
within the reality of theotic triune participation.69 Extending this development, we can 
further say that as the church is a sacrament of triune love and communion in the mode of 
its ecclesial existence constituted “in Christ” and through the Spirit (i.e., through ecclesial 
relation), it forms the bodily expression of the gospel. Theosis then is marked out 
simultaneously as being Christosis, and cruciformity as comprising theo-formity.70 
Through this theotic (storied and communal) participation in the divine life, the ecclesial 
existence of the community called atonement is as well a hermeneutical existence, as it 
comes to comprise the triune God’s manner of being known in the world.71 
Third, the church in its embodied hermeneutical ecclesial existence in the world is 
the sign of God’s kingdom. Here we pick up the theme of the kingdom of God which, while 
more readily present in Grenz’s earlier theology, dropped out over time.72 In Beyond 
Foundationalism he finds the kingdom theme too generic to challenge modernist 
individualism. Moreover, Grenz avers that the theme of community is a more central 
integrative motif.73 But while deemphasized, the kingdom theme did not disappear 
altogether, remaining implicit within his eschatological motif. However, recent 
developments in gospel studies in relation to the kingdom of God provide an occasion for 
                                                             
69 Grenz, “What Does It Mean to Be Trinitarians?,” 19–20. 
70 See Michael J. Gorman, “The Cross in Paul: Christophany, Theophany, Ecclesiophany,” in Ecclesia 
and Ethics, 21–40 and Ben C. Blackwell, Christosis: Pauline Soteriology in Light of Deification in Irenaeus and 
Cyril of Alexandria (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011). Gorman likewise suggests theotic triune participation, or 
what he calls cruciform theosis, also holds together ecclesial “act and being” and that “Spirit-enabled 
transformative participation in the life and character of [the triune] God revealed in the crucified and 
resurrected Messiah Jesus – is the starting point for mission and is, in fact, its proper theological framework.” 
(Becoming the Gospel, 5) 
71 Connected to this approach to the atonement, important are recent explorations of the doctrine 
of justification which move beyond a mere forensic, declarative sense to include unitive, communal, and 
participative dimensions. For a unitive view, see James W. Thompson, The Church According to Paul: 
Rediscovering the Community Conformed to Christ (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2014), 127–50. For 
accounts of justification with reference to (cruciform) theosis/deification, see Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, One 
with God: Salvation as Deification and Justification (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2004); Gorman, 
Inhabiting the Cruciform God, 40–104; and Gorman, Becoming the Gospel, 217–60, 277–89. We do well, 
though, to remember that while the forensic, declarative aspect can be decentered it cannot be totally 
displaced. See for example McKnight, A Community Called Atonement, 64–9, 71, 76, 90–9. 
72 See for example Stanley J. Grenz, Prayer: The Cry for the Kingdom, Revised edition (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 2005), originally published in 1988, and TCG, 22–3, 107, 260, 333, 472–9, 502, 605.  
73 BF, 234–5. 
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reemphasis.74 Scot McKnight is a biblical scholar who has been on the forefront in the 
articulation of a kingdom vision of the gospel centered on Jesus as the Messiah and true 
King. Herein, the gospel proper refers to the proclamation of the overarching story of the 
Old Testament coming to fulfillment in the whole story of Jesus. Or to put it another way, 
the gospel itself is the story of King Jesus, who in his very person is the arrival of the 
kingdom, Messiah, and Lord of all.75  
It is in this incarnational capacity that Jesus is “our new Adam through his whole 
life,”76 and that within his faithfulness as the truly human norming narrative imago he 
comes to recapitulate the story of humanity and enact the ecclesially shaped ethics of the 
kingdom.77 The emphasis on the whole life of Jesus is important, for it forms the narrative 
indication that the incarnation is not limited to simply birth, death, or resurrection, but 
includes all these together in a single story ultimately leading to the enthronement of 
Christ in the ascension.78 It is through the proclamation of the narrative of King Jesus and 
this gospel of the kingdom by which the church is called into being in the power of the 
Spirit.79 And though not representing the kingdom in all its fullness, the church’s “mission 
                                                             
74 Jonathan T. Pennington states: “the ‘gospel,’ whether in oral or written form, is the message of 
God’s comprehensively restorative kingdom.” (Reading the Gospels Wisely: A Narrative and Theological 
Introduction (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2012), 3–18 (18)) 
75 Scot McKnight, “Atonement and the Gospel,” in Church in the Present Tense: A Candid Look at 
What’s Emerging, ed. Kevin J. Corcoran (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2011), 123–140 and McKnight, “The 
Gospel,” in The Oxford Handbook of Evangelical Theology, ed. Gerald R. McDermott (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 195–208. On the connection of gospel to kingdom, see N. T. Wright, What Saint Paul 
Really Said: Was Paul of Tarsus the Real Founder of Christianity (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997), 39–62 
and N. T. Wright, “Imagining the Kingdom: Mission and Theology in Early Christianity,” Scottish Journal of 
Theology 65.4 (November 2012), 379–401. See also Joshua W. Jipp, Christ is King: Paul’s Royal Ideology 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2015). 
76 Cherith Fee Nordling, “‘Living as Jesus Did’: Practicing an Embodied Future in the Present,” in 
Revisioning, Renewing, Rediscovering the Triune Center, 199. Emphasis original. 
77 On the essential connection of gospel, kingdom, and an embodied ecclesial people, see Scot 
McKnight, Kingdom Conspiracy: Returning to the Radical Mission of the Local Church (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Brazos Press, 2014), 81–124, 205–9. See also Padilla, “The Mission of the Church in Light of the Kingdom of 
God,” 17 who states: “The Church is not the Kingdom of God, but it is the concrete result of the Kingdom.” 
See also RET, 181–2 and TCG, 478–9. On the pistou Christou debate, see Morna D. Hooker, “Another Look at 
Pistis Christou,” Scottish Journal of Theology 69.1 (February 2016), 46–62, for whom the phrase refers primarily 
to the “faith/faithfulness of Christ,” but also discerns a dimension shared by all those “in Christ.” 
78 For the connection of ascension and incarnation, see Fitch and Holsclaw, “Mission amid Empire,” 
396. For a full study on the connection of the ascension and church, see Douglas Farrow, Ascension and 
Ecclesia: On the Significance of the Doctrine of the Ascension for Ecclesiology and Cosmology (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1999). 
79 See this in McKnight, Kingdom Conspiracy, 104–6. 
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imperative” is nevertheless “to be the community of God’s kingdom and therefore, in its 
corporate life together, make God’s kingdom visible.”80 It is the narrative quality of the 
“apocalyptic” kingdom revealed in the living, dying, rising, and ascending of Jesus that 
gives aesthetic shape to the mission of God’s people and ecclesial participation in the 
saving reign of King Jesus.81 And because salvation itself is ecclesial, the church does not 
simply have a mission, “but by being faithful to the gospel the church is mission.”82 
Constituted by theotic (storied and communal) triune participation as the sign of the 
kingdom, the ecclesial and missional existence of God’s people as a faithful presence is 
itself hermeneutical, comprising the vocational coming-to-representation of the triune 
God’s cruciform manner of being known in the world. 
 
Critical Detour: The Ecclesial Self, Missio-Anthropology, and the Imago Dei 
 With the conclusion of the previous section, we have completed the “main road” 
for this chapter and extended the Grenzian social imago and narrative imago into the 
ecclesial imago. After the summary of Grenz’s ecclesiology and the constitution of 
ecclesial existence by means of triune theotic (storied and communal) participation, the 
triad of church, gospel/atonement, and kingdom was proposed as forming a missional 
grammar for the articulation of a hermeneutical ecclesiology. This chapter is working 
towards the concrete outworking of the ecclesial imago in mutual hospitality and 
friendship within the ecclesial relation of “male and female.” Ahead of that though, we 
conduct in three parts the last critical detour. The first part asks whether Grenz lapses into 
an ecclesiological foundationalism. The second explores Ricoeur’s notion of the 
“summoned self” as a critical supplementation to the Grenzian ecclesial self. The last 
                                                             
80 Andrew Picard, “Be the Community: Baptist Ecclesiology in the Context of the Missional 
Church,” Pacific Journal of Baptist Research 5.1 (April 2009), 67. Emphasis original. See also Wilson, Why 
Church Matters, 79. 
81 See Jonathan R. Wilson, “Aesthetics and the Kingdom: Apocalypsis, Eschatos, and Vision for 
Christian Mission,” in Revisioning, Renewing, Rediscovering the Triune Center, 157–74 and Wilson, Why 
Church Matters, 79–81, 84–8, 92–9, 116–31, 139–40. For a study of the church as participating in the triumph 
and reign of God, see Timothy G. Gombis, The Drama of Ephesians: Participating in the Triumph of God 
(Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2010). See also Morna D. Hooker, “Conformity to Christ,” Theology 116.2 
(2013), 83–92. 
82 Hauerwas, “Beyond the Boundaries,” 62. Emphasis original. 
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expands the prior theo-anthropology and Christ-anthropology into a missio-anthropology 
as the pathway into the discussion of the ecclesial imago, gender, friendship, and 
hospitality. 
 
Grenz and the Question of Ecclesiological Foundationalism 
 In the discussion of the critiques of the social Trinity, it was discovered that none 
of the most prominent critiques mention Grenz directly. This situation is reversed, though, 
in a recent essay written “On the Very Idea of a Trinitarian System” by Kevin Vanhoozer.83 
In part, this essay offers an analysis of Grenz’s trinitarian methodology. Vanhoozer begins 
his investigation with a taxonomy of three variations of trinitarian theological method. 
The first are those “weak” theological systems which affirm Nicene orthodoxy but simply 
treat the Trinity as one doctrine among many and accord it minimal or no methodological 
weight. The second is what he terms “reductionist” or “radical” trinitarianism which makes 
the mistake of distilling the complexity of the Trinity into a single principle. The third type 
Vanhoozer calls “strong” trinitarianism, of which he commends his own exploration of 
the0-dramatic trinitarian communicative action as an exemplar.84 Prior to this essay, 
Vanhoozer had already voiced his misgivings concerning appeals to trinitarian perichoresis 
as paradigmatic for human relations in his Remythologizing Theology. In a manner similar 
to the charge of projection from Kilby and Tanner, Vanhoozer refers to such as 
“illegitimate trinitarian transfer,”85 which he positions as a characteristic of radical or 
reductionist trinitarianism, and contends such a move threatens to undermine the 
                                                             
83 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, “Three (or More) Ways of Triangulating Theology: On the Very Idea of a 
Trinitarian System,” in Revisioning, Renewing, Rediscovering the Triune Center, 31–58. See also Vanhoozer’s 
earlier essay, “On the Very Idea of a Theological System: An Essay in Aid of Triangulating Scripture, Church, 
and World,” in Always Reforming: Explorations in Systematic Theology, ed. A. T. B. McGowan (Downers 
Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2006), 125–82 which offers a similar analysis of Grenz’s postmodern, 
postfoundationalist epistemology. 
84 Vanhoozer, “Three (or More) Ways of Triangulating Theology,” 32–3, 50–6. 
85 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology: Divine Action, Passion, and Authorship 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 150 and Vanhoozer, “Three (or More) Ways of Triangulating 
Theology,” 42. Vanhoozer’s “illegitimate trinitarian transfer” is akin to what Bruce L. McCormack, “What’s at 
Stake in Current Debates over Justification? The Crisis of Protestantism in the West,” in Justification: What’s 
at Stake in the Current Debates, eds. Mark Husbands and Daniel J. Treier (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 
2004), 111 laments as “creeping perichoresis.” 
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ontological distinction between God and humanity.86 But according to Vanhoozer, is 
Grenz himself a radical reductionist? 
 Vanhoozer notes the two triads developed by Grenz in his theological method; the 
focal motifs of Trinity, community, and eschatology and the sources of Scripture, tradition, 
and culture. He then surveys several important Grenzian features, such as the centrality of 
the Trinity; the importance of community such that “all Christian theology is 
communitarian;”87 the nature of the church as the proleptic, eschatological community 
that is nothing less than the shared participation in the perichoretic community of 
trinitartian persons; and Grenz’s reading of the imago Dei, which Vanhoozer sums up, 
saying, “In short: trinitarian theology entails relational anthropology.”88 Ultimately, 
Vanhoozer fears that Grenz’s version of the social Trinity is in fact a reduced Trinity. 
Despite Grenz’s specific development of the Trinity as his structural motif, Vanhoozer 
contends that it is really the idea of community that functions as Grenz’s material 
principle. So instead of the divine triune communion defining community, Vanhoozer 
asserts that, to the contrary, community defines the Trinity for Grenz. As well, community 
is said to attain the position of “first theology” such that the relational meaning of the 
Trinity becomes abstracted from the doctrine itself in order to fund the imago Dei. Thus 
Vanhoozer concludes that Grenz evinces a reductionist trinitarianism and presumably has 
fallen prey to illegitimate trinitarian transfer.89 
The critique Vanhoozer makes of perichoretic trinitarian proposals in general and 
Grenz in particular not only closely mirrors the concerns of the social trinitarian critics 
discussed previously but is also more intensive. Anyone deemed to have a purportedly 
overly relational take on the Trinity seems suspect. Not only do the usual suspects such as 
Jürgen Moltmann and Miroslav Volf garner the expected charges of reductionism, but the 
trinitarian onto-relational approach of T. F. Torrance is also feared to skate the thin edge 
of reductionism.90 Needed in Vanhoozer’s discussion, though, is a more extensive 
                                                             
86 Vanhoozer, “Three (or More) Ways of Triangulating Theology,” 42. 
87 Vanhoozer, “Three (or More) Ways of Triangulating Theology,” 47. 
88 Vanhoozer, “Three (or More) Ways of Triangulating Theology,” 48. 
89 Vanhoozer, “Three (or More) Ways of Triangulating Theology,” 33, 45–50, 52, 54. 
90 Vanhoozer, “Three (or More) Ways of Triangulating Theology,” 41–2, 52. 
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investigation of the Trinity proper as Grenz’s structural motif, forming as it does the crux 
of Grenz’s theology. Also advisable would be to note the combination of divine 
transcendence and a doctrine of creation that upholds the Creator/created distinction in 
the God-world relationship, while not rending it asunder either. But perhaps the most 
regrettable aspect of Vanhoozer’s discussion is that his critique of Grenz gives little to no 
space to Grenz’s mature revisioning of social trinitarian thought as found in Social God 
and continued on through Named God, the Grenz Grundaxiom identified by Jason Sexton, 
the close relation of Christology to Grenz’s trinitarian theology, or the theo-ontology at the 
heart of Named God.91  
However, these concerns are noted only briefly as matters previously discussed in 
order to move to the potential ecclesiological fallout. The implications from Vanhoozer’s 
critique stem from the charge of communitarian reductionism combined with what 
Vanhoozer observes as the “basicality” of the church in Grenz’s theology.92 Implicit within 
the contention that Grenz has moved the theme of community to the place of first 
theology and material principle is the charge of an ecclesiological or communitarian 
foundationalism. Thus it is the ecclesial community, or even worse, an abstracted notion 
of community in general that drives Grenz’s theology, not the Trinity itself. This charge 
would mean that Grenz lapses into what amounts to a communitarian onto-theology.93 
We may also add here the concerns of James K. A. Smith, who worries of a residual 
correlationalism in regards to Grenz’s approach to postmodern culture. Although 
mentioning the explicit rejection by Grenz of a “sociological foundationalism of 
community”94 in his 2003 “Ecclesiology” essay, Smith still expresses concern that Grenz 
                                                             
91 Because of these omissions, Vanhoozer also neglects any consideration of the role of theotic 
triune participation within Grenz’s trinitarian theology and ecclesiology. That he does not mention the 
Grenz Grundaxiom is also a missed opportunity given that he cites awareness of Sexton’s connected work on 
Grenz’s imago Dei theology. As well, the lack of engagement with NGQB is curious given Vanhoozer’s 
sympathetic use of it in Remythologizing Theology, 13, 44, 86, 99. 
92 Vanhoozer, “Three (or More) Ways of Triangulating Theology,” 47. 
93 The validity of this conclusion can be seen in that Vanhoozer’s “illegitimate trinitarian transfer” is 
a feature of what he labels “kenotic-perichoretic relational ontotheology.” (Remythologizing Theology, 31, 
emphasis mine) 
94 Grenz, “Ecclesiology,” 258. See also BF, 226–7. 
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evinces a lingering correlationalism that places him at risk of succumbing to an 
ecclesiological foundationalism.95 
Concerns regarding an ecclesial foundationalism can again be seen to mirror 
closely the charges of sociological projectionism from the social trinitarian critics 
discussed in the second chapter. From that discussion we found that Grenz has ample 
resources in his earlier theology up through Social God for deflecting the projectionist 
charge (and with it concerns about ecclesial foundationalism). However, this becomes 
even more evident when Grenz’s mature trinitarian theo-ontology (versus onto-theology) 
found in Named God is taken into account, which we found serves to strengthen (rather 
than move beyond) his social trinitarian theology. The consistent witness of Grenz’s 
theological method is that the triune fullness serves as the transcendent ground, not only 
for the theological task in general, but the constitution of the church in particular. Thus 
we can note that in the flow of Grenz’s trinitarian ecclesiology, the notion of perichoresis 
denotes not human sociality projected back onto the triune communion, but first and 
foremost the eternal and self-sustaining relations of Father, Son, and Spirit.  
Following on from this, the activity of the triune God in the world “in Christ” and 
through the Spirit calls the church into being by means of ecclesial relation, wherein the 
ecclesial community is brought into theotic (storied and communal) triune participation 
in the divine life. Within this dynamic the notion of perichoretic participation denotes not 
only the character and source of ecclesial relation as it is constituted “in Christ” and 
through the Spirit, but the complete human contingency and dependence upon the 
perichoretic triune relations for this invited theotic participation even to exist or be 
sustained. Not only this, but Grenz’s notion of the church as an eschatological community 
                                                             
95 Smith, Who’s Afraid of Postmodernism?, 125. Interestingly, in a 2003 essay, Vanhoozer comments 
that while Grenz “correlates” with postmodernism, he does not “capitulate” to it. (“Evangelicalism and the 
Church: The Company of the Gospel,” in The Futures of Evangelicalism: Issues and Prospects, eds. Craig 
Bartholomew, Robin Parry, and Andrew West (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 2003), 67) But in this most recent 
essay, Vanhoozer suggests rather that Grenz “coordinates gospel and culture in a dynamic conversation” and 
neither “contextualizes not correlates” but “triangulates” (“Three (or More) Ways of Triangulating Theology,” 
49–50), though Vanhoozer admittedly prefers his own method of triangulation to Grenz’s (53–5). Grenz 
himself voices concerns that both correlationists and contextualizers risk lapses into foundationalism. (BF, 
152–8) 
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also guards against ecclesial onto-theology and foundationalism. It is true that the 
positioning of the church as the interpretive storied community or the church as mission 
renders ecclesial existence in a certain sense “basic.”96 Nevertheless, the distinctly 
eschatological character of the church as the proleptic sign of the kingdom and sacrament 
of triune love and communion serves to give testimony to the equally decentered and 
dependent nature of ecclesial existence on the triune God. These considerations not only 
protect Grenz against charges of projectionism but mitigate against worries of 
ecclesiological foundationalism. 
 
Grenz, Ricoeur, and the Summoned Self 
 As was emphasized above, Grenz’s trinitarian imago Dei theology is necessarily 
pluriform. Though containing a relational emphasis, it presses beyond that with a 
narrative nuance as well as a communal character. We discussed in this chapter how the 
social imago and narrative imago intertwine towards the realization of the fully communal 
ecclesial self and ecclesial imago. Endemic to Grenz’s ecclesial vision is the imago Dei itself 
as a vocation of human identity that is at once a creational and Christological reality that 
points forward to the goal of eschatological consummation.97 Indeed, as Henri de Lubac 
states, “the church is nothing else than humanity itself, enlivened, unified by the Spirit of 
Christ.”98 The hermeneutical instantiation of the divine image in its ecclesial vocation, 
described by Grenz as a “coming-to-representation,” is well summed up in the phrase 
                                                             
96 See BF, 232–4 on the dialectical manner in which the church both is and is not “basic,” in a way 
that avoids the charge of foundationalism. Curiously, Vanhoozer himself grants Grenz’s version of the “non-
foundational basicality of the church” in “Evangelicalism and the Church,” 68. Emphasis mine. 
97 See Grenz’s vocational emphasis in SGRS, xi, 168, 202, 208, 323, 336 and NGQB, 360–73. See Paul 
Sands, “The Imago Dei as Vocation,” Evangelical Quarterly 82.1 (2010), 28–41 for a vocational approach 
offered, in part, as an alternative to relational approaches (of which Grenz is a representative for him), even 
while neglecting Grenz’s own specific emphasis on vocation. For a full length theological interpretation of 
the imago Dei as a vocation of human identity, see Ryan S. Peterson, The Imago Dei as Human Identity: A 
Theological Interpretation, Journal of Theological Interpretation, Supplement 14 (Winona Lake, IN: 
Eisenbrauns, 2016). See also Daniel J. Treier, Introducing Theological Interpretation of Scripture: Recovering a 
Christian Practice (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008), 70–7, 188–99. 
98 Henri de Lubac, Catholicism: Christ and the Common Destiny of Man (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius 
Press, 1988), 279. This is an expression of de Lubac’s view of the church as totus Christus. While Christ and his 
kingdom are never without Christ’s body (the church), the relation of church to Christ is best nuanced as an 
indirect identity, so as to maintain the Lordship and headship of Christ in the Spirit over the church. See also 
Liston’s description of the church as “the sequel to the incarnation.” (The Anointed Church, 85–90) 
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“representing God to others and others to God.”99 This hermeneutical vocation oriented 
toward its Christological and eschatological goal exists as a beckoning, a calling, or – to 
draw on Ricoeur’s language – a summons. In an essay titled “The Summoned Subject in 
the School of the Narratives of the Prophetic Vocation,” he speaks of a “mandated self” 
and/or a “summoned self” in which the call of God is manifest through the conscience.100 
 A danger lurks in that the conscience can quickly be reduced to barest levels of 
individualism, but Ricoeur’s hermeneutical philosophy, as we have seen, works against 
this in a strong manner. Any conception of a completed subject independent of or prior to 
either sociality or narrative is an illusion for Ricoeur.101 Ricoeur’s development of his 
wounded cogito resists in both directions the self-containment and self-sufficiency of the 
Cartesian cogito and the Nietzschean “shattered” cogito alike.102 The self in Ricoeur’s view 
then receives no threat from essential relation as with the modern self. And neither does it 
encounter dissolution or scattering within social embeddedness as with much radical 
postmodern thought. Rather, Ricoeur’s hermeneutical self is validated and constituted in 
relation to both human “others” and ultimately the transcendent Divine Other.103 For this 
reason, neither relationality nor narrative are extraneous to the self’s identity, for the 
relational self is intrinsically a narrative self and narrative emplotment occurs only within 
irreducible relation to others. 
                                                             
99 SGRS, 336. The latter quote is borrowed from the sub-title of MacDonald, Re-Imagining Election: 
Divine Election as Representing God to Others and Others to God. See 88, 90–1, 97, 117, 119–24, 126, 133, 137, 139–
41, 166 for her sympathetic critique of Grenz. McDonald worries that while Grenz rescues the self from an 
inward turn, he still succumbs to an ecclesial inward turn (126) and an idealistic realized eschatology 
incommensurate with the church’s existence in wider society (133). Aside from my extension of Grenz’s 
ecclesiology of the church as mission (wherein Father, Son, and Spirit send the church into the world to 
gather others into the triune mission) within this chapter, her concerns could also be mitigated by greater 
attention to Grenz’s own statement of church and mission in his “Ecclesiology” essay (not mentioned by 
McDonald); his discussion of the church in outward witness in TCG, 502–10 and CFC, 185–9 (likewise not 
mentioned); and the church as the sacrament of “God’s way of being in creation,” and “visible sign” in the 
world in SGRS (336, emphasis mine, and see discussion above). 
100 Paul Ricoeur, “The Summoned Subject in the School of the Narratives of the Prophetic Vocation,” 
in Figuring the Sacred, 262–75. This essay along with Paul Ricoeur, “The Self in the Mirror of the Scriptures,” 
trans. David Pellauer, in The Whole and Divided Self, eds. David E. Aune and John McCarthy (New York, NY: 
Crossroad, 1997), 201–20 are the two Gifford studies omitted from Oneself as Another.  
101 See Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 161–78 and Thiselton, “The Image and Likeness of God,” 192–3. 
102 Ricoeur, “The Question of the Subject,” 243 and Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 4–23. See also 
Blundell, Paul Ricoeur between Theology and Philosophy, 95–7, 126–7. 
103 Stiver, Theology After Ricoeur, 168, 177–8.  
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 Regarding the relation of the self to the other in Ricoeur, we should note again his 
engagement with Lévinas. In Ricoeur’s argument towards viewing “oneself as another,” 
one can see that he takes seriously Lévinas’ responsibility toward the other as developed 
in Otherwise than Being and Totality and Infinity.104 Nevertheless, Ricoeur regards Lévinas’ 
conception of the self in relation to the other as too totalizing, too hyperbolic, too 
dissymmetrical, and too passive. This dynamic seems to squeeze out any space for the 
mutual recognition and solicitude relationally conceived within what Ricoeur calls the 
“reciprocity of friendship.”105 Blundell observes that, from a Ricoeurian perspective, at issue 
is the danger wherein the “other becomes an external master through the injunction 
forced upon the self by the other’s face.”106 Ricoeur pushes back against the reduction of 
the self to mere passivity, stating in rather terse fashion that Lévinas employs hyperbole 
“to the point of paroxysm.”107 Contrary to Lévinas, Blundell continues: “Ricoeur contends 
that there is no conflict between the self moving toward the other and the other moving 
toward the self. . . . In recognizing the other as a self, I am able to absorb the other’s regard 
of me.”108 Thus, while the summoned self in Ricoeur may be a wounded cogito, it is 
nevertheless a self capable of ethical relation and response to summons, whether human 
or divine.109 
                                                             
104 See also the discussion in chapter two, “Grenz, Ricoeur, and the Relational Self.” 
105 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 296. Ricoeur states further concerning recognition and solicitude, 
“Recognition is a structure on the movement that carries self-esteem toward solicitude and solicitude 
toward justice.” (296) Blundell also comments: “The key to recognition is solicitude, the open regard for the 
other within the context of the ethical aim.” (Paul Ricoeur between Theology and Philosophy, 125, emphasis 
original) 
106 Blundell, Paul Ricoeur between Theology and Philosophy, 124. For other discussions of Ricoeur in 
relation to Lévinas, see Ford, Self and Salvation, 82–104; Mark I. Wallace, “The Summoned Self: Ethics and 
Hermeneutics in Paul Ricoeur in Dialogue with Emmanuel Lévinas,” in Paul Ricoeur and Contemporary 
Moral Thought, eds. John Wall, William Schweiker, and W. David Hall (New York, NY: Routledge, 2002), 80–
93; Howard Ira Einsohn, “The Summoned Self Under Seige: Shaw, Ricoeur, and the Poetics of Personhood in 
Too Good to be True,” Shaw: The Annual of Bernard Shaw Studies 28 (2008), 112–36; and Michael Sohn, The 
Good of Recognition: Phenomenology, Ethics, and Religion in the Thought of Lévinas and Ricoeur (Waco, TX: 
Baylor University Press, 2014). 
107 For this assessment, see Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 332–41 (338). See also Thiselton, “The Image 
and Likeness of God,” 193. 
108 Blundell, Paul Ricoeur between Theology and Philosophy, 124–5. See also Ricoeur, Oneself as 
Another, 295–6, 340–1. Blundell further comments: “Only in the act of regarding the other’s regard for me can 
I esteem my self as an Other.” (125, emphasis original) 
109 See also Jens Zimmermann, Recovering Theological Interpretation: An Incarnational-Trinitarian 
Theory of Interpretation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004), 7 who states that “Hermeneutics is all 
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 In his essay on the “summoned subject,” Ricoeur discusses the manner in which 
the self arises in response to divine calling and summons.110 Ricoeur is true to form in 
specifying straightaway that there is no sense in which the self somehow posits itself. 
Rather, the self that responds is “a self in relation, without being an absolute self – that is, 
outside any relatedness and in this sense the foundation of every relation.”111 This is a self 
described within the “hermeneutics of the ‘I am,’” as “already a self in relation” and 
therefore “a self in the position of respondent.”112 It is herein that we find a remarkable 
congruence between Ricoeur’s summoned self and Grenz’s ecclesial self. Ricoeur presents 
a discussion of the way the self is brought into being through a commissioning from 
engagement with the “prophetic call” and within engagement with the prophetic tradition 
in the biblical narrative.113 Subsequently, he treats Augustine’s notion of the “inner teacher” 
which gives way for Ricoeur to the “testimony of the conscience.”114  
Placed in between these discussions is a middle section in which he orients his 
proposal Christologically. Ricoeur states unambiguously that the summoned self here is 
called to “conformity to the image of Christ” and declares that the Apostle Paul forged “the 
central metaphor of the Christian self as christomorphic, that is, the image of the image 
par excellence.”115 Elsewhere Ricoeur discussed in close relation a two-part testimony 
which calls forth the outward witness of the Christian; namely, the dual testimony of 
Christ and the Holy Spirit.116 Especially in Ricoeur’s description of the summoned self as 
“christomorphic” and unable to found itself, we have come very near to our previous 
                                                             
about self-knowledge, and self-knowledge is impossible without knowledge of [and, we might add, relation 
to] God.” 
110 For discussions, see Stiver, Theology After Ricoeur, 186, 217, 234–8 and Stiver, Ricoeur and 
Theology, 158–64. 
111 Ricoeur, “The Summoned Subject,” 262. 
112 Ricoeur, “The Summoned Subject,” 262. 
113 Ricoeur, “The Summoned Subject,” 263–7. 
114 Ricoeur, “The Summoned Subject,” 268–75. Augustine, The Teacher, in Augustine: Earlier 
Writings, ed./trans. J. H. S. Burleigh (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1953), 69–101. 
115 Ricoeur, “The Summoned Subject,” 267–8, 274–5. 
116 Paul Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutics of Testimony,” in Essays on Biblical Interpretation, 138–9. See 
also Ricoeur, “Toward a Hermeneutic of the Idea of Revelation,” 93. Brian Gregor, referencing Matthew 16:24, 
further states that most pertinent for the interpretation of the cruciform self is “the call of Christ: take up 
your cross and follow after me . . . the self is called to gather itself up beneath the cross and follow after 
Christ.” (A Philosophical Anthropology of the Cross, 145) 
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discussion of Grenz’s ecclesial self in cruciform shape. Herein is the call of Jesus that 
“unless one forfeits oneself one cannot discover genuine [ecclesial] selfhood.”117 Here the 
ex-centricity of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics meets the outward oriented eccentricity of 
ecclesial existence as it is called into being “in Christ” and through the Spirit. Here the 
summoned self blossoms fully into the ecclesial self by means of triune theotic (storied 
and communal) participation and in ecclesial relation in which love of neighbor and love 
of God are bound together. True to Ricoeur and Grenz we can say: “My neighbor obliges 
me because he or she is the presence to me of the appointment and vocation of [the 
triune] God.”118 It is the hermeneutics of the summoned and ecclesial self that gives rise to 
the Christomorphic eccentricity of cruciform ecclesial existence itself as mission in which 
the triune God is represented to others and others to God.119 
 
Culture, Church, and Missio-Anthropology 
 The now vast amount of literature concerning theology of mission is replete with 
descriptions of the church in an era variously described as “post-Constantinian,” “post-
Christendom,” and “post-Christian.”120 In this cultural context the church finds itself 
regarded with indifference or perhaps even outright hostility. Some scholars therefore 
seek to apply the metaphor of exile to the shape of ecclesial existence in the world and 
culture at large.121 I find myself largely sympathetic to the notion of the church as exilic, 
                                                             
117 Wallace, “The Summoned Self,” 92. Cf. Matthew 10:38–39; 16:24–26. 
118 John Webster, “The Human Person,” in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology, 233. 
Emphasis original. Cf. Mark 12:29–31. We may note here not only a dynamic of hermeneutical obligation but 
one of understanding as well, seen within the act of the hermeneutical love of understanding one’s neighbor 
as oneself. Herein the ability (or inability) to understand texts mirrors our ability (or inability) to understand 
and love neighbors. See Merold Westphal’s description in Whose Community? Which Interpretation? 
Philosophical Hermeneutics for the Church (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2009), 135–46 of the church 
as “conversation” with the hermeneutical virtue of listening. Ecclesial hermeneutics is thus not only 
“political” but practical. 
119 I suggest the combination of Grenz and Ricoeur provides valuable narrative and communal 
resources for the revisioning and refiguring of believer priesthood in a fully ecclesial (and thus communal 
versus individualistic) mode. 
120 See Eddie Gibbs, The Rebirth of the Church: Applying Paul’s Vision for Ministry in Our Post-
Christian World (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2013), 3–30 and Brian Stone, Evangelism after 
Christendom: The Theology and Practice of Christian Witness (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2007), 111–70. 
121 See James Thompson, The Church According to Paul, 243–8 and Lee Beach, The Church in Exile: 
Living in Hope after Christendom (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2015). 
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however, for the purposes of this study I will simply note this briefly in order to hone in on 
a problematic close to heart of Grenz’s corpus and ecclesiology. The milieu known as post-
Christendom is intrinsically connected to the phenomenon known as postmodernism, 
which in turn sits very close to the central and strategic place the notion of community 
occupies for Grenz.122 This forms a problematic with two interrelated questions. The first 
comes by way of Kevin Vanhoozer, who wonders if Grenz’s engagement with the 
postmodern context indebts him too deeply to communitarian thought. Vanhoozer asks, 
“what if communitarianism falls out of cultural favor?”123 The second question regards the 
nature of postmodernism itself. Despite the oft-noted orientation of postmoderns to 
community, recent missional literature makes consistent reference to the pernicious 
effects of individualism within post-Christendom.124 Does this mean that the 
communitarian intervention at the heart of the postmodern project has failed? And if so, 
what would this mean for Grenz’s theology and ecclesiology? 
James K. A. Smith suggests that much of what is called “postmodern” may be 
better termed as “hyper-modern,” in which case, it can also be adequately said to be “most-
modern.”125 Myron Bradley Penner offers a similar description. He surveys three options for 
discerning the character of the postmodern turn: the postmodern is beyond the modern, 
the postmodern as hypermodern in that it represents modernity come of age and bringing 
its logical conclusions to fruition and fulfillment, and the postmodern as before 
modernism (this last point draws on Lyotard’s focus on logical priority rather than linear 
history).126 Penner’s description offers a way to conceptualize the multivalent nature of 
what the postmodern phenomenon displays. Also helpful is an additional heuristic 
                                                             
122 For example, see Grenz, “Christian Spirituality and the Quest for Identity,” 87–105. 
123 Vanhoozer, “Three (or More) Ways of Triangulating Theology,” 47. 
124 See Eddie Gibbs, The Rebirth of the Church, 11, 18, 23, 151, 203–6; Stefan Paas, “Mission among 
Individual Consumers,” in The Gospel after Christendom: New Voices, New Cultures, New Expressions, ed. Ryan 
K Bolger (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2012), 150–63; and Steve Hollingsworth, “Mission in a New 
Spirituality Culture,” in The Gospel after Christendom, 164–75. 
125 James K. A. Smith, “Series Editor’s Foreword,” in Daniel M. Bell Jr., The Economy of Desire: 
Christianity and Capitalism in a Postmodern World (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2012), 9. Emphasis 
original. On “postmodernism as hypermodernism” see James R. Peters, The Logic of the Heart, 217–85. 
126 Myron B. Penner, “Christianity and the Postmodern Turn: Some Preliminary Considerations,” in 
Christianity and the Postmodern Turn, 18–19. 
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distinction between postmodernism as intellectual movement and postmodernity as 
cultural milieu, suggested by Smith.127 Such a taxonomy is helpful for understanding how 
an ever-expanding diverse collage of competing worldviews (including the postmodern 
proper and the most-modern) can co-exist on the same cultural landscape. 
I suggest that the image of a web is still a particularly apt metaphor for the current 
cultural context, especially given the virtual omnipresence of the “world wide web” and its 
ever increasing role in identity formation.128 This is consistent with Lyotard’s description of 
the self as “existing in a fabric of relations that is now more complex and mobile than ever 
before.”129 The question of the self generated in modernity still persists, even if in a 
different form that is deconstructed, fluid, and without modern pretense. This means that 
even after the postmodern turn to relationality, the focus on the self can still be of such an 
intense nature that it would be possible to speak of a postmodern, or rather most-modern, 
“self” obsession, even though the self may exist in a fragmented and fluid condition. 
Nevertheless, in this state, the confluence of the turn to relationality, the internet, and 
social media has not dislodged the entrenched individualism of modernity as many may 
have formerly hoped. Strangely perhaps, while providing a reconfiguring of individualism, 
these developments seem also to have reinforced it further. The result is that the 
contemporary social imaginaries, or those “ensemble of imaginings that enable our 
practices by making sense of them,” have not only intensified what Charles Taylor has 
called “expressive individualism,”130 but as well morphed into what can be called a most-
modern “networked individualism.”131 
 Given this most-modern resurgence and mutation, has the value of Grenz’s 
theological offering explicated within this study been undercut along with his 
                                                             
127 Smith, Who’s Afraid of Postmoderism?, 20. 
128 See Alberto Romele, “Narrative Identity and Social Networking Sites,” Études Ricoeuriennes / 
Ricoeur Studies 4.2 (2013), 108–22. See also John Frederick, “Discerning, Disarming, and Redeeming the 
Digital Powers: Gospel, Community, The Virtual Self, and the HTML of Cruciform Love,” in Ecclesia and 
Ethics, 153–64. 
129 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 15. 
130 Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 165. See 
also Taylor, A Secular Age, 145, 156, 171–6, 200–1, 323. 
131 Heidi A. Campbell and Stephen Garner, Networked Theology: Negotiating Faith in a Digital Culture 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2016), 9, 56, 72–3. 
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ecclesiology? I suggest that it has not, for a couple of reasons. We should first keep in mind 
the crucial insight from Jay Smith that Grenz’s theology of triune participation itself is a 
revisioning of the convertive piety and “warm heartedness” of his Baptist context.132 The 
concern for the heart (and thus the affective dimension to theology, faith, and witness) 
remained important for Grenz throughout his career.133 Within the “age of authenticity”134 
marked by the alienation and anxiety of expressive individualism, Grenz still points most-
modern postmoderns toward (triune) participation in the truth that truly frees.135 If 
anything, the refigured heightening of most-modern individualism, visible within the 
hyper-modern making of human life and identity by means of “an intensification of the 
relation to oneself by which one constitute[s] oneself as the subject of one’s acts,”136 
suggests that Grenz’s communitarian and trinitarian project and ecclesial antidote is now 
even more urgent than before.  
Equally important though is Grenz’s consistent and thoroughgoing trinitarian 
theo-ontological orientation. Even as Grenz always aimed “toward the heart of the matter” 
in his engagement with culture, we have seen that Grenz carefully and critically avoided 
any sort of cultural foundationalism in proposing a distinctly trinitarian ecclesiology. The 
communitarian cultural mood provided a strategic target for Grenz to aim at, but it did 
not dictate to him. The thoroughly trinitarian theo-anthropology detailed in chapter two, 
and the cruciform Christo-anthropology of chapter three, now becomes an ecclesially 
shaped missio-anthropology in the formation of a peculiar people with a peculiar 
                                                             
132 Smith, “A Generous Theology,” 38.  
133 On the affective dimension and importance of the heart in spiritual formation, see James K. A. 
Smith, Desiring the Kingdom: Worship, Worldview, and Cultural Formation, Cultural Liturgies: Volume 1 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2009) and James K. A. Smith, Imagining the Kingdom: How Worship 
Works, Cultural Liturgies: Volume 2 (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2013).  
134 This is Charles Taylor’s description in A Secular Age, 473–504, an age marked by “expressive 
individualism” and alienation. The “age of authenticity” is also very much an “age of anxiety.” See also 
Wolfhart Pannenberg’s discussion of anomie and meaninglessness in “Meaning, Religion, and the Question 
of God,” in The Historicity of Nature: Essays on Science and Theology, ed. Niels Henrik Gregersen (West 
Conshohocken, PA: Templeton Foundation Press, 2008), 147–62. “The concern with emptiness and loss of 
meaning, together with a questioning about and searching after meaning, has become a predominate theme 
in our time.” (147) Written in 1988, the resonance of Pannenberg’s statement seems intensified in 2017.  
135 Stanley J. Grenz, “Participating in What Frees: The Concept of Truth in the Postmodern Context,” 
Review and Expositor 100 (Fall 2003), 687–93.  
136 Michel Foucault, The Care of the Self: The History of Sexuality, Volume 3, trans. Robert Hurley 
(London: Penguin, 1990), 37–68 (41). See also Webster, “The Human Person,” 231. 
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missional existence “in Christ.”137 This occurs as the Holy Spirit acts as the constituting 
divine love calling and summoning us to our ecclesial and eschatological home.138 The 
bodily expression of this missio-anthropology is manifest in Christ-centered and Spirit-
oriented ecclesial relation and faithful presence, as the church is called as hermeneutical 
mission within its vocational coming-to-represent God to others and others to God.139  
 
The Ecclesial Imago, Gender, and Triune Participation 
 We now arrive at the third (and final) of three dedicated sections seeking to 
explore the interrelations of Grenz’s imago Dei theology, the mutual relation of female and 
male, and triune participation oriented towards a hermeneutical vision of the church. The 
focus of this section is to offer a suggestion as to how the ecclesial relation of “male and 
female” as the vocational coming-to-representation of the imago Dei can be extended in a 
dual manner. As with the first two sections on gender, this one proceeds in three parts. 
The first part draws some of the main threads already discussed together and offers a 
summary of Grenz’s understanding of gender and its relation to the ecclesial imago and 
cruciform mutuality. The second proposes a further extension of ecclesial cruciform 
                                                             
137 See N. T. Wright’s observation that within ancient Rome, “there were no other groups [other 
than the early church] living as though they were the new version of the human race.” (Paul: In Fresh 
Perspective (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2009), 168) For Wright this comprises a distinctly ecclesial 
storied improvisation. (170–1) See Wright, The New Testament and the People of God, 121–44 for his 
improvisational hermeneutics of the five-act play, where the church takes its place in the fifth act. See 
Grenz’s appeal to Wright’s five-act hermeneutic in BF, 128. See also Brian J. Walsh and Sylvia Keesmaat, 
Colossians Remixed: Subverting the Empire (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2004), 132–6 and Middleton 
and Walsh, Truth is Stranger Than It Used to Be, 172–95 for extensions of Wright’s five-act schema into a six-
act model. On hermeneutical and dramatic improvisation, see also Bruce Ellis Benson, “The Improvisation of 
Hermeneutics: Jazz Lessons for Interpreters,” in Hermeneutics at the Crossroads, eds. Kevin J. Vanhoozer, 
James K. A. Smith, and Bruce Ellis Benson (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006), 193–210; 
Wesley Vander Lugt, Living Theodrama: Reimagining Theological Ethics (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 
2014); Samuel Wells, Improvisation: The Drama of Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2004); 
and David S. Cunningham, “Revelation, Community, and Culture: A Dramatic Inquiry,” in Revisioning, 
Renewing, Rediscovering the Triune God, 382–403. 
138 On the Holy Spirit as divine love calling us home, see Stanley J. Grenz, “The Holy Spirit: Divine 
Love Guiding Us Home,” Ex Auditu 12 (January 1996), 1–13. For the work of the Spirit in culture, see Stanley J. 
Grenz, “(Pop) Culture: Playground of the Spirit or Diabolical Device?” Cultural Encounters 1.1 (Winter 2004), 
7–25 and Grenz, “Culture and Spirit: The Role of Cultural Context in Theological Reflection,” The Asbury 
Theological Journal 55.2 (Fall 2000): 37–51. 
139 See Sexton, “A Confessing Trinitarian Theology,” 177. See also Patrick Mitchel, “The New 
Perspective and the Christian Life: Solus Spiritus,” in The Apostle Paul and the Christian Life, 71–102. 
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mutuality in the concrete expressions of ecclesial friendship and hospitality.140 Though 
Grenz himself never explicated either of these themes in depth, they are not 
unprecedented for him, and are suggestive for the concrete outworking of a Grenzian 
ecclesiology.141 The third moment closes this section, and the main body of this study, by 
connecting the expressions of ecclesial friendship and hospitality to the hermeneutical 
vision of the church as mission.   
 
The Ecclesial Imago and Female/Male Mutuality in Grenz 
 The ground, grammar, and goal of Grenz’s theology is the God who exists as the 
Divine Community. The triune God, while beyond all sexual difference (which Grenz 
notes specifically), is nevertheless the transcendent ground of the relationality endemic to 
human female/male sexuality and community arising from creation in the (trinitarian and 
thus communal) imago Dei.142 Even so, the creational moment is only the beginning. 
Grenz’s social imago looks onward toward the ecclesial and eschatological horizons in 
which the church is constituted as the vocational representation of the imago Dei. Thus, 
the primordial instantiation of the divine image in marriage is penultimate and partial. 
For Grenz, the marriage of “male and female” points onward towards ecclesial expression 
and eschatological fulfillment. But Grenz does not rest with a mere mirroring of the 
Trinity nor with a general theory of community. Grenz presses further to develop a 
theology of theosis in which ecclesial persons come to participate in the filial relation 
Christ shares with the Father (and thus Christ’s inheritance of the triune name) mediated 
by the Spirit of triune love. Triune participation in the divine life thus constitutes the 
ecclesial self and brings into being embodied ecclesial relation. It is this ecclesial 
                                                             
140 I would suggest friendship and hospitality are key ingredients to the Christian existence in the 
world that Miroslav Volf terms “soft difference.” (“Soft Difference: Theological Reflections on the Relation 
between Church and Culture in 1 Peter,” Ex Auditu 10 (1994), 15–30) 
141 See the reference to the “practice of hospitality” in TCG, 654 and Grenz, Women in the Church, 81, 
85, 90 on the key role of women in the practice of New Testament hospitality. Regarding friendship, see SE, 
6, 120, 169, 192, 218, 220, 235, 243; Grenz, “Post-feminism and the New Gender Covenant, 55; and SGRS, 2, 45, 
313, 318, 335. 
142 Grenz, “Is God Sexual?,” 190–212 and SGRS, 269–303. On the imago Dei and community, see also 
Nonna Verna Harrison, God’s Many Splendored Image: Theological Anthropology for Christian Formation 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2010), 169–84. 
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community of “male and female” constituted by triune love which forms the prolepsis of 
the imago Dei and foretaste of the new humanity of the new creation.143 
 From the study on the social imago, and Grenz’s focus on the reciprocal trinitarian 
relations, we gleaned the grammar of trinitarian mutuality.144 Thus, the female/male 
dynamic brought about by ecclesial relation achieved through triune communal 
participation takes on the mutualist character of the triune relations. Against hierarchical 
conceptions of gender relations, this translates for Grenz into what can be called the 
“blessed alliance” of full and complete female and male missional mutuality in church and 
ministry alongside each other and the practice of mutual submission and love in 
marriage.145 Yet the trinitarian social imago is comprised as well as a narrative imago which 
draws its narrative emplotment from Christ as the truly human one, norming narrative 
imago, and true image of God. In addition to its communal aspect then, theotic triune 
participation is also storied in shape and character. It is in this theotic (communal and 
storied) participation that the imago Dei is established as our vocation to be “in Christ” 
through the Spirit within ecclesial relation and ecclesial existence.146 Because the church’s 
very being is in its union with Christ as its true head, ecclesial existence then is essentially 
Christoform and thus cruciform in its narrative identity.147 The social imago and narrative 
imago together give rise to the ecclesial imago of “male and female” in triune participation 
marked by the grammar of mutual cruciformity and cruciform mutuality. 
 We are reminded though that the constitution of the church “in Christ” and 
through the Spirit is a fully embodied reality. It is the Spirit who unites ecclesial persons to 
Christ and it is only by the Spirit that the church comes to participation in the 
                                                             
143 SGRS, 334. 
144 For the connection of theosis and mutuality, see also Wyndy Corbin Reuschling, “Wholeness and 
Holiness: Christian Moral Formation,” in Jeannine K. Brown, Carla M. Dahl, and Wyndy Corbin Reuschling, 
Becoming Whole and Holy: An Integrative Conversation about Christian Formation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Academic, 2011), 133, 135. 
145 See Grenz, “Biblical Priesthood and Women in Ministry,” 272–86 for his defense of women’s 
ordination. See also Grenz, “Post-feminism and the New Gender Covenant,” 46–56 and Grenz, “Theological 
Approaches for Male-Female Relationships,” 83–99. The language of “blessed alliance” comes from Karina 
Kreminski, “Gender, Being Missional, and the Reign of God,” in The Gender Conversation, 375–6. 
146 NGQB, 361–73. 
147 Jones, Marks of His Wounds, 111. 
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eschatological new humanity. Yet what the Spirit brings about is nothing less than a bodily 
reality and bodily participation in the cruciform shape of Christ.148 Cherith Fee Nordling 
draws the explicit connection between Jesus as the new adam, Jesus as the restoration of 
the original adam (and thus the imago Dei as well), and the reconciliation between “male 
and female” in the new creation.149 We are alerted here to a cautionary note that while 
Grenz presses beyond the creational moment, neither does he leave it behind.150 For 
Grenz, there remains an intimate link between creation (and divine creational intent) and 
the eschatological reality of new creation effected proleptically in the ecclesial present. 
There is therefore a communal and storied narrative of the divinely intended human 
vocation of the imago Dei which runs all through creation, Christ, church, and 
consummation.151 This results in the intimate link between the cruciform bodily life of 
Christ and the eschatological, proleptic embodiment of ecclesial female and male persons 
as “predestined, called, justified, and glorified brothers and sisters.”152 
 Elaine Storkey presents four paradigmatic categories which can help sum up the 
account of female/male relation in mutual cruciformity and cruciform mutuality 
developed within this study.153 Her first category is that of difference. This is exemplified in 
the embodied nature of the imago Dei as “male and female” that gives rise to the 
                                                             
148 Timothy Gombis, “Participating in the New-Creation People of God in Christ by the Spirit,” in 
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expression of human community for Grenz. This is a difference that is present throughout 
the story of creation, Christ constituted ecclesial community, and the eschatological 
consummation of the new humanity. While female/male difference is eschatologically 
reoriented within ecclesial relation “in Christ” through resurrection and the Spirit, the 
gendered duality of “male and female” in the ecclesial imago Dei is still yet not dissolved 
into androgyny, but redeemed, reconciled, and finally brought to its triune divine intent.154 
The second category is that of sameness or similarity.155 While marked by fundamental 
difference as “male and female,” they are nevertheless of the same flesh and of the same 
humanity. And beyond the creational horizon, the ecclesially reoriented and 
eschatologically directed “male and female” community are also of the same humanity, 
comprised of the embodied ecclesial humanity brought into being by participation in 
Christ’s own redeeming and reconciling humanity through the power of the Spirit.156 
The third category is that of complementarity. In Grenz’s evangelical context this is 
potentially a surprising (and perhaps inflammatory) claim if complementarity is taken to 
mean an essential male/female hierarchy of (male) authority and (female) submission.157 
Yet Storkey’s complementarity is premised on the “reciprocation and completion of 
female by male, and male by female” and founded on the claim that “in Christ woman is 
                                                             
154 See “The Social Imago, Gender, and Triune Participation” in chapter two. See also Cherith Fee 
Nordling, “Gender,” in The Oxford Handbook of Evangelical Theology, 506–9 and Kreminski, “Gender, Being 
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not independent of man, nor is man independent of woman.”158 This is therefore a 
complementarity without hierarchy which points us toward the kind of Grenzian 
mutuality between women and men discussed in this study, a complementarity realized 
through mutual submission and love.159 The final category is that of union. Here Storkey 
echoes Grenz’s emphasis on imago Dei relationality, stating: “Women and men are 
together the image of God.”160 This points us toward the communal (and storied) reality 
embedded within the overarching narrative of the imago Dei through creation, Christ, and 
new creation, pictured (or imaged) in the “one flesh-ness” of Christian marriage and 
ultimately the ecclesial and eschatological relational oneness and (comm)union of “male 
and female” constituted “in Christ” and through the Spirit (as the reality toward which 
female/male marriage ultimately points for Grenz).161 Storkey’s four categories of 
female/male relation find substantial resonance with Grenz’s own theology of gender 
relations and the ecclesial relation of “male and female” marked by mutuality and 
cruciformity developed in this study. It is this ecclesial relation, established by means of 
theotic (storied and communal) triune participation, that is brought into existence as a 
storied community, sign of the kingdom, and sacrament of triune love.162 It is this 
embodied, ecclesial, and eschatological community of “male and female” that is mission in 
the faithful presence of its hermeneutical existence marked by mutual cruciformity and 
cruciform mutuality as the triune God’s way of being known in the world. 
 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Christine Pohl on Ecclesial Friendship and Hospitality 
 In John 15:15, Jesus tells his disciples: “I do not call you servants any longer, because 
the servant does not know what the master is doing; but I have called you friends, because 
                                                             
158 Storkey, Origins of Difference, 130 and Storkey, “Evangelical Theology and Gender,” 170. 
159 See the critique of subordinationism and development of mutuality in “The Social Imago, 
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I have made known to you everything I have heard from my Father.”163 (NRSV) We notice 
here a dual movement in which from out of the relational overflow of the Father to the 
Son, the Father makes himself known to the Son, and the Son makes known everything 
from the Father to his disciples. Out of this movement, Jesus declares that his disciples are 
now his friends. It is just from such a dynamic that Grenz develops his theology of theosis 
wherein believers participate in the triune divine life by being drawn into the sharing of 
the filial relationship of the Son to the Father by the Spirit. But this theotic (storied and 
communal) participation has a particular effect. It is by triune participation that ecclesial 
relation is established “in Christ” and through the Spirit and thus the church is constituted. 
The other aspect of this dynamic is that the church is then sent out as Christ’s body to 
gather others into the triune mission. Jesus calls those found in him friends so that they 
may go out and bring others in as friends of Christ in the Spirit. The idea of “making 
known” what is from the Father here suggests a hermeneutical practice bound up in 
ecclesial existence which I propose can be called ecclesial friendship. This is not 
friendship (or community) in general terms, but rather that specific concrete form of 
friendship established “in Christ” through the Spirit (that is, through ecclesial relation) as 
Jesus calls those found in him his friends.164 
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 Dietrich Bonhoeffer offers rich and suggestive resources by which the idea of 
ecclesial friendship can be focused further. Bonhoeffer forms a good conversation partner 
in part because Grenz himself references Bonhoeffer in relation to the creation of the 
duality of “male and female.”165 For Bonhoeffer, that female and male were created as a 
duality suggests that their very creatureliness subsists as they are bound to the other and 
only in relation to the other can true freedom be found. Bonhoeffer states:  
Anyone who scrutinizes human beings in order to find freedom finds nothing of it. 
Why? Because freedom is not a quality that can be uncovered; it is not a 
possession, something to hand, an object; nor is it a form of something to hand; 
instead it is a relation and nothing else. To be more precise, freedom is a relation 
between two persons. Being free means “being-free-for-the-other,” because I am 
bound to the other. Only in being in relation with the other am I free.166 
Following this description of the essential relation to the other, Bonhoeffer then gives a 
three-part rendering of the shape of this relation and the manner in which “male and 
female” are responsible to the other. Bonhoeffer declares that the creatureliness of “male 
and female” can only be defined as the existence of human beings “over-against-one-
another, with-one-another, and in-dependence-upon-one-another.”167 
 In this dynamic, “male and female” not only retain their respective difference but 
find that difference relationally constituted within essential dependence on the other. 
Similarly to Grenz, Bonhoeffer holds the creational moment of “male and female” in the 
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divine image as pointing beyond itself to the reality of ecclesial existence, or what he 
famously referred to as “Christ existing as church-community.”168 For this reason, as the 
church is constituted as that concrete community which exists in the modes of “being-
with” and “being-for”169 as the faithful presence of the new humanity in Christ, we can see 
the dynamic of ecclesial friendship taking shape within Bonhoeffer’s insistence of the 
responsibility toward and dependence on the ecclesial female and male other within their 
mutual relation. But Bonhoeffer will allow no amount of idealism to fester at this point.170 
Instructively, in Sanctorum Communio Bonhoeffer raises the reality of “Christ existing as 
church-community” specifically within the context of sin and the broken community of 
the peccatorum communio (the community of sinners). The unity of existence in the old 
Adam is only superseded through Christ as the new Adam and the unity of the new 
humanity in Christ.171 
Bonhoeffer here provides us with both an alert and a vital reminder. He alerts us to 
the persistent reality that not only does the church exist as mission in a broken world 
marred by sin, but that the church itself still shares in some measure in this brokenness, 
and will so share until the final eschatological consummation of the new humanity of the 
new creation.172 However, Bonhoeffer’s hopeful reminder is that Christ is faithful and will 
                                                             
168 See Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio: A Theological Study of the Sociology of the 
Church, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, Volume 1, trans. Reinhard Kraus and Nancy Lukens, ed. Clifford J. Green 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1998), 121 and Bonhoeffer, Act and Being: Transcendental Philosophy and 
Ontology in Systematic Theology, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, Volume 2, trans. H. Martin Rumscheidt, ed. 
Wayne Whitson Floyd Jr. (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1996), 110–16. 
169 See Jens Zimmermann, “Being Human, Becoming Human: Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Christological 
Humanism,” in Being Human, Becoming Human, 25–48, especially 34, and Zimmermann, Incarnational 
Humanism: A Philosophy of Culture for the Church in the World (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2012), 
269–83, especially 275 where he discusses Bonhoeffer’s “being-there-for-others.” 
170 See Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Life Together and Prayerbook of the Bible, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, 
Volume 5, trans. Daniel W. Bloesch and James H. Burtness, ed. Geffrey B. Kelley (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress 
Press, 1996), 36 where he states: “Every human idealized image that is brought into the Christian community 
is a hindrance to genuine community and must be broken up so that genuine community can survive. Those 
who love their dream of a Christian community more than the Christian community itself become destroyers of 
that Christian community even though their personal intentions may be ever so honest, earnest, and 
sacrificial.” Emphasis mine. 
171 Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio, 121. See also Gregor, A Philosophical Anthropology of the Cross, 
60ff on the way Bonhoeffer interprets “being in Adam” as the heart curved in on itself. 
172 On Bonhoeffer’s ability to facilitate the honest recognition of the church as a community of 
brokenness, see Michael Mawson, “The Spirit and the Community: Pneumatology and Ecclesiology in 
Jenson, Hütter, and Bonhoeffer,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 15.4 (October 2013), 453–68. 
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indeed complete his work. Ecclesial existence is not ultimately dependent on what Grenz 
referred to as a mere human shared experience or even narrative.173 While still bearing the 
scars of sin as a broken community in a broken world, ecclesial existence is solely 
constituted and maintained through participation in Christ, and thus Grenz’s notion of 
theotic (storied and communal) triune participation. Christ works even now to heal the 
brokenness, estrangement, and alienation between ecclesial “male and female” others 
precisely by constituting them in mutual cruciform dependence on each other in ecclesial 
friendship.174 Herein Christ exists and makes his presence known within ordinary life in 
the form of his ecclesial body as the prolepsis of the new humanity of the new creation.175 
It is here that ecclesial female and male others call and summon each other “in Christ” 
through the Spirit to ethical and ecclesial responsibility to each other as their concrete 
witness in the world and response to the triune divine summons. And it is this reality of 
ecclesial relation comprised of the concrete form and reciprocity of ecclesial friendship 
which is itself the mission by which the triune God is made known through ecclesial 
existence in a broken world.176 
This manner of intertwining the realities of ecclesial relation and ecclesial 
friendship brought about “in Christ” and through the Spirit gesture us forward still to the 
concrete expression of ecclesial hospitality. Reflecting on the implications of the ethical 
responsibility to the other in Bonhoeffer, John McDowell finds the potential for Christian 
“counter-praxis” in the world within the “responsible life given in theologically ordered 
identity-determinative practices of embodied hospitality to the stranger in the Abrahamic 
traditions that ‘refutes the fictitious notion that the isolated individual is the agent of all 
                                                             
173 Grenz, “Ecclesiology,” 268. 
174 For the suggestion that Bonhoeffer’s Christology is agile enough to sustain the ethical posture of 
“being for others” even within the brokenness of a community of sinners (though in Christ), see David S. 
Robinson, “Peccatorum Communio: Intercession in Bonhoeffer’s Use of Hegel,” Studies in Christian Ethics 28.1 
(2015), 86–100. See also the comparison of the sanctorum communio and peccatorum communio in Kirsten 
Busch Nielsen, “Community Turned Inside Out: Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Concept of the Church and of 
Humanity Reconsidered,” in Being Human, Becoming Human, 91–101. 
175 See M. J. Knight, “Christ Existing in Ordinary,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 16.4 
(October 2014), 414–35. 
176 See Gregor, A Philosophical Anthropology of the Cross, 78–9 for Bonhoeffer’s idea that God’s self-
disclosure requires the church. 
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ethical behavior.’”177 The importance of hospitality as an expression of ecclesial existence is 
also emphasized by Luke Bretherton. The targets for Bretherton’s critique are thin notions 
of tolerance which he regards as insufficient for the Christian fulfillment of the ethical 
responsibility toward the other. Likewise, I would suggest that visions of mere tolerance 
fail to offer needed resources to foster ecclesial female and male persons in their mutual 
summons to faithful presence to each other and together within the world. Bretherton 
notes one reason for this is that contemporary (or what I suggest might be called most-
modern) notions of tolerance fixate on individual autonomy such that it neuters its own 
ability to produce concrete social practices by which it may be identified. This is not the 
case, however, for a thickly conceived account of Christian hospitality.178 
 Christine Pohl is a foremost scholar on the presence, practice, and impact of 
hospitality throughout the Christian tradition.179 She details how hospitality functioned as 
something of a moral structure for ancient Christians. 180 It was by this moral structure of 
hospitality that they understood their place in the world and their duty in offering respite 
to the stranger and the power of hospitality to uphold the dignity and worth of persons 
created in the imago Dei. However, Pohl laments:  
Offering welcome is basic to Christian identity and practice. For most of the 
church’s history, faithful believers located their acts of hospitality in a vibrant 
tradition in which needy strangers, Jesus, and angels were welcomed and through 
which people were transformed. But for many people today, understandings of 
                                                             
177 John C. McDowell, “‘Hospitality’ at the End of Religion,” The Bonhoeffer Legacy: Australian 
Journal of Bonhoeffer Studies 1.1 (2013), 96. The quote within the quote comes from Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 
Ethics, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, Volume 6, trans, Reinhard Kraus et al., ed. Clifford J. Green (Minneapolis, 
MN: Fortress Press, 2005), 258 and reflects a more recent translation versus the older translation McDowell 
included. See also Ford, “Holy Spirit and Christian Spirituality,” 279–80 and Ford, Self and Salvation, 30, 44, 
127–8, 183, 235, 241–65 on the “hospitable self” and Bonhoeffer. 
178 See Luke Bretherton, “Tolerance, Education, and Hospitality: A Theological Proposal,” Studies in 
Christian Ethics 17.1 (April 2004), 80–103 and Bretherton, Hospitality as Holiness: Christian Witness Amid 
Moral Diversity (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), 121–59. 
179 See her major study Christine D. Pohl, Making Room: Recovering Hospitality as a Christian 
Tradition (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999). See also Christine D. Pohl, “Hospitality: Ancient Resources 
and Contemporary Challenges,” in Ancient Faith for the Church’s Future, eds. Mark Husbands and Jeffrey P. 
Greenman (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2008), 143–55. See as well Amy Oden, “God’s Household of 
Grace: Hospitality in Early Christianity,” in Ancient & Postmodern Christianity, 38–48. 
180 See Pohl, Making Room, especially “Part I: Remembering Our Heritage” (3–58) and “Part II: 
Reconsidering the Tradition” (61–124). See also Christine D. Pohl, “Hospitality from the Edge: The 
Significance of Marginality in the Practice of Welcome,” The Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics 15 (1995), 
121–36. 
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hospitality have been reduced to Martha Stewart’s latest ideas for entertaining 
family and friends and to the services of the hotel and restaurant industry. As a 
result, even Christians miss the significance of hospitality and view it as a mildly 
pleasant activity if sufficient time is available.181 
The scholarly work of Pohl is an effort to help Christians and churches reimagine 
themselves with the practice of hospitality at the center. In her recent book, Living into 
Community, she narrows in on four practices which are vital for ecclesial community (and 
the expression of what I have called ecclesial friendship above).182 They are the practices of 
gratitude, making and keeping promises, living in truthfulness (and thus confession), and 
hospitality. The last of these practices, hospitality, she regards as not only a distinct way of 
life in the church and Christian home, but as the practice that draws in the other practices 
and holds them together.183 
 A central ecclesial practice that forms the church as a community of hospitality, 
for Pohl, is the Eucharist. All ecclesial communities that gather around the Lord’s table are 
reminded that they participate in the eschatological welcome of the triune God and the 
manifestation of the kingdom of God “in Christ” and through the Spirit, and are thus called 
to “remember the poor, the stranger, [and] the needy.”184 Within this dynamic, the reality 
of ecclesial friendship constituted “in Christ” as the triune divine love of the Spirit guides 
us to our eschatological home, is at the same time constituted as an ecclesial hospitality in 
both its inward and outward dimensions.185 The eschatological Spirit that effects these “in 
Christ” realities proleptically in the present is at once “the welcoming Spirit,” drawing 
persons into ecclesial existence, as well as “the Spirit of hospitality,” sending the church 
                                                             
181 Christine D. Pohl, “Hospitality, a Practice and a Way of Life,” Vision: A Journal for Church and 
Theology 3.1 (Spring 2002), 34. 
182 Christine D. Pohl, Living into Community: Cultivating Practices that Sustain Us (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2012). 
183 Pohl, Living into Community, 159–176 and Pohl, “Hospitality, a Practice and a Way of Life,” 37–9. 
On hospitality as a community practice, see also Pohl, Making Room, “Part III: Recovering the Practice” (127–
87) and Christine D. Pohl, “A Community’s Practice of Hospitality: The Interdependence of Practices and of 
Communities,” in Practicing Theology: Beliefs and Practices in Christian Life, eds. Miroslav Volf and Dorothy 
C. Bass (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 121–36.  
184 Pohl, “A Community’s Practice of Hospitality,” 136. See also Pohl, Making Room, 30, 74–5, 158, 183. 
See also Grenz on word and sacrament and ecclesial narrative identity in “Ecclesiology,” 261–4. See also 
Zimmermann, Incarnational Humanism, 299–304 regarding Bonhoeffer’s notion of “Christ existing as 
church-community” within word and sacrament. 
185 Grenz, “The Holy Spirit,” 6–13. 
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out as a participant in the missio Dei in its hospitable (and hermeneutical) existence.186 It is 
this church which, in the concrete expression of the ecclesial friendship of “male and 
female” and practice of hospitality, manifests the defining grammar of cruciform 
mutuality and mutual cruciformity in its theotic (storied and communal) participation in 
the triune God.187 
 
Female/Male Mutuality and Missional (Ecclesial) Participation 
 As we have seen throughout, Grenz is insistent that the task of imaging the triune 
God is an inherently communal task. Neither ecclesial female nor male persons can image 
God alone. Thus, commenting on the relation of women and men in the church, he states:  
[The new gender] covenant looks for its goal in our common task as purposed by 
God. In pursuit of godly relationships, women and men should direct their life 
together toward the common calling to reflect the divine character and thereby 
the image of God. Rather than being the imago Dei in isolation from each other, 
however, it is in our relationality that we image God. God’s character comes into 
view as through the Holy Spirit we love one another, whether as partners who 
share the exclusive love relationship of marriage or as participants in the more 
inclusive nonmarital bonds that bring persons – both male and female – together, 
especially within the context of Christ’s [ecclesial] fellowship.188 
Grenz goes on to connect the dynamic of mutual and non-hierachical female and male 
ecclesial relation to the expression of friendship.189 As with the whole of Grenz’s theology 
of “male and female,” this is grounded within the trinitarian dynamic of union with Christ 
and the work of the Spirit. It is for this reason, in addition to the emphasis in the quote 
above on reflecting the divine character of the triune God, this expression of the ultimate 
                                                             
186 On the Holy Spirit as “the welcoming Spirit” with emphasis on the missio Dei, see Amos Yong, 
Hospitality and the Other: Pentecost, Christian Practices, and the Neighbor (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2008), 129–
60. On the Holy Spirit as “the Spirit of hospitality,” see Amos Yong, The Missiological Spirit: Christian Mission 
in the Third Millennium Global Context (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2014), 77–95. On hospitality as an 
eschatological reality, see Douglas H. Knight, The Eschatological Economy: Time and the Hospitality of God 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006) and Hans Boersma, “Irenaeus, Derrida, and Hospitality: On the 
Eschatological Overcoming of Violence,” Modern Theology 19.2 (April 2003), 163–80. See also Hans Boersma, 
“Redemptive Hospitality in Irenaeus: A Model for Ecumenicity in a Violent World,” Pro Ecclesia 11.2 (Spring 
2002), 207–26. 
187 For a trinitarian interpretation of hospitality, see Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, “Divine Hospitality and 
Communion: A Trinitarian Theology of Equality, Justice, and Human Flourishing,” in Revisioning, Renewing, 
Rediscovering the Triune Center, 135–53. 
188 Grenz, “Post-feminism and the New Gender Covenant,” 54–5. 
189 Grenz, “Post-feminism and the New Gender Covenant,” 54–6. 
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outworking of Grenz’s ethical vision of ecclesial relation in ecclesial friendship flows from 
nothing less than theotic (storied and communal) participation in the triune God. Herein 
the ecclesial community of “male and female” is found to be in mutual and cruciform 
dependence on each other and established “in Christ” and through the Spirit as the 
ecclesial imago.190 The resulting ecclesial friendship thereby comes to be marked by not 
only mutuality and cruciformity, but a mutual cruciformity and a cruciform mutuality. 
 Our account of ecclesial friendship was deepened by means of a detour through 
Bonhoeffer and the manner in which he places female and male within an ethical relation 
of “being-with” and “being-for” the other that prefigures and points forward to the ecclesial 
relation of “Christ existing as church-community.” Stanley Hauerwas offers the 
observation that for Bonhoeffer, even within his world of terror, the church not only exists 
but makes the reality of friendship possible.191 In the relation brought about “in Christ” and 
through the Spirit, ecclesial friendship comprises the concrete expression of ecclesial 
relation. This move, however, points us further still to the ecclesial practice of hospitality. 
Our detour into the work of Christine Pohl reminds us here of the centrality of hospitality 
as that practice which draws in the other ecclesial practices of community life and holds 
them together, while Grenz’s emphasis on theotic (storied and communal) triune 
participation reminds us that ecclesial hospitality is ultimately grounded in the triune 
Divine Community. In a reflection on Grenz’s trinitarian theology, Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen 
exclaims: “Name it Gift or Love or – as often done nowadays – Hospitality, it all speaks of 
the infinite fountain of goodness. God the Giver is also the divine Gift.”192 
Thus the ecclesial existence formed by theotic participation in triune hospitality, 
which is again “in Christ” and through the Spirit, is constituted as a community of not only 
friendship, mutuality, and cruciformity, but hospitality as well.193 It is therefore within the 
                                                             
190 SGRS, 335 and Grenz, “Theological Approaches for Male-Female Relationship, 98–9. 
191 Stanley Hauerwas, “Friendship and Freedom: Reflections on Bonhoeffer’s ‘The Friend’,” in 
Working with Words, 270–85. 
192 Kärkkäainen, “Divine Hospitality and Communion,” 150. 
193 Connected to the theme of hospital-ity, see the metaphor of the church as not simply a hospital 
in general terms, but as more specifically a “field hospital” on the move in William T. Cavanaugh, Field 
Hospital: The Church’s Engagement with a Wounded World (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2016), 3. See also 
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expressions of ecclesial friendship and hospitality that “male and female” as the vocational 
instantiation of the ecclesial imago according to the divine intent come to exhibit the 
faithful presence of ecclesial relation wrought by theotic (storied and communal) triune 
participation, both towards each other and outward together toward the world in ecclesial 
witness and ecclesial missional participation. It is in this sense that the church is mission 
and comes to comprise the faithful hermeneutical witness to the gospel. It is this storied 
ecclesial community within its common life together (which finds its eccentric narrative 
identity in the cruciform Jesus story) that is the proleptic sign of the kingdom and God’s 
way of being in the world as a sacrament of triune love and communion.194 Such an 
ecclesial existence, marked by female/male cruciform mutuality and mutual cruciformity, 
and constituted by theotic (storied and communal) triune participation “in Christ” and 
through the Spirit, itself comprises the divinely summoned ecclesial coming-to-
representation and hermeneutics of community of the triune God. 
                                                             
Reuschling, “Wholeness and Holiness: Christian Moral Formation,” 133, 135 for the connection of theosis, 
mutuality, and “hospitable generosity.” 
194 SGRS, 328–36 and TCG, 472–8. Grenz states, “In short, the indwelling Spirit leads and empowers 
the church to fulfill its divinely mandated calling to be a sacrament of trinitarian communion, a temporal, 
visible sign of the eternal, dynamic life of the triune God.” (SGRS, 336) 
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CONCLUSION: SUMMARY AND SURPLUS 
 
Summary 
 I conclude by briefly noting some of the main features of this study. No attempt is 
made to construct an exhaustive overview or summary. Rather my aim in this conclusion 
is to emphasize select important threads toward the end of articulating the theological 
import and constructive contribution of this dissertation to Grenz studies and the field of 
ecclesiology. The proposals I have made in this study have been helped along by two prior 
Grenz studies from Jason Sexton and Jay Smith.1 Nevertheless, in my study I have 
developed my own constructive lines of argument regarding Grenz beyond their 
respective projects. For instance, I have disagreed with Sexton’s conclusions regarding 
Grenz in one vital respect. As discussed and defended, while Sexton regards Grenz as 
having moved “beyond” a social trinitarian approach in his Rediscovering the Triune God 
and Named God volumes, I regard this as mistaken. In my own discussion, I contend Grenz 
did not move beyond the social Trinity, but rather presents us with a revisioned and 
strengthened social trinitarianism. 
In regards to Smith, his central thesis that Grenz never left behind the convertive 
piety of his Baptist heritage, but reinterpreted it as trinitarian participation is a crucial 
moment for what might be called “Grenz studies.” With Smith as a catalyst, I have 
developed my own proposal and constructive argument in terms of theotic triune 
participation, effected “in Christ” and through the Spirit, and the manner in which this 
dynamic constitutes ecclesial relation and existence. Thus I have sought to be more 
explicit, beyond that of any previous studies, about Grenz’s development of a theology of 
theosis in his mature theology and how this extends into theotic triune (storied and 
communal) participation as constitutive of the ecclesial self, the ecclesial imago, and 
ecclesial relation. I suggest Grenz’s trinitarian ecclesiological vision is one of his most 
important insights and vital gifts offered to his own Baptist and evangelical contexts. My 
                                                             
1 Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz and Smith, “A Generous Theology: 
Reinterpreting Convertive Piety as Trinitarian Participation in Stanley J. Grenz.” 
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hope is that my work will be sufficient to make its own contribution to Grenz studies as 
the first full length study of Grenz’s trinitarian ecclesiology. 
 The argument of this study has also been moved along by the philosophical 
hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur. A material contribution can be detected in each chapter as 
the central sections (serving as pivot points) each present a distinct Ricoeurian theme: the 
relational self, the narrative self, and the summoned self.2 However, the “detour and 
return”3 rhythm of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics also factors heavily into the structure of the 
dissertation as a whole. Within each chapter are three moments: a main road, a detour, 
and a return moment. In chapter two the main road was a summary of Grenz’s social 
trinitarian theology up through Social God. The detour was a discussion of prominent 
critiques of the social Trinity and the resources Grenz’s theology held as a strong response 
in the form of a theotic trinitarian theo-anthropology and ecclesial relation “in Christ” and 
through the Spirit. The return was the consideration of Grenz’s trinitarian social imago 
and ecclesial self in relation to the ecclesial existence of female and male as marked by the 
grammar of mutuality “in Christ” and through the Spirit. In chapter three the main road 
was a summary of the trinitarian theo-ontology of Grenz’s Named God. The detour 
defended my dissent from the Sexton thesis (that Grenz moved beyond the social Trinity) 
and the manner in which Grenz offers a revisioned and strengthened social trinitarianism, 
before moving on to explicate the manner in which Grenz’s theo-anthropology is at once a 
fully Christo-anthropology. Accordingly, the ecclesial community which derives its 
narrative identity from the “Jesus story”4 is marked by cruciform eccentricity. The return 
moment consisted of the treatment of the narrative imago in relation to the ecclesial 
existence of female and male as marked by the dual grammars of cruciformity and 
mutuality – or cruciform mutuality and mutual cruciformity.  
The main road for chapter four begins with a summary of Grenz’s 2003 
“Ecclesiology” essay, which recapitulates his communitarian, narrative, and trinitarian 
                                                             
2 I have drawn these themes from Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, Ricoeur, “Naming God,” and Ricoeur, 
“The Summoned Subject in the School of the Narratives of the Prophetic Vocation.” 
3 See the subtitle to Blundell, Paul Ricoeur between Theology and Philosophy. 
4 SGRS, 315, 329–30, 332. 
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emphases and takes an initial step into extending his insights into a missional 
ecclesiology. The remainder of this main road is comprised of my own attempt to follow 
through on Grenz’s instincts by suggesting my own constructive proposal of the church as 
mission insofar as the church is not only drawn into the divine triune life but also sent out 
into the world to gather others into the triune mission. To articulate my constructive 
extension of Grenz’s ecclesiological insights, I proposed as well my own missional 
grammar for a hermeneutical ecclesiology. We will remember that two triads, what I have 
referred to as “Grenzian grammars,” are at the heart of Grenz’s theological method.5 There 
is the grammar of the trinitarian motifs wherein the Trinity forms the structural motif, 
community the integrative motif, and eschatology the orienting motif. And there is the 
grammar of the narrative sources in which Scripture comprises the “norming norm” and 
norming narrative, tradition the hermeneutical trajectory, and culture the embedding 
context. Extending Grenz’s intuitions, I proposed my own missional grammar of church, 
gospel/atonement, and kingdom. The resulting hermeneutical ecclesiology in my proposal 
suggests that insofar as the church is mission, the ecclesial relation brought about “in 
Christ” and through the Spirt, and which comprises the church as a cruciform storied 
community, sacrament of triune love, and proleptic sign of the kingdom, constitutes 
ecclesial existence as the triune God’s hermeneutic and manner of being in the world.6  
At this point we pause briefly to observe that not only do the individual chapters 
evince Ricoeur’s “detour and return” rhythm, but the dissertation’s overarching structure 
of Trinity, narrative, and mission does as well. In the ecclesial explication of this study, 
chapter two forms the trinitarian main road, chapter three comprises the Christological 
and narrative detour, and chapter four constitutes the missional return moment. 
Returning our attention to chapter four itself, the detour moment defended Grenz from 
potential charges of ecclesiological foundationalism and extended the aforementioned 
theo-anthropology and Christo-anthropology into a missio-anthropology in which the 
church is mission. The return moment presented a discussion of the ecclesial imago in 
                                                             
5 These are detailed by Grenz in BF. 
6 The triad of storied community, sacrament, and sign is taken from SGRS, 328–36. 
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relation to the cruciform mutuality and mutual cruciformity of “male and female” as 
constituted “in Christ” and through the Spirit. Herein the ecclesial relation and existence 
of female and male is manifest in the concrete expressions of ecclesial friendship and 
hospitality, which are ours in proleptic anticipation by means of theotic triune (storied 
and communal) participation, as the eccentric hermeneutics of (ecclesial) community. 
While I have sought to extend beyond Grenz in this study, I also hope to have 
demonstrated the theological task done in a Grenzian style. I regard the extension of 
Grenz’s trinitarian ecclesiology into my own proposal for a hermeneutical ecclesiology 
arising from a missional grammar to be a substantial constructive offering on its own. 
However, as the presence of the third sections in chapters two, three, and four as return 
moments testify, I also desired to be more specific about the full cruciform mutuality and 
mutual cruciformity of “male and female” in ecclesial relation, friendship, and hospitality. 
In fact, I found that a study of Grenz’s ecclesiological vision necessitated it. The subject of 
gender relations was contentious when Grenz was still alive and remains just as heated 
today.7 At the end of this study I am more firmly committed than ever to the sort of 
Grenzian trinitarian vision for female and male ecclesial relation that I have outlined. 
However, I should also note that I realize there are many who will remain uncomfortable 
with any proposal for a “trinitarian” theology of gender relations, whether those relations 
be constructed in hierarchical or non-hierarchical fashion.8 Though I explicitly disavow 
that a trinitarian theology of gender relations is essentially hierarchical, I realize those 
who wish to forgo any talk of Trinity in relation to female/male relation, stemming from 
their suspicion of any sort of social trinitarian proposal, will potentially be disappointed I 
continue to apparently do what they contend should not be done.  
I hope, however, that my examination of Grenz’s trinitarian theology in 
conversation with the critics of social trinitarianism will have demonstrated that Grenz’s 
revisioned and strengthened social trinitarianism provides a positive response to such 
                                                             
7 For a recent account of the evangelical gender debate, see Zimbrick-Rogers, “‘A Question Mark 
Over My Head’: Experiences of Women ETS Members at the 2014 ETS Annual Meeting,” 4–13. See also Ware 
and Starke, eds., One God in Three Persons: Unity of Essence, Distinction of Persons, Implications for Life for a 
recent collection of essays that argue for a male-female hierarchy. 
8 See for example Bird and Shillaker, “Subordination in the Trinity and Gender Roles,” 305–6. 
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suspicions and strong safeguards against projectionism. Grenz maintained an unwavering 
emphasis on divine transcendence and the ontological distinction between Creator and 
created which serves to safeguard the God-world relationship while not rending it asunder 
either. These features, in addition to the extension of his postfoundationalist theological 
method into a trinitarian theo-ontology, all work as bulwarks against projectionist 
accounts of gender in relation to the Trinity. Also important is that Grenz’s overall 
theology resists drawing the kind of straight and quick lines between the rendering of 
gender relations and the Trinity that results in the univocal collapsing of the divine into 
the human economy.9 This is accomplished on the one hand by what Sexton has called the 
Grenz Grundaxiom – that triune relationality and communion retain ontological primacy 
even as the presence of the triune persons in the divine economy in the world is granted 
epistemological priority.10 On the other hand, we see also that Grenz’s perichoretic notion 
of personhood and theology of theosis speaks of the depth of human contingency and 
dependence on triune grace, and indicate that sacramental mediation and participation 
are built into Grenz’s imago Dei theology. Accordingly, in my explication of a Grenzian 
notion of the relation of “male and female,” the grammar of triune communion is itself 
mediated through the theotic triune (storied and communal) participation that effects 
ecclesial relation and existence. 
Furthermore, because Grenz’s trinitarian theology is organically connected to his 
Christology and pneumatology, we have seen ecclesial relation itself is constituted “in 
Christ” and through the Spirit. In fact, this has been a reverberating refrain throughout the 
whole of this study. What this means is that Grenz’s revisioned social trinitarian theology 
is at the same time an “‘in Christ’ and through the Spirit” theology. Thus I contend a 
Grenzian account of gender relations is not simply concerned with a trinitarian account 
that attempts to draw straight lines between the Trinity and “male and female” in order to 
construct a theology of community in general terms. Rather, a Grenzian trinitarian 
approach always flows, by means of theotic triune (storied and communal) participation, 
                                                             
9 See Grenz, “Is God Sexual?,” Grenz, “Theological Approaches for Male-Female Relationships,” and 
SGRS, 269–303. 
10 RTG, 222. 
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through the reality comprised “‘in Christ’ and through the Spirit” – the very trinitarian 
dynamic which constitutes the ecclesial imago of “male and female” in ecclesial relation. 
Rather than building a general theory of community which is then foisted back onto the 
Trinity, Grenz’s notion of female and male mutuality flows entirely in the other direction 
from its grounding in the transcendent triune divine life, and then subsequently as it 
becomes situated and implicated from within his trinitarian ecclesiology as it is 
constituted “in Christ” and through the Spirit through and through. Extending from this, 
my suggestion is that the cruciform mutuality and mutual cruciformity endemic to the 
ecclesial relation and existence of “male and female,” wrought “in Christ” and through the 
Spirit, and manifest in ecclesial friendship and hospitality is itself mission, as the storied 
community of Christ comprises a sacrament of triune love, the proleptic sign of the 
kingdom, and the ecclesial coming-to-representation and hermeneutics of community of 
the triune God. 
 
Surplus 
This investigation and constructive extension of Grenz’s trinitarian ecclesiology 
and theology of the mutuality of “male and female” as the ecclesial imago “in Christ” and 
through the Spirit has been fruitful and productive. However, the indebtedness of this 
study to Ricoeur reminds us that the symbol which gives rise to thought as well gives way 
to a surplus of meaning.11 Such is the case with this study. Though we have come as far as 
we can go in this space, there remains much surplus which needs investigation. Here I 
briefly note just three such areas of surplus which could conceivably extend out of this 
project and emerge in productive fashion from further engagement with Grenzian and 
Ricoeurian themes.12 The first concerns the intersection of Grenz’s postfoundationalist 
epistemology, which decenters modernist notions of certitude, and what has been called 
                                                             
11 The idea that the symbol gives rise to thought comes from Paul Ricoeur, “The Symbol Gives Rise 
to Thought,” in Philosophical Anthropology, 107–23 and Ricoeur, Symbolism of Evil, 347–57. On the surplus of 
meaning, see Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth, TX: 
Texas Christian University Press, 1976). 
12 See chapter four, footnotes 10, 119, and 164 for other instances of surplus for further study. 
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Ricoeur’s “hermeneutics of testimony” and theory of attestation.13 In a similar way to 
which I have proposed the church is mission, I suggest a productive account of the church 
as apologetic could be gleaned from such a study.14 As the ecclesial community “shines as 
the imago Dei,”15 its very ecclesial existence comes to comprise an apologetic of beauty 
even within the brokenness of its common life together. Ecclesial community is itself an 
attestation and testimony to the triune God.  
The second area of surplus I suggest could engage Grenz and Ricoeur along with 
the “Cultural Liturgies” project of James K. A. Smith.16 Because Grenz’s theology of triune 
participation still never leaves convertive piety behind, Grenz carries with him a concern 
about the shape of the heart all throughout his corpus. Ricoeur’s theory of narrative 
identity and hermeneutics of subjectivity comprise a substantial trove of philosophical 
resources through which to examine the formation of the heart. Smith’s project, also 
focused on heart formation, offers a productive account of human desiring and imagining 
oriented towards the kingdom. Because Smith’s project is a study of cultural liturgies and 
their role in spiritual formation, he offers a way to focus further Grenz’s study of culture. In 
turn, Grenz along with Ricoeur offer their own resources to focus the narrative dimensions 
of heart formation and, along with Smith, resources to take culture seriously without being 
overdetermined by it. As well, Grenz offers perhaps a thicker account of the Spirit 
speaking in culture and the distinctly ecclesial shape of the desire and imagination 
oriented towards the kingdom. Such a project has the promise of being mutually 
informing all the way around. 
The third area of surplus I propose, though, goes beyond a formal study in the 
form of a dissertation or book. Theological prognostications are surely marked by their 
own inherent amount of surplus. To the writing of theological tomes, it seems there will be 
                                                             
13 See Stiver, Theology After Ricoeur, 188–228 and Stiver, Ricoeur and Theology, 126–34. 
14 See Dennis P. Hollinger, “The Church as Apologetic: A Sociology of Knowledge Perspective,” in 
Christian Apologetics in the Postmodern World, eds. Timothy R. Philips and Dennis L. Okholm (Downers 
Grove, IL: IVP, 1995), 182–229; Myron B. Penner, The End of Apologetics: Christian Witness in a Postmodern 
Context (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2013); and Grenz, “Does Evidence Still Demand a Verdict? The 
Church’s Apologetic Task and the Postmodern Turn” for additional generative resources. 
15 SGRS, 335. 
16 Smith, Desiring the Kingdom and Smith, Imagining the Kingdom. 
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no end. This is perhaps fitting given the utterly transcendent nature of the triune God who 
has nevertheless come near to us “in Christ” and through the Spirit. Yet for all their 
important service and surplus, theological tomes can never take the place of an embodied 
ecclesial community. To restate the important words of Lesslie Newbigin, “the only 
hermeneutic of the gospel is a congregation of men and women who believe it and live by 
it.”17 It is the church, drawn into theotic participation in the triune life and sent out to 
gather others in, which is mission. It is the ecclesial imago which forms our summons “in 
Christ” and through the Spirit as the cruciform storied community, sacrament of triune 
love, and sign and foretaste of the kingdom. It is the fellowship of Christ’s body, 
constituted “in Christ” and through the Spirit in ecclesial relation by means of theotic 
triune (storied and communal) participation, and manifest in the blessed alliance of 
ecclesial “male and female” cruciform mutuality, mutual cruciformity, friendship, and 
hospitality, that comprises the vocational instantiation of the ecclesial imago in the 
coming-to-representation of God’s manner of being and hermeneutics of community in 
the world.18 
                                                             
17 Newbigin, The Gospel in a Pluralist Society, 227. 
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